speeches · November 20, 1977
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
BUSINESS,
FINANCE
AND POLICY
_____IN 1978
REMARKS OF
John J. Balles
PRESIDENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF SAN FRANCISCO
Los Angeles Chapter
National Association of Business Economists
Los Angeles, California r\/s Bank
November 21.
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John J. Balles
According to Mr. Balles, 1978 should wit
ness continued economic growth but a
change in the character of the expansion,
with the fast-growing sectors of the past
year slowing down and the former slow-
growers speeding up. The projected eco
nomic strength could yet be undermined
by a number of different problems—the re
cord deficit in our international transac
tions, the upsurge in energy costs, the cost
squeeze in agriculture and other basic in
dustries, the continued high level of unem
ployment, the severe stock-market decline,
and the related weakness in business profits
and business investment plans. But
throughout all our problems runs a single
common thread—inflation, resulting large
ly from a long series of Federal budget
deficits which have pulled monetary policy
off course in an expansionary direction.
Given that context, the best monetary-
policy prescription is to pursue a gradual
reduction in the growth rates of the mone
tary aggregates, to a level consistent with
long-run price stability. Continued Federal
Reserve independence is essential for
achieving that policy goal.
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I'm delighted to join you this evening for a
discussion of the 1978 business and financial
outlook, but I intend to make only one
unqualified forecast—namely, that the mar
ket for economists will continue to be
much stronger than the market for most
other things. But of course, we can always
be safe in making that forecast, at least as
long as the economy has ills to diagnose. As
for the usefulness of our endeavors, some
critics are likely to say that we'll be spend
ing all our time next year just re-arranging
the deck chairs on the Titanic. But I hope
that we'll be more usefully employed—
analyzing the very real problems of the
economy and advising solutions that will
guarantee a regime of solid growth, high
employment and stable prices well into the
next decade.
Economic Cross-currents
I'd like to spend most of my time this
evening discussing the causes and cures of
our economic difficulties, but first let me
sketch the projected shape of the 1978
economy, as it appears in the usual consen
sus forecast. There are not too many dis
agreements on that score—which is to be
expected, considering the profession’s
tendency to rely upon similar forecasting
services, whether the source is Otto Eck
stein, Larry Klein or even Jimmy the Greek.
Thus, we begin with a general expectation
of a gradual deceleration in activity, follow
ing the rapid 7-percent rate of growth of
real output in the first half of 1977. Output
might grow at about a 41/2-percent rate in
the second half of this year, and close to
that same pace between late 1977 and late
1978. At that rate, the economy would be
moving roughly in line with its long-run
potential, calculated in terms of a steadily
growing and more efficient workforce. That
is probably the most viable pace for a
sustainable prosperity in the 1980's.
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According to the standard forecast, 1978
may witness some moderation of consumer
spending for autos and other goods, follow
ing the speedup in that category earlier this
year. Also, single-family home construction
may retreat from its recent record pace,
although mortgage-lending institutions still
have ample funds to support a high level of
activity. Inventory spending meanwhile
should continue to reflect the underlying
attitude of caution in the economy, as
business firms adjust promptly to changes
in their sales.
In contrast, several sectors of the national
economy could grow at an accelerated
pace in the year ahead. Despite its perform
ance to date, business spending for new
plant and equipment could be one such
area, especially in view of the near-capacity
levels of operation evident in many indus
tries. Spending by state and local govern
ments should grow, bolstered by Federal
grants, by higher tax rates, and by the
expanding economy’s boost to tax reve
nues. (In fact, state-local governments this
year have moved into a strong surplus
position even while boosting their spend
ing.) Again, defense spending seems more
expansive in terms of the growth of military
prime-contract awards, which are running
roughly one-fifth above a year ago. On
balance, then, we might expect continued
growth but a change in the character of the
expansion, with the fast-growing sectors of
the past year slowing down and the former
slow-growers speeding up.
Surfeit of Problems
Needless to say, a number of problems
could arise to push the economy off the
growth path that I have sketched. First,
there is the massive and sudden shift to
ward deficit in the nation's trade with the rest
of the world. After posting a large surplus in
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1975, the U.S. recorded a $9-billion trade
deficit in 1976 and perhaps a $30-billion
deficit this year. The principal factor in
volved (although not the only one) has
been the continuing upsurge in oil imports,
which have jumped from $5 billion to $45
billion within the past half-decade.
Looking ahead, most observers see little
chance of a reduction in the merchandise-
trade deficit in 1978. Domestic petroleum
supplies will increase because of the open
ing of the Alaska pipeline, but oil imports
should still continue high because of pur
chases for the strategic petroleum reserve.
U.S. farm exports may remain weak because
of good harvests abroad and large carry
overs in the world grain market. Mean
while, the trade balance in industrial pro
ducts may remain unfavorable, because of
the continued pattern of sluggish growth in
overseas economies. With all this in pros
pect, the worries over the nation’s interna
tional position might continue, although
some factors—such as increased foreign
investment in this country—have helped
offset the trade deficits to date.
Energy of course has been closely involved
in both our domestic and international
problems. The long-term trend toward low
er energy costs has been at least temporari
ly reversed in the 1970's, and this historical
shift has drastically altered production rela
tionships in the world economy, creating
the possibility of a prolonged period of
reduced economic growth. (Incidentally,
we tend to understate the problem by
continuing to refer to the OPEC's four-fold
boost in oil prices at the time of the embar
go, because prices in 1978 may be roughly
ten times higher than they were at the
beginning of the decade.) The difficulty has
been aggravated by our tendency as a
nation to search for a political rather than
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an economic solution to the problem—that
is, by our failure to utilize the price mecha
nism for reducing energy demand and
allocating scarce supplies. I rather doubt
that the basic problem will be solved by the
Senate's voting of tax credits to homeown
ers who heat with wood or to motorists who
buy electric tricycles.
Some key industries have their own individ
ual problems—agriculture for instance. It
would be foolish to expect a continuation
of the tremendous farm boom of four years
ago. Still, after adjustment for inflation, the
average farmer’s net income is no higher
now than it was a decade ago—and it’s less
than half the level reached at the peak of
the export boom in 1973. (In contrast, per
capita income in the larger national econo
my, in real terms, has risen about 30
percent over the past decade.) Part of the
problem stems from the slower growth of
farm marketings, partly reflecting such
world market developments as the slow
down in demand from our overseas cus
tomers and the increase in sales by our
overseas competitors. But basically, the
farm sector remains beset by the inflation-
bloated costs of land, labor, fertilizer and
farm equipment, which in the aggregate
have doubled since the beginning of the
decade.
Then there is the steel industry. U.S. steel
consumption has risen only 15 percent over
the past decade, because of intermittent
recessions, the loss of markets to substitute
materials, and the recent slack in demand
for capital goods. But to add to the domes
tic industry’s problems, foreign imports
have siphoned off the lion’s share of this
modest market growth, accounting recently
for as much as 20 percent of the U.S. mar
ket. Meanwhile, domestic production this
year has been running at an annual rate of
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around 125 million tons—about the same as
in 1964. Whether the cause is dumping or
the simple lack of competitiveness, the
domestic industry is in difficult straits. A
somewhat similar case is the copper indus
try, which has to deal both with weak
world-wide markets and with an all-out
production drive by nationalized foreign
producers.
Problems of Labor and Capital
Now, many people believe that the most
serious national problem can be found in
the continuing high level of unemploy
ment. Unfortunately, that problem too of
ten is badly measured and badly analyzed.
Let's consider the data involved. The pro
longed expansion has generated 6V2 million
new jobs since the beginning of the
recovery—the most impressive increase of
the past generation. In addition, during this
expansion the jobless rate has dropped
from 9 to 7 percent of the labor force—and
despite its sideways movement since last
spring, there are good grounds for expect
ing further improvement.
But this raises the question of where the
rate should actually be at full employment.
The statistics are inflated—in good times as
well as bad—by women workers who move
in and out of the labor force seeking tem
porary jobs, by teenagers who are priced
out of the job market by high minimum-
wage laws, and by some individuals who
might not otherwise look for work but who
are forced to register in order to qualify for
certain welfare programs. There is indeed a
serious unemployment problem in certain
areas. Thirty-eight percent of black teenag
ers are reported without work, and a hard
core of the labor force—almost one per
cent of the total—has been without jobs for
six months or more. But those individuals
will get jobs only if we develop better
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training programs and create more low-
wage entry-level jobs—not if we insist on
adopting broad programs which stimulate
the entire economy, and not if we continue
to raise the barrier for young workers by
constant legislative increases in the mini
mum wage.
We could also use more thorough analysis
of the trade-off problem. I for one would
argue that the very notion of a trade-off
between unemployment and inflation is
fundamentally misleading. Recent evidence
suggests that under some circumstances,
inflation tends to increase rather than to
decrease joblessness. A study prepared at
my bank by Joseph Bisignano, which ap
peared in the summer issue of our Econom
ic Review, provides such evidence for the
U.S., and similar results have been noted in
such countries as Great Britain, Canada and
Italy. This perverse impact of rising prices
on unemployment can be explained by the
reactions of both consumers and produc
ers, who associate inflation with increased
uncertainty about the future. Households,
more uncertain about the future value of
their real incomes, tend to cut back on their
spending plans. Businesses, more uncertain
about the rate of return on new capital,
tend to reduce investment in plant and
equipment. The actions of both groups
lower the total level of demand in the
economy, and thereby tend to raise the
unemployment rate.
Perhaps the most telling indicator of our
economic malaise is the sluggishness of job-
creating investment, and beyond that, the
weakness of corporate profits. This seems to
be the gist of the depressing message that
Wall Street has been sending us throughout
all of this year. (Incidentally, Wall Streeters
claim that there’s only one difference be
tween the stock market and the Titanic—
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there was a band playing aboard the Titan
ic.) One important factor is a weakness of
business confidence, which leads people
on both Main Street and Wall Street to
demand increasingly high risk premiums.
As evidence, we see a shortfall of spending
on new plant and equipment, especially
long-lived investments whose profit expec
tations are concentrated a decade or two in
the future. Spending on short-lived assets—
those with rapid rates of cash return, such
as trucks and business equipment—has ad
vanced in real terms at an 8-percent annual
rate over the course of this business expan
sion. On the other hand, spending on long-
lived assets such as major construction pro
jects has increased at less than a 3-percent
rate over this same time-span. Underlying
this growing investment risk is a profound
uncertainty about the shape of the future
economic environment in which new facili
ties will be brought on line.
The weakness of business confidence re
flects to some extent the uncertainties
created by pending legislative cost
increases—energy, social security, tax re
form, minimum wage, hospital and welfare
reform—not to mention the costs of past
environmental and health legislation. But
even more basic is a weakness of business
profits—a problem which is aggravated by
the public’s misunderstanding about the
actual level of profits. The commonly cited
profits figures—the book profits that busi
nesses report to their stockholders—have
risen sharply in the last few years, to about
double their level of a decade ago. But as
you well know, raw profit figures have
become almost meaningless as a guide to
corporate health because of the way in
which inflation distorts cost calculations.
Under historical cost accounting, the true
costs of producing goods are badly under
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stated with respect to both the drawdown
of materials from inventory and the con
sumption of capital assets—and conse
quently, profits have become seriously
overstated. When we make the proper
adjustments, we find that the level of cor
porate profits was overstated in 1976 by
about $30 billion, resulting in an overpay
ment of close to $12 billion in income taxes.
And when we use a replacement-cost basis
for the tangible-assets portion of equity
capital, we find that the after-tax return on
stockholders' equity has averaged only
about 3Va percent throughout the 1970's—
about two percentage points below the
average rate of return for the 1950's and
1960's. These statistics are ominous for job-
creating investment activity, especially in
view of the historically close correlation
between the rate of return on stockholders'
equity and the rate of real investment.
Inflation and Deficit Spending
Obviously, then, the expected strength of
the 1978 economy could yet be under
mined, for a number of different reasons.
As I've indicated, the problem list includes
the record deficit in our international trans
actions, the upsurge in energy costs, the
cost squeeze in agriculture and other basic
industries, the continued high level of un
employment, the severe stock-market de
cline, and the related weakness in business
profits and in business investment plans.
But throughout all our problems runs a
single common thread—inflation, which
continually undermines the health of our
economy. Admittedly, inflation has in
creased at “only” a 4-percent rate over the
past several months, reflecting some easing
in food and other commodity prices. But
most analysts agree that a 6-to-7 percent
rate of inflation has become imbedded in
the overall economy, judging either from
the past year's trend of prices, or the in
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creases in wage costs incurred by major
pattern-setting industries, or the amount of
past fiscal and monetary stimulus.
The search for the basic cause of these price
pressures always comes back to the long
series of Federal budget deficits incurred
over the past decade or so. Deficit spending
has worked to pull monetary policy off
target in an expansionary direction, by
supporting excessive growth of money and
credit. This happens because the rise in
total credit demands, swelled by large-scale
Federal borrowing, tends to raise interest
rates. Higher rates then undermine the
strength of certain vulnerable sections of
the economy, such as small business, agri
culture, housing, and state and local gov
ernments. In an effort to minimize this type
of impact, the Federal Reserve has often
delayed taking firm action to head off ex
cessive growth in money and credit.
Total Federal spending has grown at an
unparalleled pace in the late 1960's and
early 1970’s. Defense spending has contri
buted to this budget growth, notably dur
ing the Vietnam War period. But the most
worrisome increases, which are not even
reviewed by Congress after the initial legis
lation, have been recorded in what budget
makers call “uncontrollable" categories—
certainly a very apt description. Most of
these programs involve the automatic trans
fer of money to anyone eligible under
entitlement formulas written into law. Bal
looning expenditures have been the result.
Federal spending first exceeded $100 billion
in 1962, but by fiscal 1977 it exceeded $400
billion a year. And with the slower growth
of revenues, deficits have continually
mounted, so that the cumulative deficit
over that decade and a half amounted to a
massive $337 billion. By failing to increase
direct taxes to cover this increased spend
ing, the Federal government decided in
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effect to impose a silent yet severe tax—
inflation.
There are hopeful signs in the reform
achieved under the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974, which provided a mechanism
for determining Congressional priorities
and relating expenditures to prospective
revenues. There are hopeful signs too in
some aspects of the recent budget picture.
The deficit for fiscal 1977 amounted to $45
billion—$23 billion below what the Admin
istration had expected early in the year. This
came about partly because of the healthy
increase in revenues, and partly because of
the unexplained failure of bureaucrats to
do what they usually do best—that is, spend
money. From these indications, it’s possible
that the fiscal 1978 budget will also be lower
than expected. Still, that's little consolation
when we consider that the projected $58-
billion deficit figure approaches the worst
recession figure, because an expanding
economy such as ours should not require
that much stimulus from deficit financing.
Financial Markets and Interest Rates
Now, the offsetting nature of the various
factors that I've discussed—the moderate
strength of the business expansion, along
with the effects of inflation and related
problems—might suggest a virtual standoff
in financial markets in the year ahead.
Credit extensions have sharply outrun GNP
growth this year; in the third quarter, for
example, total borrowings ran roughly 30
percent above a year ago, at about a $400-
billion annual rate. If the pace of the econ
omy should moderate, that type of financial
pressure should moderate as well. For ex
ample, we might experience some sluggish
ness in consumer-credit and mortgage de
mands, offset by an increased corporate
reliance on external financing. Yet even
after several years of expansion, our finan
cial markets still appear to be structurally
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very sound. Business corporations have
increased their ability to withstand external
strains, by building up their liquid assets
and establishing standby borrowing facili
ties for use in meeting future operating
needs. Similarly, financial institutions have
increased their ability to withstand such
strains, by stretching out the maturity of
their liabilities and increasing their holdings
of short-dated governments. But here
again, the size of the Treasury deficit ap
pears crucial. A hold-down on deficit
spending is necessary if we are to limit
Treasury borrowing demands on the mar
ket and stave off the threat of “crowding
out” for another year.
This brings up the question of interest
rates—a topic of keen importance in recent
months. Last summer, in a talk here at Town
Hall, I quoted Irving Fisher on that subject,
and I think it wise to quote him again,
especially since some prominent econo
mists appear to have overlooked Fisher in
their graduate-school reading. Several gen
erations ago, Fisher said, “Probably the
great majority of businessmen believe that
interest is low when money is plentiful, and
high when money is scarce. This view how
ever is fallacious, and the fallacy consists in
forgetting that plentiful money ultimately
raises the demand for loans just as much as
it raises the supply, and therefore has just as
much tendency to raise the interest rate as
to lower it.”
What Fisher tells us is that we should distin
guish between two kinds of rates—the real
rate and the nominal rate which is quoted
in the market-place. The real rate is meas
ured in terms of real purchasing power over
goods and services, and the nominal rate is
measured in terms of nominal purchasing
power. If lenders and borrowers all be
lieved that the purchasing power of money
would remain constant, the two interest
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rates would be the same. But in recent
years, they haven’t been able to make that
supposition. In this inflationary atmos
phere, money rates have risen considerably
above the real rate. With prices expected to
rise at (say) 5 percent a year, lenders have
demanded the real rate plus 5 percent, so
that they would be protected against an
expected loss in the purchasing power of
money. Borrowers meanwhile have been
willing to pay this 5-percent (or whatever)
inflation premium, because they expect to
repay their loans with dollars that are worth
5 percent less each year than the dollars
they originally borrowed.
Now, most people understand the role of
business fluctuations in pushing rates up
and down. In recent decades, interest-rate
peaks have roughly coincided with
business-cycle peaks, and interest-rate lows
have usually followed recession lows after a
few months’ time. Most people also under
stand (at least dimly) the short-term ability
of the Federal Reserve to push rates down
through easier money conditions or to push
rates up through tighter policy. Yet too few
people clearly understand the long-term
effects of price expectations on interest
rates, and the way in which such expecta
tions can offset other market influences.
Our recent experience should teach them
that monetary restraint can drive up the real
rate by reducing the supply of funds—but
that it can also drive down the inflation
premium by reducing inflation expecta
tions. Short-term interest rates have risen
almost two percentage points since last
spring, but long-term rates—such as the
yield on new issues of prime-quality
utilities—have remained virtually flat over
this period.
Monetary Policy Problems
As you know, Fed policy has been attacked
recently from two opposite directions,
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which may be evidence in itself that we’re
on the right track. Those critics who closely
follow money-supply trends argue that pol
icy has been too easy, and that it will
inexorably lead to severe inflation. Those
critics who closely follow every basis-point
rise in interest rates claim that policy has
been too tight, and that it will condemn us
to a credit crunch and a renewed recession.
Our duty, however, is to thread a middle
course between those two extremes, recog
nizing our responsibility for supporting the
sometimes conflicting goals of economic
growth, high employment, price stability
and stable financial markets.
In today's economic and financial context,
the best policy prescription is to pursue a
gradual reduction in the growth rates of the
monetary aggregates, to a level consistent
with long-run price stability. This is the
course on which the Fed set out in March
1975, when it began the practice of making
quarterly reports to Congress regarding our
targets for monetary growth over the year
ahead. Earlier this year, for example, Chair
man Burns announced a lower M-| target
growth range for the year ahead, of 4 to 6V2
percent, and in his latest testimony two
weeks ago, he announced a lower M2
target range, of 6V2 to 9 percent.
Money growth actually has been above the
target ranges over the past year, averaging
about 7 percent for M -\ and 11 percent for
M2. Vet some critics claim that even faster
growth is needed to support a strong econ
omy, because the growth of the real money
supply has been modest in the context of a
6-percent inflation rate. Their prescription,
then, is to increase the rate of money
growth to step up the growth of the under
lying economy. I would have thought that
that type of analysis went out of style with
the German inflation of the 1920's, when
people ran around with baskets of money
trying to buy loaves of bread. More rapid
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growth now would guarantee even more
inflation in the future, which according to
the argument I cited, would call for a fur
ther increase in the rate of money growth.
But at some point, it would be necessary to
slam on the brakes, with disastrous conse
quences for the economy.
I believe that, if we are to be effective in
carrying out our monetary-policy responsi
bilities, continued Federal Reserve inde
pendence is essential now more than ever.
The founders of the Federal Reserve early
in this century introduced a measure of
discipline into policymaking by ensuring
the independence of the central bank with
in the structure of the Federal government.
For example, the law provides that the Fed’s
Board of Governors shall have seven mem
bers appointed to staggered 14-year terms
to prevent packing the Board. The law also
gives the Fed an independent source of
revenue, the interest earnings on its port
folio of government securities, to prevent it
from being coerced by Congressional con
trol of its purse-strings.
Within that structure, we in the Fed have
been able to make prompt and (if need be)
frequent changes in monetary policy, in
contrast to the necessarily ponderous pro
cesses of fiscal policy. We have also been
able to make the hard decisions that might
be avoided by decision-makers subject to
the day-to-day pressures of political life.
Certainly, the Fed has stumbled on some
occasions, but it’s hard to imagine our
problems would have been solved if the
control of the monetary authority had been
turned over to the Executive branch or to
Congress. Indeed, if the spending propen
sities of Federal officials had been given
freer rein through easier access to the
“printing press," our inflation problem of
the past decade probably would have been
far worse than it actually was.
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Concluding Remarks
After analyzing my remarks—especially my
long list of problem areas—you'll probably
ask how we could possibly expect to
achieve business and financial strength in
the year ahead. My first answer is that I
expect a continuation of the generally cor
rect line of policy initiated several years
ago. Despite all the disaster scenarios writ
ten at the bottom of the recession, within
2V2 years we have achieved an increase of 15
percent in real output, an addition of 6V2
million people to the employment rolls, a
drop of 2 percentage points in the jobless
rate, a reduction by half in the inflation
rate, and a rise of 10 percent in real per
capita income. Obviously, private and pub
lic decision-makers must have done some
thing right during this period. Even some of
the policy mistakes of recent years can be
explained in terms of the nation's constant
effort to serve as the prime “locomotive'' of
the world economy.
My second reason for optimism is based on
our nation's long-run record of achieve
ment. Sometime in the next several months
we will pass a major landmark—a $2-trillion
GNP. At that point, we should pause to
remind ourselves of the remarkable record
achieved just since 1929, a year which we
normally consider the peak of a golden age.
Within this half-century, we have recorded
more than three-fourths of the entire in
crease in real output achieved since the
founding of the Republic. And how was this
done? Simply through a modest yet persist
ent long-term increase of 1.7 percent per
year in real per capita output. The case for a
moderate-growth policy can be summed
up in that single statistic, so if we continue
to observe that lesson from the past, we will
have within our grasp a record of steady
growth, high employment, and stable
prices in the decades ahead.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1977, November 20). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19771121_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19771121_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1977},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19771121_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}