speeches · November 14, 1971
Regional President Speech
Bruce K. MacLaury · President
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS - AFTER PHASE II
Remarks
by
Bruce K. MacLaury
President
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
at the
Eighteenth Annual Institute
School of Business Administration
University of Minnesota
Radisson Hotel, Minneapolis
November 15, 1971
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GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
AFTER PHASE II
Before President Nixon's speech on August 15, in which
he announced his new economic policy, there was near unanimity
among businessmen that it was time for the federal government
to do something meaningful about inflation. We heard an in
creasing chorus of pleas from leaders of the business community
that the government act to halt the wage-price spiral. And
after the President's dramatic Sunday night television appearance,
the response was very favorable indeed. If a few leaders of
organized labor sat on their hands, housewives and most economists
applauded. So did most businessmen.
But in the weeks since August 15, a number of businessmen
have had second thoughts. There seems to have been a growing
fear that government intervention in wage and price decisions will
not end with the freeze or Phase II, but will continue on into the
indefinite future. It is pointed out, for example, that the new
economic policy was launched by a Republican president, and that
the country has thus lost the last philosophical bulwark against
encroaching governmental ism. Moreover, in the past when as a
nation we have opted for controls, it was a clear case of national
emergency during wartime. There was every reason to presume,
therefore, that with the end of the war, we would see the end of
controls. In the present situation, there is no such clearcut link.
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And finally, there are those who think that the structure of our
institutions has changed to such an extent as to require the
government to play a continuing role in the bargaining process,
quite apart from any temporary problems.
For myself, I find these arguments unconvincing. I see
no particular reason why the President's new economic policy,
with its pay boards and price commissions, implies a government
chair at the bargaining table as a way of life. My optimism on
this score -- and I don't mind it being characterized as such --
stems from my belief that the present policy was introduced to
deal with a situation just as special in its own way as the
earlier wartime circumstances that justified temporary controls.
And when this special situation -- namely, a wage-price spiral
that was the legacy of war -- is effectively dealt with, there is
just as much prospect for phasing out Phase II as there was for
terminating wartime controls. Indeed, I would go farther, and
claim that the chances of success for an interventionist policy
may be greater in the present economic circumstances --
characterized by the underemployment of resources -- than during
wartime when controls were designed to keep a lid on an overheated
economy.
This afternoon I would like to try to justify these con
clusions. And in addition, I would like to review the prospects
for governmental intervention in other kinds of economic decisions
that will affect the lives of businessmen in the months and years
ahead. Here again, I am optimistic that while we shall certainly
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see more governmental regulation affecting some facets of the
economy, we may well see a move away from regulation in other
sectors, specifically in those sectors that until now have been
highly regulated.
But let's first consider the current wage-price restraints.
As you are aware, I am sure, we have not lacked for public pro
nouncements on the future of wage-price restraint. We have heard
from the administration at every opportunity that the new economic
policy is a temporary program designed to provide a short-cut
back to reasonably stable prices and increased utilization of our
productive resources. For the administration believes, as I do,
that the key to success in this endeavor lies in changing
expectations as to the likelihood of inflation in the future.
Once expections have been changed, it will be possible to return
to private wage-price decision-making.
Now, why should expectations have so much to do with it?
Simply because after five years of rapidly increasing prices, the
nation had become convinced that inflation was a way of life, and
all parties to the economic process tried to do what they could to
protect themselves against it. Labor unions that had seen the
real wages of their members actually decline in the latter 1960's
could hardly be blamed for trying not only to catch up, but to
demand increases large enough to protect themselves against inflation
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in the future. The same sort of expectational premiums were
built into financial markets and longer term interest rates.
And no matter how strenuously the administration pointed
out that the excess demand pressures that had caused inflation
were no longer present, the response was skepticism or disbelief --
and, of course, continued demands for hedges against inflation.
In such an environment the only reasonable response to the
challenge of "show me" was dramatic action designed to change
expectations -- and that is what we finally got.
The fact that dramatic action and direct government
intervention finally became necessary has caused quite a few
people to question whether traditional economic policies have
somehow become impotent. Indeed, for sometime, there had been
a growing conviction that the Nixon game plan of gradualism had
failed, and that the old economic remedies were no longer appli
cable. Now it can't be denied that economists, both inside and
outside the administration, were fooled. For back in early 1969,
it was widely held that a modest decrease in aggregate demand,
or a moderate increase in the unemployment rate, would rather
quickly lead to a pronounced slowing of inflation. But by mid-
1971 the Inflation rate was only slightly below that it had been
two years before.
This persistence of inflation does not, however, constitute
a refutation of traditional economics, in my mind, nor justify a
presumption that direct government intervention will be required
as a matter of course in the future. It is just that economists
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underestimated how long it would take, employing a gradualist
approach, to slow an unprecedentedly virile inflation, and to
change inflationary expectations. Had we been prepared to tolerate
six percent or more unemployment for some time into the future,
inflation would have eventually slowed, I believe, and gradually
expectations would have changed. But think of the waste and
misery that a further protracted period of high unemployment would
involve. The President, in introducing a program of wage-price
restraint, has surely taken the better way. And that is how the
new economic program should be viewed -- as a short-cut to higher
levels of employment.
I am not suggesting, of course, that with the President
having announced a wage-price restraint program, we can now
proceed rapidly back to, say, four percent unemployment. If the
program is to be effective in achieving its psychological aim,
we must return to ful 1-employment only gradually. But I aim sug
gesting that with the program, we can achieve reasonable price
stability with less unemployment faster than we could have without
it.
Of course, one question that is frequently posed is
whether or not the President's change of policy was too long de
layed. I, and many others, believe that it was. But in all
fairness we must ask ourselves: even if the economists' crystal
ball had been clearer, and they had foreseen that a much sharper
break in economic activity would have been required to check
inflation quickly -- do you suppose the history of the last three
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years would have been much different? I rather doubt it, because
no political leader could have come into office in 1969 and pro
ceeded to knock the economy on the head, no matter how much faith
he had in the advice of his economic soothsayers. Nor would
controls have been a viable remedy so long as excess demand
pressures remained. So while we may have lost some ground by
sticking with gradualism too long, the delay must be measured
in months rather than years.
If altering expectations is the name of the game, then
what are the prospects for success? Most observers agree that
the wage-prlce restraint program can do the job, but there are
differences of opinion as to how long the process will take.
Many of those who believe that we will have government inter
vention in wage-price decisions for several years at a minimum
are of the view that changing expectations will take a long time.
Now, this 1s a matter of judgment, but I do not share
this view. Expectations can, I think, be changed quickly.
Whether or not they wi11 be depends crucially on how much resolve
is shown by the administration. In this sense, Phase I, the
freeze, was a psychological triumph. I'm afraid Phase II, however,
got off to a halting start. My own view is that the administration
would have done better to have emphasized substance more and form
less, right from the outset. Now that the shape of the future is
becoming clearer and the norms for prices and wages are known, I
think the general reaction is that the administration is sticking
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to its guns. But some of the momentum of support for Phase I was
lost in the confusion of Phase II committees. Hopefully that
support can be regained, and the 4% dividend guide and 5h% wage
guide are important steps in that direction.
Of course, let me add here that second-guessing the
strategy of those in Washington whose responsibility it is to
make the new economic policy work is not a particularly worthy
or worthwhile pastime. As one who has been involved in the
policy-making process, I can well appreciate that outside ob
servers cannot know all the ingredients that go into a particular
decision. The only excuse for offering advice, therefore, is the
somewhat less harried pace that may give those on the outside
a different perspective. And from this perspective, I see the
key to success as being decisiveness and fi rmness. And success,
in my terms, will be measured by the speed with which the apparatus
of controls can be dismantled, having done their job.
Now, there are some economists who believe, as I do, that
expectations can be changed rather quickly, given sufficient
political resolve, but who also believe, as I do not, that we
nevertheless are going to have governmental involvement in wage-
price decisions on into the future. These economists argue that
even in the absence of inflationary expectations, ful1-employment
and reasonable price stability are not compatible, and therefore
to make these objectives consistent, governmental involvement is
requi red.
My own interpretation of the historical record does not
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justify this pessimism. I readily admit that ful1-employment
and price stability have been very hard to achieve in combination,
and that we have scant evidence to give us confidence that we
can sustain this desired state of affairs over any protracted
period. But I,take some hope from the experience of the early
1960's. You may recall that in 1961.the unemployment rate
averaged nearly seven percent. In the years that followed, the
rate was brought down to about four and a half percent by 1965.
This very gradual decrease in the unemployment rate was accompanied
by almost no increase in the price level. The question that this
experience raises in my mind is whether the pace of decline in
unemployment in the early 1960's couldn't have been somewhat
faster without giving rise to inflation. And just as important,
in the absence of the sudden escalation of the Vietnam War, might
we not have managed a further decrease of at least half a point
in the unemployment rate without departing from reasonable price
stabili ty?
As it turned out, of course, with the added impetus of
Vietnam War demands on top of an already fully employed economy,
the unemployment rate went to less than four percent in 1966, and
thereafter the price level began its protracted ascent. But this
may prove only that the economy cannot approach four percent
unemployment too rapidly -- especially in a wartime setting that
traditionally has been accompanied by inflation -- not that low
unemployment and price stability are incompatible.
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Another factor frequently cited by those who see a need
for continuing involvement by the government in price-wage
decisions is the very size of the parties at the bargaining table,
a size that supposedly permits them to ignore the public and the
public interest, and indeed the disciplines of the market place
itself. It is not enough, however, to observe that giant corpora
tions and unions exist. No doubt some corporations and unions,
small as well as large, do have monopoly power, at least in some
degree. And there are some prices and wages that are higher than
they would be if competition prevailed. But this has little to do
with the excessive rate at which both prices and wages have been
rising in recent years -- unless it can be shown that corporations
or unions as a group suddenly began acquiring greater monopoly
power in, say, 1966. I am aware of no evidence of this, however.
This is not to say that we should do nothing about the
giants, although I doubt that we should simplistically equate
bigness with monopoly power. Such monopoly power as does exist
should be diminished. We may very well need, as some have
suggested, a more vigorous anti-trust policy and, on the other
side, less biased legal protections for labor unions. Moreover,
the present would seem a particularly good time to begin working
toward a more competitive economy, since to the extent that
monopoly power is reduced, selected wage rates and prices should
at the least not increase as rapidly in the future as they would
otherwise. But this is quite a different prescription for dealing
with monopoly power than that offered by those who see the need
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for government to play the role of continuing public protector
in the bargaining process. As I see it, in other words, the
case for government involvement in future price/wage decisions
is unconvincing, whether based on the supposed impotency of
traditional economic remedies, or the alleged incompatibility
of full employment and price stability, or on the need to offset
monopoly power.
I would like now to turn to the broader question of the
role of government in our economic life and, more particularly,
how that role is likely to evolve over the coming years. We hear
every day that the United States is a troubled country. It has
many concerns, a large number of which involve business. There
is concern about pollution. And if corporations are not the
only pollutors, they rank, at least in the public mind, among
the worst. There is also concern about shoddy goods and sharp
practices, a concern that has been effectively dramatized by
Ralph Nader. And concern can translate quickly into demand for
government regulation. It certainly did during the early years
of this century, during the so-called muckraking era. And a
decade or two from now, we may well look back on the present as
a second such era. So perhaps businessmen should be forgiven
their Excedrin headaches, got from contemplating the future -- a
future, as many see it, of increasing government involvement in
business decisions, even if not price and wage decisions as such.
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How, it's obvious to me, as it is to most everyone, that
governments are going to exert a greater influence than they have
in the past on certain kinds of business decisions. First to come
to mind are those decisions that determine how goods and services
are to be produced -- technological decisions, if you will. I
very much doubt that concern about pollution will quickly pass,
for it is rooted in a desire for survival which most, if not all,
of us share. And whatever has been said about the unresponsiveness
of our institutions, the concern about pollution i_s finding
political expression. We now have, at the federal level, an
Environmental Protection Agency and a Council on Environmental
Quality. Many states have agencies of similar purpose. And I
might remind you here that only a couple of weeks ago the U. S.
Senate passed a water pollution control bill, described in the
newspapers as strict and far-reaching, by an 86-0 vote.
No doubt, though, you as businessmen are more aware than
I of all the recent manifestations of the concern about pollution,
so let me move on to other kinds of decisions which the government
is now, or likely will be,inf1uencing to a greater extent than in
the past. Employment decisions come to mind. Of course, in
this instance, governmental influence goes back some time. The
Wagner Act, which legalized the union shop, was passed in 1935.
But I was thinking more of the so-called Equal Pay Act, passed in
1963, and the Civil Rights Act of the year following. With the
passage of these laws, governments began to influence employment
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decisions extensively. And there is little danger, so long as
women's lib is with us, of any laxness creeping into enforcement
of our laws intended to prevent bias in employment.
And, finally, what of product design decisions? Once
they were for businessmen alone to make. But not today. I have
only to mention "auto safety" to remind you that the design of
autos is not something that auto manufacturers decide by them
selves. And in all likelihood, other manufacturers will soon
be complying with product standards, inspired by Ralph Nader and
others, and imposed by governments.
But citing these areas of increasing governmental concern
does not imply a generally enlarged role for government in the
economy of the future. There are also areas where federal in
volvement seems to be receding.
For support of this point, let me go back to President
Nixon's new economic policy, but more specifically, to his new
international economic policy. You will recall that on August 15,
he formally suspended the sale of U. S. gold to foreign central
banks. Among his purposes, there is one of particular interest
here -- namely, to secure more realistic exchange rates for the
dollar. Because the United States had been plagued for years by
payments deficits, it had resorted to a series of direct and
indirect restrictions on capital outflows. The interest equali
zation tax, the voluntary foreign credit restraint program, and
the program for the control of direct foreign investment were all
products of this problem. With the achievement of more realistic
exchange rate patterns, such regulation on U. S. capital outflows
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should recede.
I am not saying that we can look forward to complete
freedom of capital movements in the near future. For one thing,
other countries may decide to limit entry of U. S. capital. But
there is a good chance, I believe, that U.S.-imposed regulation
on capital outflows will become less restrictive over the next
couple of years. And if the western world adopts greater flexi
bility of exchange rates, as I believe it eventually will, then
we may well see much greater freedom of capital movements all
around.
It also seems a reasonable prospect that the future is
going to bring greater freedom to businesses in some, at least,
of the traditionally regulated industries, including banking.
Thus, before too long, businesses engaged in surface transporta
tion -- the railroads and trucking companies -- may well find them
selves quite a bit freer to set their own prices or, in other words,
to compete. Banks and other financial institutions may too. It
would not surprise me if the President's Commission on Financial
Institutions and Regulation, the so-called Hunt Commission, which
is scheduled to submit its report before year-end, comes out for
more competition and fewer restrictions in the financial sector
of the economy.
There have also been numerous calls of late for abolishing
the Interstate Commerce Commission, as well as other regulatory
agencies. Now, abolishing these agencies may be a little extreme,
but less regulation, at least in certain industries or for certain
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kinds of decisions, could well be beneficial. For regulation, as
practiced by many of the independent regulatory agencies, has not
effectively served the public interest, according to the opinion
of many knowledgeable observers. Recently, the Brookings Insti
tution, a highly respected non-profit research organization, held
a conference on regulation. And if there was one conclusion on
which the participants, experts all, were unanimous, it was (and
I quote from the conference report) "that regulation in the
United States is in deep trouble." But it is not only the experts
in universities and elsewhere who are dissatisfied. Thanks in part
to the ubiquitous Mr. Nader and his associates, the general public
is, too. And general dissatisfaction is what makes it possible
for elected officials, guided by experts, to make changes.
Obviously, general or widespread dissatisfaction such as our
country is now experiencing can lead to more regulation in some
cases, or to less in others. I find it difficult to discern any
clearcut trend one way or the other. By tradition, we as a
country have gone about problem-solving in a pragmatic rather
than a dogmatic way. There does not seem to be any strong
philosophical bias at the moment in favor of, or against, letting
the government call the shots. Those who find imperfections in
unfettered free enterprise and call for more regulation are just
about balanced by those who have seen regulation in action, and
are ready to try more competition instead.
So if there is any pattern at all to the shifts that are
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occurring, and seem likely to occur, it is perhaps to be found
in a hopefully healthy pendulum-like cycle that imposes some
regulation on unregulated sectors, while at the same time de
regulating those that have been tightly constrained. Perhaps
this is as intelligent a policy as can be devised in this
imperfect and changing world, where no one answer serves for
all time.
Let me close with a few rather dogmatic propositions:
1) Businessmen were right in calling for, and then applauding,
forceful action by the federal government to deal with an un
precedented problem -- a continuing wage-price spiral in the
absence of excess demand -- in an unprecedented way -- that is,
through direct intervention in the wage-price process during
peacetime.
2) The President's New Economic Policy, because it is dealing
with unprecedented circumstances, need not foreshadow continuing
government involvement in price-wage decisions, once the present
inflation and inflation psychology have been effectively dealt
with. Nor are there other structural imperfections in our
economy that seem likely to require any greater government
presence at the bargaining table in the future than in the past.
3) The one development that could frustrate the administration's
pledge to make direct controls short-lived would be if Phase II
itself were a fizzle. The outcome depends partly on the coopera
tion that is forthcoming from business, labor, and the general publ
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But this in turn depends in large measure on the firmness and
decisiveness of the administration itself. After a faltering
start, we seem to be back on the track. Gradualism failed once;
it doesn't deserve a second chance.
And 4) Apart from the question of price-wage decisions, govern
ment and business will remain prickly partners in their economic
encounters. In some areas, they are certainly going to become
better acquainted, if not better friends, while in other areas
they may begin to part company, to the great relief of both.
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Cite this document
APA
Bruce K. MacLaury (1971, November 14). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19711115_bruce_k_maclaury
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19711115_bruce_k_maclaury,
author = {Bruce K. MacLaury},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1971},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19711115_bruce_k_maclaury},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}