speeches · January 9, 1975
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
THE PROPOSED FOREIGN BANK ACT
AND ITS PROBABLE EFFECT ON CALIFORNIA BANKING
Remarks by
John J. Balles, President
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Presidents f Seminar
California Bankers Association
Santa Barbara, California
January 10, 19 75
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THE PROPOSED FOREIGN BANK ACT
AND ITS PROBABLE EFFECT ON CALIFORNIA BANKING
I am delighted to appear at this California Bankers Association
seminar to discuss the foreign bank situation, a topic of increasing
importance to this state’s banking community. As you know, the Federal
Reserve System sent to Congress last month a proposed bill to bring
under effective Federal control the foreign banks operating in the United
States. This legislation, the Foreign Bank Act of 1974, concerns an
activity which since 1966 has grown from less than $7 billion to more
than $40 billion in domestic assets.
The legislation is a product of the Federal Reserve System Steering
Committee on International Banking Regulation, on which I have served
along with two other Reserve Bank presidents and three members of the
Board of Governors. We have worked since early 1973 to develop an appro
priate national framework for regulating foreign banking activities
in this country. We have consulted with domestic banks, with foreign
banks, and also with foreign governments and their central banks. As
part of this work, I visited eight countries around the Pacific Basin
last spring to discuss the proposed legislation. On the basis of my
close involvement with this subject, I would like today to discuss the
general features of the bill and to assess its probable impact.
The main reason for the proposed legislation is the lack of a uniform
national policy on foreign banks operating in the United States. The
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present situation is a patchwork of state and national jurisdiction
that is not only unfortunate, but also unacceptable in terms of the
long-term interests of this country. We want to be able to treat foreign
banks fairly and to put them on an equal standing with equivalent U.S.
banks. We also want to be in a stronger position in negotiating on behalf
of our banks with foreign governments.
In the present situation, the terms of entry and the powers of foreign
banks are effectively controlled by the various states and not by the
Federal government. States such as California and New York give foreign
banks considerable freedom, so that they have become important parts
of the local banking community. In states such as Florida and Texas,
the entry of foreign banks is forbidden by state law; indeed, forty
states explicitly or implicitly forbid foreign entry. Ten states, in
cluding the largest financial centers, permit some kind of foreign entry,
and the result is a growing network of foreign banks. But foreign banks
come under Federal law only if they control subsidiary banks, in which
case the Bank Holding Company Act applies, or if they join the Federal
Reserve System and become subject to System membership requirements.
Branches and agencies, which are the most common forms of foreign bank
operations, are offices of their parent companies and thus have no sep
arate corporate charter. Hence, they are not regarded as "banks" for
purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act.
This situation of scattered authority cannot continue. The foreign
banks are now too important for that; over sixty now have banking offices
of some kind in the United States, and as I ’ve already mentioned, they
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support over $40 billion in domestic assets. More are likely to enter
and the size of this sector undoubtedly will grow even further. Foreign
banks are generally outside the direct control of the Federal Reserve
System for purposes of monetary control; in no other country have the
national authorities such little control over foreign banks. Moreover,
under present arrangements, foreign banks have operating advantages
which could give them an important competitive edge over their domestic
competitors— most noticeably the right to establish multistate banking
operations. Thirty-eight of the foreign banks located in California
have banking offices in at least one other state, reflecting their abil
ity (through branches or agencies) to escape the barriers against inter
state banking which apply to domestic banks.
Another frequently forgotten but major consideration is this: the
U.S. government under present conditions is hampered in its negotiations
with other governments over the rules imposed on our banks operating
abroad. The bargaining power of our government is weakened, because
it cannot carry through with its promises (or threats). Since the reg
ulatory power here rests with the individual states, U.S. banks abroad
sometimes find themselves facing restrictions which might be removed
or modified if the Federal government had a direct influence on the
entry of foreign banks into the domestic market.
Principles Behind Legislation
The development of ground rules for regulating foreign banks has
required considerable time and thought. The System Steering Committee
eventually decided that the appropriate principle would be that of
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nondiscrimination; foreign banks would have the same privileges as equiv
alent domestic banks in this country, but no more privileges than that.
The Foreign Bank Act is designed to bring about such competitive equality.
The Committee considered three possible approaches, but found
two of them to be unacceptable. One approach might be called the "home
powers" standard: foreign banks would be allowed to do in the United
States what they are permitted to do at home. Under this rule, French
e
banks, which can combine commercial and investment banking businesses
in France, would be exempted from the provisions of our Glass-Steagall
Act and be allowed to conduct both investment-banking and commercial-
banking operations here. The decision of France to allow its own banks
to engage in both investment and commercial banking may be appropriate
to French banking and the French economy, but it is clearly inappropriate
to expect that practice to be automatically extended to French banks
operating in another country,
A second approach, which could be described as ,!quid pro quo,11
is a variation of the first, except that it would give foreign banks
the same rights in the United States that the foreign country extends
to U.S. banks operating within its borders. In this case, the rights
of foreign banks in this country would be automatically determined
by their respective governmentTs treatment of U.S. banks operating
abroad.
Under both of these approaches, foreign governments in effect
would determine foreign banks’ powers inside the United States, regard
less of our views on appropriate banking powers. This is a crucial
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weakness, and therefore we have opted for a third approach, that of
nondiscrimination. Under this rule, the United States determines what
the proper functions of commercial banks should be in the light of
our own institutions, and it then grants appropriate powers to both
foreign and domestic banks. We do not expect foreign countries to
grant privileges to U.S. banks that their own banks do not enjoy at home,
nor do we expect them to discriminate against U.S. banks by giving them
fewer powers than their own banks enjoy at home. On the other hand,
foreign countries should not expect to have their practices extended
to this country. To repeat, nondiscrimination means that foreign banks
would have the same privileges as U.S. banks, but no more than that.
I should add that we recognize that not all foreign banking systems
are as well developed as ours. It is not realistic to expect small
countries to allow the unregulated entry of U.S. banks; local insti
tutions would be swamped. We cannot expect even the developed countries
to adopt strict nondiscrimination, since such uniformity would ignore
the wide differences in business customs and institutions in various
countries.
The slogan ’’reciprocity’1 frequently arises in discussions of this
subject. However, if it is defined carefully— and usually it isn’t—
it can be subsumed under one of the three approaches I have already
discussed. If reciprocity means either of the first two approaches,
then I can think of no surer way of provoking foreign retaliation.
In a contest of reciprocal retaliation, this country would be the loser,
since its banks overseas are much larger than foreign banks operating
here. However, reciprocity in the sense of nondiscrimination is the
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fairest solution to the treatment of domestic and foreign banks oper
ating within a single country.
Nondiscrimination recognizes equally the right of individual coun
tries to operate with differing laws and practices, and the right of
foreign banks to compete on the same basis with domestic banks. Nondis
crimination may not be feasible for underdeveloped countries with under
developed banking systems, but for advanced countries, nondiscrimination
is a completely equitable formula.
Provisions of the Act
Now let me review the main features of the Foreign Bank Act as it
was presented to Congress. I will comment on the significance of each
clause as I go along.
(1) Branches and agencies of foreign banks would be defined as
"banks11 for the purpose of bringing them under the Bank Holding Company
Act.
The main effect of this clause is to prohibit interstate expan
sion. A foreign bank entering the U.S. for the first time would be lim
ited to one state for its domestic banking activities, and foreign banks
now here would be limited to their current sites of operation. However,
the clause does not cover joint ventures, where ownership is divided
among several banks, none with more than 25 percent of the outstanding
shares, and it does not cover banking-type organizations licensed as
investment companies under New York State law. These organizations
are not defined as banks because of their limited competitive importance,
and also because of the complications that would arise from classifying
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domestic corporations as banks when their business is primarily in
nonbanking areas. Foreign banks under this clause would be able to
take advantage of the Bank Holding Company Act to expand in those non
bank fields open to domestic holding companies. Nonbank subsidiaries
of course are free to expand across state lines.
I should note in passing that the barrier to interstate banking
is not absolute. The Bank Holding Company Act allows interstate bank
expansion by domestic as well as foreign holding companies, if the states
concerned pass legislation specifically authorizing acquisitions by out-
of-state bank holding companies. Such enabling legislation has been
introduced in both the New York and California legislatures, but has
failed to pass. Whether these bills are brought up again this year
remains to be seen.
(2) Entry of new foreign banks would be controlled by Federal
bank licenses issued by the Comptroller of the Currency, although regis
tration alone would be required for foreign banks* existing operations.
A license would be needed whether the foreign bank applies for a national
or a state charter.
The key feature here is that, with each new application, the Comp
troller must submit to the Secretary of the Treasury the views of both
the Secretary of State and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
If the Secretary of the Treasury then determines that the issuance of
a license would not be in the Interest of the United States, the Comp
troller would be prohibited from issuing a license.
Existing branches, agencies, and bank subsidiaries would not be
affected by the new licensing requirements, apart from the formality
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of registering. However, any additional branch or agency office of
a foreign bank would need a license because it would be treated as a
separate new ’’bank" under the Bank Holding Company Act. In contrast,
banking subsidiaries would retain their existing rights under state
law to expand by de novo branching and would not need to obtain Federal
licenses.
I have argued strongly for the inclusion of this clause as a result
of my talks with U.S. bankers around the Pacific. At present, there
is no statutory basis for delaying the entry of banks of another country
on foreign policy grounds. This clause would give the Federal government
direct powers over entry, powers which could be used in helping obtain
more favorable treatment for U.S. banks in their activities abroad.
I do not expect this power to be used frequently, but its very existence
should help the State Department in negotiating with foreign governments
on external banking matters.
(3) National banks for the first time would be able to allot as
many as half of their directorships to foreign nationals, and foreign
banks would be allowed to operate branches under a Federal license
issued by the Comptroller of the Currency. Foreign banks would be
allowed to convert from state to Federal status.
Under this provision, a national charter for a banking subsidiary
would be a more attractive alternative for a foreign bank than it is
now, although I think the advantages of a Federal branch license might
be even more attractive. Such a branch would have the same powers
as a national bank, except that its lending limit would be based on the
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capital of the foreign parent, not the capital and surplus of the domestic
subsidiary bank.
Some state banking supervisors have objected to these particular
provisions. But it seems to me that defenders of the dual banking
system should not object to legislation that for the first time brings
foreign banks under that system. At present, national status is not
a practical alternative to state status for foreign banks. Application
of the principle of nondiscrimination means granting foreign banks the
same effective rights as domestic banks to operate under state law or
under national law. It would be inconsistent to argue that the choice
inherent under the dual banking system should not apply to foreign banks.
(4) Federal Reserve System membership would be compulsory for
all foreign banks whose worldwide assets total $500 million or more.
I have strongly supported this feature of the bill because it
establishes competitive equality between foreign banks and their domestic
competitors. The foreign banks affected by the membership requirement
are generally large banks, whose domestic equivalents are System members.
Under this provision, foreign banks would gain the privileges of member
ship, but they would also take on reserve requirement burdens comparable
to those borne by similar U.S. banks.
(5) FDIC insurance would be made available on branch and agency
deposits.
This feature would give foreign banks equal rights with respect
to deposit insurance coverage. One result, at least in California,
would be the ability of state-licensed agencies to accept domestic
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deposits once insurance was obtainable. Apart from this, I am not
certain there would be significant competitive benefits. Most foreign
banks operate in the wholesale-banking field, and those which seek do
mestic retail-type business usually have domestic subsidiaries which
can receive FDIC coverage. Nevertheless, I see no reason why there
should be discrimination against foreign banks on this matter.
(6) Federal Reserve Act provisions dealing with JEdge Act Corpor
ations would be changed to allow foreign banks to conduct international
banking business outside their principal state of operations, on the
same basis as domestic banks.
This clause would provide foreign banks with an interstate banking
alternative already open to U.S. banks. Since most foreign banks spe
cialize in international finance, the right to own Edge Act Corporations
would be beneficial to them, and it would partially offset the restric
tive impact of being brought under the multi-state banking prohibitions
of the Bank Holding Company Act.
The legislation contains another important provision that applies
to domestic as well as foreign-controlled Edge Act Corporations. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System would be allowed to
waive capital and surplus limitations imposed on the aggregate liabil
ities outstanding of Edge Act Corporations. The present lending restric
tions do not make sense to me. They Only make Edge Act Corporations
go through complicated paperwork to get loan participations onto the
books of parent banks. It seems sensible to cut through this facade
for the sake of both domestic and foreign banks and to recognize that
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the true lending limits of these corporations are determined by the
resources of the parent banks.
(7) Finally, all existing operations of foreign banks would be
l!grandfathered,11 and future expansion rights would be determined by
the Bank Holding Company Act.
Since expansion rights are a critical issue, I will be more specific.
In a branching state, state-chartered bank subsidiaries could have
multiple branches, and could expand (as permitted under existing law)
by de novo branching or merger. A shift to national charter would
not affect these rights. The provisions with respect to future bank
holding company acquisitions are more restrictive and complex. In its
principal state of operations, a foreign bank could continue to make
acquisitions of bank subsidiaries and to open new branches or agencies
under state or federal law. In other states, Holding Company Act pro
hibitions against interstate acquisitions would apply, except where state
legislation specifically gives permission for interstate acquisitions
to both foreign and domestic banking organizations.
New branches or agencies of a foreign bank would be treated as an
acquisition of a holding company and would be restricted accordingly,
regardless of the presence of other lfgrandfatheredlr branches or agencies
in the same state. In California, the legislation would not affect
the rights of existing state-chartered banks to branch inside the state.
Existing foreign branches and agencies also would not be affected, but
future interstate expansion would be restricted to Edge Act Corporations.
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A liberal grandfather clause has seemed suitable for several reasons.
It would not mean any significant competitive advantage for foreign
banks, especially since their largest domestic subsidiaries are already
grandfathered under the existing Bank Holding Company Act. Also, the
tradition of U.S. banking law has generally been to grandfather existing
operations—witness the multi-state operations of Bank of California
and Western Bancorporation. Moreover, grandfathering recognizes the
fact that foreign bank offices here were established legally and in good
faith. Confirmation of these existing rights is consistent with this
country's international treaty obligations; indeed, failure to grant
grandfather rights might be considered a violation of our trade treaties
with other countries. Without a liberal grandfather clause, we would
face the strong possibility of retaliation abroad, especially in contin
ental Europe.
Prospects and Probable Impact
Whether Congress will approve any legislation without substantive
changes is always difficult to predict. However, it should be recog^-
nized that the Foreign Bank Act has received very careful study by the
Federal Reserve System and other Federal agencies, and that the views
of foreign banks and governments have also been sought. This is a well-
designed piece of legislation that helps to provide a foundation for
the orderly growth of the foreign banking sector. We expect that
Congress will consider it carefully and will approve of the principle
of nondiscrimination. My preliminary impression is that the prospects
for passage are favorable.
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Now, how will this legislation affect banking in California? I
think it will have a strong impact on international business, and will
add further impetus to the growth of San Francisco and Los Angeles as
international financial centers. Foreign branches would have increased
lending and deposit-accepting powers that would permit a more rapid
expansion of their operations. The foreign-trade sector of the state’s
economy should clearly benefit from this expansion of^ international
financial services.
However, I am not certain that we will see a significant increase
in the actual number of new foreign competitors, since most of the im
portant foreign banks are already established here. Edge Act Corpor
ations of out-of-state domestic banks have been playing a more important
role in international finance, and their competitive position should
be enhanced by the proposed modification of lending limits. New foreign-
bank Edge Act Corporations, on the other hand, are less likely to be
an important factor, because most large foreign banks (except those
from continental Europe) already maintain international banking oper
ations in California.
In addition, the new legislation should have an indirect benefit
for the California economy. Foreign banks could count on their busi
ness not being upset by ill-judged pieces of state legislation as was
threatened in 19 73. Similarly, California banks with foreign opera
tions would be less exposed to foreign retaliation, and the strengthened
powers of the Federal government in negotiating over foreign banking
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matters should help reduce some of the barriers California banks now
face in certain countries.
Outside the financial centers, the pattern of California banking
may not be strongly affected. Where foreign banks already compete
vigorously in local markets, they will continue to do so. These subsi
diaries could continue to operate under state law if they so desire.
But those foreign banks considering expansion outside the financial
districts of San Francisco and Los Angeles would face the high costs
of building up a branch network.
The expertise of most foreign banks is in international and business
lending, and these skills are not easily transferred to retail banking,
where markets are dominated by state-wide branch systems and by strong
local banks. There is not going to be a sudden wave of foreign banks
spreading over the state because of the new legislation. Expansion
into retail banking markets is always a slow and costly process. This
is true for northern California banks trying to move south and for
southern California banks trying to move north, and it is particularly
true for any foreign bank, regardless of the resources behind it.
In most other states, the impact of the Act may be small, since
the type of business foreign banks are interested in is simply not there.
Foreign banks, specializing as they do in wholesale banking or inter
national finance, would tend to choose New York, Los Angeles, San Fran
cisco, or perhaps Chicago as their prime banking base. Most states
which do not already have foreign banks are in fact unlikely to get
them, and those states desirous of attracting them would find in practice
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that a modified Edge Act Corporation would be an acceptable substitute
for a foreign bank subsidiary with full powers. In Washington, for
example, where the state law has recently been changed, only one office
of a foreign bank is allowed, and that office is limited in the domestic
deposits that it can accept. There would be little difference, in view
of the restrictions currently imposed on foreign banks, between a state-
licensed branch in Washington and an Edge Act Corporation. So although
the Foreign Bank Act has clarified groundrules and equalized competitive
advantages, its effects are likely to be significant only in those states
where foreign banks already operate.
Internationally, there should be definite benefits for U.S. banks.
The example of a nondiscriminatory policy, combined with the State Depart
ment’s new power to make recommendations on foreign bank licensing,
should encourage a more equitable environment for our banks and, indi
rectly, a boost for the general economy.
Finally, the Act may reinforce the pressures building up to allow
limited interstate banking. I say "may" because the legislation works
both ways. Under present rules, the interstate branching privileges
of foreign banks are used as an argument for extending similar privileges
to domestic banks. The proposed Act removes this privilege— and thus
also removes one argument for interstate banking. The Act also maintains
the right of states to prevent interstate banking, and any such restrie-
tiono would apply to domestic as well as foreign banks. On the other
hand, the Act strengthens the Edge Act Corporation, so we may see domestic
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banks, more so than foreign, banks, taking advantage of their increased
powers to build up a network of international banking offices.
On balance, the Act maintains the trend toward increased inter
state banking for international and corporate financing. But for retail
banking, there is little net effect. The interstate banking bills intro
duced in New York and California would have allowed only two offices,
and thus they provide no base for developing a retail# business. The
foreign banks, with a few noticeable exceptions with which you are all
familiar, do not appear to be interested in retail banking.
Concluding Remarks
With its emphasis on nondiscrimination, the Foreign Bank Act should
be judged primarily as a measure to improve the functioning of the inter
national banking system and to remove certain competitive inequalities
within the United States. The principal changes will be on wholesale
and international banking. This does not mean the bill is of no interest
to small banks, because any measure which improves the functioning of
the financial system indirectly benefits them through better money-market
facilities and increased specialized knowledge. In terms of purely
local considerations, the benefits to the State of California are clear.
The further development of financial markets in San Francisco and Los
Angeles resulting from such legislation is in the interest of the whole
state, especially because of the focal role of foreign trade in the
state’s economy. Overseas, the Act should help improve the regulatory
environment within which U.S. banks operate. The Foreign Bank Act thus
represents another strand in an increasingly interdependent world economy.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1975, January 9). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19750110_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19750110_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1975},
month = {Jan},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19750110_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}