speeches · February 17, 1974
Regional President Speech
Bruce K. MacLaury · President
THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY IN A SHORTAGE ECONOMY
Remarks by
BRUCE K. MacLAURY
President
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
at the
Second Annual Bank Investments Conference
American Bankers Association
Fairmont Roosevelt Hotel
New Orleans, Louisiana
February 18, 1974
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"THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY IN A SHORTAGE ECONOMY"
If there's one word that characterizes the outlook for the economy
over the next year, that word is "uncertainty". Private forecasters are
hedging their bets even more than they usually do, and Herb Stein, the Govern
ment's top economist is busily assuring Congress that the Administration in
tends to stay loose — I think his phrase was "remain flexible" -- in case the
second half upturn doesn't turn up.
In fact, what's most surprising under the circumstances is that the
forecasts seem to cluster in such a narrow range. One wonders whether the
first man off the mark didn't just toss a dart at the circle, and everybody
else grabbed the same set of numbers on grounds that they were as good as any
others.
The standard profile foresees one or two quarters of negative real
growth in the first half of the year, followed by a pickup in the second half
of varying dimensions. Expectations of resumed growth rest on the belief that
plant and equipment expenditure will remain strong, that housing outlays will
be accelerating, and that auto sales will have recovered from the disastrous
slump of the early part of this year.
Despite this slow growth and expected rise in unemployment, there
will apparently be little if any relief from the rapid pace of price increases
that we've experienced in recent months, at least for the first half of the
year. The present higher costs of energy have by no means yet worked through
the pricing structure. We are evidently facing another bout of increased prices
for agricultural commodities, both grains and meats. And it's hard to believe
that the ending of price and wage controls this spring won't give some addi
tional kick to the cost of living.
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It's difficult to find much that's comforting to say about this kind
of economic outlook. And the frustration is all the greater because policy
makers feel trapped with no good options. In these circumstances, the Admin
istration's budget proposals seem as well tailored as could be expected to
the uncertain needs of the economy. The projected increase in expenditures of
about $30 billion represents a rise of some 11 percent, more than half of which
could be chewed up by rising prices. With a slowing economy holding down revenue
gains, the Administration is expecting the budget deficit to double, from about
$5 billion to $10 billion.
Probably the greatest risk from the fiscal side is that this deficit
figure could increase substantially. Administration spokesmen have made it
clear that they would quickly loosen the pursestrings if the economy appears
headed for a deeper downturn than they now expect. And certainly the Congress,
despite welcome progress in devising a more orderly appropriations process, is
likely to lead the parade toward larger expenditure totals in several areas.
With the spur of rising unemployment and the absence of last year's strong
restraint from the White House, the Congress could add sizably to outlays.
The dilemma of a sluggish economy, afflicted with severe sectoral
disturbances, shortages, and rising prices also made difficult the recommenda
tion to let lapse the system of wage and price controls. Yet, with some rela
tively minor differences on details, there seems to be a clear consensus that
these controls were no longer effective, and in a number of instances were
actually counterproducti ve.
In agreeing that the time has come to free most industries from con
trols, I cling to the belief that Phases I and II did provide a measure of relief
from the problems of stagflation under which the economy was laboring in 1971 and
1972. There are those who argue that wage-push inflation was slowing anyway, and
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that the freeze was therefore redundant, giving the illusion of success without
much substance. My own reading is that the country got a real psychological
boost from strong action by the Administration to help propel us out of the
doldrums. Indeed, if there is a general criticism of the wage/price control
program, it is that it was instituted a year too late, and phased out too slowly
as we approached capacity limitations. At best, wage/price restraints can only
be effective in a demand-slack economy, serving to break into and short-circuit
a price-wage spiral, and thus permit stimulative policies to be undertaken sooner
than otherwise possible.
It's always easier to comment on policies for which one is not directly
responsible, than on one's own. But the same conflicting and uncertain circum
stances that make economic policy decisions difficult for the Administration at
the moment also pose a dilemma for monetary policy. If we take for granted that
there will be a substantial slowing in output and employment over the months
ahead, the gut question is whether that slowdown can be ameliorated by an easing
of monetary policy, or whether such easing would simply exacerbate upward
pressures on wages and prices with little or no effect on employment.
Although I put the question in "either/or" terms, obviously the answer
is not either/or, but rather one of degree. Those who feel that the main con
straint on economic activity in coming months will derive from capacity limita
tions (i.e., the inability to produce the goods desired) see little point in
easing credit significantly. It is pointed out, for example, that even as we
enter a period of slowdown, we are still bumping against supply bottlenecks in
a number of key sectors. In the specific case of petroleum shortages, the po
tential impact is pervasive and, because of the embargo, unpredictable. Specific
industries and regions of the country are being, and are likely to be, much harder
hit than others.
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If these are the salient features of our predicament, then a general
ized easing of credit would truly be of little help. A much more selective ap
proach through targeted employment and unemployment programs would seem far
preferable, putting financial assistance where it's needed most rather than
spreading it around to fuel price increases in supply-short industries.
Without denying the validity of these points in any way, I think one
can postulate a different scenario that would lead, on balance, to a different
conclusion. This scenario would begin with the assessment that a cyclical slow
down was already underway last fall before the announcement of the oil embargo.
Consumer sentiment as measured by the various surveys had turned pessimistic by
mid-year, and retail sales -- in real terms — had been sluggish for some months.
The embargo, according to this reasoning, simply compounded and hastened a
"correction" that was already underway. It did so by magnifying uncertainties
about the future many fold. Even though present estimates of petroleum shortfall
are reduced from a couple of months ago, the headlines are telling us with dis
concerting regularity of layoffs in the auto industry, the airlines, service
stations, recreation and travel sectors, etc. Even though the actual numbers of
people put out of work may not be large — though it's certainly not trifling —
the psychological impact of the announcements on consumer confidence must be
substantial.
Even if we have no concern about our own job security, all of us are
being affected by the unprecedented price adjustments that we face in the grocery
store and at the gas pump. We've read that real disposable income has been de
clining through most of 1973, as price increases outpaced wage settlements. But
frankly, we don't need to read that bit of news -- it hits too close to home in
our daily experience: we know we've got less to spend, and we're cutting back
accordingly.
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As always, one could cite evidence on several sides. But the argument
from this line of reasoning is that the slowdown we face is more likely on
balance to be characterized by inadequate demand than by inadequate supplies.
If this is the case, then we are back in the typical cycle -- admittedly with
some very odd and disconcerting accoutrements — where some credit easing would
be appropriate.
But even if this argument is persuasive -- i.e., that we're in, or
shortly going to be in, an economy with inadequate demand — one can't be sure
of those facts, but one can be sure that prices are jumping higher at unprece
dented rates. How can the monetary authorities countenance a policy of easing
in the face of that hard evidence of unrestrained inflation? The answer, again
a matter of judgment, turns on how one views the present situation: is monetary
policy in the current circumstances likely to have a greater impact on real output
and employment, or on prices and wages? If one thinks, as I do, that the major
impetus to price increases at the moment is a once-over adjustment to higher
energy costs and higher agricultural prices based on changed supply schedules,
then the most that continued monetary restraint could do would be to inhibit the
transmission of these increases into wage bargains by permitting unemployment to
increase marginally. Frankly, there is little evidence that marginally higher
unemployment has much of a deterrent effect on wage settlements "justified" as
inflation catch-ups.
The record of policy actions by the Federal Open Market Committee shows
that the Federal Reserve has in fact already moved away from the degree of re
straint that was its policy stance last summer. Looking back over the inter
vening months, one can see that the growth in the monetary aggregates (using
quarterly averages) slowed noticeably in the final quarter of the year, and that
the aggregates were distinctly weak in January. At the same time, short-term
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interest rates were edging downward, with the Fed funds rate, for example,
dropping from a 10-1/2 - 11 percent range in late September to around 9 percent
at present.
But it's always difficult to distinguish policy-induced effects on the
financial variables from those feeding back from changes in the real economy.
This is as true, unfortunately, for the monetary authorities as it is for outside
observers. The only information available to policymakers that is not available
to the market, presumably, is the Fed's own current intention with respect to
future restraint or easing. And even in this area, the market thinks it is
becoming super-sophisticated in reading the signs of policy shift.
In this connection, I'd like to quote a few excerpts from an interest
ing analytical piece by A1 Wojnilower of First Boston Corporation last November
entitled "A New Monetary Environment":
"The trouble is that everyone in the market can understand
and predict -- at least we think we can — how the Federal
Reserve will be reacting to the weekly money supply figures as
they emerge. This early warning system for the market provides
in much the same way as does the promise that there will be no
credit crunch, a destabilizing removal of uncertainty. When
money supply is rising too fast, we are confident that soon the
Fed will tighten its money market stance and certain that it
won't ease; if money is expanding too slowly, on the other hand,
ease must be on the way and tightening is out of the question.
In the past, when money supply growth accelerated, interest rates
would initially fall. Now they tend to rise, because the market
knows that faster growth of money supply leads promptly to a more
restrictive official stance. Conversely, interest rates used to
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rise when money supply decelerated, but now they fall because we
know that deceleration of money supply leads to an easier Federal
Reserve posture. . .
"When it is possible for the market to feel certain, on the
basis of the trend in money supply, of the direction of Federal
Reserve policy toward short-term interest rates, the commercial
banking system can and will blow up the balloon of time deposits
and business loan demand and then let the air out again, in a
game almost completely divorced from any relation to the real
economy. . .
"This new sense of knowing the monetary authorities better
than they know themselves, coupled to new technologies of
instant news transmission, has substantially changed the
culture of our money and bond markets. . .
"In the past, when the authorities were thought to have
in mind a band of interest rates that they considered appro
priate to the business situation, and that they shifted only
gradually with the outlook, the market was understandably
cautious about moving prices so violently as to challenge
these limits. The most successful market practitioners were
those who were in tune and comfortable with the official
perception of the world. But now that these interest rate
boundaries are vague or absent, the market rewards a different
type of trader. With short-run Federal Reserve policy governed
by the behavior of monetary aggregates under seemingly trans
parent rules, practices are spreading that parallel the exciting
performance of the over-the-counter stock markets of the late
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1960's. We have to get used to the idea that it is entirely
logical for markets to race off in one or the other direction,
when traders can be confident that their sheer energy can drive
prices a long way without fear of colliding with so-called
'fundamentals.'"
I think there is some truth to the point A1 makes -- namely, that
fluctuations in short-term interest rates are likely to be wider in a regime
where the Fed is placing more weight on getting the monetary aggregates to
track a desired path, than under the previous regime of largely interest-rate
guided policy. This greater scope for rate swings in fact probably has two
time dimensions — first, the range of rate movement that can be expected
between FOMC meetings, and second, the range of movement over a longer period
of several months.
If one is serious about trying to induce more or less stable growth in
the money supply, as I am, then one must be prepared to sacrifice to some extent
interest rate stability. And I think it's also true, as A1 states, that if the
public knows the procedures by which the Fed implements its policy prescriptions,
the market is likely to anticipate rate movements, and quite possibly try to run
ahead of our intentions. Yet neither of these facts, in my mind, justifies
abandoning our emphasis on the aggregates, nor trying to cloak our procedures in
mystery. On the contrary, I believe that if the market were more fully aware of
our operating techniques, they might be less inclined to run too far in any
particular direction.
For this reason, I'd like to spend just a moment describing how I see
the Fed's policy intentions translated into market actions. I'm sure you could
get a different emphasis, if not different story, from other members of the
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Committee, so don't assume you're hearing the only interpretation of how we go
about our business. Moreover, mine will be a conceptualized description, with
out pretending to be complete in technical detail.
With these caveats, I see the process beginning with the selection of
a longer-run growth path for the aggregates (normally symbolized by M-|), a path
thought to be consistent with the needs of the economy over the quarters ahead.
In the current context of rapidly rising prices, one is already in some diffi
culty in deciding whether that path should be geared strictly to potential growth
in real terms, or whether some part of anticipated price increases should be
allowed for, or as some would say, "validated."
Once such a longer-run path is selected (note that it's not a "forever"
path of 4 percent, or any other number), a shorter-run two-month horizon is
specified, not as a single target rate, but as ranges of rates for different
aggregates, reflecting our well-proven inability to control precisely the
aggregates over any short period of time. Paralleling these target ranges for
the aggregates is a range of permissible variation for the Fed funds rate. In
concept, as the aggregates deviate from the midpoints of their specified short-
run ranges, the manager of the open market desk is expected to inject or with
hold reserves without, however, permitting the Fed funds rate to move outside its
predetermi ned 1i mi ts.
In practice, the range of permitted movement in the funds rate between
monthly meetings, while varying from time to time, has usually been on the order
of 1 - 1-1/2 percentage points. Since the prevailing funds rate is normally inside
the specified limits at the time of their adoption, the potential movement of the
rate in any four-week period is not likely to exceed 1 percentage point even if
the aggregates, as they become known, appear to be falling outside their desig
nated ranges. Nor is it contemplated that the rate would bounce from one end of
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the range to the other from week to week. As is apparent from the record, the
adjustments are fairly smooth over the inter-meeting period, with movements in
the rate (on a weekly average basis) rarely exceeding 1/4 percentage point.
Even with this gradualist approach to funds rate movements, an approach
designed to prevent short-term rates from swinging needlessly or disruptively in
response to erratic week-to-week fluctuations in money supply numbers — it would
theoretically be possible for the funds rate to move as much as 6 percentage
points within the space of six months if the aggregates were persistently falling
outside their desired limits.
Although the conceptual framework I've just described could be applied
in a quite mechanical manner, the fact is that the Open Market Committee does not
operate that way. Only after a full discussion of the relevant economic and
financial information does the Committee select specifications for the short-run
aggregates and funds rate range designed to nudge the aggregates back toward the
desired long-run target at greater or lesser speed. Thus, for all our efforts
to explain what we think we are doing, and how we are going about it, there will
inevitably — and, according to Wojnilower, desirably — be an element of un
certainty as to policy stance at any given point in time. Moreover, actual desk
actions will be guided not just by intended policy, but also by the interaction
between intended policy and the week-to-week behavior, often quite erratic, of
the monetary aggregates.
I'd like to add one final word about monetary policy in the months
ahead. I started out by saying, as others have, that uncertainty is the key
feature of our present outlook. Uneasiness might even describe the feeling
better. Past guideposts seem unavailing or absent in the world of today, and
lack of confidence is pervasive. In this kind of environment, I think there is
something to be said for a "traditional" response by the monetary authorities to
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signs of slowdown, even if on intellectual grounds a case could be made that this
slowdown is of a nature that won't be helped by monetary ease. In effect -- and
I wouldn't want to press this point too far — I think that we might only compound
uncertainty, at least among the unsophisticated, if we persisted in a policy of
restraint when people were losing their jobs.
In closing, I'd like to quote a beautiful disclaimer I saw on a recent
outlook paper from an investment banking house. Perhaps it's standard boiler
plate, but I hadn't noticed it before, and I think it's quite applicable to
what you've just heard.
"This material is for your private information, and we
are not soliciting any action based upon it. Opinions ex
pressed are our present opinions only. The material is based
upon information which we consider reliable, but we do not
represent that it is accurate or complete, and it should not
be relied upon as such.11
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Cite this document
APA
Bruce K. MacLaury (1974, February 17). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19740218_bruce_k_maclaury
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19740218_bruce_k_maclaury,
author = {Bruce K. MacLaury},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1974},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19740218_bruce_k_maclaury},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}