speeches · December 12, 1979
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
MONETARY POLICY—
THE NEW LOOK
Remarks of
John J. Balles
President
Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco
Forecast ’80
Business Forecasting Conference,
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California
December 13, 1979
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The initial results of the Federal Reserve's
October 6 policy shift give the nation hope
for surmounting the financial problems of the
uncertain 1980's, according to Mr. Balles. The
policy shift has involved a change in instru
ments and tactics to reinforce the Fed's
intention to achieve moderation in the
growth of money and bank credit. These
new steps did not reflect any change in the
Fed's basic targets for 1979 for the monetary
aggregates—but they did reflect its determi
nation that those objectives will actually be
achieved.
Federal Reserve Sank
of
San frontRco
JAN 18 1980
LIBRARY
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I'm glad to have the chance to participate in
this now-familiar autumn ritual, the annual
business-outlook meeting. We're entering
what appears to be a difficult year—and
perhaps also a difficult decade—for the na
tional economy. The sessions held here at
U.C.L.A., and those held at similar institutions
throughout the country, should generate the
type of guidance that policymakers need as
they develop their plans for the difficult
period ahead.
In accepting the invitation to speak tonight, I
said that because of my official position on
the Federal Open Market Committee, I would
not feel free to make any interest-rate fore
casts. But that gap in my presentation may
not be as important as you think. At a
conference which we hosted recently in San
Francisco for a number of leading academic
figures, a great deal of time was spent
discussing the new financial environment
which followed the monetary-policy shift of
October 6. As you might imagine, the
monetarists in the audience were generally
encouraged at the recent turn of events, but
they remained skeptical about the Fed's abil
ity to remain on the path of virtue which they
had long ago urged us to follow. Thus, they
are reserving judgment until they see the
actual results after a period of some months.
Policy Shift—and Its Background
I rather doubt that you're going to see a
complete reversal of policy, but there's no
doubt that the FOMC has shifted direction in
a significant way. Let me summarize what led
up to the events of October 6, and then tell
you what we did and why we did it.
From every vantage point, the economic
situation this summer and early fall was very
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disturbing. Following a dip in the economy in
the second quarter, and contrary to expecta
tions, the economy heated up during the
third quarter, with a 3 V2 -percent annual rate
of increase in real GNP. That burst of spend
ing reflected a "buy now" attitude spurred by
an intensification of inflationary expectations.
With consumer prices rising at a 13-percent
annual rate, households and businesses
boosted their purchases, and speculative
pressures developed in commodity markets.
And despite policy efforts to control the
situation, measured by steady increases in the
Federal-funds rate, money growth actually
accelerated; the growth of the M2 money
supply jumped from an 8.9-percent annual
rate to a 12.0-percent rate between the
second and third quarters of the year.
Those domestic pressures, plus the renewed
weakening of the dollar in foreign-exchange
markets, led the Federal Reserve to introduce
its three-part policy package on October 6.
First, the Fed announced a one-percent in
crease in the discount rate, the rate at which
Reserve Banks lend to member commercial
banks. Second, it imposed an eight-percent
marginal reserve requirement on "managed
liabilities" —large time deposits, Eurodollar bor
rowings, repurchase agreements against U.S.
Government and federal-agency securities,
and Federal-funds borrowing from non
member institutions. Finally, the Fed an
nounced a greater emphasis, in the day-to-
day conduct of monetary policy, on bank
reserves—and less emphasis on minimizing
short-term fluctuations in the Federal-funds
rate, the rate at which banks borrow reserves
from each other and from other institutions.
The purpose of all these actions was to assist
in slowing the rate of growth of the money
supply.
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The financial markets and the press have
devoted considerable attention to the first
two of those measures, yet they may have
only a short-term effect on the economy's
overall performance. But the third measure,
while receiving much less attention, could
mean a fundamental improvement in the
nation's long-run inflation outlook. By focus
ing its day-to-day operations on bank
reserves, the Federal Reserve may now have
found a better way of controlling the growth
of the nation's money supply. High inflation
rates cannot persist for long without rapid
money growth, so that better control over
the monetary aggregates should help us
achieve substantial progress against inflation
over the next few years.
Federal Reserve Operating Procedures
Now, the Federal Reserve can influence the
growth in money in either of two basic
ways—with either a reserves operating instru
ment or a Federal funds-rate instrument. Both
methods operate through the market for
bank reserves. Under the Fed's present regu
lations, member banks must hold reserves
against deposits equal to a certain minimum
percentage of those deposits. This means that
deposit growth is ultimately constrained by
the rate at which bank reserves are expand
ing. Thus the banking system must find
additional reserves if more deposits are to be
issued. The Federal Reserve, of course, has
the power to add to or subtract from re
serves through open-market operations, by
buying financial assets from banks or by
selling financial assets to them.
Under the reserves operating instrument, as
adopted essentially on October 6th, the Fed
attempts to hit certain target growth rates for
the quantity of bank reserves. Once this
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quantity is expanding at a set rate, the rate at
which banks can issue deposits (the main
element in the money supply) will be largely
determined—at least over the short-term.
Under the funds-rate instrument, as used
prior to October 6th, the Fed attempted to
influence deposit growth not through the
quantity of bank reserves but directly through
the cost of these reserves. Banks can borrow
reserves from other institutions in the Federal-
funds market. The Fed can affect the interest
rate on these reserves (the Fed-funds rate) by
injecting or withdrawing reserves. A rise in the
funds rate, for example, increases the cost of
reserves, which in turn leads to increases in
other market rates of interest. With increasing
yields on financial assets, such as Treasury
bills, we experience a decline in the rate at
which the public chooses to add to its stocks
of low- or non-interest-bearing deposits—and
we experience a decline in money growth
rates.
Many economists have argued about which
technique does a better job of controlling
money. As a technical matter, the race seems
to be a draw: using either the funds rate or
reserves as the operating instrument could
produce equally good results—provided that
the range of movement permitted in the
funds rate is sufficiently broad. This conclu
sion, however, leaves out a crucial factor—
namely, the cautious path followed by the
Federal Open Market Committee in reacting
to deviations of the aggregates from their
official longer-run targets. With such an ap
proach, a funds-rate operating instrument has
resulted in less control over the monetary
aggregates than was either desirable or feasi
ble. The cautious-control approach is now
likely to carry over to the new reserves
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operating instrument. But for reasons that I
will discuss, control over the aggregates is
likely to be significantly improved.
Cautious Funds Rate Control
In evaluating the experience under the pre
vious funds-rate instrument, we should
recognize that growth rates in the (M-i)
money supply are influenced primarily by two
factors. First, if the Fed increases the funds
rate, M-| growth rates tend to fall as the
public finds non- or low-interest-bearing de
posits and currency less desirable. Second, as
aggregate economic activity rises and falls
over the business cycle or in concert with
inflation, M-| growth will also be pulled up
and down as the public's need for transac
tions balances changes.
Presumably, in targeting the aggregates the
Fed wishes to avoid increases in money
growth rates in recoveries which would
"overheat" the economy, and decreases in
money growth rates in recessions which
would aggravate unemployment. Such
undesired procyclical money-supply move
ments could of course be avoided by
changing the funds rate fast enough to "fight
off" the procyclical effects of changes in
economic activity on money growth rates.
Unfortunately, it hasn't worked out that way
in practice. In recent years, the Fed has
moved the funds rate in the right direction —
increasing in recoveries to restrain monetary
accelerations, and decreasing in recessions to
hold back monetary decelerations. But these
actions have not been sufficiently aggressive
to keep money growth from moving in
concert with the business cycle. As a result,
monetary policy has generally added to infla
tionary pressures in cyclical expansions and to
unemployment in recessions.
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Reasons for Cautious Control
This raises the obvious question: Why hasn't
the Federal Reserve in the past moved the
funds rate more actively? A partial explanation
involves the substantial amount of uncertainty
which surrounds the current condition of the
economy at any point in time and the precise
timing and impact of policy actions. This
uncertainty reflects the current state-of-the-
art in the economics profession, and is not
likely to be eliminated in the near future.
Under these circumstances, the rational
policymaker should react cautiously in chang
ing the operating target when money growth
appears to be off target. Since the impact of
potential policy actions is uncertain, the fact
that the economy functioned tolerably well in
one month provides strong support for not
substantially changing the target for the oper
ating instrument in the following month. In
this way, significant swings in policy are quite
rationally delayed "until next month".
Several institutional factors also have contrib
uted to this tendency toward cautious
control. First, policy is made by a committee
(the FOMC), and the Committee's inevitable
compromises sometimes lead to only modest
changes in the level or range of operating
targets. Second, public and political attitudes
generally view the risk of doing something to
be greater than the risk of maintaining the
status quo. Since the mistakes resulting from
activist policies tend to generate a greater
outcry than those stemming from status-quo
policies, the Fed is frequently cautious in its
policy actions. Third, frequent changes in
policy impose costs on the private sector by
forcing it constantly to revise its decisions,
and so tend to undermine the performance
of the economy. Thus, in addition to being
concerned with inflation, unemployment, and
the foreign-exchange value of the dollar, the
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Fed wants to provide a stable policy frame
work—which means essentially a cautious
policy stance.
Interest Rate Variability
Now, all of these considerations apply equally
well to any operating instrument the Fed
might use, including either the funds rate or
bank reserves. Thus, in my personal view, the
Fed's recent decision to focus on reserves
could mean that the reserves instrument will
now be moved as cautiously as the funds-
rate instrument was in the past.
If that happens, then the Fed would not
accommodate many short- and long-term
fluctuations in banks' demand for reserves.
Consequently, the Federal-funds rate could
become much more variable than it has been
in the past. This possibility has prompted
some observers to argue that such funds-rate
variability would be unacceptable to the
Fed—indeed, would cause the Fed to revert
to a funds-rate instrument, leading again to
interest-rate smoothing.
These fears could be exaggerated. First, under
a reserves instrument, funds-rate fluctuations
probably will not be transmitted to other
money-market rates—say, to the Treasury-bill
rate or the commercial-paper rate—to the
same extent that they were under a funds-
rate instrument. Formerly, current changes in
the funds rate contained policy information
about what the Fed would do in the future;
thus, funds-rate changes almost immediately
became reflected in other money-market
rates. But under a reserves-operating instru
ment, the essentially random day-to-day and
week-to-week changes in the funds rate will
convey less information about its future lev
els, and will have a much smaller impact on
other money-market rates.
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Second, under the funds-rate regime, the Fed
came to be held publicly responsible for
interest rates—and thus came under consider
able pressure to keep rates down. Now, the
Fed of course can keep interest rates down in
the short-run, but this is not true in the long-
run. Attempts to lower rates in the face of
strong money and credit demands result in
fast money growth and ultimately inflation.
And given the inclusion of an inflation pre
mium in nominal interest rates, attempts to
resist interest-rate increases in the short run
often cause higher rates in the long run.
Today, by emphasizing reserves, the Fed may
avoid some of the public pressure to control
interest rates, and thus may promote a more
accurate public perception of its actual ability
to control rates.
Cautious Control Over Reserves
In sum, our past experience has shown that a
cautious funds-rate strategy can lead to
procyclical swings in money and reserves,
which ultimately lead to undesirable eco
nomic results. A cautiously controlled reserves
instrument should work in just the opposite
direction —it will tend to resist, rather than
accede to, the forces producing procyclical
swings in money. With the supply of bank
reserves expanding at a relatively stable rate,
the maximum rate at which banks can issue
deposits will be relatively stable also.
Cautious control applied to a reserves operat
ing instrument thus is likely to insulate the
growth in money more thoroughly from
cyclical swings in output and prices. The
outcome should be a better record in
moderating economic fluctuations, and espe
cially in containing the rate of inflation. Under
the old system, inflationary pressures often
led to faster money growth and thus even
more inflation later. Under the new system,
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more inflation now is likely to be met by
higher nominal interest rates and unchanged
money growth, which means that higher rates
of inflation cannot be permanently sustained.
For this reason, the new look in monetary
policy has definitely improved the long-run
outlook for inflation control.
Developments After October 6
The key question is whether the new ap
proach to policy has actually worked. I must
confess that the millenium didn't dawn on
October 6, much to the surprise of the many
proponents of the new look in the academic
community. Instead, the initial reaction was a
nose dive in the stock market and substantial
turmoil in other financial markets. Short-term
rates rose substantially, with, for example, the
Fed-funds rate jumping 350 basis points
within a month's time. More surprisingly,
long-term rates also increased, with corporate
Aaa bond rates rising 110 basis points within
the month —perhaps because of securities
dealers' uncertainty over the day-to-day costs
of financing their security positions.
With the further passage of time, however,
the markets recovered considerably. For ex
ample, 90-day commercial-paper rates
dropped from 14.30 percent to 12.86 percent
between early November and early Decem
ber, and newly-offered Aaa corporate-bond
rates declined from 11.52 percent to 11.24
percent in the same time-span. And of course
the last several weeks have witnessed a
welcome turn-around in the prime business-
loan rate, from its peak of 153/i percent to
1514 percent today.
The foreign-exchange market initially re
sponded well to the October 6 policy shift —
and that stability was achieved without any
major U.S. intervention in the market, con
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trary to our experience after the November
1978 policy moves in defense of the dollar.
The Iranian crisis later led to some weakness
in the dollar, and in the yen as well, but that
crisis of course reflected other forces than the
monetary-policy package. But meanwhile, a
substantial slowdown occurred in the money-
growth figures. M-] growth declined from a
9.7-percent annual rate in the third quarter to
a 2.5-percent rate in October and a 2.2-
percent rate in November. Similarly, M2
growth declined from a 12.0-percent rate in
the third quarter to 8.6 percent in October
and to 6.5 percent in November.
The tightening of policy led many observers
to fear the onset of a severe credit crunch.
But as Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker said
in a late-October letter to member banks, the
System "fully intends that sufficient credit will
continue to be available to finance orderly
growth in economic activity." I would only
emphasize, as Chairman Volcker did, that
when banks experience sharp but temporary
variations in the cost of marginal funds, they
should not consider that a signal to boost
their basic lending rates. And I would also
emphasize that banks should keep in mind
the special problems of smaller customers
who have limited financing alternatives. Spe
cifically, banks should take special care to
maintain the availability of funds for groups
such as small businesses, consumers, home
buyers and farmers. But bankers and their
borrowers may perhaps now feel more confi
dent about this situation, given the recent
decline in interest rates.
Concluding Remarks
The October 6 policy package, as it has
developed up to the present, gives us strong
hopes for surmounting the financial problems
of the uncertain 1980s. The policy shift has
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involved a change in instruments and tactics
to reinforce the Fed's intention to achieve
moderation in the growth of money and
bank credit. These new steps did not reflect
any change in our basic targets for 1979 for
the monetary aggregates—but they did re
flect our determination that those objectives
will actually be achieved. In doing so, the
new measures should emphasize the Fed's
unwillingness to finance an accelerated infla
tion, as well as our goal of reducing
inflationary pressures in the decade ahead.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1979, December 12). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19791213_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19791213_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1979},
month = {Dec},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19791213_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}