speeches · September 5, 1979
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
INFLATION AND RECESSION
Remarks of
John J. Balles, President
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Meeting with Portland Community Leaders and
Board of Directors, Portland Branch
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Portland, Oregon
September 6, 1979
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Inflation and Recession
It's always a pleasure to visit friends and acquaintances here in
the Great Northwest, but I hope that the next time I'll be able to
provide a more upbeat theme than "Inflation and Recession." That must
surely be one of the most depressing phrases in the English language.
I'll get into the details in a moment, but first let me add how pleased
I am that Portland's community leaders can have this chance to get
together with the directors of our Portland office. Our directors are
an able and diverse group of individuals, and they help in many ways to
improve the performance of the Federal Reserve System.
The directors at our five offices are concerned with each of the
major jobs delegated by Congress to the Federal Reserve. That encompasses
the provision of "wholesale" banking services such as coin, currency, and
check processing; supervision and regulation of a large share of the
nation's banking system; administration of consumer-protection laws; and
above all, the development of monetary policy. We are fortunate in the
advice we get from them in each of these four areas.
Our directors constantly help us improve the level of central-
banking services, in the most cost-effective manner. Most of all, they
help us improve the workings of monetary policy. As one means of doing
so, they provide us with practical first-hand inputs on key developments
in various regions of this District and various sectors of business and
public life. Our directors thus help us anticipate changing trends in
the economy, by providing insights into consumer and business psychology
which serve as checks against our own analyses of economic data.
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Regional Strength
We've been getting a very favorable picture recently from our
directors, as well as from our regional statistics. Indeed, in this
fairly damp section of the Sun Belt, you'd hardly know there was a
recession going on. Of course, the growth pace should slow down this
year and next, and the situation could become bleak for some regional
industries (such as tourism) if the energy crisis worsens — but
overall, Oregon's economy looks to be in very good shape to meet the
challenges ahead. One important reason is the attractiveness of
Oregon to new residents and investors; with a 17-percent population
growth to date in this decade, Oregon is the fastest growing state
on the Pacific Coast.
Oregon's strength is especially impressive in the light of the
weakness of the national home-construction industry. After all, Oregon
regularly produces one-fifth of the nation's lumber and two-fifths of
its plywood, so by past trends the state's economy should now be
weakening, as tight credit and high housing prices undermine nationwide
housing demand. But the growing size, diversity and efficiency of the
state's economy are compensating for any weakness in the forest products
industry. In particular, the growth of the state's electronics and
other high-technology industries, which have almost doubled their job
requirements since early in this decade, promises considerable strength
as we move into the 1980's.
Oregon's foreign-trade situation looks especially promising, partly
because of the rapid growth of our Pacific Basin trading partners, and
partly because of the dollar depreciation of the past several years.
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Indeed, the cheaper dollar means that wheat and other Northwest products
are selling at bargain-basement prices in the world's markets. Meanwhile,
the state's homebuilding industry is holding up fairly well, while the
commercial-construction boom continues apace — incidentally, with the
Maple Leaf flag flying over many of these projects. I understand that
office space in downtown Portland has tripled over the past decade, and
that almost 1 1/2 million more square feet will be added by the early
1980's. That sign of confidence by outside investors is perhaps the
most fitting tribute to the strength and balance of Oregon's continuing
expansion.
National Weakness
So much for the good news. When we turn to the broader national
picture, we encounter a much bleaker situation. Indeed, if you like
classical allusions, you could say that we are caught between the Scylla
of recession and the Charybdis of inflation. Ordinarily, when the economy
slows down, we adopt stimulative fiscal and monetary policies in order to
get back on a proper growth path — but we can't afford the luxury of
such expansionary policies today. In view of the weakness of the dollar
at home and abroad, we have had to adopt much more restrictive policies
than we would normally follow in a period of economic weakness. But the
policies we choose must be better integrated than they have been in the
past. Monetary policy can't carry the burden alone, as I'll discuss
further in a minute.
Let's consider first the dimensions of our present problem. We may
now be in the early stage of the most widely heralded recession of recent times.
Real gross national product -- that is, GNP adjusted for inflation -- moved
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practically sideways in the first quarter of 1979, and then dropped at
about a 2 1/2-percent annual rate in the second quarter of the year.
This recent development followed the longest and the strongest peacetime
expansion of the past generation. But the distortions introduced into
the economy by the worsening inflation of the past several years undermined
this solid expansion and finally brought on the day of reckoning.
Most observers doubt that things will turn out as badly in 1979 as
they did in 1974-75, although there are some eerie parallels, such as a
renewed energy crisis. The last time around, we suffered from the
previous boom period's unsustainably high production levels in autos,
housing, capital goods, and inventories. However, the relatively well-
balanced expansion of the 1975-78 period kept output in most of those
areas much closer to sustainable long-term needs. And even the oil-price
shock has been relatively lighter now than it was in 1973-74.
Inflation — and Policy Complications
But to repeat, inflation has undermined this otherwise strong
situation. Consumer prices soared more than 13 percent, at an annual
rate, during January-July 1979, which was about as bad as the worst
upsurge of the 1973-74 period. Moreover, the food and energy sectors
weren't the only sources of the problem. Those volatile sectors account
for only about one-fourth of the consumer market basket, so we have to
look to the rest of the market basket to measure the "underlying" rate
of inflation. Well, the prices of those other goods and services
increased at more than a 10-percent annual rate during the January-July
period, which shows that our inflation problem is quite widespread and
not simply restricted to a few headline-catching items.
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We're all familiar with the spurt in inflation caused by the OPEC
cartel's decision to boost prices, and in the case of food, by such
factors as bad weather, heavy Russian grain purchases, and the decline
in the cattle cycle. But a crucial inflation factor has been the
excessive growth of the money supply during the past several years.
The broad money supply, defined as currency plus all bank deposits
except large time certificates, increased at a 9-percent annual rate
over the four-year business expansion — and this was close to or even
above the top of the target ranges successively set by the Federal
Reserve during this period. Remember, though, that excess money creation
does not stem from any perverse policy decision on the part of the
Federal Reserve, but rather from the pressures imposed on the central
bank by the need to finance an unprecedented series of massive Federal -
government deficits.
Our problems have been aggravated even more by the sharp decline
in the value of the dollar over the past several years, with governments
and private businesses selling dollars because of their strong belief
that U.S. expansionary policies would lead to an acceleration of
inflation here at a time when prices were decelerating elsewhere. This
problem wouldn't have been so important if the dollar were a minor
currency; but for better or for worse, it is the key international
reserve currency. About one-half of all world-trade transactions are
conducted in dollars; about three-fourths of all Euro-currency transactions
are handled in dollars; and about four-fifths of all official foreign-
exchange reserves are held in dollars. When such a currency weakens,
as the dollar has done in recent years, it undermines the strength of
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the entire world economy. Hence, market participants abroad as well as
at home are apt to demand the adoption of stringent anti-inflationary
policies in today's situation.
Limitations of Monetary Policy
Now, let's consider why the money supply grew so expansively during
the recent business expansion. To answer that question, we've got to
understand the institutional factors which complicate the Federal Reserve's
policy task. We central bankers can forcefully present our views on
sound financial policy, and within the limits of our authority we can
implement appropriate actions. But in the last analysis, a central bank
in a democracy does not have -- and should not have — the authority to
nullify continually the policies of the nation's elected representatives.
Another complicating factor is the lagged impact of monetary policy.
The economy does not respond instantly to each change in the cost and
availability of money and credit. Rather it responds only after a lag
of time, and that lag (unfortunately) is not constant and predictable.
Moreover, in practical terms, monetary policy cannot offset the
inflationary effects of large budget deficits during boom periods,
because fiscal policy and monetary policy affect the economy in different
ways. Monetary policy operates less directly and on a narrower front
than fiscal policy, through its influence basically on the rate of growth
of bank credit.
Yet problems arise because the various sectors of the economy don't
all depend equally on bank credit -- and bank borrowers don't all have
equal power or credit standing. Very large corporations, and of course
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the Federal government, can also obtain funds from such sources as the
money and capital markets. But those markets are not as readily available,
if at all, to small businesses, consumers, farmers, home builders, and
state-and-local government units. Hence, these groups are usually the
first to be affected, and the most seriously hurt, by any program of
monetary restraint. Consequently, it may not be desirable, or even
practically possible, to rely on monetary policy alone to combat inflation,
especially when that problem is aggravated as it has been by heavy deficit
financing in a period of high employment.
Need for Moderate Fiscal Policy
In our search for a broad-scale and wel1-integrated set of policies
to combat inflation and recession, we must first institute a moderate fiscal
policy — one which will not destabilize the 1980's as it did the 1970's.
For example, the Treasury ended fiscal 1978 with a $49-bi11ion deficit, and
it will probably wind up this month with a $30-bi11ion deficit for fiscal
1979. For the 1970's as a whole, we'll have a combined budget deficit of
roughly $320 billion — just about equal to the combined deficit for the
entire earlier history of the Republic. The problem lies basically with our
inability to curb spending — or alternatively, to raise taxes to finance it
-- in periods of relatively full employment. In this fiscal year, for example,
Federal spending will increase by about $44 billion -- almost a 10-percent
increase. Sound fiscal policy would call for a budget surplus, or at least
a balanced budget, during strong business expansions in order to dampen
inflationary spending and borrowing pressures.
During the Vietnam War period, defense spending was the major
contributor to the spending upsurge. But more recently, the rise has
been concentrated in civilian programs, especially the aptly named
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"uncontrollable categories" of income-transfer payments. (Altogether,
the Federal government's annual transfer payments to individuals have
jumped from $27 billion to $197 billion just within the past decade and
a half.) Once such open-ended programs are established, funds are
disbursed (without specific Congressional action) in response to changing
economic conditions. Under many transfer programs, entitlements increase
automatically with any downturn in the economy.
Demography also plays a role, since age determines benefit
eligibility for many programs, and there are more and more old folks
around. In addition, inflation creates many automatic spending increases,
because of escalator adjustments to income-security programs or because
of the pass-through of rising health costs to the medicare and medicaid
programs. According to a recent study by the General Accounting Office,
spending will be very hard to control as long as we index in this fashion
over half of the expenditures in the Federal budget.
Problems have also been caused by legislated cost increases. Congress
in its wisdom has decided that certain regulations are necessary for health,
safety and environmental reasons, but the costs of doing business have been
boosted by the attendant paperwork and, especially, by the necessary new
equipment. Again, employment costs have risen this year because of sharp
increases in the minimum wage and in social-security taxes. (Indeed, within
a 3-to-4 year period, we are incurring cost increases of 50 percent or more
in both of those programs.) Then there are the costs arising from farm
price-support legislation, and also from the subsidies and restrictions
surrounding the rail, maritime, trucking, steel, construction and energy
industries. By some calculations, government actions of this type add a
full percentage point or more to the basic rate of inflation.
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Separately, wage-push pressures have aggravated the problem of
inflation throughout the past decade. Labor costs could remain stable,
with no impact on business prices, if workers' productivity advanced
at the same pace as their wages — which unfortunately hasn't been the
case in recent years. In the first half of 1979, in particular, labor
compensation per hour rose at more than a 10-percent annual rate, while
output per hour actually declined, and the resultant 14-percent rate
of increase in unit labor costs led business firms to raise their prices
substantially. The cure is not simply to hold down compensation through
guideline pressures or whatever, but also to boost productivity.
Need for Improved Productivity
This year's performance is only the climax of a dismal period of
weakness which has stretched back over the past decade. For several
preceding decades, the U.S. led the world in productivity gains, with
output per hour rising more than 3 percent annually, on the average.
Those productivity gains provided us with the basis for a strong
expansion in the real incomes of all Americans. But productivity growth
has weakened in more recent years, averaging only one percent over the
past half-decade. Meanwhile, German and French productivity gains have
been twice as large as ours throughout the 1970's, while Japanese gains
have been four times greater.
One key reason for this poor performance is a prolonged lag in the
pace of capital spending. The productivity comparisons reflect the fact
that we spend less than 10 percent of our GNP on capital investment,
whereas the Germans spend 15 percent, and the Japanese spend more than
20 percent of GNP for that purpose. The solution, then, is to stimulate
productivity-enhancing investment, primarily through improvements in our
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tax structure. Reductions in business taxes would be useful, as a means
of releasing funds that could be channeled into efficient new plant and
equipment. Equally attractive is a major overhaul of depreciation allowances,
such as the "1-5-10" formula which Treasury Secretary Miller frequently
proposed while he was still Federal Reserve Chairman. This formula stands
for a new policy of liberalized depreciation, under which all mandated
investments for health-safety-environmental purposes would be written off in
one year, all new investments for productive equipment would be written off
in five years, and all capital in structures and permanent facilities would
be written off in ten.
Concluding Remarks
To sum up, the nation's economic policymakers are in a real dilenma.
Business-cycle considerations dictate relatively easy monetary and fiscal
policies, as a means of offsetting the downturn in the economy. But other
considerations — inflation at home and a weakened dollar abroad — dictate
a much tighter set of policies, as a means of restoring the stability which
is so essential to both our own welfare and the welfare of the entire world
economy.
As I've indicated, we need an integrated and broad-scale attack on our
nation's problems. Monetary policy can do its part by moving gradually to a
rate of money-supply growth which is consistent with long-term price stability.
But monetary policy can't do everything; we need proper tax, regulatory and
energy policies as well. Our national economy is like a vintage automobile —
powerful in its prime, but now slowed down by poor maintenance and excess
baggage. With a good overhaul it can do wonders, performing excellently at
a good steady speed, but first the mechanics must work together to cure it
of its deplorable tendency to exceed the speed limit one minute and go into
reverse the next.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1979, September 5). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19790906_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19790906_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1979},
month = {Sep},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19790906_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}