speeches · February 7, 1958
Regional President Speech
Karl R. Bopp · President
For release at Noon,
February 8, 1958
Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia
Walnut 2-5900
A FLEXIBLE MONETARY POLICY
by Karl R. Bopp, Vice President
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
before Group Two, Pennsylvania Bankers Association
Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa*
Saturday, February 8, 1958
I would like at the very outset to express my sincere apprecia
tion for the good wishes that so many of you have expressed, I can hope
for no more than that you will feel as kindly toward me when my turn
comes to retire as you feel now when I am about to assume the challenging
responsibilities that lie ahead*
I seize this first opportunity since the announcement of the
retirement of Alfred H. Williams as President of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia and W. Jonathan Davis as First Vice President to pay tri
bute to these two great public servants. All of you know A1 and John
very well; nevertheless, I venture the judgment that none of you knows
them as well as Bob Hilkert and I who succeed them on March 1« A1
Williams is incomparable, unique. There is no second A1 Williams and
there never will be - and there never will be a second John Davis either.
Fortunately, Bob and I have lived and worked intimately with
them for more than fifteen years. They have done their best to develop
in us the qualities that our jobs demand: An open mind that bases its
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- 2 -
decisions on the relevant evidence, awareness of personal fallibility-
even when motives are pure, courage to do what is in the public interest
even though it may occasionally be unpleasant« They never lost sight of
the dignity and importance of every individual. We are ambitious to
maintain in the Bank an environment in which each of the thousand in
dividuals on the staff will derive zest from making his or her maximum
contribution to the important work of the Bank»
The title of these remarks, a flexible monetary policy, indi
cates that we intend to continue the efforts inaugurated by President
Williams to explain the role of the Federal Reserve System in our dynamic
economy. It is in the national interest that the role of the System be
understood without exaggeration or minimization» This is a substantial
undertaking that cannot be completed at one session. I shall, therefore,
discuss today a few aspects of the problems that are of current and con
tinuing importance.
One feature that needs tc be understood is that a central
banker cannot discuss possible future actions* This necessity arises
from the very nature of the problem and not from any desire on the part
of the central banker to be mysterious or reticent* Since some of you
may have come with the expectation of hearing a discussion of future
policy, I shall begin by demonstrating why I cannot satisfy that expecta
tion either today or at any time in the future« One reason is that such
a statement injects a new force into the situation* An act that may have
been appropriate before the statement was made may not be appropriate
after it is made* The options then confronting the central banker who
has talked of the future is either to act as he said he would - even
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- 3 -
though it is no longer appropriate - or not to act in that way and thus
falsify his own predictions« I am sure you will agree that a central
banker should not place himself in this dilemma.
Perhaps I can make this point more vivid by reference to other
fields. You all remember Pat's reply to Mike who wondered why Pat wanted
to know where he was going to die: "Because then I wouldn't go there.11
No one should be put in the position of telling Pat where he is going to
die.
Here is another illustration. Suppose that I had developed a
formula by which I could predict with precision the daily movement of the
price of a particular stock for a week in advance« Suppose, also, that
I had done this for the past five years and that I had delivered each
prediction under seal to a notary. Suppose next that I had brought the
notary to this meeting to open the predictions and compare them with the
actual behavior of the price of the stock and that the predictions had
been perfect. And now suppose, finally, that I make the dramatic an
nouncement: "On the basis of my formula the price of the stock will rise
$x a share to $y on Thursday, February 13, 1958»" Do you think it would?
I have a hunch that Monday, not Thursday, would be the big day on the
Exchange in that stock. The important point, however, for our purposes
is that what might have been appropriate before the announcement might
not be appropriate after it.
This principle is important in central banking. A central
bank exerts its influence primarily through the money market. Its opera
tions affect the supply and availability of money relative to the demand
and thereby the cost. Injections of funds tend to ease the market and
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- k -
withdrawals tend to tighten it. But the tone of the market is also in
fluenced by the expectations of those who deed in it. If they expect the
market to ease, lenders will try to lend funds before the easing results
in a decline in rates and borrowers will try to postpone their borrowing
until rates have declined. In other words, the expectations of ease will
increase the current supply of funds and will reduce the current demand
and thus will themselves produce the conditions that are anticipated. An
easing in the market brought about in this way may not continue, however,
if there is no actual increase in funds. But the timing of such release
as well as the rate and terms needed to produce and maintain a given tone
in the market will be influenced by the change in expectations.
I have neither the time nor, frankly, the competence to analyze
all of the ramifications of this problem. I hope I have said enough to
indicate that a central banker cannot say what he will do next.
A flexible monetary policy means that the responsible officials
act in accordance with their view of the current situation, not in accord
with any prior commitment.
I appreciate, of course, that there have been dramatic occasions
in the past - such as the outbreak of war - when it has been in the public
interest for a central bank to commit itself. We all hope that no such
occasion arises again, but if it does, you can be sure that the Federal
Reserve System will deliver on any commitment it makes.
Another important facet of this problem is that a central banker
is a public servant. He cannot do his job and profit personally or permit
others to profit, even inadvertently, from any prior knowledge that he may
possess.
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- 5 -
Within the limits that I have indicated, the System keeps the
public informed of its activities* I happen to have studied central
banking in a number of European countries before the Second World War.
One of the most frustrating aspects of those studies was the difficulty
of securing information. In contrast, the Federal Reserve System informs
the public of its operations» There is first of all the Annual Report of
the Board of Governors which contains a record of all policy actions of
the Federal Open Market Committee as well as of the Board itself* In
cluded are all directives issued by the Committee to the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York with respect to operations in the open market. For the
reasons I have already indicated, these directives are not made public
prior to issuance of the Annual Report. The Annual Report also contains
a complete list of the holdings of Government securities by the Federal
Reserve Banks at the end of the year. Each week the System publishes the
statement of condition of the Federal Reserve Banks, including a break
down of Government security holdings by type and maturity. The informa
tion is available to anyone who wishes to have it.
I need not tell you as bankers that the meaning of the state
ment and of changes in the magnitudes is not obvious to a casual observer.
I need not tell you either that it is worth a good deal of effort to be
come skilled in the analysis of the statement.
With a desire to be helpful in developing such skill, I would
like to point out a few pitfalls in analysis that I have observed in re
cent years.
The first arises from the unexpressed assumptions that the Re
serve System is the only institution that puts money into the market or
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- 6 -
takes money out and that it does so exclusively through open market opera
tions. These mistaken assumptions lead to the false conclusion that one
can determine the direction of Federal Reserve policy simply by following
the System's portfolio of Government securities. Persons who make those
assumptions become confused when the System buys securities in a period
of tight money or sells securities in a period of ease*
The confusion disappears as soon as one changes his assumptions
to reflect the realities of the money market. Actually there are many
operations besides purchases and sales of Government securities by the
Federal Reserve System that put money into the market or take it out.
For example, the American public gradually withdraws currency
from the banks toward the end of the year and returns it to the banks in
January. The amount involved if; about a billion dollars. It should not
confuse an observer to notice that the Federal Reserve System has pur
chased Government securities toward the end of the year as currency was
withdrawn even though it is pursuing a policy of restraint* Nor should
it cause confusion to see the System sell securities in January even
though it is pursuing a policy of ease.
A strategic feature to keep in mind when analyzing the money
market is that all other operations that put funds into the market or
withdraw funds from the market have an impact on the reserves of the mem
ber banks. It is the reserve position of the member banks that deserves
the focus of attention» One measure of the tone of the money market is
the net reserve position of the member banks. If banks are able to main
tain their required reserves only by borrowing from the Federal Reserve
Banks, they will be under pressure to limit their loans and investments.
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- 7 -
If, on the other hand, they have excess reserves beyond their require
ments, they will be under inducement to expand their loans and invest
ments.
At any moment of time, of course, some banks are borrowing to
maintain their required reserves, some have excess reserves, and some,
interestingly enough, are borrowing even though they have excess re
serves. The net position of the banking system is measured by subtract
ing the amount of borrowing from the amount of excess reserves. The tone
of the money market is greatly influenced by the net position: a net
borrowing position being reflected in a tighter market and a net free
reserve position being reflected in an easier market. The tone of the
market is also influenced, of course, by the distribution of the borrow
ings and the excess reserves among the member banks.
The System publishes information on borrowing and on excess
reserves in its weekly release. When you consider the magnitude and com
plexity of the forces in the money market and the impossibility of pre
dicting their behavior accurately even a day or two in advance, you will
appreciate, of course, that not every change in the net reserve position
of the banking system reflects a change in Federal Reserve policy. But
the general level over time is important.
Another measure of conditions in the money market is the cost
of money. One of the tools that the System uses is the rate at which the
Reserve Banks discount the notes of their members. Each Reserve Bank
establishes such a rate subject to review and determination by the Board
of Governors.
A change in the rate, of course, is news. It is understandable
that question will be raised as to why the change was made. Unfortunately,
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- 8 -
it is not possible to give a brief and accurate description of why the
specific decision was made.
Occasional misunderstanding on this score arises because we are
tempted to apply different standards in judging others than we apply in
judging ourselves. W. Somerset Maugham had something to say about this
problem in his reminiscences published as "The Summing Up."
We all have shared the experience of trying to determine why a
relative, a friend, a customer or a public official behaved as he did.
We become impatient with elaborate explanations and are tempted to be
lieve they are designed to cover a few simple - and perhaps base or em
barrassing motives. We are tempted to say, "Get to the point! Why -
in two or three sentences - did you do it?"
How different it all seems when we are on the receiving end of
such questions. Again, we become impatient; not now with elaborate ex
planations, but rather with the demand for brevity!
How, then, can one explain why a given decision was reached?
The answer must be based on all the surrounding circumstances. Rarely
will one or two factors be decisive.
Each month the Board of Governors publishes the Federal Reserve
Bulletin with more than 60 pages of statistical tables and a Chart Book
on Financial and Business Statistics with about 60 pages of charts of
economic magnitudes that are relevant in reaching a decision on monetary
policy. Each Federal Reserve Bank, in turn, has data on developments in
its own district. In addition, many non-systematic and qualitative fac
tors are relevant.
I am not so naive as to say that the full implication of all
relevant forces is taken into aacount - or even known - in reaching a
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- 9 -
decision. We are not yet living in the millennium! But I do think that
mere mention of these areas of information should make it apparent that
decisions on policy are based on judgments as to the net effect of a wide
variety of forces that sire operating in our dynamic economy.
Formation of such a judgment is hard work. I can appreciate
that many would find it dull and unexciting. For myself, I find it so
enormously important and stimulating that no effort is too great if it
results in even a single improvement in judgment* Since, as John Donne
said: "No man is an island unto himself", I am happy to have the active
support of my thousand colleagues at all levels at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia*
* * * * * * *
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
A FLEXIBLE
MONETARY POLICY
By Karl R. Bopp, President*
I would like at the very outset to express my sin They have done their best to develop in us the
cere appreciation for the good wishes that so many qualities that our jobs demand: An open mind that
of you have expressed. I can hope for no more bases its decisions on the relevant evidence, aware
than that you will feel as kindly toward me when ness of personal fallibility even when motives are
my turn comes to retire as you feel now when I am pure, courage to do what is in the public interest
about to assume the challenging responsibilities even though it may occasionally be unpleasant.
that lie ahead. They never lost sight of the dignity and impor
I seize this first opportunity since the announce tance of every individual. We are ambitious to
ment of the retirement of Alfred H. Williams as maintain in the Bank an environment in which
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Phila each of the thousand individuals on the staff will
delphia and W. Jonathan Davis as First Vice derive zest from making his or her maximum con
President to pay tribute to these two great public tribution to the important work of the Bank.
servants. All of you know A1 and John very well; The title of these remarks, a flexible monetary
nevertheless, I venture the judgment that none of policy, indicates that we intend to continue the
you knows them as well as Bob Hilkert and I who efforts inaugurated by President Williams to ex
succeed them on March 1. A1 Williams is incom plain the role of the Federal Reserve System in our
parable, unique. There is no second A1 Williams dynamic economy. It is in the national interest
and there never will be—and there never will be a
second John Davis either. *An address before Group 2, Pennsylvania
Bankers Association, Philadelphia, Pa., Saturday,
Fortunately, Bob and I have lived and worked
February 8, 1958
intimately with them for more than fifteen years.
3
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
business review
that the role of the System be understood without notary to this meeting to open the predictions and
exaggeration or minimization. This is a substan compare them with the actual behavior of the price
tial undertaking that cannot be completed at one of the stock and that the predictions had been per
session. I shall, therefore, discuss today a few fect. And now suppose, finally, that I make the
aspects of the problems that are of current and dramatic announcement: “On the basis of my for
continuing importance. mula the price of the stock will rise $x a share to
$y on Thursday, February 13, 1958.” Do you
Indication of future actions think it would? I have a hunch that Monday, not
One feature that needs to be understood is that Thursday, would be the big day on the Exchange
a central banker cannot indicate possible future in that stock. The important point, however, for
actions. This necessity arises from the very nature our purposes is that what might have been appro
of the problem and not from any desire on the part priate before the announcement might not be ap
of the central banker to be mysterious or reticent. propriate after it.
Since some of you may have come with the expec This principle is important in central banking.
tation of hearing a discussion of future policy, I A central bank exerts its influence primarily
shall begin by demonstrating why I cannot satisfy through the money market. Its operations affect
that expectation either today or at any time in the the supply and availability of money relative to
future. One reason is that such a statement injects the demand and thereby the cost. Injections of
a new force into the situation. An act that may funds tend to ease the market and withdrawals
have been appropriate before the statement was tend to tighten it. But the tone of the market is also
made may not be appropriate after it is made. The influenced by the expectations of those who deal in
options then confronting the central banker who it. If they expect the market to ease, lenders will
has talked of the future is either to act as he said try to lend funds before the easing results in a de
he would—even though it is no longer appropriate cline in rates and borrowers will try to postpone
—or not to act in that way and thus falsify his own their borrowing until rates have declined. In other
predictions. I am sure you will agree that a central words, the expectations of ease will increase the
banker should not place himself in this dilemma. current supply of funds and will reduce the current
Perhaps I can make this point more vivid by demand and thus will themselves produce the con
reference to other fields. You all remember Pat’s ditions that are anticipated. An easing in the mar
reply to Mike who wondered why Pat wanted to ket brought about in this way may not continue,
know where he was going to die: “Because then I however, if there is no actual increase in funds.
wouldn’t go there.” No one should be put in the But the timing of such release as well as the rate
position of telling Pat where he is going to die. and terms needed to produce and maintain a given
Here is another illustration. Suppose that I had tone in the market will be influenced by the change
developed a formula by which I could predict with in expectations.
precision the daily movement of the price of a I have neither the time nor, frankly, the compe
particular stock for a week in advance. Suppose, tence to analyze all of the ramifications of this
also, that I had done this for the past five years problem. I hope I have said enough to indicate
and that I had delivered each prediction under seal that a central banker cannot say what he will do
to a notary. Suppose next that I had brought the next.
4
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
business review
Flexibility vs. commitments statement of condition of the Federal Reserve
Banks, including a breakdown of Government
A flexible monetary policy means that the re
security holdings by type and maturity. The infor
sponsible officials act in accordance with their
mation is available to anyone who wishes to have
view of the current situation, not in accord with
it.
any prior commitment.
I need not tell you as bankers that the meaning
I appreciate, of course, that there have been
of the statement and of changes in the magnitudes
dramatic occasions in the past—such as the out
is not obvious to a casual observer. I need not tell
break of war—when it has been in the public in
you either that it is worth a good deal of effort to
terest for a central bank to commit itself. We all
become skilled in the analysis of the statement.
hope that no such occasion arises again, but if it
With a desire to be helpful in developing such
does, you can be sure that the Federal Reserve
skill, I would like to point out a few pitfalls in
System will deliver on any commitment it makes.
analysis that I have observed in recent years.
Another important facet of this problem is that
The first arises from the unexpressed assump
a central banker is a public servant. He cannot do
tions that the Reserve System is the only institu
his job and profit personally or permit others to
tion that puts money into the market or takes
profit, even inadvertently, from any prior knowl
money out and that it does so exclusively through
edge that he may possess.
open market operations. These mistaken assump
tions lead to the false conclusion that one can de
Public information
termine the direction of Federal Reserve policy
Within the limits that I have indicated, the Sys
simply by following the System’s portfolio of Gov
tem keeps the public informed of its activities. I
ernment securities. Persons who make those as
happen to have studied central banking in a num
sumptions become confused when the System buys
ber of European countries before the Second
securities in a period of tight money or sells secur
World War. One of the most frustrating aspects of
ities in a period of ease.
those studies was the difficulty of securing infor
The confusion disappears as soon as one
mation. In contrast, the Federal Reserve System
changes his assumptions to reflect the realities of
informs the public of its operations. There is first
the money market. Actually there are many opera
of all the Annual Report of the Board of Governors
tions besides purchases and sales of Government
which contains a record of all policy actions of the securities by the Federal Reserve System that put
Federal Open Market Committee as well as of the money into the market or take it out.
Board itself. Included are all directives issued by
For example, the American public gradually
the Committee to the Federal Reserve Bank of New withdraws currency from the banks toward the
York with respect to operations in the open mar end of the year and returns it to the banks in Jan
ket. For the reasons I have already indicated, these uary. The amount involved is about a billion dol
directives are not made public prior to issuance of lars. It should not confuse an observer to notice
the Annual Report. The Annual Report also con that the Federal Reserve System has purchased
tains a complete list of the holdings of Government Government securities toward the end of the year
securities by the Federal Reserve Banks at the end as currency was withdrawn even though it is pur
of the year. Each week the System publishes the suing a policy of restraint. Nor should it cause
5
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
business review
confusion to see the System sell securities in Jan in Federal Reserve policy. But the general level
uary even though it is pursuing a policy of ease. over time is important.
A strategic feature to keep in mind when analyz Another measure of conditions in the money
ing the money market is that all other operations market is the cost of money. One of the tools that
that put funds into the market or withdraw funds the System uses is the rate at which the Reserve
from the market have an impact on the reserves Banks discount the notes of their members. Each
of the member banks. It is the reserve position of Reserve Bank establishes such a rate subject to
the member banks that deserves the focus of atten review and determination by the Board of Gov
tion. One measure of the tone of the money market ernors.
is the net reserve position of the member banks. If
banks are able to maintain their required reserves Reasons for policy actions
only by borrowing from the Federal Reserve A change in the rate, of course, is news. It is
Banks, they will be under pressure to limit their understandable that question will be raised as to
loans and investments. If, on the other hand, they why the change was made. Unfortunately, it is not
have excess reserves beyond their requirements, possible to give a brief and accurate description
they will be under inducement to expand their of why the specific decision was made.
loans and investments. Occasional misunderstanding on this score
At any moment of time, of course, some banks arises because we are tempted to apply different
are borrowing to maintain their required reserves, standards in judging others than we apply in judg
some have excess reserves, and some, interestingly ing ourselves. W. Somerset Maugham had some
enough, are borrowing even though they have ex thing to say about this problem in his reminis
cess reserves. The net position of the banking sys cences published as “The Summing Up.”
tem is measured by subtracting the amount of We all have shared the experience of trying to
borrowing from the amount of excess reserves. determine why a relative, a friend, a customer or
The tone of the money market is greatly influ a public official behaved as he did. We become im
enced by the net position: a net borrowing posi patient with elaborate explanations and are
tion being reflected in a tighter market and a net tempted to believe they are designed to cover a
free reserve position being reflected in an easier few simple—and perhaps base or embarrassing
market. The tone of the market is also influenced, motives. We are tempted to say, “Get to the point!
of course, by the distribution of the borrowings Why—in two or three sentences—did you do it?”
and the excess reserves among the member banks How different it all seems when we are on the
as well as expectations, as I mentioned previously. receiving end of such questions! Again, we be
The System publishes information on borrow come impatient; not now with elaborate explana
ing and on excess reserves in its weekly release. tions, but rather with the demand for brevity!
When you consider the magnitude and complexity How, then, can one explain why a given deci
of the forces in the money market and the impos sion was reached? The answer must be based on
sibility of predicting their behavior accurately all the surrounding circumstances. Rarely will one
even a day or two in advance, you will appreciate, or two factors be decisive.
of course, that not every change in the net reserve Each month the Board of Governors publishes
position of the banking system reflects a change the Federal Reserve Bulletin with more than 60
6
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
business review
pages of statistical tables and a Chart Book on should make it apparent that decisions on policy
Financial and Business Statistics with about 60 are based on judgments as to the net effect of a
pages of charts of economic magnitudes that are wide variety of forces that are operating in our
relevant in reaching a decision on monetary dynamic economy.
policy. Each Federal Reserve Bank, in turn, has Formation of such a judgment is hard work. I
data on developments in its own district. In addi can appreciate that many would find it dull and
tion, many non-systematic and qualitative factors unexciting. For myself, I find it so enormously
are relevant. important and stimulating that no effort is too
I am not so naive as to say that the full implica great if it results in even a single improvement in
tion of all relevant forces is taken into account— judgment. Since, as John Donne said: “No man
or even known—in reaching a decision. We are is an island unto himself,” I am happy to have the
not yet living in the millennium! But I do think active support of my thousand colleagues at all
that mere mention of these areas of information levels at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
7
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Cite this document
APA
Karl R. Bopp (1958, February 7). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19580208_karl_r_bopp
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19580208_karl_r_bopp,
author = {Karl R. Bopp},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1958},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19580208_karl_r_bopp},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}