speeches · July 25, 1977
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
INFLATION,
INTEREST RATES
__ AND THE FED
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John J. Balles
Americans are continuing to suffer from
the “silent yet severe tax" of inflation, says
Mr. Balles. The problem can be traced
basically to an upsurge in Federal deficit
spending, which generated a cumulative
deficit of $337 billion over the past decade
and a half. This series of budget deficits
has frequently pulled monetary policy off
target in an expansionary direction, by
supporting an excessive growth of money
and credit. The resultant inflation has also
led to a high level of interest rates, largely
because lenders demand an inflation
premium to protect themselves against an
expected loss in the purchasing power of
their money. Thus, he argues, we must
work to curb inflation if we want to keep
interest rates in check.
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I’m glad to have this opportunity to dis
cuss with you the problems of dealing
with the high cost of living and the high
cost of money. I can't think of a better
setting for this talk than Town Hall—an
institution which is part New England
town-meeting and part Chautauqua, the
type of traveling educational seminar that
was popular in our country a generation
or two ago. In fact, those old-fashioned
Chautauquas had a flavor of religious
revival about them, and that too I think is
appropriate, because I strongly believe
that the subject of inflation should be
approached in terms of fire and brim
stone, with much pounding of the pulpit.
Some experts tell us that we should learn
to live with inflation, by such means as
indexing our wages and other payments,
so that they rise each year in step with the
consumer price index. But this stopgap
type of solution helps only certain groups
whereas the rising tide of prices under
mines everyone's standard of living—and
besides, distorts the price mechanism so
badly that major inefficiencies develop in
the allocation of resources. I hasten to adc
that the prices of many goods and service;
can and should increase through the
workings of the marketplace, for that is
the market's way of signaling people to
reduce their consumption and expand
their production. But what should con
cern us is a rise in the general level of
prices—the continued escalation in the
cost of everything bought by the average
household and the average business
enterprise.
Costs of Inflation
What then is wrong with inflation? For one
thing, inflation weakens productive effi
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ciency. It impairs business management by
taking the meaning out of cost-accounting
figures, and making it all but impossible to
gauge the efficiency of operations by their
cost performance. Inflation also perverts
business incentives from production to
potentially more profitable activities, such
as occurred in the inventory speculation
of 1973-74. Shortages then develop, and
soon all businessmen are hoarding or
speculating in the gray market simply to
keep production going. Again, inflation
obstructs the flow of capital through the
economy, by segmenting capital markets,
distorting financial prices, and undermin
ing financial values. In all these ways,
inflation acts as an insidious disease of the
price system.
Inflation also reduces workers’ incentives
to produce more in order to earn more—
acting very much like a regressive type of
tax. People might put money aside for
future big-ticket purchases or for chil
dren's educations, but they then find the
value of those savings melting away. With
experiences such as this, their willingness
to work in order to save becomes gradual
ly undermined. A story I've heard, which
helps explain the Germans' strong fear of
inflation today, concerns a prosperous
German businessman who purchased in
the 1890's a large 50,000-mark endowment
policy, payable on retirement in 1923. In
that year, in the midst of the terrible
German hyperinflation, he received his
50,000 marks in the form of two postage
stamps.
Inflation consequently creates an atmos
phere of broken promises. That man of
few words, Calvin Coolidge, probably said
it best with the phrase, ‘‘Inflation is repu-
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diation.” Private agreements to purchase
goods and to pay wages and salaries be
come undermined, along with govern
mental promises for debt repayment and
pensions. People receive the dollars they
were promised, but the purchasing-power
substance of the promise is missing. In the
long run, they get the feeling that some
one has been swindling them, and then
anything can happen. Witness what hap
pened when hyperinflation hit Germany
in the 1920's, China in the 1940's, and (to a
lesser extent) Latin America in more re
cent decades.
Record of Inflation
Our own country has had a long history of
inflation, although only at certain periods
and with nothing to match the other cases
I've just cited. Until recently, there was a
certain pattern to these price movements.
Before each major war—the Revolution,
the War of 1812, the Civil War, World
War I and World War II—prices roughly
hovered around the same level. During
each of those conflicts, prices just about
doubled, and then sank back to the origi
nal level in a grinding postwar depression.
However, the postwar depression didn't
happen after World War II, partly because
of wise private and governmental actions
which offset the dangers of a serious
economic downturn. But unfortunately,
the inflation problem still persisted, mildly
at first and then more seriously.
In the period of a decade and a half that
stretched from the recession of the late
1940's to the eve of Vietnam, the general
price level increased almost 40 percent,
reflecting such developments as the Kore
an War and the investment boom of the
mid-1950's. In the even shorter period
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which began with the Vietnam War, prices
have almost doubled. The worst of course
was reached just three years ago, when
the inflation that had been suppressed for
several years by price controls burst out in
all its fury, resulting in a 13-percent annual
rate of increase in late 1974. At that point,
TV and nightclub humorists began to find
that inflation jokes represented their best
stock in trade, with such definitions as
“Inflation is when you pay a dime for the
penny candy you used to get for a nickel.”
Incidentally, one of the economists at my
bank just investigated that particular sub
ject, and reported that the Hershey bar is
20 percent larger today than during the
1950's, but costs four times as much.
We've been congratulating ourselves re
cently for the fact that the inflation rate
has been cut almost in half in the past
several years, and many people now claim
that we should get used to a “moderate”
rise in prices of (say) 5 percent a year for
the foreseeable future. One trouble with
that scenario is that consumer prices have
increased at close to a 9-percent rate since
last fall—almost twice as fast as in the
preceding six-month period. But let's as
sume that we get inflation down to 5
percent and keep it there. Where would
that leave our children in the early dec
ades of the next century? With constant 5-
percent inflation, in the year 2020 your
average $4,600 car would cost over
$40,000, and many other examples could
be cited. Wages of course would rise also,
but under our progressive income-tax
system, the Federal tax bite for the worker
now earning $3 an hour would rise from
roughly zero to 30 percent of income,
cutting deeply into real income and rep
resenting a major transfer of resources
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from private to government control. Here
again we see the regressive nature of this
worst kind of tax.
We hear from some quarters that we have
to live with a certain amount of inflation in
order to reduce the unemployment rate
to respectable levels—a concept enshrined
in many textbooks under the name of the
Phillips curve. But our experience several
years ago, when prices shot up in the
middle of a recession, should have con
vinced us that something was wrong with
that simple textbook relationship. Indeed,
the economists on my staff now argue that
the typical response to a high rate of
inflation is more rather than less unem
ployment, because that inflation reduces
consumer confidence, forces households
to save more and spend less, and thereby
reduces the level of business activity. As a
policy matter, therefore, we are not faced
with a choice between competing alterna
tives, but rather with a straightforward
imperative to fight inflation if we want to
conquer unemployment.
Causes of Inflation
The obvious question is: How did we in
the 1970's ever get involved in such a
serious inflationary problem? Only by
answering this question can we avoid
going through another bout of double
digit inflation. Some experts blame the
problem on a collection of one-time mis
fortunes, such as crop failures and the
upsurge in oil prices. Others lay the blame
on basic changes in the structure of the
U.S. economy, such as the growth of
nationwide unions and the increasing
concentration of industry. Closer to the
mark, we can trace the severity of the
inflation problem to a worldwide con-
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junction of easy monetary and fiscal poli
cies in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
Governments, by providing too much
money and too much stimulus to purchas
ing power, fueled a worldwide price
explosion throughout this period. In this
country, the upsurge in prices during the
inflationary boom reflected pressures on
the Federal Reserve to accommodate
much larger increases in the money sup
ply than it would ordinarily sanction. The
nation's money supply, defined as curren
cy plus bank demand deposits, grew at a
5.6-percent annual rate over the 1965-75
period, compared with a 2.4-percent
growth rate over the preceding decade.
Here indeed is the crux of the problem,
for the severe inflation of the mid-1970’s
can be traced primarily to governmental
policies first adopted a decade before. I
noted earlier that the price level doubled
during each of the nation's wars. In the
past decade, the price level again practi
cally doubled, but Vietnam was only part
of the reason. Prior to the war, during the
war, and especially after the war, the
Federal government undertook a number
of stimulative measures, many of them
involving open-ended income-security
and health programs. The pressures on
available resources generated by that se
ries of strongly expansionist measures
were accommodated for a time by a liber
al monetary policy, and the rest is history.
Our fiscal problem was serious enough,
but it was made worse by a fatal flaw in the
conventional economic thinking of our
generation. Theoretically, there was noth
ing wrong with the idea that substantial
tax cuts and deficits should be incurred in
recessions, because they would be
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matched by spending cuts and surpluses
in business expansions. Practically, the
prescription didn't work, especially since
it lacked an enforcing device. Policymak
ers eagerly adopted part of the advice and
ignored the rest, because of their natural
eagerness to increase spending and their
comparable reluctance to increase explicit
taxes. Practically, too, policymakers could
not easily reduce programs once they got
under way, because each program quickly
developed its own political constituency,
within both the bureaucracy itself and the
groups being served.
Many traditional programs, such as de
fense spending, are now rising strongly.
But the most worrisome increases, which
are not even reviewed by Congress, are in
what budget makers call "uncontrollable''
categories—certainly a very apt descrip
tion. Most of these programs involve the
automatic transfer of money to anyone
eligible under entitlement formulas writ
ten into law. In the past two decades,
Federal government payments to individ
uals have risen from $17 billion to $172
billion, and various grant payments to
state-and-local governments have jumped
from $4 billion to $61 billion. Net interest
on the Federal debt—another kind of
“uncontrollable" item—meanwhile has
climbed from $5 billion to $29 billion,
equal in amount to the entire economy of
a country the size of New Zealand.
For all these reasons, total Federal spend
ing has grown at an unparalleled pace in
the late 1960's and 1970's. The country was
186 years old before the government
spent $100 billion a year, but by the time
of the Bicentennial it was spending almost
$400 billion annually. And since revenues
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have failed signally to keep up with this
spending upsurge, deficits have been re
corded in 15 of the last 16 years. The
cumulative deficit in that period, includ
ing spending of off-budget agencies, has
amounted to $337 billion. The Federal
government, through its heavy demands
on both financial and real resources, in
this way laid the basis for today’s severe
inflationary problem. By failing to increase
direct taxes to cover its increased expendi
tures, the government decided in effect to
impose a silent yet severe inflation tax.
Inflation and Interest Rates
Again, by generating these inflationary
pressures, government programs have
helped to push up the price of money—
interest rates. This point is worth empha
sizing because of a general misunder
standing of how interest rates operate, as
we saw during this spring's controversy
over the rise in the prime rate which
bankers charge their best commercial cus
tomers. Many pundits argued at that time
that basic credit demands were not strong
enough to cause any rise in rates, and
moreover, that the Fed had unnecessarily
added to borrowers' costs by tightening
monetary policy and pushing up rates in
response to this spring's sharp rise in the
money supply. One response involves a
matter of fact; despite sluggishness in
business-loan demand at some big-city
banks, total bank loans increased at a 13-
percent annual rate in the first quarter of
the year—twice the average growth of
1976—and the lending pace has continued
to strengthen in later months.
Our second response involves a basic
theoretical explanation of what causes
interest rates to rise and fall. One of our
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country’s greatest economists, Irving Fish
er, once said, "Probably the great majority
of businessmen believe that interest is low
when money is plentiful, and high when
money is scarce. This view however is
fallacious, and the fallacy consists in for
getting that plentiful money ultimately
raises the demand for loans just as much as
it raises the supply, and therefore has just
as much tendency to raise interest as to
lower it.”
What Fisher tells us is that we should
distinguish between two kinds of rates—
the real rate and the nominal rate which is
quoted in the marketplace. The real rate is
measured in terms of real purchasing
power over goods and services, and the
nominal rate is measured in terms of
nominal purchasing power. The differ
ence between nominal and real purchas
ing power is the inflation rate. If lenders
and borrowers all believed that the pur
chasing power of money would remain
constant, the two interest rates would be
the same. But in recent years, they haven't
been able to make that supposition. In this
inflationary atmosphere, money rates
have risen considerably above the real
rate. With prices expected to rise at (say) 5
percent a year, lenders have demanded
the real rate plus 5 percent, so that they
would be protected against an expected
loss in the purchasing power of money.
Borrowers meanwhile have been willing
to pay this 5-percent (or whatever) infla
tion premium, because they expect to
repay their loans with dollars that are
worth 5 percent less each year than the
dollars they originally borrowed.
Many authorities in Congress and the
press (and even some money-market par
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ticipants) have had trouble understanding
the connection between inflation and
interest rates, as the recent controversy
has demonstrated. Most people under
stand the role of business fluctuations in
pushing rates up and down. In recent
decades, interest-rate peaks have roughly
coincided with business-cycle peaks, and
interest-rate lows have usually followed
recession lows after a few months' time.
Most people also understand (at least
dimly) the short-term ability of the Federal
Reserve to push rates down through easier
money conditions or to push rates up
through tighter policy.
Yet too few people clearly understand the
long-term effects of price expectations on
interest rates, and the way in which such
expectations can offset other market influ
ences. Our recent experience should
teach them that monetary restraint can
drive up the real rate by reducing the
supply of funds—but that it can also drive
down the inflation premium by reducing
inflation expectations. This spring, for ex
ample, in the wake of a modest tightening
of monetary policy, short-term rates went
up but long-term rates went down, as
market participants showed their appre
ciation for the Fed's anti-inflation stance.
This suggests that money marketeers at
least are now learning the lesson that rates
can move down rather than up in the
event of tighter credit conditions. Slow
learners apparently don't survive as long
in the money market as they do else
where.
Cure for Inflation
The point of all this discussion is that we
should put the horse before the cart and
work to curb inflation if we want to keep
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interest rates in check. As we have seen,
our severe inflation has been generated
by a series of budget deficits that have
consistently pulled monetary policy off
target in an expansionary direction, by
supporting excessive growth of money
and credit. Basically, these deficits have
created demands for goods and services
without at the same time adding to the
supply of goods and services. To cure the
problem, then, we must act to bring the
Federal budget into reasonable balance,
while gradually slowing the rate of growth
of the money supply. President Carter has
recognized the need for meeting the fiscal
objective, while Chairman Burns, in each
of his quarterly appearances before Con
gress, has emphasized the need for bring
ing the long-run growth of the money
supply down to rates which are compati
ble with general price stability.
There are hopeful signs in the reform
achieved under the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974, which created an effective
link between Congressional tax and ex
penditure decisions. We should be well
served by the new element of order and
discipline introduced into fiscal delibera
tions by the House and Senate Budget
Committees and the Congressional Bud
get Office, since this system gives us a
mechanism for determining Congression
al priorities and relating expenditures to
prospective revenues. Yet strict vigilance
will be needed to keep that mechanism in
working order—beginning right now. De
spite the expansionary environment we
expect in fiscal 1978, the Administration
projects a deficit in that year of about $62
billion, which approaches the worst reces
sion figure and exceeds the likely 1977
deficit by more than $13 billion.
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On the monetary side, the founders of the
Federal Reserve early in this century intro
duced a measure of discipline into the
system by ensuring the independence of
the central bank within the structure of
the Federal government. With our mode
of operation, we have shown the ability to
make prompt and (if need be) frequent
changes in monetary policy, in contrast to
the necessarily ponderous processes of
fiscal policy. We have also shown the
ability to make the hard decisions that
might be avoided by decision-makers sub
ject to the day-to-day pressures of political
life. Certainly, the Fed has stumbled on
some occasions, but it's hard to imagine
that our problems would have been
solved if the control of the monetary
authority had been turned over to the
Executive branch or to Congress. Indeed,
if the spending propensities of Federal
officials had been given freer rein through
easier access to the “printing press," our
inflation problem of the past decade
would probably have been even worse. As
evidence, consider the fact that the two
major nations with the strongest central
banks—Germany and the United States—
are the two with the strongest records of
curbing inflation.
Concluding Remarks
From these remarks, I hope you now have
a better understanding of what inflation
does, why it is a serious evil, and how it
can be curbed. I repeat that to reduce
inflation, we have to reduce the growth of
money—but we can't reduce money
growth sufficiently if we don't cut back
significantly on Federal deficit spending. If
we fail to do that, the combined credit
demands from the government and pri
vate business will exceed the nation's
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long-term flow of savings. In that case, the
demand for additional funds can be met
only through an accelerated growth in the
money supply—and in the rate of infla
tion. And as we've seen, inflation nowa
days won't help cure unemployment and
other ills, but instead will only aggravate
such problems.
In the last analysis, we have to realize that
the people responsible for inflation are
the people in the voting booth, because
they ask their Congressmen for more
benefits in the form of new spending
programs, but resist having taxes raised to
pay for those benefits. Yet the only way
that Congress can spend more without
increasing taxes explicitly is through infla
tion. We in the Fed have long recognized
this point, and I believe that fiscal policy
makers are now beginning to see it too—
that in the words of that old Pogo comic
strip, “We have met the enemy, and they
is us."
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1977, July 25). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19770726_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19770726_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1977},
month = {Jul},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19770726_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}