speeches · May 16, 1973
Regional President Speech
David P. Eastburn · President
by
David P. Eastbum, President
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
before the
70TH ANNUAL CONVENTION
NEW JERSEY BANKERS ASSOCIATION
Chalfont-Haddon Hall - Atlantic City
May 17, 1973
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Picture the following set of conditions:
. A Federal funds rate of, say, 9 percent.
. Corporate borrowers reluctant to issue long
term securities at 8% percent and other un
favorable terms.
. Municipalities finding it impossible to float
bonds under existing interest rate ceilings.
. Homebuyers scouring the market to find mort
gages, even at six to eight points.
. Savers investing in bonds and other market
issues rather than putting their funds into
savings and time accounts.
. Large banks, unable to issue enough CD’s,
pulling large amounts of funds from the Euro
dollar market and inventing new techniques
of liability management.
. Country banks selling large amounts of Fed
eral funds to city banks at profitable rates.
. All banks facing strong demands for credit but
worrying about declining liquidity and a rising
volume of classified loans.
. Increasing bankruptcies.
This is not a prediction. It is a description of what could
happen if we were to have a credit crunch this year. The question I should
like to explore is what is the likelihood of seeing conditions like these
in 1973.
Causes of Crunches
Having gone through two crunches in the latter f60’s we now know
something about what causes them and therefore what to do to avoid them.
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Three elements are basic: strong demands for credit under inflationary
conditions, sharp restraint on the supply of money and credit, and in
terferences with the flow of credit.
In both the f66 and '69 crunches, demands for credit were ex
tremely heavy in all sectors of the economy. The upsurge in borrowing
reflected the rapid pace of economic activity and inflation. As borrowers
expected further increases in prices, they increased their demands for
credit in anticipation of repaying their debts with cheaper dollars. This,
of course, put further upward pressure on interest rates. Thus, the in
crease in inflationary expectations made financial markets riper for a
credit squeeze.
In response to inflationary pressures, the Federal Reserve
brought about a very sharp drop in growth of the money stock.* In 1966,
the money stock, after growing at a rate of over 6 percent for about
twelve months, actually declined in the last nine months of the year.
In 1969, following an increase of over 7.5 percent in 1967-68, money grew
at a 3 percent annual rate with almost no growth in the second half of the
year. Thus, financial markets were caught between one blade of the scissors—
heavy credit demands— and the other— a sharp slowdown in the supply of funds.
Add to this mix of ingredients a complex scheme of interest rate
ceilings on deposits, mortgages, and municipals, and you have the recipe for
a credit crunch. Deposit ceilings brought on disintermediation by preventing
thrift institutions from keeping pace with rising interest rates. Unlike
large banks, savings intermediaries were unable to substitute costly non
deposit sources for deposits, and so their loans to particular borrowers,
* Currency plus demand deposits.
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such as homebuyers, dried up. States and municipalities also suffered
as rates on municipals rose above legal maximums. Housing activity and
state and municipal expenditures were particularly hard hit as a result.
Will History Repeat?
The question for the future is whether these three conditions
for a crunch are likely to recur in 1973. I think not.
Credit Demand. Some aspects of the economy look much the same
as in f66 and’69. Certainly, inflationary pressures are intense. Prices
have been rising faster than at any time in two decades. Surveys indi
cate that consumers are becoming increasingly concerned about inflation,
so the expectational element is strong— and with good reason. As the
economy continues to move forward this year, upward pressures on prices
will almost certainly intensify as more and more industries approach ca
pacity. Added to demand-pull pressures will be cost-push pressures. So
far, wage costs have been contained remarkably well and everyone is hoping
that this record can be extended. But as prices rise and productivity
gains slow down, there will be upward pressures on wage costs and these,
in turn, will lead to still more pressure on prices.
Yet there are good reasons why credit demands are not likely to
be as strong, relatively, as they were in ’66 and ’69.
For one thing, I’m looking for a slowing in the rate of economic
expansion as the year unfolds; not a recession, but a more moderate growth
rate. As a consequence, overall credit demands are not likely to be so
strong as to bring on a credit crunch. A rundown of various factors likely
to be at work supports this conclusion:
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. The recent upsurge in business loans has been
stimulated in part by the fact that the prime
rate has been so attractive compared with
rates on commercial paper and other instru
ments. As a dual prime rate becomes operative,
this kind of artificial stimulant should dis
appear. Business loans will tend to rise as
the economy expands, but the pace should be
slower.
. Demands for longer-term funds should be held
down by the fact that corporations are still
generating large amounts of internal funds.
. Credit demands on the part of states and munic
ipalities should be restrained as these govern
mental units enjoy large surpluses and increased
revenue sharing.
. Demands for mortgages should tend to slacken
as the expected modest decline in housing
materializes.
. Hopefully, the Treasury’s needs for the re
mainder of the year will be tempered by gov
ernmental efforts to hold the line on spending
and by larger-than-anticipated tax receipts.
In short, except for the fact that inflationary expectations
will be inducing some to borrow, forces should be at work moderating the
pace of credit demands and avoiding a buildup of crunch dimensions.
Monetary Policy. What about the supply of credit? I can’t pre
dict that the Fed will not make any mistakes, but I think that any mistakes
will not be so great as to bring on a credit crunch. We have learned at
least two important lessons from the past.
Lesson #1 is that serious consequences can ensue from permitting
sharp changes in the money supply. The Fed does not concentrate single-
mindedly on the money supply, but we have given increasing emphasis to it
in recent years. We still, of course, pay much attention to what happens
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to other variables, such as interest rates, but in doing so we are, I
believe, more aware of the trade-offs involved than we once were. Cer
tainly, the crunches of 1 66 and f69 suggest what can happen when the Fed
pulls very sharply on the money reins.
Lesson #2 is that monetary policy cannot do everything. An im
portant part of the financial history of the past three decades relates
to what monetary policy can accomplish and what it cannot accomplish.
In the late 1940!s the Fed learned that it could not effectively control
inflation and still support prices of government securities. The Accord
of 1951 ushered in a period which raised hopes that monetary policy could
do a great deal in minimizing extreme fluctuations from boom to bust to
boom. Then in the f60fs we learned that monetary policy cannot contain
inflation if fiscal policy is strongly expansionary in an overheated econ
omy and upward cost pressures go unchecked. Or, more precisely, we learned
that monetary policy cannot quickly curb inflation under these conditions
without running the serious risk of a crunch and recession.
As I look ahead, I see evidence that both of these lessons will
stand us in good stead. The Fed already has begun to slow down growth in
money and, hopefully, will be able to exert a consistent moderating influ
ence without cutting back sharply. And this time monetary policy has help
both from fiscal policy and direct controls on prices and wages. The reli
ability of this help is not completely assured and the Fed may find itself
again fighting a lonely battle. If so, it will be important for policy
makers in and out of the Fed to bear in mind the risks of allowing the
whole job of fighting inflation to fall on monetary policy.
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Interferences in the flow of credit. A third symptom of a
crunch has been especially tight conditions in particular kinds of
sources and uses of funds. What is the possibility that these spot
stringencies can be avoided in 173? This will depend partly on how much
can be done to permit funds to flow freely from one market to another.
It seems to me that some progress has been made in this respect since
the late ’60’s, but much remains to be done.
As a result of experiences in the crunches of the 60fs, some
constraints have been eased. Interest ceilings in some cases have been
raised or removed. This should help to relieve some of the pressures
in municipal and housing financing. In housing, the Federal credit
agencies, such as F.H.L.B. and F.N.M.A., demonstrated in 1969 their
ability to reduce the impact of tight credit on mortgages. I suspect
that these agencies will continue to serve as a buffer between the de
posit flows of financial institutions and their mortgage lending.
What is done with Regulation Q could be perhaps the single most
important factor in the flow of funds. There is now no ceiling on CD’s
with maturities under 90 days. As a result, banks have been able to keep
on issuing these obligations despite sharp increases in money market rates.
If market rates move substantially further, however, a piling up of large
amounts of very short-term CD’s would build strong pressures on banks to
find other sources of funds, as they did in ’69, and on the Fed to raise
the ceilings.
The biggest problem with Regulation Q, however, is a longer-run
problem. Many agree that Regulation Q is undesirable and, in the end, in
effective. The difficulty is in moving away from it. There never seems
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to be a good time. As thrift institutions restructure their balance
sheets they should become less dependent on protection from rate com
petition, but this will not happen overnight. I would hope that in the
meantime greater flexibility with Regulation Q ceilings, particularly on
large marketable CD’s, might indicate the direction of the future.
Conclusions
The odds are against a credit crunch in 1973 because:
. demands for credit should not be all that over
whelming
. the Fed probably can benefit from past experience
and avoid a sudden and sharp contraction in money
and credit
. some modest progress has been made toward allevi
ating causes of especially tight conditions in
particular markets.
This conclusion can be interpreted as an optimistic one. But
bear in mind that it rests on several assumptions, one of the most impor
tant being that the Fed will get help from fiscal policy and wage-price
controls. If that help is not forthcoming, the Fed faces the unhappy
choice of making up for deficiencies elsewhere and thus risking a credit
crunch, or doing what it can and thus tolerating more inflation for longer
than it would like. I hope that choice will not be necessary.
DPE-5/10/73
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Cite this document
APA
David P. Eastburn (1973, May 16). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19730517_david_p_eastburn
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19730517_david_p_eastburn,
author = {David P. Eastburn},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1973},
month = {May},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19730517_david_p_eastburn},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}