speeches · July 16, 1974
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
PROBLEMS
OF INFLATION
AND HIGH
INTEREST
______ RATES
Testimony of
John J. Balle
PRESIDENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BP
OF SAN FRANCISCO
House Committee on
Banking and Currency
Washington, D. C.
July 17, 1974
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i[ >-/jib
John J. Balles
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportu
nity to share my thoughts on basic
monetary problems with this Committee.
I will attempt to set forth and analyze what
I believe are the major issues and the ap
propriate policies to deal with them. In
that context, I will deal with the questions
you raised in your letter of June 19. *
As you pointed out in calling these hear
ings, two of the most serious problems
currently facing the U.S. economy are an
unprecedented rate of peace-time inflation
and a record high level of interest rates.
The present inflation is especially perni
cious because many of the largest price
increases have been for necessities such as
food, housing and fuels, so that the poor
and those living on reduced retirement in
come have been hardest hit. Such perverse
effects of inflation tend to negate the
attempts of the government in recent years
to assist such groups with direct govern-
‘Letter printed at end of pamphlet.
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merit programs. Similarly, it is clear that
the current high level of interest rates has
created serious dislocations and strains in
our economy. These include the adverse
impact on the housing market, the large
capital losses to those persons in all walks
of life who have put their savings into
stocks and bonds, directly or through mu
tual funds and pension trusts, and the
threat to the liquidity of financial institu
tions.
World-Wide Problem
As you are aware, the problems of ram
pant inflation and extremely high interest
rates are not restricted to the United States.
All of the major industrial countries are
experiencing similar, or even higher rates
of inflation, and the high interest rates
which go with these rates of inflation. A
significant share of our current inflation
results from the fact that the prices of
many basic goods—such as oil, wheat,
cotton, and lumber—are determined in
the international market place, rather than
in the U.S. market alone. Thus, worldwide
inflation acts to exacerbate and complicate
our domestic inflation problem. For sim
ilar reasons, the resolution of our current
inflation and high interest rate problems
does not lie completely within our hands,
but rather requires the cooperation of the
major industrial countries of the world.
What has led to this unprecedented world
wide inflation? Some observers would cite
excessive monetary and fiscal expansion as
the major immediate cause. But since I do
not believe that governments and central
banks act out of blind ignorance or per
verse motives, we must consider the social
and political climate which tends to pro
duce a bias toward inflationary policies.
One major factor appears to be the in
creasing pressure on the world's available
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resources which has been created by a
growing and more affluent population with
ever-rising expectations for a higher stan
dard of living. Another key factor appears
to be the increased priority that govern
ments have assigned to achieving a fully
employed economy, both here and
abroad, since World War II. Given this
priority, governments have committed
themselves to ongoing, expansionary do
mestic policies to prevent “unacceptable"
levels of unemployment from developing.
These secular developments have tended
to create an underlying inflationary bias
in government policies throughout the
world.
The cultural and economic forces gener
ated over the past three decades have
provided the basis for our present infla
tionary experience, but they do not explain
why serious worldwide inflation occurred
in the first half of the 1970's, rather than
the second half of the 1960's, or at some
other period. The reasons for the timing
of our problems are complex. However,
one element which has not received as
much attention as it deserves is the break
down of the Bretton Woods System, and
the decline in recent years in foreign con
fidence in the U.S. dollar. In the years from
the end of World War II until the mid-
1960's, the world looked on the U.S. as the
strongest and most stable country, and the
dollar as the strongest and most stable cur
rency. As a result, both foreign govern
ments and private persons tended to
accumulate dollar assets. But as the U.S.
suffered an almost unbroken string of def
icits in our balance of payments, and as
the U.S. inflation rate gradually accelerated
in the late 1960's towards 6 percent, con
fidence in the dollar weakened, and there
was an incentive to switch out of dollars
into other currencies.
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This movement out of dollars accelerated
in the period after the U.S. suspended
convertibility of the dollar into gold in
August, 1971. The movement only came
to a halt in March 1973, when most indus
trial countries floated their exchange
rates, and thereby rang down the curtain
on the Bretton Woods system of fixed-
exchange rates.1 In the period up to March
1973, foreign governments resisted an
appreciation in value of their own curren
cies vis-a-vis the dollar because they be
lieved that it would hurt their export
industries, slow their growth, and create
domestic unemployment. The consequent
intervention in foreign-exchange markets
by other governments substantially in
creased the domestic money supply in
these countries as they bought dollars by
issuing their own money through central
bank operations. Thus the well-publicized
dollar overhang was matched by foreign
monetary expansion. Simultaneous mon
etary expansion in all major industrial
countries helped to foster a simultaneous
business-cycle boom around the world,
which aggravated the inflation from which
we all now are suffering.
Having noted the worldwide inflationary
climate, I would now like to turn to a more
specific analysis of the underlying factors
that have produced rampant inflation in
the United States, even in the face of a
softening in economic activity. It may be
helpful to put this problem in historical
perspective, before attempting to assess
possible cures.
1. "How Well Are Fluctuating Exchange Rates
Working,” Report of the Subcommittee on Inter
national Economics of the Joint Committee, 93rd
Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office), August 14, 1972.
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Effect of Budget Deficits
Our domestic inflation problem owes
much to the fact that the Federal Govern
ment in the United States has run deficits
in 14 of the last 15 fiscal years. These def
icits, which occurred in all phases of the
business cycle, have expanded the Federal
debt by $193 billion, or 67 percent since
1959. Federal deficits became an especially
critical problem with the major escalation
of the Vietnam war in mid-1965. The size
of these deficits increased at an alarming
rate during the Vietnam build-up period
between 1966 and 1968 when the econ
omy was at, or near, full employment. The
fiscal situation was temporarily relieved by
the belated income-tax surcharge in mid-
1968, and by a leveling off in military ex
penditures at about the same time. How
ever, the situation deteriorated further in
1969-70 when outlays for civilian programs
outstripped recession-reduced revenues,
and became still worse in the 1971-73
period when a full-blown expansion got
underway.
It can be argued that a tighter monetary
policy ought to have been able to offset
the inflationary effects of this large, sus
tained deficit financing. In theory this may
be true, but in practice the opposite has
tended to occur. When huge Federal credit
demands are added to those of a fully-
employed private sector, interest rates
tend to rise sharply. There are some sec
tors of the economy, such as housing con
struction, and programs financed with
municipal bonds, that are especially sensi
tive to such a development because they
depend heavily upon long-term credit.
Because high interest rates have an uneven
impact on the economy, demands for re
lief are quickly heard. For example, in the
spring of 1973, there was a serious effort
made by some members of Congress to
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freeze interest rates, or even roll them
back to the level of January 1,1973.
In short, large-scale deficit financing by the
Government tends to bring great pressures
on the central bank to keep interest rates
from rising to "unreasonable," "unaccept
able," or "dangerous" levels. Unfortu
nately, the only way that mounting credit
demands can be satisfied without an in
crease in interest rates in the short run is
for the Federal Reserve to accelerate the
growth of money and credit. But if done
for too long, or to an excessive degree,
such action can generate inflationary pres
sures which may persist for a long period
of time and result in even higher interest
rates in the long run.
It has been my observation that large and
persistent Federal deficits are a major fac
tor in pulling monetary policy off course,
in the direction of excessive monetary ex
pansion, as the central bank attempts to
cope with the conflicting pressures that
develop. Too often in practice, therefore,
an expansionary fiscal policy tends to gen
erate excessive expansion in money and
credit.
Priority of Employment Goal
The second major factor tending to inhibit
the use of monetary policy in combatting
inflation is the conflict in national goals
that often occurs as between "full employ
ment" and stable prices. Since the early
1960's, the "full employment" goal in the
U.S. generally has contemplated an unem
ployment rate of 4 percent or less. Such a
rate was regarded by many as a practical
minimum, in view of the normal shifting of
workers between jobs and the lack of mar
ketable skills of some job-seekers. When
ever the conventional or aggregate unem
ployment rate has exceeded 4 percent,
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pressures have developed for expansion
ary monetary and fiscal policies. For ex
ample, recently there have been demands
for a tax cut to take up slack in the econ
omy and to reduce our conventional or
aggregate unemployment rate from the 5.2
percent level that prevailed last month.
Were such policies to be undertaken, I
greatly fear that they would simply accel
erate the already extremely high inflation
rate in the U.S,
In my view, there has not been enough
policy use of a refined analysis of the em
ployment and unemployment data, con
centrating on the "hard core" of our labor
force—i.e., heads of households or
"breadwinners"—for whom the social and
economc costs of unemployment are the
highest. Among this group, the unemploy
ment rate last month was only 3.1 percent,
in contrast to the conventional or aggre
gate unemployment rate of 5.2 percent.
The significance of a 4 percent aggregate
unemployment rate has gradually changed
over time because of shifts in the composi
tion of the labor force. An earlier study by
George Perry of the Brookings Institution,2
and a more recent study by Eckstein and
Brimmer for the Joint Economics Commit
tee* suggest that a 4 percent unemploy
ment rate today represents a much tighter
labor market than it did twenty years ago,
in view of the increased participation in
the labor market by teenagers and other
2. George L. Perry, "Changing Labor Markets and
Inflation,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activ
ities, No. 3, 1970.
3. "The Inflation Process in the United States."
Study prepared for the use of the Joint Economic
Committee by Otto Eckstein and Roger Brimmer,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office),
February 22, 1972.
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new entrants who also lack marketable
skills. Generally, it now seems to take a
higher rate of inflation to achieve a 4 per
cent unemployment rate than it did some
years ago, because of those factors. Thus if
we should now attempt to follow a mon
etary policy aimed at reducing unemploy
ment to 4 percent, the likely consequence
would be to exacerbate present inflation
ary pressures, which have already reached
dangerous levels.
This, of course, is not to imply that mon
etary and fiscal policy should never be
used to help deal with unemployment.
What it does mean is that, because of shifts
in structure of the labor force, there may
be a change over time in the practical
minimum unemployment target that can
be achieved through expansionary mon
etary and fiscal policies without creating
an unacceptable rate of inflation. Thus,
some knowledgeable observers would
hold that, because of the shift in the com
position of the labor force already noted,
the practical minimum target today might
be about 41/2 -5 percent as far as measures
to stimulate aggregate demand through
monetary and fiscal policy are concerned.
In these circumstances, a very useful way
to fight unemployment is to attack the
structural source of the problem by help
ing to increase the marketable skills of
those groups who lack experience. Such
measures as low-interest education loans
to youth and minority groups, retraining
programs directed toward skills where job
vacancies are high, and steps to facilitate
worker mobility are all important in this
context. Rather than imposing inflation on
everyone by attempting to reach our em
ployment goals through expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies, our aim
should be a much more vigorous use of
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selective means to deal with these specific
problems. We need a high-powered rifle
shot approach, rather than the shotgun
approach of monetary and fiscal policy.
For whatever reason, there has been a
tendency for the goal of "full employ
ment" to take priority over stable prices,
in view of actions in recent years by the
Administration and Congress—whose job
it is to determine national priorities. Not
enough attention seems to have been paid
to the trade-off—i.e., the additional infla
tion that must be accepted to get a lower
unemployment rate. In essence, my argu
ment is that we have had both a faulty
diagnosis, and in part the wrong medicine,
for the unemployment goal. First we need
a more meaningful "target rate" for un
employment, as I have explained. Sec
ondly, we need new perceptions and new
remedies for structural unemployment,
particularly among teenagers, minority
groups and part-time women workers.
Lags in Monetary Policy Impact
A third major factor which tends to inhibit
the use of monetary policy in combatting
inflation, and which results in calls for its
use to provide short-term stimulus to the
economy, is a complicated technical one.
Namely, the lags in the effects of a change
in monetary policy seem to be shorter for
production, employment and profits than
for prices. Admittedly, our knowledge
about the length of those lags is imperfect.
But it is reasonably clear that the "good
news" from easy money appears first, with
production, employment, and profits ex
panding within, perhaps, 6 to 12 months.
However, the "bad news" comes later, in
the form of increased inflation with a lag
of perhaps 1 to 3 years. Conversely, if a
tight money policy is adopted, the bad
news of a dampening of economic activity
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comes first, whereas the good news of a
diminished rate of inflation is delayed. In
these circumstances, it is not surprising
that elected officials who must face the
voters at regular intervals tend to prefer an
easy money policy.
Has Monetary Policy Been Too Expansive?
Thus, it may be asked, has monetary policy
been a principal cause of our inflation
problem, with the accompanying high
level of interest rates, and could this have
been avoided if monetary policy had been
tighter in recent years? In testimony earlier
this year before the Congress, Chairman
Burns acknowledged that, with the benefit
of hindsight, monetary policy may have
been overly expansive in 1972. Some of
our critics, such as Professor Milton Fried
man, would go much further—alleging
that the money supply has grown too fast
since about 1970, and that this played a
major role in producing the current
inflation.
Such criticism, whether or not fully justi
fied, is easy enough to make, based both
on monetary theory and statistical studies,
but it seems to me to ignore real problems
in the real world. No central bank can be
or should be wholly independent of gov
ernment. The elected representatives of
the people of the United States, both the
Congress and the Administration, must
have the ultimate responsibility for eco
nomic policy. The Federal Reserve System
must take account of the high priority
which the Congress and the Administra
tion have assigned to full employment and
economic growth, which has often con
flicted with stable prices. Central banks
cannot completely ignore such imperatives
—even against their better judgment. It is
vital that this matter be thoroughly appre
ciated, not only by the Congress and the
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Administration, but also by the business
and financial community and the general
public. It is only in this way that we can
get support for the belt-tightening mea
sures needed to overcome the corrosive
problem of rampant inflation and sky-high
interest rates.
Inflation and Financial Markets
Having dealt at length with “what went
wrong," I would next like to deal with the
pressing question of “where do we go
from here." Specifically, I will attempt to
assess the consequences of severe inflation
for the economy and financial markets and
the policy options available to deal with
these problems. But first, I must empha
size the crucial role which inflation plays
in causing high interest rates.
Interest rates, as the price of money, are
determined by the supply and demand for
funds, which in turn are critically influ
enced by inflation expectations. On the
supply side, in a period of inflation lenders
will expect an interest premium to com
pensate for the erosion by inflation of the
value of their assets. On the demand side,
the need for funds in a period of inflation
is boosted by rising prices of new plant,
equipment, inventories and consumer
goods. Additionally, expectation that re
payment will be in depreciated dollars will
also add to demand for credit. The resul
tant heavy credit demands push rates even
higher.
It is crucial to realize that the sharp esca
lation of interest rates in the first half of
1974 has occurred despite a continued
growth in the money supply at a rate
which some of our critics fear is still too
large to be non-inflationary. According to
latest estimates, the narrowly-defined
money supply (M 1) rose at an annual rate
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of 7.0 percent in the first six months of
1974. Thus, the extremely high level of in
terest rates has stemmed principally from
forces set in motion by inflation itself—i.e.,
by an inflation premium in interest rates
and the way in which inflation magnifies
credit needs.
In a very real sense, the double-digit in
flation and accompanying high interest
rates from which we are now suffering
reflect inflationary policies of the past, the
symptoms of which were temporarily sup
pressed during the period August 1971 to
early 1973 by wage and price controls
under various programs. Unfortunately,
the inflationary process is not quickly re
versible, and it will probably require sev
eral years to reduce the rate of inflation,
and hence interest rates, to more reason
able levels. If sole reliance continues to be
placed on monetary policy to do the job,
unaided by fiscal restraint, it may take even
longer. It is vital to recognize that rampant
inflation cannot be brought under control
without sustained monetary and fiscal re
straint, in the U.S. or any other country. I
believe that this conviction is shared by
most economists of all schools of thought.
Thus, the great challenge that we face in
the process of licking inflation is to design
the best measures to restrain demand and
to increase supplies.
High and rising interest rates have
taken their toll on financial markets.
To the man in the street, some
of the most obvious results have been
the decline in the stock market and
the sharply reduced supply of
funds for home loans at savings institu
tions. These institutions have endured
heavy withdrawals of funds, as depositors
placed their funds in higher yielding mar
ket instruments, and the consequence has
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been a major curtailment of funds to the
housing industry. To the man on Wall
Street, the dangers have been just as om
inous. For example, public utilities have
experienced serious difficulties in raising
money in the capital market, and the
commercial banks have had increasing
problems in raising funds to meet heavy
loan demands.
The market disruptions caused by high
interest rates, in turn, have seriously
affected the real economy. Those who
have invested in stocks and bonds, directly
or through mutual funds and pension
trusts, have suffered substantial capital
losses, and have become poor sales pros
pects for new homes, new cars and other
big-ticket items. And higher borrowing
costs generally have contributed to higher
prices of most goods and services.
One may certainly ask whether we must
put up with such severe dislocations in the
financial markets and the overall economy.
Unfortunately, the answer to this question
appears to be yes. A policy specifically
aimed at reducing interest rates now
would require massive injections of re
serves into the banking system by the
Federal Reserve and an acceleration in the
growth of money and credit. The result
might be a temporary levelling off or
decline in interest rates, and a short-run
rise in output. But in the longer run, this
policy would cause an even sharper rise
in prices, which in turn would cause inter
est rates to rise even higher.
Since high interest rates have had such
painful consequences, it is pertinent to ask
whether they have done any good in
moving toward a solution to the inflation
problem. I see mounting indications that
the high cost of credit is having the desired
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rationing effect, both from the standpoint
of borrowers and lenders, in “cooling off"
the economy. This is a necessary first
step in purging the economy of inflation
ary excesses and starting on the long road
back toward stable and non-inflationary
growth.
Policy Recommendations
What can policymakers do to extricate
the economy from the present situation of
surging inflation and high interest rates?
I believe that several major lessons are
implicit in what I have already said about
the dangers of inflation and of unbalanced
policy responses. However, these lessons
can be summarized in the following four
specific policy recommendations.
1. Longer-term policy horizons. Both with
regard to monetary and fiscal policy, I
suggest that we explicitly recognize the
lagged effects of policy measures, and
work within somewhat longer time hori
zons than has been the custom in the past.
In our present uphill battle against infla
tion, we should expand our policy-
planning horizons to at least three years
to measure the effect of policy actions
being taken currently. A planning horizon
which does not capture the full conse
quences of current policy actions, espe
cially with regard to prices, necessarily
has an inflationary basis.
2. Budget reform. I applaud Congress' ef
forts this year in moving toward budget
reform. By setting up new machinery
that will deal with the budget as a single
entity, you are in effect creating a vested
interest devoted to the cause of economic
stabilization. For the first time, Congress
will be able to vote on fiscal policy. But
beyond that, it seems essential to push for
actual budgets which are restrictive in
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periods of severe inflation. The best fiscal
policy for fiscal 1975 would be at least a
balanced budget, or preferably a surplus,
instead of the $11.4 billion deficit currently
projected. In my judgment, this is the most
important single step that the Congress
could take to relieve inflationary pressures
and to reduce the level of interest rates.
Up to the present, far too great a burden
has been placed on monetary policy, with
the anti-inflation effort centered around
credit controls and the resulting high price
of credit.
3. Economic priorities. I would recom
mend an amendment to the Employment
Act of 1946, stating explicitly that price
stability is a co-equal goal of economic
policy, along with "maximum employ
ment, production, and purchasing power."
Further, I would suggest making explicit
in policy decisions the implicit trade-off
between full employment and stable
prices whenever a conflict arises between
these two goals. In the past, our laudable
emphasis on the full-employment goal has
caused us to downplay other necessary
objectives, with the results we see today.
4. Monetary policy. If we are to overcome
inflation, the Federal Reserve System must
have Congressional and Administration
support in pursuing a non-inflationary
growth target for money and credit—even
if high interest rates and some increase
in unemployment are necessary in the
short run, as inflationary forces are wrung
out of the economy. It is particularly vital
that we not be pulled off course toward
excessive credit ease by the two major
forces that have done so in the past—i.e.,
the necessity to finance large-scale budget
deficits, and the tendency to call for easy
money to solve structural unemployment
problems that could be handled better
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through selective measures of the type
I've described.
Concluding Comments
My testimony, Mr. Chairman, has at
tempted to deal with the broad problems
raised in your letter of June 19. Now I
would like to conclude with a brief reca
pitulation directed specifically toward the
six issues noted in that letter that involve
some dispute in monetary economics.
While recognizing that there are differ
ences of opinion on these matters, both
within and without the Federal Reserve
System, my own views are summarized
below.
1. The reliability of the trade-off between
inflation and unemployment as a guide
for monetary policy.
The trade-off between inflation and
unemployment seems to be unstable
and subject to change. In recent years,
it appears that the trade-off has
worsened—i.e., it now takes more infla
tion to produce a given decline in
unemployment. Even with the recent
11.5 percent inflation rate, the unem
ployment rate last month was 5.2
percent. Moreover, the trade-off ap
pears to be a short-run phenomenon.
In the long run, say, three years or
more, a higher inflation rate will not
"buy" a lower unemployment rate.
Only in the short run of one to two
years will we possibly observe a higher
rate of inflation leading to a temporary
decline in unemployment. This obser
vation follows from the widely-
accepted doctrine that in the long run
the growth in the money supply affects
only the general price level, while in
the short run the principal effects are on
production and employment.
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2. Benefits and risks involved in the
Federal Reserve accommodating non
recurring price increases originating in
supply shortfalls and other special
events.
It is my view that the Federal Reserve
should seldom, if ever, accommodate
price increases originating from supply
shortfalls and other transitory events.
This will do nothing to ease the supply
problem, and by facilitating higher
prices, it will contribute to a higher
permanent rate of inflation. As Chair
man Burns said last winter, we recently
have had a shortage of oil, not a
shortage of money, and we cannot
increase the supply of the former by
increasing the supply of the latter.
3. The benefits and risks involved in
monetizing deficit spending.
As I indicated earlier, it is undesirable
for the Federal Reserve to monetize the
deficits of the Federal Government in
periods of full or nearly-full utilization
of resources. At such times, the mone
tization of Federal deficits tends to pull
monetary policy off course toward
excessive monetary expansion, and thus
contributes to inflation. In periods of
recession, on the other hand, it is
appropriate and beneficial to monetize
Federal deficits as part of a program
aimed at recovery. Unfortunately,
Federal budget deficits (as measured
by the unified budget) have occurred
in 14 of the last 15 years, irrespective of
the state of the business cycle. There
have been a number of important tech
nical reforms in recent years, such as
the auctioning of Treasury securities,
which have reduced the Federal
Reserve's role in support of the debt
management area. However, the funda
mental solution to the problem lies in
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keeping spending in line with receipts,
thereby eliminating the deficits when
they are not needed to bolster a sagging
economy.
4. The benefits and risks involved in the
Federal Reserve fighting money market
fires.
A primary function of any central bank
is to act as the lender of last resort to
protect the institutional integrity of the
financial system. In this sense the
Federal Reserve must “fight money
market fires." Many scholars believe
that a serious aggravating factor in the
Great Depression was the Federal Re
serve's failure to perform this function
in an aggressive way. In my opinion,
the Fed has done a creditable job in
protecting the institutional integrity of
financial markets in recent decades
during periods of liquidity crises, with
out letting the money supply get out of
control on the upside.
5. Relationships between money supply,
inflation and interest rates.
The rate of growth in the money supply
is a major influence determining the
level of interest rates in both the short
run of a few months, and in the long
run of a few years. However, the nature
of this influence is quite different in
these two time periods, because of the
role of inflation in these relationships.
In the short run, accelerated money
growth can force interest rates down,
and restricted money growth can force
interest rates up, by altering the short-
run supply of funds relative to demand
for these funds. However, short-run
changes in money growth have little if
any direct effects on the overall rate
of inflation. In the long run, sustained
changes in the rate of growth in the
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money supply are a major determinant
of the rate of inflation, and expectations
of future inflation rates. Since current
rates of inflation and inflation expecta
tions are major determinants of the cur
rent level of interest rates, sustained
changes in the rate of money growth
will have a major effect on the level of
interest rates. The lesson here is that
efforts to reduce interest rates by accel
erating money growth in the short run
will be self-defeating in the long run.
Thus, excessive easy money over a
period of several years leads to infla
tion, which is a major factor producing
high interest rates.
6. How to use monetary policy to check
inflation and to bring interest rates
back down to reasonable levels.
Monetary policy can check inflation and
bring interest rates back down to
reasonable levels through a gradual but
steady policy of reducing the rate of
monetary expansion to a non-inflation-
ary growth track. But to make this a
viable approach, we will need a power
ful assist from a policy of fiscal restraint,
along with support for making stable
prices a goal of equal importance with
economic growth and full employment.
* ■ ■ * * * *
Committee Letter
June 19,1974
Mr. John J. Balles
President
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
San Francisco, California
Dear Mr. Balles:
We are scheduling hearings on inflation
and high interest rates beginning July 8,
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1974. Inflation and high interest rates are
our country's gravest economic problem.
Many believe that whether inflation con
tinues to worsen or finally is checked and
whether interest rates continue to soar or
return to reasonable levels depends crit
ically on what the Federal Reserve does.
A staff report based on interviews with
the twelve Reserve Bank Presidents and
five members of the Board of Governors
is being prepared and will be presented at
these hearings. The report focuses atten
tion on several areas of dispute in
monetary economics. In specific, the
report calls attention to disputes over (1)
the reliability of the trade-off between
inflation and unemployment as a guide for
monetary policy; (2) the benefits and risks
involved in the Federal Reserve accom
modating non-recurring price increases
originating in supply shortfalls and other
special events; (3) the positive elements
and the risks involved in monetizing deficit
spending; (4) the benefits and risks in
volved in the Federal Reserve's fighting
money market fires; (5) the relationships
between money supply, inflation, and in
terest rates; (6) how to use monetary
policy to check inflation and bring interest
rates back down to reasonable levels.
The Committee would benefit from your
testimony on these questions. Please
inform me at your earliest convenience
about your availability during the weeks
of July 8, July 15, and July 22 ,1974.
Sincerely,
Wright Patman
Chairman, Committee on
Banking and Currency
U.S. House of Representatives
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1974, July 16). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19740717_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19740717_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1974},
month = {Jul},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19740717_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}