speeches · January 31, 1978
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
1978 PROSPECTS.
BUSINESS AND
.THE DOLLAR
REMARKS OF
John J. Balles
PRESIDENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF SAN FRANCISCO
Bankers Club
San Francisco, California
February 1 9 ^ 8 ^ M
of San Francisco
MAR 2 2 1978
LIBRARY
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Mr. Balles argues that the large U.S. trade
deficit was only one element in the late-1977
decline in the value of the dollar. A more im
portant factor was a shift in market sentiment
concerning this nation's ability to contain in
flation, as reflected in a slowdown in capital
inflows into the U.S. For international as well
as domestic reasons, therefore, U.S.
policymakers must redouble their efforts to
combat inflation. We must moderate the
growth in our domestic money supply, but
in addition, we must adopt an effective energy
program to reduce oil-import demand, and
also work to offset the impact of those legisla
tive actions that tend to boost business costs
and lead to higher prices.
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I'm glad to have the opportunity to partici
pate today in that important seasonal ritual, the
annual business forecast. The annual pat
tern, as you may have noticed, is similar to that
of the rainy season here in the Bay Area. The
season typically begins in late October or early
November, builds up considerably in De
cember, and then the heavens open in January.
This leads to the question—why have we
had so many conflicting forecasts (and so much
rain) in the past month or two? The answer is
simple—the economic atmosphere (like the
meteorological atmosphere) has become
quite disturbed during this period.
People would have taken an intense interest
in the business outlook this year anyway, be
cause of the fear of impending recession as a
result of the rather advanced age of this three-
year-old expansion. (I hasten to add, how
ever, that gerontological explanations of the
business cycle are somewhat oversimplified;
business expansions don't just die of old age,
but rather because of riotous living during
their earlier stages.) In any event, the already
murky economic atmosphere has suddenly
become more uncertain because of the clouds
drifting across the Pacific from Japan. This
development reminds us, not for the first time,
that our domestic actions or inactions can
eventually create trouble for ourselves through
the influence of world market forces.
The forecast pessimists thus may have a point
in warning us about all the dangers that face
us in 1978. Their advice might be discounted,
however, because they badly underesti
mated the strength exhibited by the national
economy over the past three years. In 1977,
for example, this $2-trillion economy continued
to sustain one of the strongest and most
prolonged expansions of the past generation.
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Total production of goods and services, in
real terms, increased 4.9 percent, and this sec
ond straight larger-than-normal increase
brought into play more of the reserves of labor
and capital that had been left unemployed
by the 1974-75 recession. The jobless rate
dropped sharply to the lowest level of the
past three years. More importantly, employ
ment increased faster than in any other year
since World War II—up 4.I million over the
year—and 58 percent of the working-age
population held jobs at year-end.
Pattern of 1978 Growth
The consensus forecast suggests a deceleration
of activity in the second half of 1978, similar
to what we encountered in each of the past
two years. The same basic factor seems to
be involved—a series of mini-inventory cycles.
Businessmen have shown some reluctance
to hold large inventories, causing sudden de
pletion of stocks whenever unexpected de
velopments occurred, such as strikes or sharp
increases in final demand (as in the last two
Christmas seasons). The result thus has been
several first-quarter flurries in stockroom ac
tivity, followed by slowdowns in the later quar
ters of each year. The same pattern could
easily be repeated during 1978. But for the year
as a whole, total real output may increase
about 4'/2-percent above its 1977 average.
Thus the economy would still be growing
above its long-run potential, calculated in terms
of a steadily growing and more efficient
workforce.
Aside from this shifting pattern of inven
tories, 1978 may witness a mixed pattern of
spending in other sectors of the economy.
Consumer auto demand may decline some
what, because of buyers' disinterest in
scaled-down models with scaled-up sticker
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prices. Also, single-family home construction
could retreat from its record 1977 pace, as
mortgage-lending institutions adjust to the
recent slowdown in savings flows. In contrast,
business spending for plant and equipment
could show unexpected strength, especially in
view of the near-capacity levels of operation
evident in many industries. Spending by state
and local governments should grow, bol
stered by Federal grants and by the expanding
economy's boost to tax revenues. (In fact,
state-local governments moved into a strong
surplus position in 1977 even while boosting
their spending.) Again, defense spending seems
more expansive in terms of the growth of
military prime-contract awards, which are run
ning roughly one-fifth above a year ago. On
balance, we might expect continued growth
but a change in the character of the expan
sion, with a slowdown by the fast-growing sec
tors of 1977 (such as consumption), but a
speed-up by some of the former slow-growing
sectors.
Unemployment and Inflation
Now, most forecasters had argued earlier
that continued growth would cause the unem
ployment rate to drop to about 6 V2 percent
of the labor force sometime in 1978. Well,
we've seen that rate achieved already by
the end of 1977, and the likelihood now is that
the jobless rate will fall to 6 percent or possi
bly lower later this year. Many observers be
lieve that that figure represents a significant
amount of unused resources in the economy.
But they may be wrong, because the pub
lished jobless rate (for a number of demogra
phic and other reasons) is a much poorer
guide in this respect than it used to be. The
pressures already reached in the labor mar
ket can be measured by the fact that the vol
ume of help-wanted advertising jumped
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one-third over the course of the past year. And
as I've already said, a record 58 percent of
the entire working-age population held jobs at
year-end, which suggests a closer approach
to "full employment" than was achieved in all
those years of the past several decades that
boasted lower jobless rates.
We might also expect inflationary pressures
to continue in 1978. Most analysts would agree
that a 6-percent rate of inflation has become
imbedded in the overall economy, judging ei
ther from the past year's trend of prices, or
the increases in wage costs incurred by major
pattern-setting industries, or the amount of
past fiscal and monetary stimulus. Moreover,
we might see further price pressures from a
depreciating dollar, reflecting the much higher
cost of goods from Japan, Germany and
other trading partners.
Trade and the Dollar
This prospect for domestic markets—contin
ued moderate growth, along with continued
wage and price pressures—is bound to be af
fected during 1978 by what happens in the
foreign-exchange markets. This forces us to
take our eyes off domestic goals and search
for answers to the question of "Why did the
dollar fall so sharply in 1977?" Actually, the
crisis was a relatively recent event. For most of
the first three quarters of 1977 (except july),
the dollar remained fairly stable in relation to a
trade-weighted basket of currencies. But
from late September on, the dollar declined
steeply and steadily against almost all major
currencies except the Canadian dollar—11
percent against the German mark, the Japa
nese yen, and the British pound, and even
more against the Swiss franc. The market
then stabilized in early January, when the Fed
eral Reserve and the Treasury undertook
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support operations in the market and the Fed
underscored this move with a half-point rise
in its discount rate.
Now, the first explanation—although only a
partial one—of the steeply falling dollar can be
found in the rapid deterioration in our trade
balance with the rest of the world. The num
bers here are instructive. The merchandise-
trade balance shifted from a $9-billion surplus in
1975 to a $6-billion deficit in 1976 and then
finally to almost a $27-billion deficit in 1977.
The current-account balance—that is, the
balance on trade, services and investment in
come-deteriorated from a $ 12-billion sur
plus in 1975 to a slight deficit in 1976 and then
to a $ 17-billion deficit in 1977.
At least part of the deterioration in the mer
chandise-trade balance can be blamed upon
other things besides oil. Imports of other pro
ducts—such as autos, steel, radios, TV sets
and the like—amounted to about $105 billion
last year, or 48 percent above the 1975 fig
ure. In contrast, U.S. exports last year were only
about 14 percent above the level of two
years before. Our export performance might
improve if overseas economies increase
their growth rates and increase their demand
for American products, while our own surg
ing demand for German and Japanese products
should be curbed by a depreciation-caused
rise in their pricetags. Imported oil is a separate
question, however, and I'd like to digress for
a minute to talk about its overall impact on our
economy.
Over the past half-decade, oil imports have
jumped from $5 billion a year in value to
about $45 billion a year, reflecting sharp in
creases in both the volume and the price of
OPEC oil shipments. In this connection, we
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tend to understate the problem by continu
ing to refer to the OPEC's four-fold boost in oil
prices at the time of the Middle East war, be
cause oil prices in 1978 (even without a price
increase) are roughly eight times higher than
they were at the beginning of the decade. That
date of 1970 is a crucial one, because that's
when a "quiet revolution" (in Alan Greenspan's
phrase) took place in the world oil market.
Prior to that time, the U.S. was the marginal
supplier in the market, being prepared to
unload Texas crude to keep the price down in
any crisis—as in fact it did during the several
earlier Middle East wars. But after about 1970,
the U.S. could no longer play the same role
because of its declining production and still-ris
ing demand, and the key price decisions
thenceforth were made by the cartel rather
than by ourselves.
Asset Demand on the Dollar
As I said earlier, the large U.S. trade deficit
was one element in explaining the decline in
the international value of the dollar. How
ever, it was by no means the only or even the
major factor in that development. This can
be clearly seen from the fact that in 1975, when
the U.S. had a $9-billion trade surplus, the
international value of the dollar was even lower
than now, yet in 1976 and the first half of
1977, the value of the dollar actually increased
while the trade balance deteriorated. The
reason for this was an offsetting and very sub
stantial capital inflow, associated with the
high degree of foreign confidence in U.S. politi
cal and economic stability—including its
price stability.
Even so, asset demand can change very
quickly as market sentiments become altered.
And in view of the massive size of the hold
ings of international financial assets, any shift in
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asset preference can have an enormous im
pact on the exchange markets, as we have
learned so well in the past several months.
But what caused the shift in asset demand? We
can't simply point to the upsurge in U.S. pur
chases of oil and other foreign products, be
cause the trade balance had been
deteriorating on that account for several years
previously.
A more likely explanation has to do with the
rise in inflation expectations in the U.S., rela
tive to other major industrial nations. Given its
unique role, the dollar is especially sensitive
to changes in inflation expectations, because its
value as an international store of value and
medium of exchange depends heavily on its
stability and negotiability. Inflation expecta
tions may have changed because in the 1976-
77 period, monetary growth accelerated in
the U.S. compared with the previous two
years, whereas a number of our major trad
ing partners did not show such a trend, or in
some cases, actually displayed decelerating
monetary growth vis-a-vis the 1974-75 period.
In the short run, this has meant that the U.S.
economy has grown more rapidly than the Jap
anese and European economies. However,
it has also suggested the possibility of a worsen
ing of inflationary pressures in the U.S., rela
tive to other major countries.
This experience demonstrates once again
that exchange stability in our interdependent
world economy is not consistent with diver
gent monetary policies. Yet divergent mone
tary policies are virtually inevitable, given the
fact that all industrial countries mainly conduct
their policies with a view toward their own
domestic problems. Thus, so long as such di
vergence exists, all concerned may be
forced to accept the exchange-rate conse
quences of their policies. Large-scale at
tempts to target exchange rates or to limit their
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variations could require continuous ex-
change-market interventions—which are but
another form of open-market operations—
and thus could undermine domestic monetary-
policy objectives. The Bank of England
learned this last fall, when after absorbing an
enormous capital inflow, it was finally forced
to abandon its effort to hold down the sterling
exchange rate against the dollar.
Domestic and International Policy
This discussion finally brings us back to the
necessarily close relationship between domes
tic and international policy. If we want to
halt the decline in the dollar and control the tur
moil in the foreign-exchange market, we
must moderate the growth in our domestic
money supply—but we must do much else
besides. Several modest interim steps that have
already been taken in the foreign-exchange
field could help in this regard by attracting a
larger flow of capital into the U.S. I'm think
ing of such developments as the small rise in
short-term interest rates that we have re
cently experienced, as well as the more active
intervention by the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve to head off disorderly conditions in the
market.
However, an overall solution of that problem
will depend on some more basic corrective
actions. First would be an effective anti-infla
tion policy on the part of the U.S. Govern
ment. This would include a moderation of
monetary growth by the Fed, but it would
also need to encompass a moderation or even
reversal of those legislative initiatives that
tend to work against our national goal of price
stability. The checklist of actions which have
pushed up costs and prices in the U.S. would
include farm price-support legislation, mini-
mum-wage laws, legislative floors under con-
struction-labor costs, maritime subsidies, rail-
and truck-transport restrictions, and the various
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protectionist measures that have been taken
to shore up individual industries.
Another basic requirement is the passage of
an energy bill that would include effective pro
visions to conserve oil on a large scale and to
stimulate domestic exploration and produc
tion—thus reducing oil imports. Also
needed is a change in our tax laws to stimulate
both direct and financial investment by for
eigners in this country. At the same time, our
major trading partners could help redress
the U.S. trade balance and enhance the foreign
value of the dollar if they followed policies
aimed at faster economic growth.
Monetary policy of course has a role to play
in curbing the decline in the dollar and in curb
ing inflationary pressures here at home. Dur
ing 1977, monetary growth was on the high
side—about 7Vi percent for M-| (currency
plus bank demand deposits) and about 91/2
percent for M2 (currency plus all bank de
posits except large CD's). This exceeded the
twelve-month growth range that the Federal
Open Market Committee had set one year ear
lier as being prudent for M-|, and was high in
the range for M2. Moreover, inflationary pres
sures have been aggravated for more than a
decade by excessive growth of the monetary
aggregates, related in turn to the long series
of Federal budget deficits incurred over that
period. Ballooning expenditures for a host of
Federal programs, even in the face of sharp in
creases in tax revenues, have caused a cu
mulative deficit of $337 billion over the past
decade and a half.
Deficit spending has worked to pull mone
tary policy off course in an expansionary direc
tion, by supporting excessive growth of
money and credit. This happens because the
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rise in total credit demands, swelled by
large-scale Federal borrowing at a time of rising
private-credit demands, tends to force up
interest rates. Higher rates then undermine the
strength of certain vulnerable sectors of the
economy, such as small business, agriculture,
housing, and state and local governments.
Under pressure to minimize this type of impact,
the Federal Reserve has occasionally delayed
taking firm action to head off excessive money-
and-credit growth, and the eventual result
has been more inflation.
Domestically as well as internationally, the
best monetary-policy prescription today is to
pursue a gradual reduction in the growth
rates of the monetary aggregates, to a level
consistent with long-run price stability. This
is the course on which the Fed set out in March
1975, when it began the practice of making
quarterly reports to Congress regarding our tar
gets for monetary growth over the year
ahead. During the course of 1977, the Fed low
ered the M-| growth range to the area of 4 to
6 Vi percent, and the M2 growth range to the
area of 6 V2 to 9 percent—and despite prob
lems earlier in the year, it kept the growth of
the aggregates within those ranges during
the final months of 1977. Nonetheless, the cen
tral bank will not have an enviable task in the
year ahead, because projected Federal deficit
spending of $60 billion or so in both fiscal
1978 and fiscal 1979 could create severe new
financing demands.
Concluding Remarks
To sum up, we appear to be heading into a
year of continued growth but also a year of
great potential danger. The greatest danger,
of course, is resurgent inflation. If prices should
accelerate, and if the Fed should attempt to
tighten credit, "crowding out" might become a
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reality rather than only a distant threat to the
financial market. In that case, Treasury financing
demands could dominate the market and
deny credit to the housing industry and other
vulnerable sectors of the economy.
Alternatively, if the Fed should try to accom
modate all credit demands in this inflationary
atmosphere, the result might be another bulge
in the money supply and a further boost to
inflation expectations—which could then be
curbed only by the slamming of brakes and
a severe recession. And now that we've been
warned by a shot across the bow from the
foreign-exchange market, any resurgence of
domestic inflation could lead to a severe and
lasting deterioration in the value of the dollar,
which in turn could give another push to the
vicious spiral of inflation.
During the past three years, we've avoided
a number of disaster scenarios that were writ
ten at the bottom of the recession, and we
should be able to avoid this disaster scenario
also. To accomplish that goal, however, we
must maintain a large measure of discipline in
our fiscal and monetary policymaking.
Among other things, that requires maintaining
the independence of the Federal Reserve
within the structure of the Federal government.
Over the decades, we in the Fed have been
able to make prompt and (if need be) frequent
changes in monetary policy, in contrast to
the necessarily ponderous processes of fiscal
policy. We've also been able to make the
hard decisions that might be avoided by deci
sion-makers subject to the day-to-day pres
sures of political life. A number of such
decisions may have to be made in the years
ahead, but that is the price required for sustain
ing a period of domestic and international
prosperity into the 1980's.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1978, January 31). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19780201_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19780201_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1978},
month = {Jan},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19780201_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}