speeches · December 2, 1987
Regional President Speech
Silas Keehn · President
SILAS KEEHN REMARKS
ROBERT MORRIS ASSOCIATES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 3, 1987
1. INTRODUCTION -- TO SAY THE LEAST THIS HAS BEEN AN
INTERESTING YEAR -- AS ALWAYS A CHALLENGING PERIOD;
SOMEHOW THIS PARTICULAR TIME SEEMS PARTICULARLY
CHALLENGING--FINANCIAL SYSTEM RIGHT AT THE CENTER OF
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A. FOR FINANCIAL INDUSTRY THE DEREGULATION PROCESS
MOVING ALONG AT A RAPID PACE
1. HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE FIRST PHASE
2. ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE SECOND PHASE
B. THE FIRST PHASE--GEOGRAPHIC DEREGULATION
1. IN A REGULATORY/LEGISLATIVE SENSE, THE NECESSARY
STEPS ALL BUT COMPLETE
2. SUBJECT TO THE RESTRAINTS OF THE APPLICATION
PROCESS--RELEVANT MARKET CONSIDERATIONS--SAFETY
AND SOUNDNESS
3. MARKET FORCES WILL PLAY OUT THE LAST STEPS IN
THIS CHANGE
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4. INTERESTING THAT THE ENABLING STEPS TOOK PLACE
ENTIRELY AT THE STATE LEVEL--NO FEDERAL ENABLING
LEGISLATION
5. THIS MAY BE INSTRUCTIVE AS TO HOW THE SECOND
PHASE MAY EVOLVE
C. THIS NEXT PHASE, OF COURSE, ADDITIONAL POWERS FOR
BANKING COMPANIES
1. THE ELIMINATION OR SUBSTANTIAL REVISION OF
GLASS-STEAGALL
D. OCTOBER FOR SOME MAY SEEM TO CAST
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CHANGE IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT
1. THE FUNDAMENTALS HAVE NOT CHANGED
2. AL THOUGH THE ENORMOUS DECLINE IN THE VALUE OF
EQUITY PRICES MAY HAVE CAUSED PEOPLE TO STEP BACK
AND RECONSIDER THE GLASS-STEAGALL ISSUE, A QUICK
AFTER-LOOK SUGGESTS THAT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM HAS
COME THROUGH SURPRISINGLY UNSCATHED.
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3. THE TRAUMA HAS NOT RAISED ANY TROUBLING QUESTIONS
"REGARDING THE WISDOM OF SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFYING
OR ELIMINATING GLASS-STEAGALL.
4. TWO MONTHS AFTER THE CRASH, VIRTUALLY ALL
REGULATORS, ARE SUPPORTING A RELAXATION OF THE
ARCHAIC SEPARATION OF BANKING FROM THE REST OF
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY.
5. WHILE THE TIMING OF THE CHANGES MAY HAVE BEEN
DEFERRED, THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME SEEMS REASONABLY
ASSURED.
6. FOR PURPOSES OF MY COMMENTS THIS EVENING, LET US
ASSUME THAT WE ARE MOVING FORWARD ON THE POWERS
ISSUE.
A. ANt~HAT THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY WILL
BE STRUCTURED IN LARGER, HIGHLY DIVERSIFIED
AND MUCH MORE COMPLEX ENTITIES OFFERING A
BROADER ARRAY OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
(1) NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE
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B. IDEALLY, THESE ADDITIONAL SERVICES WOULD AT
LEAST ENCOMPASS INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES,
INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE.
(1) I WILL NOT DEBATE THE PRO'S AND CON'S OF
THESE INDIVIDUAL SERVICES TONIGHT SINCE
THE SPECIFICS OF EACH OF THEM DO NOT
IMPACT THE CONTEXT OF MY REMARKS.
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II. WITH THAT AS BACKGROUND, I THOUGHT I WOULD COMMENT THIS
EVENING ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS THAT RELATE TO THIS
CHANGING LANDSCAPE.
A. FIRST, I NEED TO START WITH SOME COMMENTS REGARDING
SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS.
1. BECAUSE ONE'S VIEW OF SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS AND
ACCESS TO THE SAFETY NET HAS AN IMPORTANT BEARING
ON THE STRUCTURAL QUESTION.
B. NEXT AND INTERRELATED WITH THIS IS THE QUESTION OF
SEPARATENESS.
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1. CAN COMPLEX FINANCIAL ENTITIES BE STRUCTURED IN A
WAY THAT ONE ACTIVITY CAN GENUINELY BE INSULATED
FROM THE OTHERS.
C. FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH A BIT ON THE
SUPERVISION OF THESE LARGER, DIVERSIFIED ENTITIES
1. JUST AS THE REGULATIONS WHICH GOVERN FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ARE OUTDATED
2. IT IS A FAIR COMMENT THAT THE SUPERVISORY
STRUCTURE HAS NOT KEPT PACE WITH MARKETPLACE
CHANGES.
III. WITH THAT AS A ROADMAP, LET ME START WITH SOME COMMENTS
ABOUT SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS AND ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL
SAFETY NET
A. THE PURPOSE OF THE SAFETY NET IS TO LIMIT TO THE
EXTENT POSSIBLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FINANCIAL CRISIS.
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1. A FINANCIAL CRISIS OR PANIC OCCURS WHEN SOME
·MAJOR EVENT SHOCKS THE SYSTEM CAUSING ASSET
PRICES TO FALL (PRECIPITOUSLY) LEADING TO
WIDESPREAD INSOLVENCY OF FINANCIAL FIRMS,
ULTIMATELY DESTROYING THE MARKET'S ABILITY TO
ALLOCATE CREDIT.
B. Tl►!&- BRHdG3 IIQ IO F~ THE FEDERAL SAFETY NET ~
HAS TWO MAIN COMPONENTS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE, THE
NATION'S CENTRAL BANK, AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE PROVIDED
BY THE FDIC.
C. THE FEDERAL RESERVE--
1. CAN LIMIT THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CRISES BY
PROVIDING THE LIQUIDITY TO THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE
THROUGH OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
2. AND WE CAN ALSO INJECT LIQUIDITY INTO THE SYSTEM
BY LENDING TO SOLVENT BANKS THROUGH THE DISCOUNT
WINDOW
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3. WHILE IT MAY BE A SLIGHT OVERSTATEMENT THAT
DEPOSIT INSURANCE GIVES THE BANKING INDUSTRY AN
UNFAIR FUNDING ADVANTAGE
A. IT IS A FAIR COMMENT THAT BANK MANAGEMENTS
SOMETIMES ABUSE DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND ATTEMPT
TO EXPONENTIONALLY INCREASE THEIR REACH BASED
ON THIS UNIQUE FEATURE.
IV. REVERTING TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO
CONSIDER JUST HOW EXTENSIVE OUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE IN
DEALING WITH THE SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS ISSUE
A. SPECIFICALLY, HOW MUCH SHOULD WE INTERVENE TO MEET
THESE CONCERNS
B. THERE ARE THOSE THAT TAKE A VERY NARROW VIEW
1. THAT OUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE MONEY
SUPPLY AND THE PAYMENTS MECHANISM
2. THAT IF WE MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE MONEY
SUPPLY AND THE PAYMENTS MECHANISM WE SHOULD NOT
PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ANY SINGLE INSOLVENT
INSTITUTION
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3. AND THAT, THEREFORE, INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIONS ARE
NOT IN THEMSELVES LARGE ENOUGH TO CAUSE SYSTEMIC
DAMAGE
A. INDEED, EVEN THE VERY LARGEST WILL NOT CAUSE
SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS RISKS
4. CONSEQUENTLY, THE OPERATION OF THE OPEN MARKET
DESK TO PREVENT THE CONTRACTION OF THE MONEY
SUPPLY OR THE OPERATION OF THE DISCOUNT WINDOW TO
PROVIDE LIQUIDITY TO THE BANKING SYSTEM SHOULD BE
OUR ONLY RECOURSE .
C. OTHERS ARGUE THAT THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FDIC
MUST GO BEYOND THIS NARROW DEFINITION AND DEAL WITH
INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE LARGE ENOUGH TO
CAUSE SYSTEMIC DAMAGE.
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1. OUR MAJOR BANKS ARE SO INTERRELATED WITH EACH
OTHER AND WITH THE REST OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
THAT THE FAILURE OF ONE LARGE BANK WILL HAVE
NEGATIVE RAMIFICATIONS FOR OTHER BANKS
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D. I DON'T VIEW THESE ALTERNATIVES, THE NARROW
DEFINITION AND THIS BROADER DEFINITION, AS MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE
l. WHILE IN A TECHNICAL SENSE ONE CAN DEVELOP A GOOD
CASE FOR THE NARROW DEFINITION OF OUR
RESPONSIBILITIES, EXPERIENCE TELLS ME THAT IN
PRACTICAL CIRCUMSTANCES WE MUST EXTEND OUR
SUPPORT TO INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIONS AND,
THEREFORE, TAKE ON A BROADER RESPONSE
2. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FACTUALLY PROVE THE
CASE CONCLUSIVELY FOR EITHER OPTION, CERTAINLY
THE FEDERAL RESERVE MUST IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TRY
AND PREVENT INDIVIDUAL EVENTS FROM SNOWBALLING
INTO SYSTEMIC CALAMITIES
A. IT MAY SOUND UNDULY CAUTIOUS BUT OVERKILL IS
FAR PREFERABLE TO UNDERKILL--WE REALLY CAN'T
TAKE A "CHANCE"
V. WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND, LET ME NEXT COMMENT ON THE
EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF LARGER, DIVERSIFIED FINANCIAL
ENTITIES
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A. I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THE SAFETY NET OR
THE BENEFITS INDIRECTLY DERIVED FROM THE SUPPORT OF
THE SAFETY NET SHOULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL
PARTS OF THE LARGE DIVERSIFIED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND OF COURSE I AM REFERRING TO THE NON-DEPOSITORY
PARTS
1. GLASS-STEAGALL HAS MADE THIS ISSUE EASY
2. INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL BANKING WERE LEGALLY
SEPARATED--THE SAFETY NET DEALS WITH THE LATTER,
NOT THE FORMER
B. BUT HOW WILL IT WORK WHEN INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL
BANKING ACTIVITIES ARE INTERMIXED IN THE SAME ENTITY?
1. THIS RAISES THE VERY THORNY ISSUE OF SEPARATENESS
2. CAN FIREWALLS BE ERECTED THAT WILL PREVENT
CONTAMINATION THAT MAY OCCUR IN ONE PART OF THE
ENTITY FROM SPREADING TO THE OTHER PARTS
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:3. OR EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, WILL THEY PREVENT THE
SAFETY NET SUPPORT THAT IS APPROPRIATELY PROVIDED
• TO THE BANKING SEGMENT FROM SPREADING TO THE
NONBANKING SEGMENT
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4. CERTAINLY BANK REGULATORS DO NOT WANT THE
FINANCIAL HEAL TH OF A BANK TO BE THREATENED BY
ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES ELSEWHERE IN THE HOLDING
COMPANY
C. BUT JUST HOW TO BUILD THE FIREWALL
1. A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS HAVE TRIED TO SOLVE THIS
PROBLEM, MOST BY HAVING DIFFERENT ACTIVITIES
CONDUCTED IN SEPARATE SUBSIDIARIES OF THE BANK
HOLDING COMPANY- -NOT SUBSIDIARIES OF THE BANK
2. PROPONENTS OF THIS APPROACH ARGUE THAT REGULATORS
WILL NOT NEED TO EXTEND THE SAFETY NET BEYOND THE
BANK
A. REGULATIONS CAN BE DEVELOPED (IN ADDITION TO
THOSE THAT NOW EXIST) TO LIMIT THE ABILITY OF
THE BANK SUBS !DIARY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO
NONBANKING AFFILIATES
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B. BUT UNDER THIS SCENARIO, BY DEFINITION,
REGULATORS WILL HAVE TO BE WILLING TO LET
NONBANK SUBSIDIARIES IN THE ENTITY FAIL--WE
MUST ASSUME THAT A NONBANK SUBSIDIARY IS NOT
SO LARGE THAT ITS FAILURE WILL WASH BACK ON
TO THE BANKING SUBSIDIARY
C. REPORTING MECHANISMS MUST BE DEVELOPED TO
PREVENT AND/OR DETECT FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
THAT BREACH THESE INSULATING REGULATIONS
D. FDIC FUNDS MUST NOT BE USED TO IMPROVE THE
STATUS OF THE CREDITORS OF NONBANK
SUBSIDIARIES OR HOLDING COMPANIES
D. CAN WE DEPEND ON THE FIREWALLS?
1. CERTAINLY THE CONCEPT HAS INTELLECTUAL APPEAL -
ALSO, CERTAINLY IT IS AN ISSUE THAT ONCE AGAIN
DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSIONS
(2) BUT AT THIS POINT, I ADMIT TO A LEVEL OF
CONCERN THAT THE CURRENT PROPOSALS WILL
DELIVER AS ADVERTISED
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(3) I HAVE THE UNEASY FEELING THAT FIREWALLS
WILL WORK WHEN YOU DON'T NEED THEM BUT
WON'T WORK WHEN YOU REALLY DO NEED THEM
(4) WHEN THE WINDS OF ADVERSITY ARE BLOWING
AND MANAGERS ARE REALLY IN A CORNER,
THERE IS THE RISK THAT INAPPROPRIATE
TRANSACTIONS WILL PENETRATE THE FIREWALLS
(5) THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT FIREWALLS ARE
NOT USEFUL. INDEED THE PROPOSALS BY
SENATOR PROXMIRE AND CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN
WILL SHARPLY REDUCE THE RISK THAT
PROBLEMS AT A NONBANK SUBSIDIARY WILL
HAVE A DIRECT IMPACT ON BANKING
SUBSIDIARIES.
( 6 ) HOWEVER~EW~ IF
REGULATORS ARE WILLING TO LET NONBANK
SUBSIDIARIES FAIL
(7) TODAY, THERE ARE MANY IN CONGRESS AND
THE REGULATORY AGENCIES WHO WOULD BE
UNCOMFORTABLE PERMITTING THIS TO OCCUR
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(8) MOREOVER, CURRENT LAW GIVES REGULATORS A
STRONG INCENTIVE TO TRY AND SHORE UP A
TROUBLED HOLDING COMPANY
(A) UNDER THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY
ACT, HOLDING COMPANIES ARE
OBLIGATED TO INJECT CAPITAL, IF
AVAILABLE, INTO A TROUBLED BANK
(B) THIS WILL PLACE THE REGULATOR IN A
VERY AWKWARD POSITION--FORCING THE
HOLDING COMPANY TO SUPPORT THE
BANKING SUBSIDIARY BUT PREVENTING
THE SUPPORT OF NON-BANKING
SUBSIDIARIES--(YET PRESERVING THE
RIGHT TO DO SO IF THE NON-BANKING
SUBSIDIARY'S FAILURE MIGHT BE
SYSTEMIC)
(9) WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND EXPERIENCE,
REfilJL.A TORS MAY FE EL MORE COMFORTABLE
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WITH \ENV Oe..c.J y SEPARATENESS. BUT AT
THIS POINT, I 1D ARGUE THAT WE NEED
ADDITIONAL TOOLS AND EXPERIENCE +N-
DE AI I NG I:' J J II IR QU BL EQ BANK HQ I PING
MOVING TOO FAR AND TOO
FAST ON THIS ONE
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VI. THIS LEADS TO THE QUESTION OF THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCE
AND FINANCE--A LONG STANDING TRADITION IN THIS
COUNTRY--AN IMPORTANT FACET OF THE SEPARATENESS QUESTION
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A. GIVEN THE CLEAR DIFFICULTIES OF DEALING WITH THE
SAFETY NET ISSUES
l. AND THE CONCERN THAT THE BENEFIT OF ACCESS TO THE
SUPPORT OF SAFETY NET SUBSIDIES COULD SPREAD TO
THE NONBANKING PARTS OF THE FINANCIAL ENTITY
2. I FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE WITH PROPOSALS THAT MIGHT
PERMIT BANKS TO OWN OR BE OWNED BY NON-FINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS
B. THE EXPANSION OF POWERS MUST PROVIDE IDENTIFIABLE
BENEFITS
1. SOMEHOW IN ALL THE RHETORIC, I FEEL THAT THIS
ISSUE HAS BEEN LOST
2. WE SHOULD NOT SIMPLY ADD POWERS FOR THE SAKE OF
ADDING POWERS
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3. THE BENEFITS OF ALLOWING THE OFFERING OF
·DIVERSIFIED FINANCIAL SERVICES BY HOLDING
COMPANIES SEEM OBVIOUS
A. TO USE AN OVERWORKED WORD, THE SYNERGIES
INVOLVED ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD
B. FOR EXAMPLE, TH IS CHANGE SHOULD INCREASE
COMPETITION AND LOWER THE COST OF INVESTMENT
BANKING SERVICES
C. FEES, PRICES, ETC., WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE--A
CLEAR PUBLIC BENEFIT
5. BUT THE CASE FOR PERMITTING FINANCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
AND VICE VERSA IS LESS COMPELLING
A. STUDIES FAIL TO PROVE THAT CROSS INDUSTRY
SYNERGIES EXIST
B. QUITE THE OPPOSITE; CROSS INDUSTRY
PROFITABILITY IS THINNER THAN EXPECTED AND
MANAGEMENT DIFFICULTIES GREATER
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C. l FIND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTANCES WHERE
COMMERCE AND FINANCE ARE NOT SEPARATED LESS
THAN COMPELLING
(1) FOR EXAMPLE, GERMANY DOES PERMIT THE
OWNERSHIP OF A CONTROLLING INTEREST IN A
NON-FINANCIAL ENTITY BY A BANK--BUT
THERE ARE VERY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THEIR SYSTEM AND OURS
(2) TIME WILL TELL, AND IT'S PERSONAL
CONJECTURE ON MY PART, BUT IT IS
ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT SOME COUNTRIES
WILL MOVE IN OUR DIRECTION AND THAT WE
WOULD MAKE A GREAT MISTAKE IN
TERMINATING THE LONGSTANDING SEPARATION
BETWEEN COMMERCE AND FINANCE JUST AT THE
POINT THAT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE
GIVEN THE BROADER CAPABILITY TO OFFER
DIVERSIFIED SERVICES WHICH SEEMS SO VERY
APPROPRIATE
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VI I. AS TO
HOW THESE LARGER MORE DIVERSIFIED INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE
SUPERVISED
A. WHILE THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF BANKING HAS AND
WILL CONTINUE TO CHANGE, AND ASSUMING THAT THIS
POWERS ISSUE MOVES FORWARD AS I SUGGEST
1. THE SUPERVISORY STRUCTURE HAS NOT ONLY NOT MOVED
FORWARD--INDEED WE WILL BE TAKING A STEP BACKWARD
2. AS INSTITUTIONS EXPAND GEOGRAPHICALLY AND
DIVERSIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES, THEY WILL BE DEALING
WITH AN EVER INCREASING NUMBER OF REGULATORS
3. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT A LARGE DIVERSIFIED
HOLDING COMPANY WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE
FEDERAL RESERVE, THE COMPTROLLER, THE FDIC, THE
SEC, THE CFTC, A MULTIPLICITY OF STATE BANKING
AND INSURANCE REGULATORS, NUMEROUS CONSUMER
REGULATORY BODIES, AS WELL AS REGULATORS IN EACH
COUNTRY WHERE THE ENTITY HAS A PRESENCE
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4. MORE THAN ENOUGH--NOT ONLY WILL THE HANDLING OF
· THESE VARIOUS RELATIONSHIPS RAISE THE POSSIBILITY
OF A TRUE BUREAUCRATIC NIGHTMARE BUT THERE WILL
BE OBVIOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGULATORS ON
ISSUES WHERE EACH HAS RESPONSIBILITY
5. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BUSH COMMISSION
PROVIDE A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THIS CONFLICT
B. YOU MAY BE SKEPTICAL BUT MY VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE
REALLY STEM FROM MONETARY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, NOT
TURF ISSUES
1. GOING BACK TO MY COMMENTS ABOUT THE SAFETY NET
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
(TM NAlION'S CLNI~} TO DEAL WITH
QUESTIONS OF SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS
2. WE ARE SIMPLY GOING TO HAVE TO HAVE A BROADER
SUPERVISORY PRESENCE
C. WHILE I WOULD IN NO WAY SUGGEST THE REPLACEMENT OF
PRIMARY SUPERVISORS IN DEALING WITH THE ENTITIES
WHERE THEY HAVE A DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY
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1. THE FEDERAL RESERVE IS GOING TO HAVE TO HAVE SOME
· INVOLVEMENT IN ALL SIGNIFICANT PARTS OF THE LARGE
DIVERSIFIED ENTITY AT LEAST ON AN INFORMATIONAL
BASIS
D. IF AT THE END OF THE DAY WE MUST PROTECT AND PRESERVE
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE BROADEST SENSE
1. AND EVENTS OF THE LAST DECADE TEND TO SUPPORT
THIS BROADER DEFINITION
2. THEN WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO HAVE AN AWARENESS OF
ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE ORGANIZATION SO THAT WE
CAN DEAL WITH THESE RESPONSIBILITIES
3. INFORMATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A DIRECT SENSE WILL
ALLOW US TO REACT AND ON A TIMELY BASIS--WITHOUT
THAT, OUR RESPONSE MAY NOT BE AS EFFECTIVE AS
WOULD OTHERWISE BE THE CASE
VIII. TO CONCLUDE, WHAT I HAVE TRIED TO SUGGEST THIS EVENING IS
THAT THE COMING EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES WILL
RESULT IN LARGER MUCH MORE COMPLICATED AND DIVERSIFIED
ENTITIES
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A. IN THIS CONTEXT I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT:
FIRST 1. SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS RESPONSIBILITIES CANNOT BE
NARROWLY LIMITED BUT MUST INCLUDE LARGE
DESTABILIZING EVENTS THAT HAVE SYSTEMIC
RAMIFICATIONS
A. WITH THE GROWING SIZE OF FINANCIAL ENTITIES,
THIS WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS
B. AN EVER INCREASING NUMBER OF COMPANIES WILL
FIT INTO THIS DEFINITION--A TROUBLING THOUGHT
SECONDLY 2. SEPARATENESS IS AN ELUSIVE CONCEPT--IT HAS A
GREAT INTELLECTUAL RING ABOUT IT BUT BOYS BEING
BOYS, I WORRY ABOUT THE GENUINE PROTECTION THAT
FIREWALLS WILL PROVIDE WHEN THERE IS A FOUR ALARM
FIRE IN PROGRESS
A. GIVEN THIS CONCERN, l GREATLY FAVOR THE
CONTINUATION OF OUR LONGSTANDING TRADITION OF
SEPARATING COMMERCE AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
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THIRDLY 3. FINALLY, WHILE IT SOUNDS VERY SELF-SERVING, I
SIMPLY DON I T SEE HOW THE FEDJftAL RESERVE ,CAN DEAL
w,rt,tr,.J°/.-tl\,N111/G-
WITH ITS RESPONSIBILITIES ANQ N8T IIAI/-E A BROADER
SUPERVISORY PRESENCE
B. TO CONCLUDE, I DO THINK THAT ALL OF THESE ISSUES ARE
ARGUABLE
1. THESE HAPPEN TO BE MY CURRENT VIEWS, BUT AT THIS
JUNCTURE THE REGULATORY BODY HAS A REASONABLY
OPEN MIND ON ALL OF THEM
2. MY POINT IN RAISING THEM WITH YOU THIS EVENING IS
SIMPLY TO SAY THAT THE TIME TO THINK ABOUT THESE
ISSUES IS NOW BEFORE THE STRUCTURAL CONCRETE HAS
BEGUN TO DRY--NOT WELL AFTER THE FACT
3. I WOULD FAR RATHER BE PROACTIVE IN REACHING
CONSIDERED VIEWPOINTS THAN REACTIVE, DESPERATELY
GRASPING FOR SOLUTIONS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
WILL BE LESS THAN IDEAL
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~~~ B ~ ~ K
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4. HOPEFULLY MY COMMENTS WITH YOU THIS EVENING WILL
PROVIDE SOME IMPETUS FOR STARTING THE DEBATE
AMONG THIS GROUP
THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
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Cite this document
APA
Silas Keehn (1987, December 2). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19871203_silas_keehn
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19871203_silas_keehn,
author = {Silas Keehn},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1987},
month = {Dec},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19871203_silas_keehn},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}