speeches · February 21, 1965
Regional President Speech
W. Braddock Hickman · President
Talk by W. Braddock Hickman, President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, at
the annual meeting of 350 officers and directors
of The BancOhio Corporation and officers and
directors of its 22 affiliated banks at Columbus,
Ohio, on Monday, February 22, 1965.
For Release: TUESDAY AM's, February 23, 1965, and After
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION
When Lee Stoner invited me to speak to you several months ago, he asked
me to talk about monetary policy and the Open Market Committee of the Federal
Reserve System. Since, then, one of the principal interests of the Open Market
Committee has been the U. S. balance of payments situation, to which we have had
to pay increasing attention in recent weeks. I thought it would, therefore, be
timely and pertinent if I would talk with you today about this problem and what
it involves.
My career as an economist and prognosticator has been a checkered one,
but in the balance of payments area I.have occasionally been known to hit the
nail on the head. Two years ago last month, for example, I talked to a group
at the University of Kentucky on this subject, and I began with the statement that
the U. S. balance of payments--or rather the deficit in that balance--was one of
the most serious problems facing the country. My feeling then was that strong
steps were needed to improve the situation--and these steps were not taken. It
is an undesirable state of affairs when, some two years later, I can begin a talk
on the same subject with the same statement.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -2-
In every year but one since 1950, the United States has experienced a
deficit in its balance of payments. In all but one year since 1950 we have paid
out to the rest of the world more than the rest of the world has paid us. Total
payments by the U. S. to other countries since 1950 have exceeded receipts by
nearly $35 billion; in the past seven years alone, annual deficits have totaled
$25 billion, or an average of $3. 5 billion a year. This can go on for just so
long. Moreover, progress in correcting the imbalance has been very slow
indeed. In 1962 through 1964, the deficit declined by only $300 million a year.
At this rate, it will take another ten years for us to wipe out the total deficit.
The situation became particularly serious in the fourth quarter of 1964.
The year as a whole had been expected to show substantial improvement, and
the first quarter of the year was favorable. But the situation deteriorated as
the year progressed, and the fourth quarter changed the picture completely.
The deficit for the fourth quarter was by far the largest in our recent history, and
accounted for about half of the whole year's deficit. This development points
up the fact that the balance of payments situation can change very quickly--
unfortunately, often for the worse.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -3-
A deficit has to be financed, and the way in which it is financed has
world-wide impact. This became very obvious in the fourth quarter. The United
States must finance its deficits either by inducing foreigners to hold more
dollars in the form of bank balances and short-term U. S. securities or by
permitting them to exchange their dollars for some of our gold reserves. As
bankers, we all know that no individual or business can spend more than is
earned indefinitely and that we can make up the difference through borrowing
or drawing down on savings for only so long. The fourth quarter of 1964 may
well have been the turning point for the United States, in that we may have
reached the limits of world acceptance of our continuing deficits.
Some recent events will illustrate this. In 1964 as a whole, our
creditors built up their dollar balances substantially, but drew on our gold
reserve by only $125 million. That was the smallest reduction in our gold
reserve in the past seven years. But this year is an entirely different story,
with our gold stock already down $450 million, over three times the entire
loss of 1964. At least one European country apparently intends to exchange all
future net increases in dollar claims for gold. Furthermore, there seems to
be increasing resistance on the part of several major industrial nations to
increasing U. S. investments in their economies. Individuals in France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium have begun to grumble about American
subsidiaries moving into those countries.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -4-
These foreign attitudes may be a little easier to understand against the
background of time. The United States has been running balance of payments
deficits quite consistently in the postwar period. Before 1957, this was an
intentional policy, in that we were trying to fill the world need for dollars to
finance reconstruction from World War II. By 1958, however, most European
nations had recovered from the war to such an extent that they began to use
our deficit dollars to build their financial reserves. The result was the first
large drain on the U. S. gold supply.
Since 1958, dollar claims held by foreigners have increased sharply,
serving as a reminder that our gold stock could be threatened. Our Govern
ment has had to resort to a number of special financing arrangements to
induce our creditors not to exchange dollars for gold. These technical
arrangements include currency swap agreements, special Treasury bonds
(known as Roosa bonds), and advance payments on foreign debts to the U. S.
Most recently, a law has passed both Houses of Congress to increase the supply
of gold that is free to meet the demands of our creditors. I am referring,
of course, to the measure that eliminates the necessity of holding gold reserves
against member bank deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks.
Now what has been causing our balance of payments difficulties in the
past few years ? We had some warning in 1958 that the so-called world dollar
shortage of the early postwar period had turned into a dollar surplus. It was
not until I960, however, that measures were taken to counter-balance our
deficits. But progress has been poor, with great expectations disappointed
frequently.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -5-
What developments in our international transactions share the blame?
In a nutshell, our current earnings overseas have been less than our foreign
loans and investments and Government grants and loans. In effect, we are like
a bank that is over-loaned and over-invested.
An examination of the major categories of the U. S. balance of payments
accounts reveals some contrasting patterns. For one thing, we have achieved
a large net surplus on current account in recent years. This means that we
have earned much more from the export of goods and services than we have had
to pay for similar imports. Also contributing to the excellent showing of this
category is the increasing stream of income from U. S. investments in other
countries--income in the form of interest and dividends on foreign stocks and
bonds and profits returned from overseas branches of U. S. companies.
Our past showing on current account does not convey a picture of a
nation losing out in its current transactions in world markets. This is
particularly true in merchandise trade where the United States has a very
strong and favorable position in exports. About the only "losers" in the current
account are the large annual exodus of U. S. tourists and their money to other
countries and net outpayments for pensions and charity. Even these outflows
reflect the prosperity of our nation.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -6-
Unfortunately, our net earnings from sales of goods and services abroad
have not been large enough to wipe out serious deficits in other categories of the
balance of payments. We know that U. S. Government grants and loans abroad
have been large throughout the postwar period, reflecting the role of this country
as a leader of the free world. Many of the decisions that shape these flows of
funds are political rather than economic, but efforts have been made to reduce
the drain. The Government is struggling to improve the efficiency of U. S.
foreign aid programs and to obtain more assistance from other countries in aiding
under-developed areas of the world. One effective counter-measure has been to
increase the proportion of U. S. aid that is spent directly on U. S. merchandise - -
so-called "tied aid". Government capital flows continue to represent a serious
drain on our balance of payments, but recent efforts to hold down these flows have
paid off.
The remaining major category in our international accounts reflects trans
fers of private capital. Private capital outflows have been a constant drain on our
balance of payments in recent years, climbing to a peak level in the fourth quarter
last year. Such outflows may be long- or short-term in nature and take many
forms. Long-term capital outflows generally are divided into two parts: direct
investment (spending by U. S. companies on branches and affiliates overseas) and
indirect investment (extensions of longer-term U. S. bank loans abroad and U. S.
purchases of foreign stocks and bonds.)
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -7-
Basically, long-term funds flow out to other countries because profit
opportunities are greater there than here. U. S. funds have been readily
available because of relatively easy conditions in credit and capital markets, the
high level of liquidity in the economy, and the increasing volume of earnings.
The outflow of direct investment has been particularly heavy to Europe, as
American companies have rushed to get established in the Common Market to
take advantage of tariff benefits and attractive markets. Many of the countries
that have received large U. S. direct investments are the same ones that have
been taking U. S. gold. Last year, the net outflow of direct investment from
this country rose to more than $2 billion.
Indirect investments also have been increasing rapidly, so much so that
controls were proposed in 1963 to restrict use of our capital markets. U. S.
indirect investment rose sharply during the last half of 1962 and early 1963,
chiefly in the form of new foreign bonds and stocks floated in our capital
markets. This development prompted the Treasury to impose the interest
equalization tax, designed to make foreign borrowing more costly. The threat
of the tax and its effect when enacted did have some success in restraining this
type of capital outflow, but the success was limited because under-developed
countries were excluded from the tax and Canada, the largest foreign borrower
in the U. S. , was exempted.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -8-
Moreover, a new and offsetting trend developed, when foreigners turned
from our capital markets to our banking system as an alternative source of funds.
Beginning in 1963, there was a very large expansion in the volume of term
lending to foreigners by U. S. banks, lending that was exempt under the interest
equalization tax. Term lending in 1964 amounted to about $1 billion, and was
four times as large as in 1962.
Some outflows of U. S. capital, including bank loans, are short-term
in nature. In addition to bank loans, such transactions represent the shifting
of liquid corporate funds from a bank balance here in Columbus, Ohio, or
Cleveland, to a time deposit in a Canadian bank or into British or Canadian
Treasury bills. Short-term capital outflows in the aggregate rose markedly
in 1964, following some improvement in this area in the previous two years.
Because liquid funds usually move to gain an interest rate advantage, the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury have tried to keep interest rates here and
abroad in rough alignment and to avoid or cushion disturbances in world
financial markets that might lead to speculative runs against the key reserve
currencies (the pound and the dollar). Despite all our efforts, the outflow of
total short-term funds from the U. S. was not discouraged last year; in fact,
the volume may even have doubled from the 1963 level to reach $2 billion.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -9-
The overall deficit in the fourth quarter of last year has caused grave
concern in this country and abroad, particularly because it came on the heels
of the currency crisis in Great Britain and despite efforts of the Federal Reserve
and the Administration to correct our balance of payments difficulties. Speaking
very frankly, the lack of success in controlling the deficits has weakened the
international position of the dollar, put the United States in a bad bargaining
position in world politics, and hampered policy actions concerning domestic
economic activity. As a result, the President with the full support of the Federal
Reserve System has initiated a broad-scale program to combat our balance of
payments situation. Granted that some of the fourth quarter developments may
have been temporary in nature, the basic problem has been going on far too
long and permanent progress has been much too slow to be tolerated. As the
President pointed out in his special message to Congress on the balance of
payments on February 10, accelerated progress must be achieved in order to
assure the "continued and growing strength" of the dollar in world markets. We
have told the world that the dollar is "as good as gold", and we must strive to
keep it that way so that the world will be willing to hold dollars "as a safe and
convenient medium of international exchange. "
The new balance of payments program has special significance for us
as members of the financial community, and so I would like to spend the
remaining minutes in outlining the major proposals. There are two basic parts
to the program: first, recommended legislation, and second, measures needing
voluntary cooperation. Let me summarize the requested legislation.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -10-
The interest equalization tax would be extended beyond its original life
to remain in effect through 1967, and broadened to cover nonbank loans with a
maturity of more than one year to borrowers in developed countries. The
President also imposed the tax on bank loans of similar maturity to the same
borrowers. Congress has been asked to provide banks with immunity from the
anti-trust laws to allow bankers to serve on committees seeking to reduce
foreign loans.
Legislation also will be requested to improve tax incentives affecting
the purchase of U. S. securities by foreigners, in order to encourage investment
in the United States.
Recognizing the impact of foreign travel on the balance of payments,
the President has asked that the duty-free exemption on overseas purchases
by U. S. travelers be reduced from the present $100 to only $50, and applied
at the retail rather than the wholesale level.
The heart of the new program--the real punch--is contained in a series
of voluntary proposals applying to banks and businesses. On the one hand, the
Commerce Department is going to deal with business corporations in an attempt
to restrain their loans and investments overseas. For example, U. S.
corporations will be asked not to increase their holdings of Canadian time
deposits or British bills. Furthermore, businesses will be requested to return
more foreign earnings to this country, to borrow funds abroad, and to limit the
establishment or enlargement of new plants in the developed countries.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -11-
In addition to negotiating the voluntary investment restraint program,
the Commerce Department will continue its vigorous efforts to promote growth
in U. S. merchandise exports. American business will be reminded again that
continued wage and price moderation is essential in order to strengthen our
world trade position.
The Federal Reserve System is assigned the responsibility of dealing
with banks and other financial institutions (insurance companies, pension funds,
charitable institutions, etc. ). Banks are being asked to limit their foreign
lending to finance U. S. exports and to restrict the increase in their total foreign
claims this year to 5 percent of foreign loans and investments hald as of
December 31, 1964. Specific details about the voluntary lending restraints are
still being formulated, but we already know that there will be many problems to
be solved in the administration of the program. For example, we know that some
banks are already forward-committed to provide credits to foreign countries in
excess of the 5 percent guideline --and if these commitments are firm, they will
have to be honored. At the same time, special efforts must be made to promote
export credits so as not to hinder sales of U. S. goods abroad. Finally, the new
restraints will not be equitable for all banks. Those just starting in the business
of foreign lending will have fewer maturing foreign loans that can be renewed or
extended to other foreign borrowers than banks that have been operating for a
long time in the foreign field; in effect, each bank will be tied into its existing
foreign loan base on the books on December 31, 1964.
(more)
President W. Braddock Hickman -12-
Nevertheless, despite many problems, we must remember the national
importance of the entire program. We must defend the dollar and the position
of the United States in world finance. The heart of the balance of payments
program is voluntary, as opposed to one based on direct controls, and it is in
our national interest to join in to the fullest extent. Thus far, all the Fourth
District banks that I have contacted will cooperate 100 percent. There is some
foreign skepticism--but I think I know the American people--and particularly
bankers--better than they do. If we all pull together, we can make this thing
work.
# # #
Cite this document
APA
W. Braddock Hickman (1965, February 21). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19650222_w_braddock_hickman
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19650222_w_braddock_hickman,
author = {W. Braddock Hickman},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1965},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19650222_w_braddock_hickman},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}