speeches · June 12, 1977
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco
JUL 8 1977
LIBRARY
BANKING:
THE WINDS
OF CHANGE
John J. Balles
PRESIDENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF SAN FRANCISCO
Oregon Bankers Association Convention
Seaside, Oregon
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John J. Balles
Mr. Balles reviews new legislative proposals
that would permit depository institutions to
pay interest on consumer checking-type
accounts and to receive interest on their
required reserve balances. He states that
there are three imperatives associated
" "
with the new bill. First, it should begin to
equalize the ground rules among compet
ing classes of institutions, so that all partici
pants in the new system would be subject to
the same restrictions on interest rates pay
able and on required reserves. Second, it
should minimize the burden of Federal
Reserve membership, by permitting pay
ment of at least some interest on reserves
held as deposits with the Fed. Third, it
should restore to the Fed some of the
control that it has lost over the volume of
money, and thus improve its management
of monetary policy.
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We in the Federal Reserve have done our
best to contribute to the theme of this
year’s convention (Create a Wave). In fact,
we have created lots of waves with our
support of the Administration's recent leg
islative proposals, which would permit
depository institutions to receive interest
on their required reserve balances and to
pay interest on consumers’ checking-type
accounts. (These are known as NOW
accounts—i.e., negotiable orders of with
drawal.) Yet many people, in Congress and
in the banking community, tend to think
that the Fed and the Treasury alone are
responsible for all these waves, when in
actuality the basic driving force is the winds
of change that have been sweeping
through the marketplace for the last several
decades. Thus, I think it would help if we
first looked at these underlying factors
before examining the legislative proposals
that will be discussed in next week's Senate
hearings.
I realize that I might be at a slight disadvan
tage in presenting the Fed or the Treasury
position here. As a wise philosopher once
said, the three most suspicious-sounding
phrases in the English language are 1) the
check is in the mail; 2) certainly I’ll respect
you just as much in the morning; and 3) I’m
from the Government and I'm here to help
you. But bear with me, and I'll try to outline
the logic of the Federal Reserve's position
as it meshes with the current realities of the
nation's financial system.
Background to Reform
Three inter-related developments over the
years have created the environment for the
current legislative proposals. First, there has
been the major drive by thrift institutions
for expanded powers rivalling those of
commercial banks. These would include
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loan and investment powers, and most
importantly, those related to third-party
payments or bill-paying services—for exam
ple, NOW accounts for New England
mutual-savings banks and savings-and-loan
associations, demand deposits for certain
mutual-savings banks, and share drafts of
credit unions. Thus, savings accounts at
thrifts have begun to behave more like
demand deposits—that is, more like a me
dium of exchange.
Historically, the unique distinction between
commercial banks and other financial insti
tutions has been the banks’ right to accept
demand deposits and to operate the na
tion’s payments mechanism. But their role
by now has been seriously weakened—and
thrift institutions can be expected to ex
pand their third-party payments activities
whether or not the banks get NOW ac
counts. Indeed, those banks which don't
join the NOW parade may be in serious
danger of losing their share of the market.
A second crucial development has been the
long-standing inequity between member
and non-member banks concerning the
burden of reserve requirements. Yet, ironi
cally, there are now new inequities to con
tend with—between commercial banks as a
whole and thrift institutions, and even be
tween S&L's and credit unions, the latter
having the least burdensome requirements.
A third major development has been the
continued erosion of Federal Reserve
membership, to the point where 25 percent
of all demand deposits are now held by
non-member banks. As thrift institutions
get money-like liabilities, this erosion will
spread even further. It must be emphasized
that this development prevents the Fed
from being fully able to control the volume
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and rate of growth of money—that is, to use
monetary policy as a means of promoting
economic stability.
As a result, I see three imperatives in the
new bill. First, it should begin to equalize
the ground rules among competing classes
of institutions, so that all participants in a
nationwide NOW system observe the same
restrictions on interest rates payable and on
required reserves. Second, it should mini
mize the burden of Federal Reserve mem
bership, by permitting payment of at least
some interest on reserves held as deposits
at the Fed. Third, it should restore to the
Fed some of its lost control over the volume
of money, and thus improve its manage
ment of monetary policy.
Background to NOWs
Against this background, let’s consider the
evolution of the NOW-account proposal.
Over the past several decades, businesses
and consumers have both found ways of
improving the rates of return on their
funds, especially by economizing on the
use of non-interest bearing checking ac
counts. Banks have responded by moves to
improve their own rates of return, in some
cases by dropping membership in the Fed
eral Reserve System and using the reserves
released thereby for money-making pur
poses. In the process, of course, they have
lost certain Federal Reserve services that are
also frequently priced below market.
The situation logically would seem to de
mand a move towards "unbundling," with
each bank charge and each bank service
being priced explicitly at the market. The
securities industry has been going through
just such a process during the past year or
so, under pressure from the Securities and
Exchange Commission. But many banks and
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thrift institutions, seeing only one side of
the equation, fear unbundling for the im
pact it could have on their earnings.
A recent Federal Reserve staff study consid
ered this problem in detail, specifically in
regard to the proposed lifting of the
Depression-era prohibition against pay
ment of interest on demand deposits. The
study argued that if banks began to pay
explicit interest on demand deposits, they
undoubtedly would also move to price
checking and other services more nearly in
line with costs. On the plus side, this would
tend to curtail uneconomic use of certain
bank services and would encourage an
allocation of resources to uses more highly
valued by the public. However, the pay
ment of explicit interest on all demand
deposits would mean temporarily reduced
bank earnings—perhaps by as much as 5 to
20 percent of pre-tax earnings during the
worst year of the transition.
The largest transitional impact would be felt
if interest were paid on all demand deposits
and if thrift institutions were also empow
ered to offer such deposits. But the impact
could be limited if interest payments were
paid only on consumers’ NOW-type ac
counts instead of on all demand deposits.
Nationwide, the volume of demand depos
its that could be converted to NOWs proba
bly amounts to about $80 billion, as op
posed to the roughly $320 billion found in
all checking accounts. As the Fed study
noted, the earnings impact could be further
limited by controlling the interest rate paid
on NOWs and by phasing in the change
over a several-year period. Moreover, cost
pressures resulting from deposit interest
payments could be partially offset by the
payment of interest on required reserve
balances held at Federal Reserve Banks.
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Background to Membership Issue
This brings up the question of Federal
Reserve membership—an issue of crucial
importance to the central bank and to the
nation's entire financial system. We start
with the System's basic belief that the
broadest possible membership is essential
for the proper control of the reserve base
and thereby for the proper conduct of
monetary policy. “Reserve requirements
are the fulcrum against which we work," as
one of my colleagues neatly puts it.
I’m sure that you can all understand our
position, but as many of you tell us, your
own earnings statements frequently dictate
a choice against membership. The costs of
membership are primarily reflected in re
quired reserves, which impound at the Fed
some funds that banks feel they could
employ better elsewhere. In fact, about
two-thirds of a group of 250 banks which
withdrew during the 1965-74 period cited
reserve requirements as the reason. I don't
want to overstate the problem. Some por
tion of the vault cash maintained for opera
tional purposes, and some of the reserve
accounts held at Reserve Banks and used
for clearing balances, clearly do not repre
sent foregone earnings. Also, the Federal
Reserve incurs expenses of about $350 mil
lion per year for providing coin, currency,
checking and other services to member
banks. Still, as Chairman Burns said in re
cent Congressional testimony, withdrawals
reflect mainly the “high cost of non-interest
earning reserves that banks are required to
hold as members of the Federal Reserve.”
Everyone would probably agree that the
existence of a well-functioning central bank
brings broad benefits to the banking com
munity, and that it would be equitable to
expect banks to bear some of the burden of
policy, provided that the costs are fairly
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shared. But that is the crux of the problem;
the burden of reserve requirements is
borne unevenly between members and
non-members. For example, 22 states—
unlike the Fed— permit commercial banks
to hold securities as a portion of their
reserves. Thus, if only quantifiable costs and
directly provided clearing services are tak
en into account, the vast majority of banks
would find it less costly to meet state-
imposed reserve requirements than to meet
Federal Reserve requirements. That situa
tion of course is not new; however, in the
recent environment of inflation and high
interest rates, member banks forego more
earnings than formerly by maintaining re
serves at the Fed instead of employing them
in loans or securities.
Proposed Legislation
All of these factors and more have helped
to mold Federal Reserve thinking on the
solutions to banking’s structural problems.
The Fed’s views are reflected in the Admin
istration bill which the Senate Banking
Committee plans to take up next week. As
you can see, it is a far-reaching package that
will affect the interests of all the participants
in the nation’s financial markets.
First of all, the draft bill authorizes NOW
accounts for all insured commercial banks,
mutual savings banks, savings and loan
institutions, and credit unions. (The latter
could issue both NOWs and share-draft
accounts, or SDAs.) These interest-bearing
checking accounts would be limited to the
use of individuals. The ceiling rate payable
on NOWs or SDAs would be set—for a
three-year period, followed by three years
of standby authority—by an inter-agency
committee at a uniform figure below the
bank savings-deposit ceiling rate, currently
5 percent. Those New England institutions
which are now offering a higher rate than
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the new ceiling rate could continue to do
so for a three-year period. Also, authority
for Regulation Q interest-rate ceilings, in
cluding the Vi-percent differential for thrift
institutions, would be continued through
1979. The agency committee would be
chaired by the Federal Reserve Board
Chairman, and would also include the FDIC
Chairman, the Home Loan Bank Board
Chairman, and the National Credit Union
Administrator.
In another major innovation, the legislation
would impose uniform reserve require
ments on NOWs and SDAs for all depos
itory institutions. The Federal Reserve
Board of Governors would set these re
quirements, within specified limits ranging
from 3 to 12 percent of deposits. (Fed
member banks’ reserve requirements
would continue to range between 3 and 10
percent for other time and savings deposits,
and also between 7 and 22 percent for
demand deposits, but with a 5-percent
minimum for banks with less than $15 mil
lion in net demand deposits.) The reserve
requirements against NOWs and SDAs
would be phased in over a three-year peri
od for those institutions offering such
instruments which do not now belong to
the Fed. In addition to vault cash, the
reserves could be held in the form of
deposits directly with the Federal Reserve,
or indirectly with other regulatory
institutions for redeposit with the Fed.
The other major feature of the bill involves
the authorization of payment of interest on
reserve balances with the Fed (not includ
ing vault cash), at rates determined by the
Fed's Board of Governors. However, the
aggregate interest paid in any year could
not exceed 10 percent of Reserve Banks'
net earnings for the previous year, before
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payment of interest on reserve balances. In
setting this interest rate, the Fed would be
expected to consider the possible effects on
Treasury revenues and on banks'
revenues—as well as the effect on the Fed
eral Reserve membership problem.
In this regard, it should be noted that at the
present level of earnings, the indicated
maximum could not exceed $600 million a
year—roughly equal to 2Va percent of re
quired reserve balances. Given all the un
certainties in this area, it is doubtful that
that 10-percent ceiling would prove ade
quate for coping with the cost problems of
member banks. Indeed, simply overcoming
the costs associated with the burden of
membership could cost $500 million a year,
so that there would be little room left for
alleviating the transition costs of NOWs or
for meeting other possible changes, such as
explicit charges for Fed services. For that
reason, there is a good argument for setting
the maximum payment to depository insti
tutions at 15 percent instead of 10 percent
of Reserve Bank earnings.
Meanwhile, we should remember that the
bill offers a potential for reduced bank costs
through a lower statutory minimum for
reserve requirements on demand deposits.
Large reductions should not be attempted
overnight, but there would be some leeway
for reductions over time within the pro
posed range of requirements. Although not
in the proposed bill, I believe that a case
could also be made to reduce the statutory
minimum on time-and-savings deposits
from 3 to 1 percent.
Concluding Remarks
From what I've said, you can see that the
new legislation is both far-ranging and
complex, affecting the interests of business
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people, consumers, regulators, banks, thrift
institutions and ordinary taxpayers. How
ever, I should emphasize that a great deal of
thought has gone into the development of
the Federal Reserve's and the Administra
tion's position on the issues now facing the
financial community. I've already summa
rized the main features of the Federal Re
serve staff study. In addition, our Reserve
Bank directors last month conducted an
opinion survey of District member banks, as
a means of informing the Board of Gover
nors as well as themselves of how bankers
feel about all these issues. Those of you
who participated in the survey helped us a
great deal in formulating our own thoughts.
Admittedly, there were few surprises in the
survey responses. Member banks, both
here in Oregon and throughout our nine-
state district, strongly favored the payment
of interest on required reserves. (Inciden
tally, they also favored an alternative
proposal—counting interest-earning assets
as part of required reserves.) But not sur
prisingly, member banks generally opposed
paying interest on demand deposits, or
even the widespread adoption of NOW
accounts—although a majority of the large
banks in the survey differed with the con
sensus and favored NOW accounts. In fact,
banks holding more than three-fifths of all
member-bank deposits in the District fa
vored both nationwide NOWs and the
payment of interest on demand deposits.
The survey respondents also reported a
broad level of satisfaction with Reserve
Bank services—such as check collection,
wire transfer, and coin and currency
services—and generally expressed willing
ness to pay for such services if the Federal
Reserve were to pay interest on their re
serve balances.
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Bankers’ opinions, as expressed through
our survey or through other means, are
necessary grist for the legislative mills. The
other interests that I've listed also will have
their say before legislation advances very
far. But I believe that the Administration's
legislative package will provide a logical
and comprehensive solution to the prob
lems I have discussed today. After you read
and ponder those proposals, I hope that
you will give them your support.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1977, June 12). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19770613_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19770613_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1977},
month = {Jun},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19770613_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}