speeches · November 10, 1975
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
Reading copy
INTERNATIONAL BANKING: A CENTRAL BANKER* S VIEW
Remarks of
John J. Balles, President
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
International Bankers Conference
Seattle Branch
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Seattle, Wash in g t on
November 11, 1975
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International Banking: A Central Banker’s View
I would like to extend to all of you a varm personal welcome to this
conference sponsored by the Seattle Branch of our Bank. I would also
like to say congratulations for a job well done to Bill Donovan and Jim
Curran, who conceived and organized this conference. I think they have
put together a first-rate program, and I am glad that you could all par
ticipate* It is good that people with a common Interest In International
banking can get together to take stock of recent developments in the field,
and to exchange views with each other and with persons in the regulatory
agencies.
We at the San Francisco Fed are glad to be able to host this con
ference. Too often, people view government agencies at worst as harmful
meddlers, and at best, as influential but disagreeable old uncles whom
one has to humor occasionally, but normally would hope to avoid. That
imagery of government bureaucracy, I suspect, holds true throughout
history and in all lands. However, I should hope that in our democratic
society, it holds less true than in others. Certainly as a Federal Reserve
Bank President, I intend to emphasize and enlarge the positive role our
institution plays in serving our community. We are sponsoring this con
ference in Seattle today, and next week we shall hold a foreign exchange
seminar in San Francisco. Through these and other means, our Bank seeks
to be a prime mover in bringing together experts like yourselves to dis
cuss topics In national and international finance. In the process of
establishing good communications with the financial community, we hope
to acquire a better understanding and thereby improve our services to
the community.
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Growth of World Banking
Recently, in a speech I gave at the A»B.A*fs School for International
Banking at Boulder, Colorado, I drew a distinction between flinternational
banking” and "world banking." To my mind, "international banking" covers
the standard financing of international trade and investment, such as
letters of credit, bank acceptances, foreign-project loans, and so on—
activities that have been part of the banking tradition since the Renais
sance, But by "world banking," I mean the very recent phenomenon of
bankers viewing the world!s money and capital markets as a whole in the
gathering and placement of funds. International trade is as old as
history-~but only in recent decades have business firms broadened their
outlook to consider the world as a whole in making their production and
marketing decisions. We are now seeing the dawning of a parallel move
ment in the world of banking, with worldwide banking organizations opera
ting as the counterparts of industry!s multinational corporations. This
conference, in a small way, bears witness to the emergence of world
banking in this part of the world, the great Northwest gateway to the
Pacific and beyond.
World banking, in the sense I have in mind, requires a certain mini
mum size that Is quite beyond what the majority of the banks in this
country can hope to attain* Nonetheless, 125 American banks now operate
abroad, with some 730 branches and with net foreign assets amounting to
more than $125 billion. Within this single Federal Reserve District, as
Hang-Sheng Cheng reported this morning, there are 18 banks with foreign
operations, and they have more than 130 overseas branches and hold a
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total of more than $30 billion in foreign assets. Thus, contrary to the
common view, world banking is not the exclusive reserve of the banking
giants. Indeed, quite a few medium-sized banks here on the West Coast
and elsewhere are now engaged in this activity.
The expansion of world banking has been nothing short of spectacular,
as several recent studies indicate. Total foreign assets of the world!s
commercial tanks nearly quadrupled from $108 billion to $410 billion
during the first half of this decade. This high expansion rate brought
in its wake a remarkably high rate of growth of earnings from foreign
operations. Over the last five years, the overseas earnings of a group
of nine U.S. bank-holding companies increased at a 37-percent annual
rate, compared to only a 3-percent rate of grox^th in their domestic
earnings. In 1974, international earnings accounted for 42 percent of
their total earnings before security gains. Individually, for Citicorp,
International earnings accounted for nearly two-thirds of its total
earnings, and for BankAmerica Corp, the ratio was about 40 percent.
Problems of World Banking
Thus, both in terms of absolute size and as a source of earnings,
world banking has become very important for our major banks, and hence
for the nation*s entire banking system. The world's central bankers may
have been content in the past to watch passively the growth of world
banking, but its rise has been so phenomenal that we must now devote
some hard thinking to what all this means for the national and interna
tional economy.
Now, as soon as I mention "hard thinking/* you might conclude that
I'm about to propose some rigid controls over this type of activity.
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That’s not -what I mean. Like most of you, 1 believe that a lot of good
has come from this upsurge of growth. World banking has been the re
sult of a remarkable burst of ingenuity on the part of private bankers
in an environment relatively free of government restrictions* It has
greatly enhanced world competition in the provision of financial inter
mediation services, and improved the allocation of funds for the world
as whole* Moreover, in the past two years, this market has demonstrated
remarkable strength and adaptability in coping with the unprecedented
problems of petrodollar recycling and wide exchange-rate fluctuations.
At the same time, the spread of world banking has raised a number
of difficult issues for the world1s central-banking authorities. The
close integration of international capital and money markets has made
effective monetary control in each individual country much more diffi
cult. Moreover, central bankers are not certain how much to take off
shore private liquidity into account in setting monetary-policy targets.
With the tremendous growth of such funds to more than $220 billion today,
it seems odd that they are not included in any country1s money supply,
and are not taken into consideration in the determination of any country’s
monetary policy.
These and other policy issues arising from the growth of world
banking are very much on central bankers1 minds today. At the monthly
meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee, we are frequently called
on to consider the impact of world banking on domestic credit markets,
on foreign-exchange markets, and on the U.S. balance of payments. We
are in frequent consultation with foreign central bankers, trying to
analyze the myriad interactions among policy actions and market developments
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in the major nations. But I Xvrould be less than candid if I left
you with the impression that central bankers have definitive answers to
all the monetary-policy questions I've mentioned. In fact, we do not.
That is why I said, some hard thinking on those questions is very much
needed.
The Foreign Bank Act
Some of our thinking has already borne fruit in the form of the
Federal Reserve’s proposal for legislation to bring the foreign banks
operating in this country under effective Federal control. Our bill was
first introduced In late 1974, and then reintroduced in March of this
year under the title of the Foreign Bank Act of 1975. I am a member
of the Federal Reserve System Steering Committee which developed this bill,
and I would like to discuss the reasoning which lay behind the System*s
proposal. Youfve already heard the details of the legislation from Bob
Johnston.
The present complex regulatory framework in this country stems from
a situation where individual states determine the ^entry rights and powers
of foreign banks. Almost all foreign subsidiary banks are state-chartered,
since national charters are unattractive to them for various reasons.
Branch and agency offices of foreign banksy which have roughly four times
the assets of foreign subsidiary banks, operate with state licenses, and
since they are not considered banks, they do not come under the Bank
Holding Company Act.
No other major country allows foreign banks to operate Inside its
borders without national regulation. The lack of a national policy on
foreign banking operations completely baffles many people who are
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unfamiliar with the way we conduct our banking in this country— as I can
attest from my many conversations with Asian central bankers. The Foreign
Bank Act is designed to establish the principle of national control over
the entry of foreign banks, while leaving room for the states to exer
cise appropriate controls within the framework of the dual banking system.
The bill also would strengthen the ability of the Federal government to
negotiate with foreign governments on behalf of our banks*
Nondiscrimination--and Alternatives
What ground rules should regulate the operations of foreign banks?
Our Steering Committee considered several possible standards, but finally
decided on the principle of V’nondiscrimination.n This means that for
eign banks would have the same privileges that are available to equiva
lent domestic banks in this country, but no more privileges than that.
Nondiscrimination would mean the establishment of competitive equality
between foreign and domestic banks.
Some observers argue that we should go by the standard of "reciproc
ity” --which implies nyou treat me fairly and I111 treat you fairly in
return*” Who can be against fairness? Yet in spite of its apparent
simplicity, reciprocity is a very slippery concept which is subject to
different interpretations. One possible interpretation is the so-called
nhome-powersn standard, which means that foreign banks can do the same
things here that they do at home. Under this standard, as it was put
to us, French banks should be able to offer the same investment-banking
and commercial-bank services in their New York branches that they offer
their customers in France. It is one thing to argue that France can
combine investment and commercial banking if that suits French financial
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customs, but it is an entirely different matter to suggest that all
French practices are suitable for American banking. The home-powers
standard interferes with each country!s choice of banking practices,
and thus should be rejected,
A second unacceptable alternative is "quid pro quo,11 which means
that foreign banks in the U. S. should have only those powers which are
extended to U.S* banks in their own country. This concept sounds plau
sible, but again, it abdicates to another nation the decisionmaking for
banking in this country. The powers of a foreign bank in the United
States would vary according to country of origin. Under this rule,
foreign banks1 activity here would be determined by foreign decisions
and not by U.S. needs* I would argue that the rights of foreign banks
in this country should be determined on a uniform basis by the needs of
the American financial system. Other countries1 treatment of our banks
abroad is a separate question and a matter for negotiation, not fixed
rules*
Reciprocity supposedly would force foreign countries to give our
banks more privileges, but it!s a rather crude means of bringing about
that result. Some proponents of Reciprocity" probably hope that foreign
countries would not reciprocate, thus justifying restrictions on for
eign banking operations in the U.S. However, this in turn would bring
the threat of retaliation. Let me remind you that in any war of retalia
tion, we have more to lose, because our banking operations abroad are
much larger than foreign operations in this country. Retaliation would
also mean your own plans for possible expansion into international fi
nance could be blocked.
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Nondiscrimination;, in contrast, is a good rule which can be applied
universally in the field of international-banking regulation. Because
it appears to be such a good principle, our bill would grant the Federal
government certain powers to negotiate for nondiscriminatory treatment,
at least among the developed industrial nations. In practice, we
would recognize that unregulated entry of U.S. banks in less-developed
countries could swamp local financial institutions, and so in those
countries we could accept policies aimed at strengthening local insti
tutions.
Nondiscrimination in Practice
In brief, nondiscrimination avoids the danger of competitive restric
tionism, but without giving foreign banks special privileges. It means
that foreign banks in this country should have roughly the same privi
leges as their domestic competitors. Now let me Illustrate how this
principle determined some of the more important provisions of the For
eign Bank Act:
(i) Redefinition of Branches and Agencies as Banks ’
We bring branches and agencies of foreign banks into equality with
domestic banks by redefining them as "banks’* for purposes of the Bank
Holding Company Act. This would bring them under the same laws which
prevent interstate expansion by domestic banks. A foreign bank entering
this country for the first time would find Its new banking operations
limited to one state, and its branching or acquisition privileges also
limited to that one state. Similarly., existing foreign banks could not
expand banking operations across state lines.
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(ii) Federal Branches and National Bank Charters
We support nondiscriminatory treatment for foreign banks by offering
them the option already available to domestic banks of operating under
either state or Federal law. The Federal Reserve bill would allow as
many as one-third of a national bank!s directors to be foreign citizens,
thus increasing the attractiveness of national-bank chartering. The bill
would offer Federal branch status as a separate alternative to a state
license.
(iii) Grandfather Rights
The question of grandfather rights involves not only nondiscrimina
tion, but also legislative tradition and international law. The interstate
offices of foreign banks were established in conformity with existing
law and in good faith. Moreover, elimination of these offices might
violate our international treaty obligations as well as our tradition
of grandfathering existing banking operations whenever laws are changed.
For these reasons, the Foreign Bank Act would grandfather all branches
and agencies brought under the Bank Holding Company Act and in existence
on December 3, 1974, the date the bill was first sent to Congress* I
might emphasize that a liberal grandfather clause is essential in over
coming foreign governments5 objections to our bill.
(iv) Federal Banking Licenses
Finally, since we think nondiscrimination should be adopted by other
countries, the Federal government would be given licensing powers over
foreign banks to encourage foreign countries to reduce their own unrea
sonable restrictions. In banking matters the bill gives the Federal
government a "club in the closet" to use if negotiations are unsuccessful
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with foreign governments. Specifically, the Act requires that each
new foreign bank or branch would apply for a federal banking license
issued by the Comptroller of the Currency, If, after consultation with
the Federal Reserve and the Department of State, the Secretary of the
Treasury rules that approval of an application is not in the national
interest, the Comptroller would not issue the license. This is the
club in the closet, and merely by being there, I hope its use may be
avoided.
Concluding Remarks
From my remarks, I hope you1ve gotten some flavor of the reasons
for the rapid expansion of world banking--a quadruple expansion during
a brief half-decade. Obviously, in an age of multinational corpora
tions, there is a need for a parallel development on the financial side.
World banking has improved the worldwide allocation of funds, and it
has won its spurs in meeting the critical problems of the past several
years.
I hope you!ve also seen why the new era of world banking requires
new regulatory approaches. Just as the individual states, by themselves,
can no longer expect to control such an important sector of our finan
cial system as the foreign banks, individual nations must face the need
for international cooperation to control world banking. You can expect
greater cooperation among foreign governments in banking regulation that
would parallel their exchange of information on monetary policies. The
Foreign Bank Act would strengthen the powers of the Federal government
in its right to exchange information with other nations. Greater coor
dination among regulators to monitor the liquidity of international
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banking operations, joint ventures, and, perhaps, foreign-exchange
dealings is on the horizon. But although you may face greater control
and the costs of regulation, the same process may establish greater
stability and greater uniformity in the competitive groundrules. On
balance, the functioning of the system of world banking should be im
proved by international coordination in the regulatory area*
To conclude, no doubt exists in my mind that world banking activities
will become an increasingly important influence on the operations of U.S.
banks overseas. The other side of the coin from U.S. banks1 expansion
abroad is more foreign banking competition here* Still, I think you
will agree that an equitable environment in our home market is essential
for our o\m. banks1 overseas expansion.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1975, November 10). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19751111_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19751111_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1975},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19751111_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}