speeches · June 15, 1979
Regional President Speech
J. Roger Guffey · President
.
,
For Release: 11:00 a.m., June 16, 1979
SETTING THE STAGE FOR
A MORE COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Remarks by
Roger Guffey
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Annual Convention
New Mexico Bankers Association
Albuquerque, New Mexico
June 16, 1979
•
Not long ago, a thoughtful banker stood on a platform
like this and spoke on the theme that "banking isn't fun any
more." We all know what he meant and we understood well his
point: .the regulatory burden faced by banks is becoming
heavier and it seems to be getting in the way of a banker's
ability to do the job he wants to do in his community.
I'd like to add my variation to that theme: Bank Regu
lation Isn't Fun Any More. In large measure, the traditional
opportunity for bankers and regulators to work together, in
the interest of a sound banking system responsive to the needs
of the public, has been seriously diminished.
As we all know, the winds of social change and politics
have blown a blizzard of legislation over banking. More than
15 major new pieces of legislation affecting banks have been
sent forth from Congress in just the past decade or so. As a
regulator, I am sensitive to the fact that regulators are more or
less in the middle--striving as you are to adjust to the constant
demands 6f new legislation and the inevitable regulations,
while seeking to continue to serve the banking industry effectively
with as little oppression as possible. The result: some days
it just isn't fun anymore. But it's not hopeless. There are
good opportunities ahead for thoughtful bankers to work with
regulators and legislators to develop a system that acknowledges
the complementary needs of financial institutions and the public.
An~ the opportunity for all like financial institutions--including
S & L's, mutual savings banks, and others--to compete on an equal
basis should be the central theme of our mutual efforts.
-2
I am convinced that a financial system which permits the prin
ciples of the free market to operate, unfettered by oppressive
regulation; . is the most efficient way to allocate the total
financial resources of our nation.
As you know, much of the current regulatory framework
is a heritage of the traumatic 1930's, when laws were imple
mented to bring stability to a chaotic banking system and to
restore public confidence in a banking system viewed with
distrust. These laws emphasized protection of bank depositors
and pre~v ention of bank failure.
Experience confirms that many of these laws, such as the
creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, served
their purpose well. Other laws, however, written for another
time and purpose, now serve only to reduce competition without
appreciable improvement in bank soundness and safety. A key
example is interest payment restrictions on demand and savings
deposits originally designed to prevent "excessive" competition
among banks.
The regulatory legacy of the 1930's is still with us. How
ever, recent changes in technology, together with the growing
competition from nonbank financial institutions, and continuing
inflationary pressures have resulted in strong incentives to
alter piecemeal much of this regulatory structure. Although the
soundness of our financial system must continue to be of paramount
concern, increasing emphasis needs to be given to competitive
considerations if banks are to compete effectively with other
financial institutions to continue to serve the deposit and credit
needs of the public. Thus, it seems to me that increased emphasis
on competition will be a primary ingredient of future bank regulation.
- "
-3
I want to spend a few minutes to look at some of the current
bank regulatory issues concerning financial competition and exam
ine how they set the basis for my views about what's ahead in
bank regulation. Specifically, how will proposed changes promote
comvetition and efficiency in our financial system while also
insuring bank soundness? Since the effects of these changes are
interdependent and bear on the structure of our entire financial
system, not just banks, a comprehensive approach toward regulatory
reform is needed to ensure a financial sector which is both competi
tive at!d sound.
One major area in which legislative and regulatory reform will
significantly increase competition--and ultimately economic effi
ciency--is the payment of interest on all types of deposits. The
regulations on ceiling interest rates and the outright prohibition
of payment of interest on demand deposits are rooted in the Banking
Acts of 1933 and 1935. These laws arose out of the dangerously
unstable condition of our banking system in the depths of the
Depression. Since that time, Congress has extended this ceiling
rate authority 13 times, most recently through Title 16 of FIRA,
which extends the authority to set interest rate ceilings on time
and savings deposits through 1980.
In the past few years, increased pressures have been mounting
to eliminate the prohibition against the payment of interest on
demand deposits and to phase out what we know as Regulation Q
ceilings. These pressures stem from two sources: the rise in the
inflation rate and the public's desire to receive a fair rate of
return on their deposits. As recently as 1976 the six-month
Treasury bill rate was 5.25 per cent, about the same as the
-4
Regulation Q ceiling on passbook savings. Since that time, however,
the Treasury bill rate has jumped to 9.5 per cent, while the pass
book ceiling rate for commercial banks has remained at the 1973
level of 5 per cent (5.25 per cent as of July 1). To compensate
for the disparity between market rates and those allowed under
Regulation Q, new savings instruments have been authorized and
introduced. The result has been the slow evolution of a complex
array of time and savings instruments with varying interest rates
and maturities. These instruments, now in 15 varieties, have
confused savers, have led to discrimination among classes of savers,
and have in some measure lessened the incentive of the public to save.
Depositors, however, are not the only ones penalized by inter
est rate ceilings. Regulated financial institutions are also hurt.
While financial institutions have experienced increased
operating costs associated with the multiple types of instruments
available to depositors, more importantly they have suffered seri
ous problems of disintermediation during periods when market rates
rose above those allowed under Regulation Q.
Although some argue that interest rate ceilings are nec
essary to ensure a source of stable and low costs funds to the
borrowing public, the ceilings have not provided that result.
Rather, the flow of funds away from institutions subject to Regu
lation Q provisions has periodically caused a shortage of funds for
borrowers at times when these institutions could not compete with
other market rates.
It is fair to say that our recent experience with interest rate
prohibitions and ceilings has been less than satisfactory. The
problems they have created have led to increased regulatory and
legislative efforts to do away or sidestep them. For example, the
.
.
-5
NOW accounts permitted in New England and New York provide
depositors an interest-bearing transaction account. Automatic
transfer services and bill-paying arrangements, until struck
down by the united States Court of Appeals in April, provided
depositors outside New England and New York with an indirect
method of earning a return on demand balances. Currently, bills
are pending in Congress which would phase out or abolish interest
rate prohibitions and ceilings, and the current administration
has put its support behind a gradual phase-out of all deposit
interest rate controls. In my judgement, one result of these
trends and developments is that we are on the threshold of having
Federal legislation to authorize NOW accounts for like financial
institutions--including banks--on a nationwide basis.
Another area where legislative and regulatory change is
likely to occur and result in competition is the further
inc~eased
relaxation of branching restrictions on financial institutions.
In New Mexico, of course, bank customers benefit from con
venient access to banking services as permitted and encouraged by
the state's branching and multi-bank holding company laws. Never
theless, branching may remain an i mportant topic in New Mexico as
technological progress and the growing incursion by other insti
tutions into the traditional banking service areas requires greater
competitive flexibility for banking.
In many areas of the nation, advances in electronic payment
mechanisms and the sharing of facilities by different banks and
other financial institutions have led to the development of
statewide and regional electronic transfer systems. At the same
time, growth in electronic banking nationwide has eroded the
.
.
-6
importance of political boundaries in governing competitive inter
action among financial institutions. Banks have, or soon will
have, the capability to serve their customers electronically
over great distances. Restrictive state branching laws, which
did not anticipate such advances in our payments mechanism, or
the ability to perform interstate and even international business
through loan production offices or Edge corporations, must adapt
if banks are to compete effectively with other financial and
nonfinancial institutions unfettered by such restrictions.
extent that state branching laws are not sufficiently
T~the
flexible to allow banks to compete in this new competitive and
technological environment, they will force the creation of inno
vations to circumvent their restrictions.
In my judgement, technological and competitive considerations
will bring increasing pressure for reform in state branching
laws nationwide. This reform may come in "fits and starts" with
development of reciprocal branching agreements among states and
the linking of EFT systems. But most of us would prefer that
reform evolve in a more comprehensive and efficient manner by
allowing nationwide linking of electronic systems among many
types of financial systems while clearly defining the allowable
types of transactions. Such an approach would assure that no
state would be left at a competitive disadvantage and it would
allow financial institutions to plan for the future in a more
certain environment.
Another competitive issue--one that member banks constantly
remind us about at the Federal Reserve--is reserve requirements.
Member bankers feel strongly that the costs of holding idle
reserves have hindered them in competing with banks and
no~member
..
-7
financial institutions. And as more and more types of institu
tions begin to offer transaction services, greater attention
will have to be focused on establishing equitable reserve require
ments. Increasing competition for sources of funds, rapid infla
tion, and the high interest rates have combined to force bankers
to take a close look at the cost of membership. Many banks have
reacted by withdrawing from the System. From 1945 to 1970 the
proportion of U.S. banking deposits controlled by member banks
fell from 86 per cent to 80 per cent; but from 1970 to 1979
that has shrunk to 72 per cent, complicating the
p~centage
Federal Reserve's monetary policy implementation. Aside from
the membership implications of the reserve burden, a number of
economists have attacked the present system of required reserves
because it is inefficient and allocates resources poorly. These
economists question whether a desired level of investment in
banking can occur relative to other industries if bankers are
required to hold a portion of their assets in nonearning balances.
Thus, if our banking system is to be competitive with other
financial institutions, both here and abroad, and with other
industries in the economy, the burden of idle reserves must be
eliminated. As well documented in industry discussions of the
Federal Reserve membership issue, lower reserve requirements
and/or the payment of interGst on reserves are the two primary
methods suggested for lessening this reserve burden.
New member bankers may be assured that the Federal
Mexi~o
Reserve Bank of Kansas City will continue to urge an early reso
lution of the membership issue and an easing of the reserve burden.
In we know now that some of the 1930's banking
sUIT~ary,
legislation serves only to reduce banking competition without
.
,
-8
producing any measurable gains in the efficiency of the banking
system. Moreover, as a result of restrictions on bank activities
and deposit interest rates, and partly a result of banker atti
tudes, the role of commercial banks in the financial sector
has been gradually usurped by other financial intermediaries
and new credit arrangements. This change has become more rapid
since the late 1960's as the burdens of interest ceilings and
reserves have increased with inflation and as technology has
fostered new payment practices. Banks have been particulary
vulnerable to this combination of circumstances, given the nature
of their assets and their special need to attract both deposits
and capital.
What concerns me most about this financial growth and
development outside of the banking sector is that it has occurred
not because banks lost their desire to deliver financial services
in an efficient way, but because banking law was too slow to adapt
to changing conditions and the demands of the public. Therefore,
as bankers and regulators, we both have an interest in developing
and supporting a new regulatory framework which insures that
commercial banks are allowed to offer competitive services to the
public. At the same time that framework must preserve the essen
tial features which contribute to a sound banking system deserving
of public confidence.
If we continue to embrace the outdated--and largely anti
competitive--aspects of the banking laws of the 1930's, which
have led to a "band-aid" approach to financial institution
problems, then the confusing morass of piecemeal, patchwork
fixes which are so characteristic of legislative and regulatory
response will continue to hold us back.
.
·
-9
Change, and now accelerating change, has brought us a new
ball game. This game demands a comprehensive understanding
of how the game is to be played, not rules made up by the umpires
and the people in the star.ds as the game goes along. I will
support--and you should support--a fundamental review of the
environment in which financial institutions operate and compete
today, with a view toward legislating a financial system which
recognizes the importance of improved competition in the financial
arena. Furthermore, we should support development of a system
which has as an ultimate objective the economic efficiency of
~
our financial structure.
As these issues of the future framework of our financial
structure are aired in national forums in the period ahead, I
know that thoughtful bankers will continue to draw upon their
experience to counsel their lawmakers and regulators. I hope
that legislators will consider fully the traditional principles
of free enterprise in their I hope we can estab
deci~ionmaking.
lish a financial structure where all like institutions can compete
equitably. Let us have reasonable equity in requirements for
capital, liquidity, and taxation. Let the marketplace decide
what institutions should provide what services and at what prices.
In closing, I want to say that as change inevitably occurs
in banking, and as bankers and regulators join to encourage a
responsive regulatory framework for financial institutions, the
Federal Reserve would intend to work with you in supporting a
system which acknowledges your needs and meets the needs of
your customers.
Cite this document
APA
J. Roger Guffey (1979, June 15). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19790616_j_roger_guffey
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19790616_j_roger_guffey,
author = {J. Roger Guffey},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1979},
month = {Jun},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19790616_j_roger_guffey},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}