speeches · March 6, 1973
Regional President Speech
John J. Balles · President
PROBLEMS
OF THE DOLLAR-
AT HOME
- __ AND ABROAD
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John J. Balles
I was pleased to be included in the
program of the 25th Annual National
Credit Conference of the American
Bankers Association, particularly since you
are meeting in my new “home base."
For there is certainly enough in the way
of mutual interest for us to discuss.
If there is one theme which seems to
underlie your program, it is the variety
and pace of change that is affecting the
country and the banking industry.
Over the past two decades, I have come
full circle from central banking to
commercial banking and return. Travel is
broadening, it is said, and I have observed
a number of changes in the craft and
practices of banking in this journey.
The innovations of bankers have enlarged
the variety and scope of financial services
available to the public—and have also
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challenged the resourcefulness of the
central bank on many occasions. The
interactions involved in this dynamic
process have paved the way for progress
in the field of banking and finance.
As we meet today, the problems of the
dollar at home and abroad must rank high
on the list of matters deserving our
attention. Simply stated, at home we
are experiencing a rapid expansion in the
economy—which is laudable in many
ways—but which also shows signs of
strains and continued inflationary
pressures. Abroad, despite the 10 percent
devaluation of the dollar which had
already occurred on February 13, our
currency was faced with another acute
crisis late last week, in a speculative
assault that produced a temporary
closing of official exchange markets.
Taken together, these developments
are certainly enough to cause all of us
to "stop, look and listen." In an earlier
era, such a climate would have signalled
strong deflationary policies, especially
by the central bank. But we no longer
live in a world where such single-minded
remedies are acceptable, and solutions
must be sought across a broader front.
What are the major implications of
these developments for the economy,
for credit markets, and for public policy?
In particular, what are the implications for
banking? As best I can in the time available,
I would like to address these problems.
Booming Economy and Demand
for Bank Credit
The real growth of the economy has been
expanding for the past five quarters at an
average annual rate of 71A percent.
This much expansion is something of a
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mixed blessing. On the one hand, it has
brought idle resources back into
production and has cut by half the
gap between estimated "full employment
output" and actual output. At the same
time, the rate of growth that we have
been experiencing is nearly three
percent above the long-term trend rate.
Activity in the capital goods and
consumer goods industries already is
attaining boom proportions, and therefore
some moderation in these sectors would
be welcome. A continuation of current
rates of expansion could generate excess
capacity and unsustainable inventory
accumulation, resulting in a readjustment
or even recession.
The economic outlook for the year has
been widely presented and discussed,
both from official and private sources.
According to the most widely-held view,
real growth for 1973 as a whole should
about match the 1972 pace of 6.4 percent.
However, the distribution of the growth
throughout the year is likely to be less
even, with a strong first half and a
slower second half. The combination
of rising employment, higher social
security benefits and an extra $8 billion of
Federal tax refunds from overwithholding
in 1972 should result in at least a 10
percent increase in after-tax personal
income. With strong demand impinging
on the economy, the possibility must be
recognized that the rate of inflation in
1973 could move higher than the 1972
pace of 3 percent, instead of reaching
the announced goal of a lower rate.
The strong growth in total output in
1972 was accompanied by a record
expansion in bank loans, with an
increase of $56 billion. Within the
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framework of an accommodative
monetary policy, there were sharp
advances in all categories of bank loans
—e.g., mortgage loans by over $16
billion, business loans by nearly $14
billion, and consumer loans by $10 billion.
Given the prospects for the domestic
economy in 1973, several widely-known
private forecasts are anticipating a
demand for bank loans about as large
as last year's record increase. The
composition may be somewhat
different, however. Given the pace of
business capital spending and inventory
accumulation, the increase in business
loan demand may be even larger than in
1972, while consumer loan growth
may continue to be as strong. On the
other hand, growth in mortgage
loan demand may slow down somewhat,
in view of the expected decline
in housing starts.
Since the first of the year, it is evident
from published data, actions and policy
records that a firmer monetary policy
has already been adopted. The growth
of key monetary aggregates has slowed
down from the rate prevailing in the
second half of 1972. The discount rate
was increased in both January and
February, to bring it into better
alignment with rising short-term open
market rates stemming from strong
credit demands, and also in view
of developments in foreign exchange
markets, to further the objective of
economic stabilization.
Wholly apart from further policy moves
which could develop from the current
problems of the dollar abroad, bankers
should be asking themselves: “Where
are the funds going to come from to
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satisfy burgeoning loan demand?"
Toward a Viable Policy on
Loan Commitments
According to press reports on your
meeting a year ago, the presidents of
four large banks said they constantly
feared that loan demand might exceed
their ability to meet loan commitments,
even though the industry was doing a
better job of gauging the potential
usage of lines of credit and firm
commitments. As one panelist put it,
"The airline and hotel industries know
the extent to which they may be
oversold. Our nightmare is that
someday we may wake up and find
we are over-extended."
If that was a proper concern a year
ago, it is even more relevant today.
1 believe it is a healthy development that
banks are giving increased attention to
the whole problem of what constitutes
a prudent upper limit on loan
commitments. Bankers should become
more cognizant of the risks attendant
to making loan commitments which are
likely to be exercised at a time when
loanable funds are scarce and expensive.
In 1969, for example, commercial banks,
faced with a $4 billion net outflow of
deposits, tapped some $20 billion in
nondeposit sources of funds with which
they were able to make good their
commitments and to expand credit by
about $16 billion. Fulfilling commitments
partly through the purchase of Eurodollars
at rates of 11 to 13 percent was, however,
a very costly undertaking. These rates
were well above the 8.5 percent prime
rate, or even the prime rate plus a
stipulated spread written into loan
agreements. In fact, the subsequent
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introduction of the floating prime rate
in part represented an effort to lessen
this gap by tying the lending rate
more closely to current yields in the
money market.
In view of these considerations, I would
urge banks to continue their efforts to
work toward a viable policy on loan
commitments. Specifically, this should
involve efforts to project or forecast loan
demand under alternative conditions
affecting economic activity and the
demand for credit. The individual bank
is not able, of course, to alter the
overall economic and credit environment,
but within certain limits it may tailor its
balance sheet to meet anticipated
changes in economic activity and the
demand for credit.
I seriously doubt that there is a universal
formula applicable to all banks. Rather,
each bank must develop reliable
information on the utilization rate of its
lines of credit and firm commitments,
especially during periods of tight
money. In my judgment, that is the key
to developing a policy for each bank
on a workable upper limit to such
commitments.
It is no more realistic for a bank to base
its plans on 100 percent utilization of
loan commitments than it is to plan on 100
percent withdrawal of its demand
deposits. But unless it knows what the
utilization rates have been in the past,
and makes estimates of the level and
timing of future peaks in utilization, it is
flying in the dark. Moreover, the prudent
upper limit to commitments will vary
widely between banks, based on such
factors as their liquidity in the form
of secondary reserves, the strength of
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their capital position and hence their
ability to incur losses from sales of
non-liquid assets, and their ability to deal
in “liability management"—i.e., reliance
on interest-sensitive “purchased funds."
In turn, the capacity of a bank to rely
on purchased funds hinges on such
matters as the stability of other sources
of funds, especially demand and savings
deposits, and its ability to increase the
rate of return on loans when the cost
of purchased funds is rising.
In any event, if past experience is any
guide, the present and prospective
climate is likely to produce an increased
utilization of loan commitments already
on the books. Thus, from my vantage
point, it would appear that for most
banks a substantial further increase in
commitments at this time could invite a
liquidity and profit squeeze.
International Monetary Problems—
Implications for Banking
American banking has been greatly
affected in recent years by structural
changes and institutional innovations in
the field of international finance. As
a consequence, international monetary
disturbances such as we have
experienced in recent weeks interact
quickly with our banking system through
linkages with banking systems abroad.
U.S. banks have placed special emphasis
upon the rapid expansion of their
foreign branch systems and Edge Act
facilities in order to service the growing
banking needs of their customers abroad.
A similar tendency for foreign banks
in the U. S. to expand has stiffened
banking competition here.
In the period 1965 to 1972, assets of
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agencies and branches of foreign banks
in the United States increased three-fold
to about $13 billion, and the assets of
foreign branches of U. S. banks
increased about eight-fold to about
$75 billion.
One of the most significant innovations
over the last decade has been the
development of the Eurodollar market.
This market offers a means of financing the
overseas activities of U. S. banks, and in
periods of tight money has been a source
of funds for domestic needs of such
banks. On balance, most observers would
agree that the Eurodollar market has
been a major constructive force in the
financing of economic growth and
expanded international trade.
At the same time, however, the Eurodollar
market has a potential for transmitting
monetary instability, as witnessed by
recent developments. With the size of the
market estimated at about $80 billion, the
shifting of even a fraction of this amount
to "strong currencies," for speculative
or precautionary motives, can quickly
undermine the viability of the fixed
exchange rate system that has prevailed
in the postwar world.
As we know, last Thursday foreign central
banks were forced to absorb well over
$3 billion of U.S. dollars in support
operations designed to maintain the new
currency parities agreed upon in the
currency realignment of February 13.
The bulk of the support operation
was undertaken by West Cermany. This
new crisis for the dollar resulted in
closing the official foreign exchange
markets of leading countries, and
according to announcements from the
finance ministers of the European
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Common market, official exchanges will
remain closed all of this week, pending
an agreement on new measures to
restore monetary stability. Meanwhile,
the major European currencies will all
float unofficially against the U.S. dollar.
President Nixon has made it clear
that there will be no further devaluation
of the dollar in terms of gold. The
present crisis is not justified by existing
exchange rate relationships, but rather
has speculative origins.
The question thus arises as to whether
the volume of Eurodollars, especially as
fed by chronic deficits in the U.S.
balance of payments, has become
unduly large in view of the lack of any
international control over it. It would be
unfortunate if the constructive aspects
of the Eurodollar market had to be
sacrificed because of the role which
Eurodollars may play in exchange-rate
instability. Thus, participants in the
market have a vital stake in measures to
restore a workable international monetary
system, which among other things,
requires urgent attention to the U.S.
position in international payments.
The currency adjustments associated
with the February 13 devaluation of the
dollar were important first steps toward
reestablishing competitive prices for
U.S. goods abroad and restoring the U.S.
balance of payments to reasonable
equilibrium. They were only steps toward
these goals, however, and in the light
of events last week, it is clear that much
more needs to be done and be
done quickly.
The basic causes of international
disequilibrium remain. Many of these
causes concern the restrictive conditions
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under which international trade is
conducted. Some of these, such as
discriminatory tariffs and quota
restrictions abroad and the desire of
some foreign countries to maintain
persistent balance of payments surpluses,
are in the hands of other sovereign states
and thus lie beyond our control.
Others concern the structure of the
world payments system, which clearly
needs to be overhauled. The responsibility
for devising a stable world payments
system and maintaining the stability of
that system once established, must be
shared by both surplus and deficit
countries. In particular, those nations
with persistent balance of payments
surpluses should take appropriate steps
to adjust their position, so as to aim
for equilibrium.
But much of the responsibility for the
international financial disequilibrium of
the last few years lies at our own doorstep.
We have had an almost uninterrupted
string of balance of payments deficits
since 1950. In the early 50's these deficits,
which ranged generally from $1 billion
to $4 billion per year, were welcomed
abroad. They were part of our effort to
rebuild the war-depleted reserves of other
countries and thus hasten the restoration
of currency convertibility in the Free
World. In the early 60's, our deficits also
generated the dollars needed by the
private sector abroad to meet the growing
requirements of a burgeoning world
economy.
Our continued deficits, however,
generated more dollars than the world
wished to hold. As this became apparent,
we adopted various measures to reduce
if not eliminate the deficits—including
the Interest Equalization Tax, the
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Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint
Program, and controls over direct foreign
investment by business.
Still the deficits persisted. The U.S. trade
surplus, long a mainstay of our balance
of payments, began to deteriorate
after reaching a high level of nearly $7
billion in 1964. By 1968 and 1969
it was little more than $600 million.
The following year (1970) the surplus rose
to $2.2 billion, only to drop sharply into
a $2.7 billion deficit the following year,
the first annual trade deficit experienced
by the U.S. this century. This was followed
by a $6.8 billion trade deficit last year.
Even though exports rose by $6.1
billion in 1972, the deficit grew because
imports increased by $10.2 billion. In
part this reflected a more rapid increase in
business activity in the U.S. than in
most countries constituting our major
export markets. Also contributing to the
U.S. trade deficit last year was the
rise in import prices relative to the rise in
export prices due in part to stronger
inflationary pressures abroad than here,
and to the initial perverse effects of the
Smithsonian currency adjustments
on our trade position.
In recent years our overall payments
deficits have been on such a scale as to
swamp the monetary systems of other
countries. In 1971 the deficit on a
gross liquidity basis was nearly $24
billion, and was even larger (almost $30
billion) on the official reserve
transactions basis.
Last year, even though there was some
improvement, the U.S. balance of
payments deficit was still extremely large
by historical standards—$15.6 billion on
a gross liquidity basis and $10.1 billion
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on the official reserve transactions basis.
It is obvious from the recent turmoil in
the exchange markets that deficits of this
magnitude are wholly incompatible
with world financial stability today.
Recognizing this, Federal Reserve
Chairman Arthur F. Burns, in a recent
statement before the Senate Banking
Committee, called for a program to end
the deficits within a period of two to
three years. This will not be easy—but
it is essential that it be done. In a
multi-national world economy, there is
no simple solution to international
financial problems which require
multilateral action. Each nation must
make its full contribution to world
economic order. Discriminatory trade
restraints must be removed by the
countries imposing them. The U.S. export
growth needed to improve our overall
balance cannot be expected to overcome
such obstructions. It is therefore of the
greatest importance that the work of
removing trade restraints (particularly
quota systems and other non-tariff
barriers) go forward without further delay.
It is also essential and urgent that a
viable international monetary system be
devised and put in place.
We could threaten to impose import
restraints of our own, or more stringent
controls over capital flows, but these
measures would carry with them the
seeds of self-defeat through the stifling
of trade, and widespread economic
dislocation. One important contribution
to world economic order would be to
end inflation in the U.S. An effective
program, not only in monetary policy,
but particularly with respect to fiscal
policy, could be expected to help calm
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the inflationary expectations now
undermining the dollar abroad.
It will not be enough to completely
overhaul the machinery of international
trade and finance. Such an overhaul will
not do the job if we are not capable
of using the machinery properly. If
inflation in the U.S. is not subdued and
domestic stability restored and maintained
as a continuing national policy, no trade
programs and no programs of monetary
reform will restore international
stability. The U.S. is too large a part
of the world and the dollar too important
a currency to permit indifference in the
conduct of our domestic affairs. One
key to international stability is confidence
in the dollar abroad, and the key to that
confidence is economic stability at home.
To achieve this, we must use every
means at our disposal. Monetary policy
is a powerful tool, but one that works
best in making adjustments before
stresses reach dangerous proportions.
But it is no substitute for the power of
fiscal policy, and monetary policy cannot
contend against perverse fiscal policy.
Solutions to our problems on the
international front require us to respect
and observe the classic policy prescription
of “putting our house in order"—
advice we have freely given other nations
for a great many years. What role
can we expect of fiscal policy?
Fiscal Restraint Urgent
The restraint on expenditures reflected in
the Administration's current budget plan
should merit particular attention from the
banking community, especially in view of
the support of a restrictive Federal budget
announced by the American Bankers
Association last fall. All too frequently in
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the past, public policies of restraint have
leaned most heavily upon monetary policy
while fiscal policy was at best neutral, and
at worst expansive. As a result, monetary
policy became more restrictive and interest
rates soared.
A failure to achieve a reduction in the rate
of growth in Federal spending commensu
rate with Federal revenues in 1973 and
1974 could result in a continuation of
deficits even at full employment. In the
1974 budget fully three-fourths of all
Federal outlays are categorized as "relatively
uncontrollable." These expenditures
include social programs financed out of
trust funds, interest on the public debt, and
obligations and contracts from prior years,
to name but a few of the items. The
proportion of "uncontrollable" items in
the budget has grown 10 percent from 1971,
and this rising proportion severely limits
the ability to impose restraints upon
spending.
The emphasis upon restraining growth in
nondefense spending in the President's
fiscal 1974 budget, arises from the fact that
nondefense spending now constitutes the
largest part of the budget. In 1968, when
the Viet Nam build-up was approaching its
peak, nondefense spending made up less
than half of the total budget. In 1974, it will
account for well over two-thirds of the total
budget. The plain fact is that nondefense
spending has grown relatively and abso
lutely at a faster rate than Federal revenues.
In order to restrain growth in Federal
expenditures, priorities must be assigned to
programs, and the ones which have
outlived their usefulness or which do not
generate benefits proportionate to their
costs must be reduced or eliminated.
A fiscal policy which engenders a succession
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of Treasury deficits restricts the options of
the central bank and commercial banks as
well. It is a responsibility of the Federal
Reserve to facilitate Treasury financing
operations, and the more frequent the trips
to credit markets, the smaller the latitude
for implementing a consistent monetary
policy. The end result is that credit for the
private sector is less available and more
costly than would have been the case if
fiscal restraint had been exercised. To this
end it is imperative that we achieve a better
mix of monetary and fiscal policy.
As a bare minimum, the growth of Federal
expenditures should be held to the growth
in revenues in periods of near-full employ
ment when deficits would be inflationary.
At present, it would be even better if the
"full-employment" budget showed a
surplus, and some observers are recom
mending a tax increase, if necessary, to
achieve this objective.
In Conclusion
The problems of the dollar at home and
abroad are formidable—in view of domestic
inflationary pressures and a speculative
attack on our currency in the foreign
exchange markets. But these problems can
be dealt with successfully, given the
cooperation of all major groups in society,
including the banking industry.
In some ways, we are engaged in a bold
new effort to solve these problems through
a coordinated use of monetary policy,
incomes policy (Phase III), and fiscal
restraint. It is only in this manner that the
Federal Reserve System can achieve its
goal of helping to restore non-inflationary
growth without a credit crunch. If fiscal
policy and price-wage restraint fail to
carry their share of the burden, the whole
country—including banks and their
customers—will be the loser.
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Cite this document
APA
John J. Balles (1973, March 6). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19730307_john_j_balles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19730307_john_j_balles,
author = {John J. Balles},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1973},
month = {Mar},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19730307_john_j_balles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}