speeches · March 6, 1974
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
THE FEDERAL
RESERVE
AND THE
OBLEM OF
INFLATION
r
REMARKS BY
John J. Balles
PRESIDENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF SAN FRANCISCO
Joint Directors’ Meeting Luncheon
San Francisco, California
March 7, 1974
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;3 * *
John J. Balles
I am delighted that we could arrange to
have a cross-section of bankers, business
executives, and other professional leaders
in the San Francisco area meet with us
today. As you were informed, this is the
occasion of the Annual Joint Board
Meeting of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco and its four branches.
Chairman Wilson, as the historian in our
group, has reminded us of the historic
forces which preceded the establishment
of the Federal Reserve and which brought
it into existence over 60 years ago. He has
also introduced the Boards of Directors of
this Bank and its branches, which repre
sent important elements in the structure of
the Federal Reserve System.
Today, I would like to describe some of the
current forces operating on the Federal
Reserve, and then examine the causes and
possible cures for the dangerous infla
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tionary spiral we are now witnessing. How
ever, before getting to these topics, I think
that it would be appropriate to say a few
words for our guests about the role of a
Federal Reserve Bank and its directors in
the context of today's problems. For I am
often asked, "Just what does a Federal Re
serve Bank do? And what is the authority
and responsibility of your directors?" It
happens that the Federal Reserve System
has a policy of rotating its directors after a
certain period of service. It is likely, there
fore, that some of our guests today might
be approached in the future and asked to
consider serving as a director. If so, I hope
you would give it favorable consideration.
Role of the Directors
The Board of Directors of a Federal Reserve
Bank has a unique function in that it com
bines some of the traditional responsibil
ities of directors in a private corporation
with the special responsibilities of contrib
uting to the formulation of public policy.
This dual role has evolved from the unique
structure of the Federal Reserve itself—
i.e., part government and part private,
guided by a central authority in Washing
ton, but with twelve semi-autonomous
Federal Reserve Banks.
As the nation's central bank, the Federal
Reserve System's basic responsibilities fall
into three basic categories: (1) to regulate
the flow of money and credit in a manner
that contributes to economic growth
without inflation; (2) to supervise and
examine those commercial banks which
are members of the System, to regulate
bank holding companies, and to oversee
the foreign activities of U.S. banks; and (3)
to provide numerous "wholesale" central
banking services, such as provision of cur
rency and coin, operation of a check
collection system, and service as fiscal
agent for the U.S. Treasury.
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The central policy-making body in the Fed
eral Reserve System is the Board of Gover
nors, appointed by the President and con
firmed by the Senate. The twelve regional
Federal Reserve Banks share certain of the
responsibilities relating to monetary policy
with the Board of Governors, administer
various regulations, and provide the
"wholesale" banking services noted ear
lier. Thus, the Federal Reserve System is
characterized by coordinated control
through the Board of Governors and by
decentralized administration through the
Reserve Banks.
The affairs of each Reserve Bank are con
ducted under the supervision and control
of its Board of Directors, subject to general
supervision by the Board of Governors.
The Board of Directors of each head office
of a Reserve Bank consists of nine mem
bers, three of whom (including the
Chairman and Deputy Chairman) are ap
pointed by the Board of Governors as rep
resentatives of the general public. The
public members may not be officers, direc
tors, employees or stockholders of any
bank. The remaining six directors at each
Head Office are elected by the member
banks, which own all the stock in the Fed
eral Reserve Bank. Of these six, three are
representatives of the member banks and
are usually actively engaged in banking;
and the other three must be actively en
gaged in commerce, industry, or agricul
ture, and may not be officers, directors, or
employees of any bank.
Similarly, for each branch of a Federal Re
serve Bank, the Board of Governors ap
points certain directors as representatives
of the public interest, while the majority of
the branch directors are appointed by the
Fiead Office Board. The affairs of each
Branch office are conducted under the
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control of its Board of Directors, subject to
general supervision by the Head Office
Board.
Thus, a Federal Reserve Bank is a privately-
owned institution with a public purpose.
Except for a dividend on member-bank
stock, which is limited by statute to 6%, the
great bulk of our earnings is paid over to
the U.S. Treasury. A Reserve Bank has a
certain degree of regional autonomy, but it
is also part of a national system.
The Federal Reserve System is a unique
blend of public interest and private repre
sentation of "grass roots" interests. In
meaningful ways, it reflects the traditional
belief in this country in a system of checks
and balances. This type of organization has
served the country well, in my opinion.
Our directors are successful men in many
fields of endeavor—business, finance, ag
riculture and universities, to name a few.
They provide counsel and advice to ensure
that the Bank has clearly-defined goals and
objectives, and programs for reaching
them, and they have the responsibility for
overseeing the efficiency of operation and
quality of management.
In the area of economic intelligence, our
directors provide us with information on
the economy weeks or even months before
developments are reflected in national
economic data. At other times their first
hand information reminds us that ours is a
diverse economy in which developments
in many industries and regions of a country
can run counter to nation-wide trends.
Our directors also provide information and
insights on the proper course for public
policy, and they can add substance to their
views by recommending changes in the
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Federal Reserve discount rate. This is the
rate which the Federal Reserve Bank
charges for loans to its member commer
cial banks, and it is one of the tools of
monetary policy. Although the Board of
Governors in Washington has the ultimate
authority to approve or disapprove a pro
posed change in the discount rate, it is
strongly influenced by the "grass-roots"
reaction expressed by the directors, espe
cially if the directors of a number of Federal
Reserve Banks make the same recommen
dation.
One of the major strengths of the decen
tralization of the Federal Reserve System is
its ability to draw on the best talent in var
ious regions of the economy to serve as
directors with the foregoing responsibilities.
The Federal Reserve as an Institution
The unique structure of the Fed, which I
believe gives it unusual strength in per
forming its job, also subjects it to criticisms
by those who do not appreciate its role and
its structure.
The Federal Reserve has at least two ele
ments which make it institutionally unique.
First, it is independent within, but certainly
not from, the Federal Coverment. More
specifically, it is an independent agency
but with ultimate responsibility to the
Congress, and it is not a part of the Execu
tive Branch. Second, the decision-making
process within the Federal Reserve System
is decentralized in the sense that it is
shared by the Board of Governors in Wash
ington with the twelve regional Federal
Reserve Banks. I'd like to say a few words
about each of these functions.
When Congress and the Administration
established the Federal Reserve in 1913, it
was deliberately made an independent in
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stitution within Government, in order to
free it from day-to-day political influence.
Senator Carter Glass, the architect of the
original Federal Reserve Act, hoped that
the System would act as a "Supreme Court
of Finance." That hope has been at least
partly fulfilled over the decades. The estab
lishment of the Federal Reserve System as
the central bank indicated that Congress
believed that monetary policy was too
important to leave to private bankers. On
the other hand, the fact that Congress,
over the years, has specified 14-year terms
for members of the Board of Governors in
Washington, and 5-year appointments for
Presidents of the regional Reserve Banks,
indicates that monetary policy also is too
important to be left to the day-to-day pres
sures from the political arena. The goal was
to establish a Federal Reserve System
which is responsive to the long-term eco
nomic needs of the nation in an objective
and non-partisan way.
Over the years there have been a number
of attempts to erode the independence of
the Fed. There have been repeated legisla
tive proposals to retire the capital stock of
the Reserve Banks, to eliminate their direc
tors, to centralize all powers of the Fed in
Washington, and to make the System more
directly amenable to influence by the Con
gress.
A current example is a bill scheduled for
vote in the House of Representatives in the
near future, which would provide for a full-
scale audit and review by the General Ac
counting Office of the finances, operations
and monetary policy actions of the Federal
Reserve System. Although we are com
pletely in favor of audits in the traditional
sense, we are opposed to the bill for sev
eral reasons. With respect to financial
transactions, the Federal Reserve Board is
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already thoroughly audited by a nationally-
known CPA firm, and the results are re
ported to Congress. In turn the Board per
forms exhaustive examinations of the Fed
eral Reserve Banks, in addition to the work
of the resident auditing staff at each Bank
which reports directly to the Board of
Directors. Secondly, The Federal Reserve
System, both at the Board of Governors
and at the Reserve Banks, has in place
effective and hard-hitting programs aimed
at operational efficiency. Thus a financial
audit and an "efficiency" audit by the GAO
would merely duplicate effective programs
already in place.
The really serious objection, however, has
to do with the proposed policy review by
the GAO. In our view, this could be an en
tering wedge for direct Congressional con
trol over monetary policy—with conse
quent adverse effects on the economy if
such control were to be influenced by par
tisan goals and political pressures. Forty
years ago, the Congress wisely decided to
remove the Federal Reserve System from
the scope of the GAO, in order to provide
for independence of judgment on the part
of the System in carrying out the responsi
bilities delegated to it by Congress. We be
lieve that it would be unwise to change that
arrangement.
A second unique feature of the Federal
Reserve is the decentralization of policy
making. The Federal Open Market Com
mittee (FOMC), one of the two major
policy-making bodies of the Federal Re
serve, meets once a month in Washington
to decide on the course of open market
operations, the most important instrument
of monetary policy. The majority of the
FOMC consists of the seven members of
the Board of Governors. The remaining five
members are drawn from the twelve Re
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serve Bank Presidents, on a rotating basis.
But those Presidents who are not currently
voting members have an opportunity to
attend the meetings and express their
views. Thus, the formulation of monetary
policy benefits from regional inputs and
from a variety of viewpoints.
Role of the San Francisco Reserve Bank
The advantages of a decentralized Federal
Reserve System extend beyond strictly
policy-related issues. Let me describe
some of those that I am most familiar with,
using the experiences of the San Francisco
Bank.
Until very recently, banking structure in
the Twelfth Reserve District, with its state
wide branch banking, was relatively unique
in the nation. The Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco has brought these special
institutional factors to the attention of the
Board of Governors, and in most cases
obtained regulatory treatment which is
suitable to this particular bank structure.
The Reserve Bank in San Francisco also has
taken an active interest in developing the
West Coast as an international financial
center. It has encouraged a legal and regu
latory environment favorable to interna
tional banking operations, and has at
tempted to get government and financial
institutions to consider the longer-run
developmental interest of our financial
markets. The Bank itself is in the process of
strengthening its own research capability
with regard to the Pacific Basin area and
will assist in the growing financial integra
tion of trading partners in this region.
Over 90 percent of the budget of the Fed
eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco is ex
pended to provide payments mechanism
services, currency and coin, fiscal agency,
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and other services to government, banks,
and to the economy in general. In my view,
the decentralized organization of the Fed
eral Reserve System promotes efficiencies
in these operations because the System's
semi-autonomous Reserve Banks can ad
just their procedures to local conditions;
they can innovate in improving the quality
and reducing the cost of service; and they
can recruit and challenge better staff.
Two examples may illustrate this point. The
Federal Reserve Banks issue virtually all
new currency in circulation and are re
sponsible for retiring and destroying unfit
currency. More currency is issued and de
stroyed in the Twelfth District than any
where else in the nation. To do this job
more efficiently, the Bank is experimenting
with a number of methods, including some
automated ones, for verifying and de
stroying worn-out currency. Another ex
ample is in the area of improving the pay
ments mechanism. The San Francisco
Reserve Bank operated the first automated
clearing house in the nation, and elec
tronic funds transfers were first processed
by a Reserve Bank computer in the Twelfth
District. We expect to continue to take a
leading role in this field and to support
commercial bank efforts to reduce the flow
of paper checks.
Perspectives on Inflation
I would now like to turn to the major eco
nomic problem facing the nation today—
namely, rampant inflation that is occurring
even in the face of a softening in economic
activity. It may be helpful to put this
problem in historical perspective, before
attempting to assess the possible cures.
Effect of Budget Deficits. During the first
half of the 1960's, the United States en
joyed a period of sustained and stable eco-
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nomic growth, with very little inflation. The
origins of our current problems seem to lie
in the major escalation of the Vietnam war
starting about mid-1965.
Government deficits increased at an
alarming rate in the Vietnam build-up pe
riod of 1965-68, when the economy was at,
or near, full employment. President
Johnson perceived a lack of popular sup
port for the war and was fearful that his
"Great Society" spending programs might
get scuttled if he asked Congress for a tax
increase. He therefore elected initially to
finance expanded military commitments in
South Asia with government debt. The def
icits which resulted from this decision were
temporarily relieved by the belated in
come-tax surcharge in mid-1968, and by a
leveling off in military expenditures at
about the same time. However, the fiscal
situation deteriorated further in 1969-70
when outlays for civilian programs out
stripped recession-reduced revenues, and
became still worse in the 1971-72 period
when recovery from the recession got
underway.
The persistence of substantial government
deficits regardless of the phase of the busi
ness cycle has been a major source of the
inflation that is now built into the U.S.
economy, in my view.
Monetary Policy Undermined. It can be
argued that a tighter monetary policy ought
to be able to offset the inflationary effects
of large, sustained deficit financing. In
theory this may be true, but in practice the
opposite tends to occur. When huge Fed
eral credit demands are added to those of a
fully-employed private sector, interest
rates tend to escalate. There are some sec
tors of the economy, such as housing con
struction and programs financed with mu
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nicipal bonds, that are especially sensitive
to such a development because they de
pend heavily on long-term credit. When
these sectors are confronted with high in
terest rates, demands for relief are quickly
heard. Moreover, the U.S. Treasury itself
has a natural desire to finance its deficits at
the lowest feasible cost.
In short, large-scale deficit financing by the
Government tends to bring great pressures
on the central bank to keep interest rates
from rising to “unreasonable,” "unaccept
able," or "dangerous" levels. You may re
call that about a year ago there was a se
rious threat in the Congress to freeze
interest rates, or even roll them back to the
level of January 1,1973.
Obviously, the only way that mounting
credit demands can be satisfied without an
increase in interest rates is for the Federal
Reserve to accelerate the growth of money
and credit. If done for too long, or to an
excessive degree, such action can generate
inflationary pressures which may persist
for a lengthy period.
It has been my observation that large and
persistent Federal deficits are a leading
factor in pulling monetary policy off
course, in the direction of excessive mone
tary expansion, as the central bank at
tempts to cope with the conflicting pres
sures that develop from such a situation.
Too often in practice, therefore, an expan
sionary fiscal policy tends to generate ex
cessive expansion in money and credit.
Priority of Employment Goal. A second
factor which tends to inhibit the use of
monetary policy in combatting inflation is
an unresolved conflict in national goals as
between full employment and stable
prices. Since the early 1960's in the U.S.,
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achievement of the "full employment"
goal has usually contemplated an unem
ployment rate of 4% or less. Such a rate
was regarded by many as a practical mini
mum, in view of normal shifting of workers
between jobs and the lack of marketable
skills of some job-seekers. However, pre
sent evidence suggests that structural shifts
in the labor force during the last decade
would now make the "practical minimum"
about 4.5% or 5%, especially in view of the
increase in the labor force represented by
teen-agers and other new entrants into the
labor force who often lack marketable
skills.
In my view, there has not been enough re
fined analysis of the employment and
unemployment data, concentrating on the
"hard core" of our labor force—i.e., heads
of households or "breadwinners"—for
whom the social and economic costs of
unemployment are highest. Among this
group, the unemployment rate in January
of this year was only 2.8%, in contrast to
the conventional or aggregate unemploy
ment rate of 5.2%.
Studies by the Brookings Institution indi
cate that the conventional unemployment
rate seriously understates the tightness of
labor markets. Similarly, studies by our
Bank indicate that it takes a higher rate of
inflation now to achieve a 4 percent unem
ployment rate than it did ten years ago.
This is due to two factors: first, the
changing structure of the labor force has
brought higher participation rates for
workers with marginal skills; second, in
creased inflation expectations have caused
labor to demand larger wage increases
even at times when the unemployment rate
is relatively high. If we should now attempt
to follow a monetary policy aimed at re
ducing unemployment to 4%, the likely
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consequence would be to exacerbate pre
sent inflationary pressures, which have al
ready reached dangerous levels.
For whatever reason, there has been a
tendency for the goal of "full employment"
to take priority over stable prices, in view
of actions in recent years by the Adminis
tration and Congress—whose job it is to
determine national priorities. Not enough
attention seems to have been paid to the
trade-off—i.e., the additional inflation that
must be accepted to get a lower unemploy
ment rate. In essence, my argument is that
we have both a faulty diagnosis as well as
the wrong medicine for the unemployment
goal. First we need a more meaningful
"target rate" for unemployment, as I've
explained. Secondly, we need new percep
tions and new remedies for unemploy
ment. Rather than imposing inflation on
everyone, by attempting to reach our em
ployment goal through expansive mone
tary and fiscal policies, our aim should be a
more vigorous use of selective measures to
deal with the problem. These measures
could include low-interest educational
loans to youth and minority groups, re
training programs directed toward skills
where job vacancies are high, and steps to
facilitate worker mobility.
Lags in Monetary Policy Impact. A third
factor which tends to inhibit the use of
monetary policy in combatting inflation,
and to call for its use by the Administration
or the Congress to provide short-term sti
mulus to the economy, is a technical one.
This factor has to do with the lags in the
impact of a change in monetary policy on
production, employment, profits and
prices. While the technical reasons are
complicated and while our knowledge in
this area is imperfect, it seems reasonably
clear that the lags are longer for an impact
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on prices than for the impact on the other
measures noted.
Thus, the "good news" about easy money
appears first—i.e., favorable effect on pro
duction, employment, and profits; while
the "bad news" comes later—i.e., infla
tion. Conversely, if a tight money policy is
adopted, the bad news comes first—i.e.,
unfavorable effects on production, em
ployment, and profits; whereas the good
news is delayed—i.e., a reduced rate of in
flation. Under these circumstances, it is
not surprising that elected officials who
must face the voters at a given time would
prefer to see easy money.
Has Monetary Policy Been Too Expansive?
Thus, it may be asked, has monetary policy
been a principal cause of our inflation
problem, and is there a simple cure in the
form of tight money? In recent testimony
before the Congress, the Chairman of the
Board of Governors, Arthur F. Burns, ac
knowledged that, with the benefit of hind
sight, monetary policy may have been ov-
erly-expansive in 1972. Some of our critics,
such as Professor Milton Friedman, would
go much further—alleging that the money
supply has grown too fast since about 1970,
and that this played a major role in pro
ducing the current inflation.
Such criticism, whether or not justified, is
easy enough to make, based both on mon
etary theory and statistical studies. But it
seems to me to ignore real problems in the
real world. No central bank can be or
should be wholly independent of Govern
ment. The elected representatives of the
people of the U.S., both the Congress and
Administration, must have the ultimate
responsibility for economic policy, and
that includes monetary policy. In today's
world, a central bank that consistently de
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fied its government on major issues would
quickly be taken over by the government.
I have been attempting to convey an un
derstanding of some of the forces that im
pinge on the freedom of action of the Fed
eral Reserve System in using tight money to
combat inflation. Whether by accident or
design, our Federal budget has been char
acterised by large deficits in most recent
years, giving rise to very large financing
needs and to higher interest rates, to a
point where serious damage was threat
ened in some sectors of the economy and
where many members of Congress were in
a mood to freeze interest rates. Also,
whether based on a faulty analysis or a
misplaced emphasis, those elected officials
with ultimate responsibility for economic
policy have placed a high priority on the
“full employment" goal, even at the ex
pense of stable prices. Central banks
cannot completely ignore such imperatives
—even against their better judgment.
It seems to me that our best hope lies in a
better understanding of the long-run infla
tionary damage done to our economy by
excessive monetary and fiscal stimulus and
by over-emphasis on employment targets,
whatever the short-run benefits. It is vital
that this matter be thoroughly appreciated
not only by the Congress and the Adminis
tration, but also by the business and finan
cial community and the general public. It is
only in this way that we can get support for
the belt-tightening measures needed to
overcome the corrosive problem of
rampant inflation.
Price Controls-Hidden Inflation. In com
pleting the analysis of the basic causes of
inflation in recent years, I would note that
the problem was compounded by price
controls. The “new economic policy" im
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plemented by the Admi nistration in August
of 1971 had some favorable price effects in
its initial two phases because excess ca
pacity existed in the economy and because
the inflationary pressures were largely of
the cost-push variety in 1971 and early 1972.
However, by late 1972 and early 1973, the
economy was at virtually full employment,
and continued wage-price controls led
mainly to a misdirection of resources and
to artificial shortages. Further, the illusion
of stable prices tended to conceal for a
while the effects of continued expan
sionary economic programs. This illusion
was rather rudely shattered by the price
freeze experience last summer when, for
example, certain agricultural sectors quite
literally began to shut down. By now, pop
ular support for wage-price controls has
declined to a point where they probably
will be dropped almost entirely this year.
Special Causes of Inflation, 1972-73. In ad
dition to fiscal problems and the nation's
misadventure with wage-price controls,
three other factors deserve special men
tion in analyzing the origins of our present
inflation problem. The first is the unprece
dented world-wide grain crop failure in
1972 that sent agricultural prices through
the roof. The second is the fact that the
business cycle in virtually all industrial
countries was in a coincident boom phase
in 1973, which placed extreme pressure on
the supplies and prices of internationally
traded goods. The third factor, of course,
was the unanticipated imposition of the
Arab oil embargo last fall. Inappropriate
fiscal policies and overstaying the useful
ness of wage-price controls would have
created difficult price problems in any case
—but these policy mistakes in conjunction
with the special factors I've noted pro
duced an inflation problem of epic dimen
sions.
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Inflation and the Current Outlook
How do we get out of the apparent box we
have gotten ourselves into? The first thing
to remember is that at this time our main
economic problem is a shortage of oil, not
money. The current rise in unemployment
and the cutbacks in production to this
point have resulted primarily from supply
problems which cannot be solved with
monetary policy. Even if a deficiency in
aggregate demand develops from the
supply-induced slowdown in the economy,
monetary policy could do little to relieve
the situation this year because of the lags in
its impact on the economy, which I men
tioned earlier. In these circumstances,
monetary policy should be directed to
wards 1975 and beyond when the policies
we adopt now will have their major
impact.
If we wish to overcome inflation, it is going
to be a long, hard uphill battle, and our
monetary-economic time horizon must be
expanded to at least three years to see the
success of our actions. Also, since there is
a trade-off between inflation and unem
ployment, we must be prepared to accept
at least a temporary rise in the unemploy
ment rate—even after the energy problem
is solved—and to use special programs to
ease the plight of those affected. Such pro
grams could include liberalization of wel
fare payments, increased unemployment
benefits, and more public employment.
Whatever is done in this regard, it is vital
that we not try to solve the unemployment
probiem of the few, by imposing inflation
on everybody through expansionary fiscal
and monetary measures.
In the final analysis, it will not be possible
to solve our inflation problem without
fiscal and monetary restraint. For that rea
son, I found it encouraging to note the
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recent testimony before Congress by the
Secretary of the Treasury. He warned
against broad-based increases in spending
programs or tax cuts as means of pumping
purchasing power into the economy at this
time. One can only hope that his point of
view will prevail over that of an official of
the Office of Management and Budget who
was widely quoted recently to the effect
that the Administration would "bust the
budget," if necessary, to combat unem
ployment and any downturn in the
economy in the months ahead.
One can also hope that the budget reform
bill which has passed the House will be
enacted. Under present procedures, a
large number of appropriations bills are
considered separately, without regard to
an overall expenditure target, any as
signing of priorities, or sources of fi
nancing. The budget reform bill would, for
the first time, give members of Congress a
chance to vote on fiscal policy. Until such a
measure is passed, the balance between
expenditures and revenues will continue to
be a "happening" rather than a policy—
and with a high likelihood of chronic
deficits.
Similarly, if we are to overcome inflation,
the Federal Reserve System must be free to
pursue a non-inflationary growth target for
money and credit—even if higher interest
rates are necessary in the short run, as in
flationary forces are wrung out of the
economy. It is particularly vital that we not
be pulled off course toward excessive
credit ease by the two major forces that
have done so in the past—i.e., the ne
cessity to finance large-scale budget defi
cits, and the tendency to call for easy
money to solve unemployment problems
that could be handled better through
selective measures.
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Conclusion
The fight against inflation this year and in
the years immediately ahead will not be
easy, but it is absolutely essential. As
Chairman Burns stated in recent testimony
before Congress, continued inflation will
"reduce the dollar's strength in foreign
exchange markets—destroy the gains we
have recently made in strengthening our
competitive position in world markets—
. . . undermine confidence .. . send in
terest rates soaring and wreck our chances
of gaining a stable and broadly based pros
perity in the near future."
We are now on the verge of Latin-American
style inflation, measured in two digits. We
must bite the bullet now, because it will be
much harder to fight inflation the longer
we wait. This effort will require less expan
sionary monetary and fiscal policies than
we have been following in recent years. If
we are not prepared to take these actions,
we will be faced with turmoil, uncertainty
and economic instability for years ahead. I
am confident that the people of this coun
try, and its leaders, have better sense.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1974, March 6). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19740307_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19740307_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1974},
month = {Mar},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19740307_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}