speeches · April 7, 1971
Regional President Speech
David P. Eastburn · President
FORECASTING AND POLICYMAKING;
SOME LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
by
DAVID P. EASTBURN
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS ECONOMISTS
Seminar on A New Look at Short-Range
Forecasting Techniques
Thursday, April 8, 1971
Marriott Motor Hotel
Chicago, Illinois
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FORECASTING AND POLICYMAKING:
SOME LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
It is greatly tempting for me to assume the role of a policy
maker here today and exhort you all as economists to produce better fore
casts. Certainly, policymakers realize now more than ever before how
dependent they are on good forecasts. And, certainly, policy in recent
years would have been much sounder had economists supplied policymakers
with better forecasts.
But having participated in both kinds of activities, I’m con
vinced that as much can be gained by considering also what might be
accomplished by better policymaking. Not that policymakers should neces
sarily try to make the forecaster’s life any easier, but better policies
can make for better forecasts, which can make for better policies. For
better or worse, all of us— forecasters and policymakers— are in the same
boat; our futuresrise and fall together.
With this in mind, I should like to make a few comments on
policymaking over the past decade or so, especially as it relates to
monetary policy. The point will be to see if we can find anything in
this experience that can help forecasters and policymakers to be of
greater use to each other in the future.
Three elements of policymaking have been especially important
in recent years. These are:
1. The value judgments which policymakers have brought to bear
in trading off social costs of unemployment against social
costs of inflation.
2. The role which monetary policy has played vis-a-vis other ways
of stabilizing the economy, especially fiscal policy.
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3. The degree of precision— or fine tuning— which policymakers
have tried to achieve in their results.
I propose to touch quickly on the first two and spend most of
my time on the third, inasmuch as that one poses perhaps the greatest
challenge for forecasters. Then, in conclusion, I'll try to indicate
what actions policymakers might take with respect to each of these three
points and some implications of these actions for forecasters.
Value judgments
Despite their very real worries about inflation, I believe it
is fair to say that policymakers in the past decade or so have been in
creasingly concerned about the social impact, especially on disadvan
taged groups, of unemployment. This concern has caused them to move
more gradually— and probably less effectively— to deal with inflation
than otherwise would have been the case.
No one can say this value judgment is "right" or "wrong," but
it has tended to lead forecasters to some conclusions that have greatly
complicated problems for policymakers. For the typical forecaster has
interpreted this judgment as imparting an inflationary bias to the
economy for the indefinite future. To the extent his principals act on
the basis of this forecast, they make it self-fulfilling. And to the
extent it is fulfilled, it is reinforced in the next round of forecasts.
The policymaker then finds himself facing the very difficult dilemma of
permitting this spiral of expectation and actuality to accelerate or
of taking extraordinary measures to bring it to a halt.
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Role of monetary policy
A second broad lesson from policymaking over the past decade or
so is that fiscal policy is still an uncertain and unreliable tool. By
this I mean we can't be certain that Government will use fiscal policy in
a sufficiently timely and flexible way to be of much help in stabilizing
the economy. As a result, monetary policy has been made more difficult
and has assumed a larger role than it should have.
This development, too, has had ramifications for forecasters.
For if the Fed delays taking effective steps in hopes that fiscal action
may be forthcoming (as happened in recent years), forecasters may have to
calculate the probabilities that such action will not, in fact, be forth
coming. And if monetary policy bears a larger burden of restraint than
it should, forecasters— who, after all, are not so much concerned with
what happens to total GNP as the outlook for particular markets— will
have to take special pains to calculate likely effects on certain parts
of the economy— like financial markets, housing, and state and local
governments.
"Fine tuning"
A third element of policymaking has been the search for greater
precision in results. This is perhaps most popularly summed up in the
term "fine tuning." More broadly, it reflects the ever-rising standards
of performance which the public demands of the economy and of policymakers.
In my view, this is an irreversible trend, and much as we might long for
the days when margins of error were larger and standards lower, forces are
moving us inexorably in the other direction.
This search for precision poses a severe problem for both the
policymaker and the forecaster. As I look back over the last 15 years or
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so, I believe the gap between what policymakers require from forecasters
to make decisions and what forecasters are able to deliver has expanded
rather than diminished. I further believe that increased cognizance of
this growing gap has had a major impact on the course of monetary policy
over the past year. So, a close look at this gap between what policy
makers need and what forecasters provide may give us some important clues
about the future direction of Federal Reserve policy actions.
Consider for a moment the policymaking climate that prevailed
in the 1950fs. Then we were content to avoid depressions but were will
ing to accept recessions as necessary to control inflation. This posi
tion required little explicit forecasting on the part of the Federal
Reserve. The Fed evaluated current data about aggregate demand, employ
ment, and prices to determine if the economy was operating satisfactorily.
Much more direct attention was paid to the actual course of economic
events than to the projected path of the economy. If policymakers became
convinced that a turning point in the economy had occurred, then they
changed policy.
In this kind of environment, what did policymakers require of
forecasters? Because routine instability was taken for granted, fore
casters did not really have to prognosticate turning points. It was good
enough— for policymakers and forecasters alike— to identify turning points
as they occurred or not long thereafter. And a r'eading of the record
indicates that forecasters were pretty successful at supplying this kind
of information.
But as the 50fs wore on and we headed into the 1960Ts, the
public began to question routine instability as an acceptable way to oper
ate an economy. Tolerance, especially for recessions and unemployment,
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began to diminish rapidly. A recession for the nation as a whole still
meant depression levels of unemployment for some groups in society—
particularly blacks and teenagers. Hence, the effort to fine tune.
And it did look as though the effort was paying off. After two
recessions in four years (1957-61), the economy purred along for much of
the early 60's. Monetary and fiscal policies seemed to be providing just
the right amount of stimulus to spur economic growth and reduce unemploy
ment, but without igniting inflation. The business cycle, as far as the
public was concerned, was about to be consigned to the museum of things
past and economists were riding high on this new wave of accomplishment.
It is now clear, of course, that the early 1960's was not a
true test of whether forecasters could actually bear the new burdens
which fine tuning placed upon them. Policymakers really didn't have to
worry about out-wobbling the wiggles between 1961-65. The basic problem
was one of reducing a very large amount of excess capacity in the economy.
But all of this changed in the latter part of the 1960's. The
economy was now bumping along the ceiling of prosperity, inflation was a
real threat, and unemployment was increasingly unacceptable. The public
had come to accept the idea that the economy could be adjusted without
the pain and bloodletting of the 50's. Policymakers were under the gun,
and so turned to forecasters for the necessary information.
What kinds of information did the policymakers need to fine
tune successfully? Unlike the 1950's, when they needed basically to
recognize only changes in direction of the economy, they now needed, in
addition, precise information about the magnitude of change and when the
change would take place. Moreover, they needed to know how much counter
cyclical impact policy changes would have on the economy and precisely
when the impact of these changes would occur.
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Now this is no small order. If we have learned anything about
the economy in recent years, we have learned that it is much more compli
cated than we had thought. Internally, we have found that its inter
connections are quite loose. Externally, we have found that it isn’t well
insulated from unpredictable shocks such as wars and strikes.
In addition, we have become much more sensitive to lags. We
do not have a push button economy in which more money instantly brings
more jobs. In fact, lags between policy change and impact on the world
of sales, jobs, and prices have proved variable and unpredictable. Fine
tuning required an ability to predict these lags and to be able to fore
cast far enough ahead to compensate for them.
I think it’s safe to say that, despite improved data and more
sophisticated techniques, forecasters, so far at least, have not been
able to deliver the kind of information policymakers need to fine tune
the economy.
Conclusions
We find ourselves, as a result of the lessons of the past decade
or so, in this position:
1. Forecasters interpret value judgments of policymakers as
giving the economy an inflationary bias. In doing so, they
create further problems for policymakers.
2. The unreliability of fiscal action and over-reliance on
monetary policy create problems in gauging the timing and
sectoral impacts of changes in policy.
3. Efforts to fine tune, although responsive to pressures in
society, pose an extremely difficult challenge to both fore
casters and policymakers, a challenge which neither is able
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What are the implications of all this for policymaking? The
policymaker will have to do something convincing about inflation before
the forecaster can remove the inflation factor from his predictions.
He will have to achieve better balance between monetary and fiscal policy
and move more decisively to deal with structural problems in society if
problems of timing and sectoral impacts of policy are to be reduced.
And he will have to reconsider how best to meet the public’s demand for
top performance without engaging in fine tuning operations that actually
may destabilize the economy.
These, of course, are all very difficult things to do. For
tunately, they all move in the same direction and reinforce each other.
The only way to persuade forecasters to remove the inflation component
from their predictions is for policymakers to demonstrate that value
judgments about inflation and unemployment look to the long run as well
as the short run. The social costs of unemployment cannot be avoided in
the long run by permitting inflation to go unrestrained now. The Federal
Reserve has already provided ample liquidity. In my view, the Fed should
avoid moving rapidly to stimulate the economy further; inflation is still
too deeply rooted.
At the same time, policymakers should not give up on fiscal
policy. Fiscal policy is still a potent tool and, despite all our dis-
illusionments and disappointments, policymakers should keep trying to
master it. The period immediately ahead might, in fact, prove an ideal
time to restore fiscal policy as a flexible tool. Monetary policy has
supplied abundant funds; if the economy lags behind expectations, it may
well be appropriate to take fiscal action to reinforce that already
taken on the monetary front.
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In the longer run, both monetary and fiscal policy can be made
much more effective if steps are begun now to deal with structural
problems in our society. Income maintenance and more comprehensive unem
ployment compensation are needed to protect disadvantaged groups against
economic slowdowns which policymakers may have to produce in fighting
inflation. Training and education can better prepare those groups for
the shocks of economic change.
Finally, policymakers will have to figure out how best to meet
the objectives of fine tuning without attempting more than they are
capable of. It is tempting, of course, to give up on discretionary
monetary policy altogether. If fine tuning aggravates rather than re
duces economic fluctuations, one argument goes, then we ought to forget
it and adopt some kind of rule, such as a fixed rate of growth in the
money stock.
I am not prepared to take this step, but I do believe experience
now suggests a more restrained approach to discretionary monetary policy.
The kind of extremes that prevailed between 1965-69 is clearly not
warranted given the shortfall in forecasting information.
Current Fed policy reflects a workable compromise between too
much discretionary action and too little. For more than a year now, the
Fed has pursued a path of moderation. It has sought to provide enough
funds to sustain the recovery without refanning the flames of inflation.
The Fed has resisted the temptation of deviating too far from a rate of
monetary expansion that is not sustainable over long periods of time;
yet, it has not hesitated to deviate from the course for short periods
of time when this seems advisable, as, for example, during the Penn
Central episode. An overall policy of moderation may not yield precisely
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the pace of recovery in 171 that some might prefer or that, theoretically,
fine tuning could deliver if we had the knowledge to fine tune, but moder-
tion will go a long way towards avoiding actions this year that we would
regret in T72, ’73, and f74.
Where does all this leave the forecaster? If policymakers do
a better job, his task will be made easier in some respects. He should
be able to make better forecasts. But policymakers will need still better
forecasts if they are to meet the rising standards expected of them.
The policymaker and the forecaster will be even more dependent
on each other in the 70fs than they were in the 60’s. But the relation
ship should be more comfortable and realistic because of the experience
we have both been through. With policymakers more realistic about the
kinds of information forecasters can reasonably provide, perhaps we can
do a better job of stabilizing the economy in the next decade than we did
in the past five years.
DPE-4/7/71 (2)
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Cite this document
APA
David P. Eastburn (1971, April 7). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19710408_david_p_eastburn
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19710408_david_p_eastburn,
author = {David P. Eastburn},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1971},
month = {Apr},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19710408_david_p_eastburn},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}