speeches · November 11, 1976
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
Reading copy
U.S. FOREIGN BANKING LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
Remarks of
John J. Balles, President
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Finance Section
American Chamber of Commerce
Tokyo, Japan
November 12, 19 76
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U.S. Foreign Banking Legislation and Regulation
ITm delighted to have the opportunity to bring you up-to-date
on what’s going on at home. No, Ifm not going to mention our just-
completed quadrennial tribal rites; there were few prizes for
economic literacy handed out during the long period that stretched
from New Hampshire’s primary to last weekfs finale. I’ll also skip
over any discussion of the U.S. business outlook; after surmounting
the severe problems that faced us when I was last here two and a
half years ago, I think we should have few doubts about our ability
to overcome the problems of the late 1970Ts.
Instead, I shall concentrate my remarks on two humdrum but
important questions of banking regulation— specifically, the
regulation of American banks overseas and the regulation of foreign
banks in the United States. With the expansion of international
banking in the past decade, Congress and the regulatory agencies
have begun to re-examine existing laws and regulations. This concern
has developed in part because of the magnitude of the operations
involved, but largely because of the shocks caused to the financial
system by the failure of several large banks in the U.S. and
abroad.
Today, U.S. banks have some $150 billion in foreign assets—
roughly 16 percent of their total assets. These foreign assets have
been a major.source of earnings, and losses from international
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operations have remained relatively low. Yet we can no longer
assume that existing regulatory policies are appropriate; they should
be examined now, rather than in a hurry after serious problems
develop. The very size of the foreign operations of U.S. banks
requires a re-assessment of existing controls. Meanwhile, foreign
banks have grown substantially in the United States, and are now
a significant part of the U.S. banking system. Their standard
banking assets have grown from $18 billion in November 1972 to
$45 billion in June 19 76. Despite that growth, the U.S. stands out
as the only major trading nation whose national government does not
exercise control over foreign banking activities. The situation of
state-by-state control should soon be changed.
U.S. BanksT Activities Overseas
Let’s consider the changing views regarding the activities
of U.S. banks overseas. In the past, bank regulators generally
felt that U.S. banks should have ample freedom to compete with foreign
banks in the foreign arena. Whatever the domestic restrictions on
commercial banks, these should not restrict U.S. banks in their
operations elsewhere. The rights granted by foreign countries to
their own banks should be open to U.S. banks; otherwise our banks
would be at a competitive disadvantage. Following up on this view,
U.S. banks have moved into certain areas in which they don’t operate
at home— securities affiliates, trading-company investments, and so
on, depending on the laws of the various countries where they operate.
Without these freedoms, our banks would not have achieved the leading
position they now have in world banking.
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Underlying this permissive attitude has been an assumption that
foreign countries1 regulation and examination procedures would force
banks within their jurisdiction to follow sound banking practices.
Unfortunately, this has not always been the case, since practices
vary by country, from very tight control to no control. (I’m sure
you can think of an example of a country with very tight control.)
With the current high levels of foreign lending, and with the
worrisome losses that have occurred in some cases, the regulatory
agencies have had to look again at their practices.
Let me note some major areas of concern. First, nonbanking
activities. Expansion into such areas as real-estate finance or
merchant banking may appear profitable, but the very diversity of
activities under many differing laws makes it difficult to assess
risk properly.
Second, joint ventures. American banks have regularly joined
with foreign banks, sometimes under government prodding, to form
subsidiaries where they share control with others. In joint
ventures, however, banks are exposed to potential losses which are
difficult to measure. Some American banks here have experienced
losses and other problems because of lack of control, so that theyTve
had to mount rescue operations, increasing their investments to save
certain enterprises.
The third area of concern is loans to less-developed countries,
LDCs in the economists’ jargon. Banks everywhere have sharply
increased their lending to developing countries, from $6 billion in
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1970 to $28 billion today. However, we don’t have sufficient data
to assess total loan-servicing burdens, and the financial standing
of some LDCs must be in doubt. Some countries have been forced to
re-schedule their debts, although actual defaults have been rare.
Yet, in view of the magnitudes involved, you can see why regulators
are worried.
Now, what are the regulatory agencies doing in this situation?
First of all, they are increasing their international examination
activities. As you know, National Bank and Federal Reserve examiners
have just completed a review of Japanese branches of U.S. banks.
This is a part of an overall increase in the scope and frequency
of examinations, which reflects the end of our automatic assumption
that supervision by foreign authorities is always adequate. Our
regulatory agencies now tend to believe that an American bank can
engage in a number of financial activities in a host country, even
though they would not be permitted in the U.S., as long as there is
no threat to the bank’s overall financial strength. In other words,
freedom to compete abroad'is now tempered by consideration of risk
to the parent bank.
The Federal Reserve changed its regulations last February to
require that an application to form a joint venture must include a
statement of the bank’s potential investment liability, and not
just its initial commitment. We recognize that when a bank’s
affiliate is going under, that bank very rarely exercises its legal
right to step aside and not support the affiliate. In practice,
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banks step in to support their subsidiaries as a means of protecting
their own reputations. Consequently, where control does not exist,
banks must be careful in their investments and their exposure.
This brings us to the sensitive topic of assessing "country
risk". Among the regulatory agencies, the Comptroller of the Currency
has a formal system for assessing country risk, which can be used
to classify loans to foreign governments and public bodies, but the
Federal Reserve operates without a rating system of that type. This
is a very sensitive area; because of both the technical problems
in trying to assess the likelihood of default, and the diplomatic
consequences of putting a country on such a list. As I understand
the Comptroller’s procedures, most of the countries in question have
been in South America and Africa, but mere rumors of being listed
have caused serious diplomatic reactions in some European countries.
Yet a problem of default does exist in some cases, and a resolution
of the problem requires sophisticated economic and political
analysis. At the moment we do not have the capability for doing
this, and I see no easy solution to the situation.
Increased cooperation among regulators may help solve this
and other problems. As a rule, the host country should have
regulatory responsibility within its own borders, but in practice
joint responsibility■is sometimes needed. The Bank for International
Settlements has sponsored a series of meetings to build a foundation
for more effective cooperation and exchange of information among
regulators. In addition, one purpose of my present trip is to help
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increase contacts with Pacific central banks. Already, as a con
sequence of my earlier trip in 19 74, I’ve received information from
several central banks about the attempts of certain individuals
to buy U.S. banks. I expect our examiners to share information
about their findings with foreign central banks, and I’ll appreciate
getting similar help from foreign countries.
Foreign Banks1 Activities in the U.S.
Now let’s turn to the prospects for control of foreign banks
in the United States. The International Banking Act passed the
House this session but became lost in the pre-adj ournment rush in
the Senate. But the bill will be reintroduced next term, so it’s
worth our while to analyze it here.
This legislation has been designed to give the Federal govern
ment control over the entry of foreign banks and to establish
competitive equality with domestic banks in the U.S. market. The
aim is nondiscrimination; foreign banks would have no more power
than domestic banks, and no less power either. This Act is not
protectionist, and therefore it provides no excuse for foreign
retaliation against U.S. banks. In fact, U.S. banks operating
abroad may benefit from the legislation, because Federal agencies
could consider how our banks are treated by foreign countries before
approving the entry of foreign banks in the U.S. market.
At the moment, entry of foreign banks is effectively controlled
by the states and not by Federal authorities, so that foreign banks
in certain areas have more powers than U.S. banks. Subsidiary banks--
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those with domestic charters— are subject to the same rules as
domestic banks, but branches and agencies are not regarded as "banks"
and thus can be established across state lines. At the moment,
these branches and agencies have three times the assets of sub
sidiary banks, so there is good reason for bringing them under
Federal control.
One important provision of the legislation would subject branches
and agencies(but not state-chartered subsidiaries) to Federally-
imposed reserve requirements on their deposits. At the same time,
these branches and agencies would gain access to Federal Reserve
services.
The legislation also would permit Federal licensing of branches
and agencies, providing a Federal alternative to state licensing.
However, in states that specifically prohibit foreign branches or
agencies, Federal licenses could not be issued. National banks,
and Edge Act corporations also, could have a minority of non-citizen
directors.
Under another provision, branches would be limited to only one
state, except that multi-state branches existing as of May 1, 19 76
would be grandfathered. On the other hand, agencies would be able
to operate in several states, because they don’t accept deposits
and thus are the equivalent of loan production offices.
I should mention also the provision requiring the Secretary
of the Treasury to establish guidelines for the operation and
entry of foreign banks, which utilizes this banking legislation to
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foster the nation’s international economic policies. Congress has
not been specific on this point, but one of our important inter
national policies is the reduction of restrictions on American
firms operating abroad. Therefore, I read this clause as giving
the Treasury powers that would help it negotiate on behalf of U.S.
banks overseas.
Concluding Remarks
Whenever problems develop in any rapidly growing area,
pressures are likely to develop for tighter and more consistent
regulation. So it is today in the field of international banking.
Regarding the activities of U.S. banks overseas, our regulatory
authorities are simply being prudent in looking into such areas as
nonbanking activities, joint ventures and loans to LDCs. And as
for the U.S. operations of foreign banks, the authorities are
simply trying to equalize competitive advantage and not to impose
new burdens. For example, I favor the Fed’s original proposal to
impose Federal Reserve membership on foreign bank subsidiaries if
their parent has more than $500 million in assets, and I also think
that agencies should not be allowed interstate banking privileges
except where existing offices are grandfathered. Until the domestic
groundrules are relaxed for U.S. banks, I feel that foreign banks’
interstate operations should be just the same as those permitted U.S.
banks, Edge Act corporations, loan production offices, and nonbank
subsidiaries permit ted under the Bank Holding Company Act. In sum,
I believe that an increasingly interdependent world will benefit from
the growing trend toward uniformity of financial regulatory practices.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1976, November 11). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19761112_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19761112_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1976},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19761112_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}