speeches · March 4, 1990
Regional President Speech
W. Lee Hoskins · President
A US. PERSPECTIVE ON ZERO INFLATION
W. Lee Hoskins, President
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
C.D. Howe Institute
Toronto, Canada
March 5,1990
A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON ZERO INFLATION
Good afternoon. I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the C.D. Howe
Institute on the merits of a monetary policy that strives for zero inflation; a policy that
has been widely debated in both Canada and the United States over the past several
years.
Policymakers in Canada and the United States have become more aware that a
commitment to price stability is the most important contribution monetary policy can
make to achieve full employment and maximum sustainable growth. Governor Crow
and other Bank of Canada officials have publicly supported the goal of price stability.
In the U.S., Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and the 12 Federal Reserve
Bank presidents have publicly supported House Joint Resolution 409 introduced by
Congressman Stephen Neal of North Carolina. This resolution would make zero
inflation the primary, overriding goal of the Federal Reserve.
Today, I would like to discuss the U.S. perspective on zero inflation. Policymakers
and businessmen are beginning to recognize that inflationary monetary policies are
very costly, and I believe that support for a goal of price stability will continue.
Nevertheless, there are signs of complacency in the United States that concern me.
Inflation has hovered around 4 percent for most of the current expansion in the U.S.
and has exceeded 4 percent for the past 3 years. In August 1971, the President of the
United States and his administration were so disturbed by a rate of inflation just above
4 percent that wage and price controls were imposed. We should not be complacent
about a 4 percent inflation rate. Even a low rate of inflation interferes with economic
efficiency and productivity. Only in an environment of price stability can the economy
achieve maximum, sustainable growth.
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Price Stability: Reduces Uncertainty and Spurs Growth
An important benefit of price stability is that it would stabilize the economy and
spur growth. High and variable inflation has always been one of the prime causes of
financial crises and economic recessions in the United States and Canada. Every
recession in our recent history has been preceded by an outburst of cost and price
pressures and the associated imbalances and distortions. A monetary policy that
strives for price stability, or zero inflation, would help markets avoid distortions and
imbalances, stabilize the business cycle, and promote the highest sustainable growth in
our economy.
Even fully anticipated inflation can have a profound impact on economic growth.
Inflation interacts with the tax structure to stifle incentives to invest. Research at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland indicates that a steady, fully anticipated 4 percent
rate of inflation would reduce the U.S. capital stock and lead to a future loss in
production of about $600 billion. This estimate is much greater than the output loss
typically associated with recessions. Moreover, the $600 billion estimate includes only
the loss associated with the failure to fully index taxes on capital income, ignoring the
costs to decisionmakers of the uncertainty caused by inflation.
Unfortunately, the costs associated with unanticipated and uncertain inflation can
be substantial. Random and unanticipated inflation can disrupt and disturb otherwise
prudent and productive investments. The uncertainty created by inflation surprises
stifles growth by adding risk to decisions and by retarding long-term investments.
Furthermore, inflation causes people to invest scarce resources in activities that have
the sole purpose of hedging against these adverse price fluctuations. A number of
studies have shown that higher inflation or higher uncertainty about inflation is
associated with lower real economic growth.
-3-
Sound Policy, Credibility, and the Neal Resolution
Through sound economic policies, policymakers seek to minimize this disruptive
uncertainty. As long as we live in a world of imperfection, some uncertainty will
always exist. But, economic policy should not create unnecessary confusion. Sound
economic polices must have clear objectives, verifiable outcomes, and rules that are
consistently adhered to in order to minimize uncertainty. Predictable, verifiable
policies ensure that long-term planning and resource allocation decisions will be
efficient.
Monetary policy can and should be guided by these characteristics of sound
policy. Representative Stephen Neal's resolution satisfies the key requirements of
sound policy: it is clear, it is verifiable, and it has consistent rules. The Neal Resolution
would mandate the Federal Reserve to eliminate inflation over a five-year time period,
and maintain price stability thereafter.
If policymakers have learned anything over the past 20 years, it is that policy is a
dynamic process. That is, the effect of monetary policy depends greatly on people's
expectations of future policy. The commitment to price stability supported by a
legislative mandate would increase the credibility of the Federal Reserve. Improving
the credibility of the central bank would strengthen the expectation that prices will be
stable, contributing to price and wage decisions that would make price stability easier
to achieve and maintain.
The Neal Resolution would not only contribute to the Federal Reserve's credibility,
but it would also enhance the Fed's independence from political pressures as it pursues
that goal. A commitment by the United States Congress to price stability would reduce
the political pressure to deviate from that goal. Thus, a distinction can be made
between a central bank that is accountable for long-run performance and a central bank
that can be influenced to pursue short-run goals that might be incompatible with
desirable long-term economic performance.
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A History of Multiple Goals
Why does the Federal Reserve have the need for an explicit declaration of a single
goal for monetary policy? Over the years, legislation in the U.S. has assigned multiple
objectives for economic policy. Stability and growth of the economy, a high level of
employment, stability in the purchasing power in the dollar, and a reasonable balance
in transactions with foreign countries were recognized by Congress as objectives for
governmental economic policy in the Employment Act of 1946. More recently, the
Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977 amended the Federal Reserve Act so that it now
requires the Fed "...to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." However, it is the Federal Reserve's
responsibility to decide how best to pursue those goals.
Up to now, the Federal Reserve has attempted to achieve a balance among its
congressionally mandated objectives. We have strived to balance the economic goals of
full employment, economic growth, and low long-term interest rates with low rates of
inflation. However, as policymakers have discovered over the past several decades,
pursuing multiple policy goals is confusing to markets and disruptive to long-term
economic growth.
A more promising approach is to select one objective, the only one that the Fed can
influence directly — price stability. Under the provisions of the Neal Resolution, the
Fed would seek to maintain a stable price level over time. Price stability is defined in
the resolution as an inflation rate so small that it does not systematically affect
economic decisions. The definition may appear less specific than some would like, but
I believe that by monitoring the decisions of economic agents we can measure the
success in achieving price stability. In practice, the size of the inflation premium in
long-term interest rates, surveys of the public's inflation expectations, and other
market-generated measures of inflation expectations can be very useful. If policy is
credible, both the inflation component and the inflation uncertainty risk premium
would be eliminated from interest rates.
-5-
Enactment of the Neal Resolution would create a situation similar to that of West
Germany's central bank. More than one goal is specified by law for the Bundesbank,
but German law states that the goal of price stability is to be given highest priority
whenever another goal might conflict. This is the major reason that West Germany's
price level doubled between 1950 and 1988, while the U.S. price level quadrupled.
While monetary policy may be capable of influencing the economy in the short
run, these effects are only temporary. Ultimately, excessive money growth results in
higher rates of inflation and higher interest rates. The rate of inflation affects all
dimensions of economic performance, including output, employment, and interest
rates. Over time, maximum production and employment along with low interest rates
can be achieved only with price stability.
U.S, Fiscal Policy and Zero Inflation
As I said earlier, support of a monetary policy that strives for zero inflation is
building in the United States. However, opponents of the Neal Resolution often argue
that particular economic conditions make the pursuit of price stability too costly. For
example, it is argued that high federal budget deficits in the U.S. make a monetary
policy of zero inflation impossible. Federal budget deficits should not compromise
either the central bank's goal of price stability or the adoption of a specific timetable to
achieve it. I do not mean to suggest or imply that current fiscal policy, in either the U.S.
or Canada, is ideal. But, we should recognize that monetary policy cannot offset
whatever harm may result from inappropriate fiscal policies; indeed, it can only add to
those costs.
-6-
In the United States, we are familiar with the argument that large federal budget
deficits cause high interest rates, forcing the Fed to ease monetary policy in order to
keep interest rates at levels consistent with full employment. Even if larger deficits
were to put upward pressure on interest rates, and there is little consensus among
economists that this is the case, it is far from clear that the Federal Reserve can do
anything to alleviate the economic consequences of that problem. Ultimately, it is real
interest rates that affect the consumption and production decisions of individuals and
businesses and the allocation of resources over time. Real rates of return are based on
the productivity of labor, capital, and other real assets in a society, and have very little,
if any, connection with monetary policy.
In an inflationary environment, nominal rates of return include an inflation
premium to compensate lenders for being repaid in money of reduced purchasing
power. The correlation between monetary policy and nominal interest rates that
dominates discussion in the financial press tells us next to nothing about the
relationship between monetary policy and the real interest rates that govern the
allocation of resources over time. Every movement in the central bank discount rate
does not produce equivalent changes in real interest rates, in the productivity of our
capital stock, or in any of the other important real variables that affect economic
activity.
It is unnecessary and undesirable for sound monetary policy choices to await
sound fiscal policy choices. Sound fiscal policy decisions, like sound private economic
decisions, require the stable price environment that a commitment to zero inflation
would provide. The tax-related distortions and economic complexities associated with
even stable, positive rates of inflation argue strongly for price stability.
-7-
Information and the Current Policy Process
Critics argue that the Federal Reserve should release more information about
monetary policy in a more timely fashion. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Federal Reserve
provided less information than it does today. But the information provided in the
1950s and 1960s was adequate because price level stability was the generally expected
norm. Moreover, the intentions of policy were more apparent because monetary
velocity was thought to be highly predictable, making monetary aggregates more
reliable indicators of policy intentions. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the increased
uncertainty about monetary velocity, associated with variable inflation and
deregulation of the financial services industry, left much doubt and uncertainty about
the goals and objectives of monetary policy, giving rise to calls for more information.
Monetary policy information comes in two forms: policy actions and policy
intentions. Policy actions refer to open market operations and discount rate changes.
They might also include reserve requirement changes, but I will restrict my comments
to the most often-used policy tool — open market operations. The Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), the Federal Reserve's monetary policymaking body, describes
these actions as decisions to maintain or change the degree of reserve pressure, a
characterization that at present is generally interpreted in terms of its effect on the level
of the federal funds rate.
Policy intentions, sometimes called the "policy reaction function," refer to potential
future policy actions in response to evolving economic and financial conditions.
Knowledge of policy intentions helps rational agents plan and carry out their market
activities with minimum losses due to surprises.
-8-
Monetary policy intentions are difficult to characterize because the FOMC has
discretion in formulating policy within the scope of its multiple objectives. Even
though each individual FOMC member may have policy intentions, the FOMC as an
official body has not specified either its ultimate objectives or its intended reaction to
new information. And, in the context of multiple goals, it is not always clear in
advance how the Committee will respond to new information about the economy, or
how fast or slow policy should move to correct deviations from those goals.
A rotating committee of 12 people pursuing multiple objectives surely would be
expected to have difficulty trying to reach agreement both on a single, unambiguous
policy intention and on a policy action consistent with that intention. In effect, the
members of the Committee must reach agreement at each meeting on acceptable
current policy, even though there may be differences in ultimate policy goals or the
way members would pursue those goals. Reaching agreement on an immediate,
explicit policy action at each meeting has been the method by which the 12 members
have reconciled their differences in policy goals and methods of implementation until
the next meeting.
Improving the Policy Process
A lack of credibility and predictability in the policy process is the problem. More
specifically, policy lacks an explicit, attainable objective. Under the current policy
process, the relative importance of the various objectives changes with economic
fluctuations. To accurately assess past and future decisions, market participants must
constantly update their best guess about the central bank's long-run objectives. In the
current environment, the market monitors policy actions to detect policymaker's
intentions. But the lack of a clearly defined long-term goal makes market expectations
of the goal vary with the latest economic news. This uncertainty reflects an economic
policy that is neither predictable nor sound.
-9-
Some people believe that more information about current policy actions would
reduce uncertainty and improve market efficiency. There is legislation under
consideration in the United States that would require earlier release of the FOMC's
decisions. But, would earlier release of information regarding the FOMC's actions
reduce uncertainty? I think not. More timely information about open market decisions
cannot substitute for other needed and more important changes in policy procedures.
Economic decisionmakers need more information about the long-run goal of
monetary policy, not more information about yesterday's open market operations.
More information about policy actions may help markets operate more efficiently in the
current environment, but the improvements may not be very large and may carry with
them the cost of diverting attention from the fundamental information problem. To be
fully efficient, markets need to know that the long-term inflation rate will be zero. This
requires a monumental change in the current policy process. The Neal Resolution, with
its clear focus on price stability, would help bring about this change.
Conclusion
The ultimate goal of monetary policy must be to provide a credible and predictable
commitment to price stability -- a requirement for peak performance of our market
economy. Achieving this goal at the least cost requires that policymakers provide
markets with certain basic information that will minimize uncertainty about the
commitment and about the timeframe within which it is to be accomplished.
If central banks and governments were to commit to an explicit plan for price
stability, nations could realize benefits that would be large and permanent. An explicit
commitment to zero inflation would be a milestone in modern economic policy-making
because it would shift the focus of monetary policy away from short-term fine-tuning
to the long term, where it belongs.
Cite this document
APA
W. Lee Hoskins (1990, March 4). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19900305_w_lee_hoskins
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19900305_w_lee_hoskins,
author = {W. Lee Hoskins},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1990},
month = {Mar},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19900305_w_lee_hoskins},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}