Regional President Speech

• .(.; For release 2 p.m. (E.S.T.), Wednesday, November 2, 1949. REMARKS OF ALIAN SPROUL, PRESIDENT, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, BEFORE THE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA NOVEMBER 2, 1949 First, let me ask you to permit me to come out from under the blanket of the title given my talk in your program. It sounds pedagogic; it sounds boring. It is the kind of title you give the program chairman in August when you do not know what you are going to talk about in November. It provides a blanket cover for the discussion of any conceivable topic within your special field of competence, but it may also smother any possible interest there might be in what you have to say. I am not going to try to coin a new title, how ever, relying on my talk to hang together without a title, or perhaps to suggest one as we go along. As a native Californian - and a native San Franciscan - I thought first of something I might discuss which would be of special interest to our generous hosts at this convention. The fact that this is 1949, and that the whole State of California has been engaged in a two-year round of celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the discovery of gold in California, and of its · immediate consequences, gave me'an obvious lead. Gold is something in which we are all interested. Nor is this an untimely topic on other grounds. The recent wave of currency devaluations which swept around the world, following upon the devaluation of the British pound sterling six weeks ago, has fanned into modest flame the always smouldering fires of the gold controversy. In addition, I was eager to review the gold question because it is a good starting point for an understanding of the place of the Federal Reserve System in the monetary and economic life of the country. When I finish with gold, I shall want to say something more specific about the System, and about your relations with it. As central bankers, of course, charged with responsibility for our m9netary and credit policies, we have the question of gold under more or less constant surveillance. Most of the time, in recent years, we have been under attack from two sides because of our attitude toward gold. Those interested primarily or initially in the price of gold, and in what they call a free gold market, have fired from one side. Those interested primarily and eternally in gold coin convertibility - in a full and automatic gold standard domestically and internationally - have fired from the other. More recently, we have had a brief respite from attack while these two groups fired at each other, each group arrogating to itself responsibility for the only true gospel according to St. Midas. What I have to say will probably bring that brief respite to an end. The fire will again be concentrated on the monetary authorities, for whom I cannot presume to speak except as one individual engaged in the practice of central banking, but who will, no doubt, be blamed for my views . Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 2 Let me take account of each of these two groups separately; those who concentrate, at least initially, on a free gold market, and those who will have none of this heresy, but who want a fixed and immutable gold price and convertibility of currency - and therefore of bank deposits - into gold coin. The first group, which includes the gold miners, makes its argument on several grounds, trying to combine economics and psychology with self-interest. Let me paraphrase their principal arguments as presented at hearings on bills to permit free trading in gold in the United States and its territories. In this way I may avoid the fact as well as the appearance of building straw opponents. The arguments most frequently presented in favor of these bills were: 1. In the--~face of rising production costs and fixed selling prices, the gold mining industry has been forced to curtail its operations, and to the extent that it has operated, its profits have been reduced. The higher gold prices which would presumably prevail in a free market would correct this situa tion. This is the "do something for the gold miners" argument at its baldest. When this argument is embroidered a little, it is claimed that since the prices of all goods and services have increased so substantially during the past ten or fifteen years, it is necessary to open the way for an increase in the price of·gold so as to be sure there will be enough gold to carry on the country's business; to bring the price of gold into adjustment with the prices of everything else. 2. A second group of arguments expresses concern over the unsettling effects of the "premium" prices which are paid for gold abroad, and claims that a free gold market in the United States, with no gold export restrictions, would cause these premium markets abroad to disappear, with beneficial effects upon world trade and international relations. · 3. Third, there is an argument in eq~ity - that gold miners should be allowed to sell their product at the best price they can obtain, as do pro ducers of other products; and that American citizens, like the citizens of most other countries, should be free to hold or to buy and sell gold. 4. Finally, there were those who viewed and favored a free gold market as a first step in the direction of a full gold coin standard, and who held that even a free market would act as a "fever chart" of the economy and lead to reform of extravagant Government fiscal policies, remove inflationary tendencies fos tered by a managed currency, and lead to sounder conditions, generally. To take these arguments up in order, it should be pointed out right away that it is quite possible that a free market for gold in the United States would not result in a rise in the price of gold, if for no other reason than that the Secretary of the Treasury is required, by law, to maintain all forms of United States money at parity with the gold dollar which contains l/35th of an ounce of fine gold. This means that the Treasury should maintain the price of gold at $35 a fine ounce in legal gold markets in the United States. To do this, if there were a legal free market for fine gold, the Treasury should sell gold to the extent necessary to maintain the market price at $35 a fine ounce. We might, therefore, get what would be in effect gold convertibility by way of a free market, but not a rise in the price of gold. Aside from this possible outcome of the Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 3 establishment of a free market for gold, what is it we are being asked to do? In effect we are being asked to do something to benefit the gold mining industry, to encourage a shift of productive resources, in this and other countries, into gold production, in order to provide gold for hoarding. This, I submit, would be a witless proceeding, in terms of the welfare of the whole economy, matched only by our bonanza provisions for the special benefit of the miners of silver. ✓ ·As for the economic embroidery of this request for aid to the gold mining industry, there is no lack of monetary means of carrying on the business of the country, nor is there likely to beo It is the economics of perpetual inflation to argue that a rise in the commodity price level should be followed by an arbitrary increase in the price of gold and hence in the reserve-base, thus permitting and, perhaps, promoting additional deposit expansion and a fur ther upward movement of prices. Even on the basis of statistics, which are not always reliable or comparable, it is interesting to note that the increase in the price of gold in the United States, in 1934, raised the price of gold by 69 per cent, whereas wholesale prices in the United States are now only 60 per cent above the 1927-29 level. We have been plagued, if anything, with an over supply of money in recent years, and the United States gold stock, at the present price, is large enough to support whatever further growth in the money supply may be needed for years ahead. The second group of arguments has to do with the desirability of knocking out of business the premium markets in gold which have ·existed and still exist in various foreign countries. I share the general dislike of these markets because they are parasites on the world's monetary system and help to siphon into gold hoards the resources of people who need food and clothing and equipment - and who wouldn't need so much help from us if they didn't use scarce foreign exchange to buy gold for private hoards. But I don't think the sound ness nor the stability of the United States dollar is actually brought into question by these premium markets. At our official purchase price for gold - $35 a fine ounce - the United States has been offered and has acquired more gold than the total world production (excepting the U.S.S.R. for which reliable data on gold production, as on everything else, are not available), since 1934, the year of our devaluation. During those years - 1934 to 1948 inclusive - estimated world gold production, valued at United States prices, was about $13.5 billion and United States gold stocks increased $16 billion. Most of the producers and holders of gold have been quite willing to sell us gold for $35 a fine ounce , despite the quotations of $45 and $55 and so on up in the premium markets. The fact is that these premium markets represent insignificant speculative adventures around the fringe of the world supply and demand for gold. They reflect mainly the urgent and often illegal demands of a small group of hoarders, together with some private demand for gold to be used in relatively backward areas, or areas where the forms of civilized government have broken down, and where the metal serves the needs of exchange - or hoarding - better than a paper note. I do not think there would be any appreciable stimulus to United States gold production, if we opened the·doors of this largely clandestine trade to our domestic gold miners. But, by legalizing it, we might well create what we are trying to de stroy - uncertainty about the stability of the dollar and our own intentions with respect to its gold content. The third argument - that the miners of gold should be free to sell their product at the best price they can get - is probably the give away. It is the argument that gold should be treated as a commodity when you think you can Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 4 get a higher price for it, and as a monetary metal and an international medium of exchange when you want a floor placed under its price. I would say that you can't have it both ways. If you want the protection of an assured market at a fixed price, because gold is the monetary metal of the country, you should not ask permission to endanger the stability of the monetary standard by selling gold at fluctuating prices (the gold producers hope higher prices) in a fringe free market. Under present conditions, the only real price for gold is the price the United States Treasury is prepared to pay for it. So long as that is the case, there is no sense in a "make believe" free gold market, in which pos sible temporary or short run deviations from the fixed price of the Treasury might have disturbing consequences. Nor is the argument that citizens of the United States should have the same privileges as the citizens of other countries, when it comes to hold ing or trading in 301~, at all convincing to me. It is true that in a number of foreign countries the holding of gold by private citizens is legal, and in some foreign countries strictly internal free trading in gold is permitted. In many cases, however, this merely represents the shifting around of a certain amount of gold which is already being hoarded in the country, since in practi cally all of these countries the export and import of gold on private account is either prohibited or subject to license. And, in many countries ~here gold is produced, some percentage, if not all, of the newly mined gold must be sold to the monetary authorities, a requirement which further limits the amounts available for trading and hoarding. These restricted and circumscribed privi leges in other countries are no reflection of a loss of inalienable rights by our people. They are attempts by these foreign countries to adjust their rules with respect to gold to their own self-interest and, so far as possible,to the habits of their people, all under the sheltering umbrella of a world gold market and a world gold price maintained by the Treasury of the United States. We have deemed it wise to maintain such a fixed point of reference, in a disordered world. We have decided by democratic processes and by Congressional aGtion, that this policy requires, among other things, that gold should not be available for private use in this country, other than for legitimate industrial, profes sional, or artistic purposes. We have decided that the place for gold is in the monetary reserves of the country, as a backing for our money supply (currency and demand deposits of banks), and as a means of adjusting international balances, not in the pockets or the hoards of the people. If we want to reverse that decision, the means of reversal are at hand, but it should be a clear cut and a clean cut reversal, restoring convertibility. Providing a dependent free gold market, in which gold miners and a little group of speculative traders or frightened gold hoarders (such as those who now·take advantage of a provision in the regulations to buy and sell "gold in the natural state") could carry on their business is not the way to meet the problem. I do not propose to get in the cross fire of those who claim that a free gold market would be a step toward convertibility, and those who claim that a free gold .market, without free coinage at a fixed price, would cause us to lose whatever modicum of a gold standard we now have and lead to monetary chaos. That is one of those doctrinal arguments in which the subject abounds. I will merely say here that I think authorization of a free gold market in this country, with no change in the present responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain all forms of money coined or issued by the United States at parity with the "gold dollar", would probably lead indirectly to convertibility. The desirability of Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 5 doing this is another matter, which I shall now try to discuss briefly and dis passionately. This is a hazardous attempt because there is no subject in the field of money and banking which so arouses the passions, and which so readily defies brief analysis. Two groups of arg'Uillents for the reestablishment of a gold coin standard may, perhaps, be distinguished in the writings and speeches of those who propose it, one group relating primarily to the domestic economy and one to the probable effects on international trade and finance. In the first group the arguments run about as follows: 1. Replacement of our "dishonest", inconvertible currency with an "honest" money having intrinsic value would promote confidence in the currency, and encourage savings, investment, long-time commitments and production. 2. Irredeemable paper money leads to inflation, whereas the upper limits imposed upon currency and credit expansion by a thoroughgoing gold standard serve as a restraining influence on irresponsible politicians and over-optimistic businessmen. 3. Present Governmental taxing and spending policies are . wrong, and dangerous. The gold standard would put a brake on public spending. 4. As a corollary of the preceding argument, since the gold standard would hinder further extension of Government control and planning, it is a necessary implement of human liberty. The second group of arguments, relating to the internati,onal advantages of a gold coin standard, generally make no distinction between the effects of a unilateral adoption of such a standard by the United States, and the multilateral establishment of an unre$tricted gold standard by many countries, and of exchange rates fixed by such a standard. The arguments run somewhat as follows: 1. Th~ existence of premium marketq in gold abroad and the lack of gold convertibility at home creates - and is repres.entati ve of - lack of confidence in the gold value of the dollar. In the absence of a thoroughgoing gold coin standard we cannot convince anyone that we may not devalue the dollar. 2. Restoration of "normal" patterns of international trade is being retarded by the inconvertibility of currencies in terms of gold and, therefore, one with another. This inconvertibility has led to tariffs, quotas, exchange controls, and to general bilateralism. Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • •• 6 3. Under a managed paper currency system there is always the temptation to solve national problems by devices which lead to international disequilibrium. This, i~ turn, has led to domestic devices restrictive of foreign trade. The international gold standard, by eliminating the need for restrictive coilllilercial policy, would in crease the physical volume of international trade, resulting in an improved division of labor and higher standards of living for everyone. First, let me say that I perceive no moral problem involved in this question of gold convertibility. Money is a convenience devised by man to facilitate his economic life. It is a standard of value and a medium of ex change. Almost anything will serve as money so long as it is generally acceptable. Many things have served as money over the centuries,. gold perhaps longest of all because of its relative scarcity and its intrinsic beauty. In this country we still retain some attachment to gold domestically, and more internationally, but to carry on our internal business we use a paper money (and bank deposit accounts) which has the supreme attribute of general acceptability. There is no widespread fear of the soundness of the dollar in this country, no widespread flight from money into things. The constant cry of wolf by a few has aroused no great public response. Savings, invest ment, long-term commitments, and the production and exchange of goods have gone forwa~d at record levels. Much of the nostalgia for gold convertibility is based, I believe, on fragrant memories of a state of affairs which was a special historical case; a state of affairs which no longer exists. The great period of gold converti bility in the world was from 1819 to 1914. It drew its support from the . \,,';:;_ position which Great Britain occupied, during most of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century, in the field of international production, trade, and finance. The gold coin standard flourished because .the organization of world trade under British leadership provided the conditions in which it could, with a few notable aberrations; work reasonably well. The ability of the. British to sustain, to provide a focal point for this system has been declining for many years, however, and the decline was hastened by two world wars which sapped the resources of the British people. The heir apparent of Great Britain, of course, was the United States, but-up to now we have not been able to assume the throne and play the role. And until some way has been found to eliminate the lack of balance between our economy and that of the rest of the world, other than by gifts and grants in aid, we won't be able to do sp. This is a problem of unravelling and correct ing the influences, in international trade and finance, which have compelled worldwide suspension of gold convertibility, not vice versa. The job before us now is to attack the problems of trade and finance directly. We should not 9-eceive ourselves by thinking that gold convertibility, in some indefinable but inexorable way, could solve these underlying problems for us. Nor is it true, of course, that gold convertibility prevented wide swings in the purchasing power of the dollar, even when we had convertibility! Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 7 Within my own experience and yours, while we still had a gold coin standard, we had tremendous movements in commodity prices, up and down, which were the other side of changes in the purchasing power of the dollar. What happened to us in 1920-21 and 1931-33 under a gold coin standard should prevent a too easy accep tance of that standard as the answer to the problem of a money with stable purchasing power. When you boil it all down, however, and try to eliminate mythology from w . the discussion, the principal _argum tori t ~- Qin in tbis county, se s to be distrust of the money managers and oft policies of GQver The impelling desire is o me ing automatic and impersonal which willccurb Government spending and throw the money managers out of the temple, as were the money changers before them. To overcome the inherent wea of human beings confronted with the neces~i t of 1~.-..,~ ,o,,.~ec:i.-9 ans, the goldr:coin stan arc! is o ered as an im ersonal and automatic solution, Through this mec anism e p ic is to regain control over Government spending and bank credit expansion. It is claimed that whenever··~the :public sensed dangerous develop ments, the reaction of many individuals would be to demand gold in exchange for their currency or their bank deposits. With the monetary reserve being depleted in this way, the Government would be restrained from e ic inancing through drawi~ upon new bank credit; banks would become re uctant to expand credit to their customers because of the drain on their reserves; and the Federal Reserve System would be given a signal to exert a restraining influence upon the money supply. In this way, Congress, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve System would be forced by indirection to accept policies which they would not otherwise adopt. In effect, under a gold coin standard, therefore, the initiative for overall monetary control would, through the device of free public withdrawal of gold from the monetary reserve, be lodged in the instinctive or. speculative re~ actions of the people. No doubt some people would take advantage of their ability to get gold. There would be many reasons for their doing so. Conscientious r~istan 1 ver ent s ending, or fear o 'U,fla.tion_, mie;ht wel.l e among these r.e_as.ons. But specqlativ . mot· :ves a desi;i;_ ~ _ hoarJi (however motivated) , such pani actJons as are generated by unsettle · nterna.tiQPal _an conditions or temporary fright concerning the business outlook or one's individ- ual security -- a o ese, an more -- would be among the reasons for gold withdrawals. The gold coin mechanism does not distinguish among motives. Whenever, for any reason, there was a demand for gold, the reserve base of the monetary system would be reduced. Moreover if onl the United St tes .doll tible ,into gold while practically all other currencies were not, hGarding demands from all over the world would tend to converge upon this countr~'s monetary reserves. Circumvention of the exchange controls of other countries would be stimu ated, and dollar supplies which those countries badly need for essential supplies or for development purposes would be diverted to the selfish interests of hoarders. Even if a particular reduction in the reserve base did occur for use- ful "discipli " t of such old withdrawals upon the credit Since the presen -- t -- -- ra-t-i-o -between is about one-to-five, "a-nd since some such ratio will be in eftect so long as this country retains a fractional reserve banking system, a withdrawal of gold coins (once any free gold is exhausted) will tend to be multiplied many times in its contractive effect on bank credit and the money supply. a business recession the Rese Y-e SY-stem might under- take to offs.ex ~his effe~t as it does now in the case of old exports but, if the gold withdrawals attained sufficient volume, the shrinking reserve position of the Federal Reserve Banks would eventually prevent them from coming to the rescue. Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 8 It was, in part, to offset such arbitrary and extreme influences upon the volume of credit, and to make -up for the inflexibility of a money supply based on gold coins (in responding to the fluctuating seasonal, regional, and growth requirements of the economy), that the Federal Reserve System was ini tially established. During the first two decades of its existence, the System devoted much of its attention to offsetting the capricious or exaggerated effects of the gold movements associated with continuance of a gold coin stand ard. We had an embarrassing practical experience with gold coin convertibility as recently as 1933, when lines of people finally stormed the Federal Reserve Banks seeking gold, and our whole banking mechanism came to a dead stop. The _god coin standard was abandoned, an international gold bullion standard---- adepted, because repea e e~erience had shown that internal convertibility of the currency, at best, was no longer exerting a stabilizing influence on the economy and, at worst, was perverse in its effects. Dis~±p±".ne ·. ecessa in these matters but it should be the discipline com etent sponsib men; not the automatic ctiscip ine of a harsh and pe~-~~- If~ are not willing to trust men with the management of money, history has proved that you will not get protection from a mechanical control. Ignorant, weak or irresponsible men will pervert that which is already perverse. Here, I would emphasize my view that the integrity of our money does not depend on domestic gold convertibility. It depends upon the great ~ro uctive ower of the American economy and the competence with which we manage our fiscal and mone ary affairs. I suggest that anyone who is worried a~ e uoIIar concentrate on tne correction of those tendencies in our economic and political life which have brought us a deficit of several bil lion dollars in our Federal budget, at a time when taxes are high and produc tion, employment, and income are _near record levels. I suggest, that going beyond the immediate situation, t-h-ey address themselves to the difficult problem of the size of the budget, whether·~in deficit or surplus :or balance. At some point the mere size of the budget, in relation to national product, can destrOy incentives throughout the whole community, a dilemma which is even now.forcing curtailment of _Government expenditures by the Labor govern ment in Great Britain. These are ~roblems gold coin convertibility cannot solve under resent economic and social conditions. Gold has a useful pur pos to serve, chiefly as a me ium for balancing in~ernational accounts among nations and as a guide to necessary disciplines in international trade and finance. It has no useful purpose to serve in the pockets or hoards of the people. To expose our gold reserves to the drains of speculative and hoard ing demands at home and abroad strikes me as both unwise and improvident. Perhaps before I let go of this subject, which has held me and you overlong, I should say a word about merely raising the price of gold, without doing anything about a .free gold market or gold coin convertibility of the currency. This is something which has intrigued Europeans and others who are "short of dollars",_has interested some of our own people, and has become a South African war cry. Anrincrease in the price the United States pays for gold would have two major results. It would_provide the gold producing countries (and domestic producers), and the countries which have sizable· gold reserves orprlva e o-artt, ~tth aaa:i.-t±orrai indfalI aol1ars ·th which to purchase American goods. And it would provide the basis for a manifold expan sion of credit in this country which might be highly inflationary. Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 9 We have been engaged in an unprecedented program of foreign aid for the past four year:s .. The Congress has authorized this aid at such times and in such amounts as were deemed to be. in the interest of the United States . This is much to be preferred, I suggest, to the haphazard aid which would be granted by an increase in the price of gold, which must be on tne basis of a more or less accidental di}.itribution. of existing gold stocks and gold producing capacity. If we raised the price of go1d, eve-r:y country which holds gold would automati cally receive an increase in the number of dollars available to ito The largest increases would go .to the largest holders which are the Soviet Union, Switzerland and the United King~omo Every country which produces gold would automatically receive an annual increase in its dollar supply, and its gold mining industry would be stimulat~d to greater productive ef,fort. 'l1he large.st increases would go to the largest producers which are South Africa, Canada, and probably the Soviet Union. That would be an indiscriminate way to extend our aid to foreign countries, both as to direction and as to timing. The domestic results of an increase in the price of gold would be no less haphazard. Th~s country, as I have said, is not now suffering from a shortage of money and it has large gold reserves, whi.ch could form the basis of an additional money supply if we needed it. An increase ,in the dollar price of gold would increase the dollar value of our existing gold rei?erves in direct proportion to the change in price. There wo.uld be an 'iillI)'.lediate "profit to the II Treasury. The '1proftt" could be ·spent by Congressional direc.tiot.i, or Treasury discretion. This'would provide the basis for'a multiple 'expansibn,of bank credit which, unless offset by appropriate Federal Reserve ac_tion, would expose our economy to 'the, t):1.reat of an e·xcessive expansion of t:he d.omest.ic money sup ply. The arb~tra;ry creati,on of more dollars in this way ,would c~rtainly be inappropriate under irµ'lationary conditions, and would be an ineffective method of combatting a deflationary situationo At the· moment,, also, we should have ·in mind that there has just been an almost worldwide devaluation of currencies Using the fixed dollar as a a fulcrum, individual foreign countries have taken acti.on designed to improve their competitive poqition vis-a-vis the United States, and to maintain their competitive positi9n •vis-a-vis one another. An increase in the dollar price of gold, which is devaluation of the dollar by another name, would undo the possible benefits of a venture in improved currency relationships which already has its doubtful aspects . For ail bf these reasons it is encouraging to know that the Secretary oft~~-Trea?urY has recently reiterated that the gold poli~y of the United States is ci:tre-c;:ted .P+imarily toward ·ma{nt~ining a stab1e relationship between gold and the dollar, and that for all practical purposes only the Congress can change that relationship. We have maintained an international gold bullion st~~d~rd by buying and selling gold freely at a fix~d price of $35 a fine ounce· in transactions with foreign goverrune.nts and central banks for all legi timat·e _m onetary purposes. This has been one fixed point in a world of shifting gold a~d currency relationships. We sh9uld keep it that way as another contribution to international recovery arid domestic stability. Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 10 This whole discussion of gold has been a long wind-up for what may now seem to you like a small pitch. I want to end my remarks with a few words about the Federal Reserve System and the relations of your organization and you, as bankers and citizens, with that System. In my gold discussion I tried to emphasize what seems to me to be a fundamental proposition in the case of a country with the domestic and inter national strength of the United States. We can't have, or we don't want, both an automatic gold coin standard and discretionary control of the reserve base by a monetary authority~ The existence of two independent and frequently incompatible types of control over the reserves of our banking system is un desirable. In the light of that finding we abandoned the gold coin standard as a control over the domestic money supply, and placed our reliance in monetary management by the Federal Reserve Systemo I think it has become established American policy that a principal means of Government intervention in the economic processes of the country is the administration of broad credit powers by the System. In this way a pervasive influence may be broughtto bear on our economy, without intrusion upon specific transactions between individuals, which is likely to be the consequence of more detailed physical controls, and which would spell the end of democratic capitalism as we have known ito I have thought it reasonable to assume that the public in general, and bankers in particular, clearly recognized the special place of the System in our economyo The fact that the development of a national monetary and credit policy is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve System should fix its place beyond questiono This is not a function which can be split up and passed around. Many of the activities of other Government agencies engaged in making or guaran teeing loans, or conducting bank examinations, or insuring bank deposits, have a bearing on the way monetary policy works, but monetary policy, as such, is one and indivisibleo It is only the supervisory and service functions performed by the Federal Reserve System which are comparable to the operations of these other Government agencies. The distribution of these incidental duties among such agencies can be largely determined by administrative convenience, historical precedent, and economy of operation, so long as there are arrangements for con sultation to avoid unnecessary differences in policy and practiceo But overall responsibility for holding the reserves of the banking syst~m, 'and influencing the creation of credit by varying the cost and availability of those reserves, can only reside in the one agency designated by Congress as the national monetary authorityo The Federal Reserve System is not just one of a number of Federal agencies having to do with bankingo Its duties and responsibilities are unique; they range over the whole of our economy and touch the lives of all our people. I was somewhat dismayed, therefore, by recent reports that the American Bankers Association seemed to hold a different or opposite viewo It is reported. to have recommended to the Congress the maintenance of parity of compensation of the three Federal bank supervisory agencies (Board of Governor.s of the Federal Reserve System, Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency), on the theory of equal pay for equal work; equal pay for sharing equally heavy responsibilities. I mean no disrespect of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, nor of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, when I say there is and can be no such equality of responsi bility. The bank supervisory duties of the Federal Reserve System are a distinctly Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 11 minor part of its work. There is no desire to increase or add to those duties against the wishes of the banks or the best interests of the public. To represent the Federal Reserve System as just another bank supervisory agency, in the name of maintaining proper checks and balances in Federal bank supervision, seems to me to miss, and to misrepresent, the main reason for our being. I mention this small but significant item first, because it cuts across the whole concept of the Federal Reserve System and, therefore, cuts across the whole range of our relationships with you. There are other points of apparent difference where we seem to be at odds, or not pulling together effec tively, because of mistrust, or lack of proper consultation, or inadequate study of the broad aspects of the questions with which we are mutually concerned. I shall touch on a few of them. Concentration of power - The picture of a .Federal. Reserve System trying to arrogate power to itself·, which at times you have painted, obscures the real picture. The real picture would show a Federal Reserve System trying hard to keep its powers in working order so that it can discharge its responsibilities as a monetary authority, with a measure of independence from the pressures of partisan political aims and the exigencies of managing a Federal debt which totals about $255 billion and, unfortunately, is growing. To lump the Federal Reserve System with the other bank supervisory agencies at Washington, and to play one against the other, is not an attack on the real concentration of power; it is giving aid and comfort to those who would seize upon the failure of mone tary and credit controls as a pretext for fastening more direct controls upon our economy. Organization of the Federal Reserve System - I have been at one with many of you in my opposition to undue centralization of control of the Federal Reserve System by the Board of Governors at Washington. In testimony before Congressional committees and in public statements, I have affirmed my belief that we can have in the Federal Reserve System a wise blend of national authority and regional responsibility, of Government control and private participation. I think we shall do well to retain and to improve the regional characteristics of the System, both in matters of decentralized operation and, more important, in matters of national ~redit policy. I should like to see the bankers of the coun try, and this organization of bankers, give some more thought to this problem, and I should like them to offer some constructive suggestions concerning it. The climate may be right for its calm considerationo Reserve Requirements - The Federal Reserve System is··-charged with the responsibility of formulating and administering national credit policy. It does this chiefly through its influence upon the cost and availability of bank res~rves. This is a proper exercise of Federal power, and its point of incidence is upon the commercial banks of the country because only they, among all of our finan- cial institutions, have the ability to add to or subtract from the money supply of the nation. I qu~stion whether there is good and sufficient reason for ex empting any commercial banks from a minimum participation in this national undertaking. It only requires a moderately sharp pencil and a grammar school knowledge of arithmetic to figure out how you can save money by not being a member of the Federal Reserve System, as things now stand. But I don't think Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 12 this country really likes "free riders", and nonmember banks, in that sense, are "free riders". I know the objections to compulsory membership in the Federal Reserve System, I recognize some of its dangers, and I think it is probably politically impossible. But it should not be beyond our ingenuity to devise appropriate powers of fixing reserve requirements, to be exercised within statutory limits by an appropriate body within the Federal Reserve System; reserve requirements which would be adequate for our national purpose, and which would apply to member and nonmember banks alike. Here is another instance, I believe, where your theory of checks and balances, runs the danger of being all check and no balance. And let it be clear that this is no attack on the dual banking system. State member banks have lived within the Federal Reserve System for years, and submitted to its reserve requirements, without loss of identity. We welcome this continued re lationship. Nor am I frightened by the existence of a fringe of nonmembers, and the ability of state banks to move from one group to the other. A mass exodus of state member banks from the Federal Reserve System seems to me to Qe so unlikely as to be outside the range of practical consideration. But I do think that all commercial banks have a common obligation and a common responsi bility in this matter of reserve requirements, and that they should assume the obligation and share the responsibility. Correspondent ~nk Relationships - Somehow there has grown up a feeling in some places tha.t we in the Federal Reserve System are out to under mine the network of correspondent bank relationships which you have built up over the years. Every time we suggest some change in the method of assessing reserve requirements, or make some minor improvement in our check collection system, or in our methods of providing coin and currency, or in some other detail of our operation9, the question seems to be raised. I can assure you that these things are suggested or done in an effort to improve the efficiency and economy of our operations in terms of the whole banking system, the busi ness community, and the general public. There is no hidden purpose. We recognize that there are some things which correspondent banks can do better than we can, and we are glad to have them perform these services. At the same time we would caution them against competition in providing services which really do not pay their way, and remind them that there are some things which, perhaps, the Federal Reserve System can do better than they. Surely here is an area, if our motives be reasonably pure on both sides, where there is no need for friction between us. Selective Credit Controls - We have differed on the matter of selec tive credit controls or, more specifically, on the matter of control of consumer installment credit. I have advocated the continuance of the control which the Federal Reserve System exercised, briefly, over consumer installment credit .. I would be concerned over the dangers of any further significant extension of selective controls, whether over the credit used in commodity markets, in real estate transactions, in inventory financing, or in other forms of business lending. Requests for further powers should meet two tests - is the power really needed and will its use still leave an effectively functioning private economy? I have argued and still believe that cont.rol of consumer installment credit meets these tests. Your offici~l ~osition has been opposed to this view. Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • • 13 I would ask you, however, whether you are happy about the way things are now going in this field of finance. I am not. I suggest that we might sit down together and re-examine the problem to our mutual advantage and to the advan tage of the public which we .both serve. These are some of the matters which I think deserve your constructive attention. A negative approach has been and will continue to be effective in stopping the passage of individual pieces of legislation, which you happen to dislike, but it won't check the progress of the idea of Government controls and intervention, if you have little constructive to offer in the face of difficult economic problems. Over the years you will win a lot of battles but you will lose the war. I recognize and share your dislike for Government controls and your distrust of too much centralized power. But I recognize, as I think you must, that a certain amount of Government intervention is necessary to the preserva tion of our political and economic system. The central problem in our country, and in all countries but Russia and its satellites, is how far such Government guidance and control can go without destroying the effective functioning of a private economy. In this country, with our traditions of individual ente~ prise, we have preferred to keep such guidance to a practicable minimum, and to have it exercised largely through broad and impersonal controls - controls which affect the general environment. One cornerstone of such a philosophy is a competent and adequately powered monetary authority which can administer an effective ·monetary policy. In making monetary policy work to the limit of its capacity, we have one of the best defenses against control by Government intru sion in our personal and private affairs. That is why I should like to see the American Bankers Association adopt an affirmative, constructive attitude toward the Federal Reserve System. If you don't like it, as it stands, put some real time and effort into the study of ways to improve it - its personnel, its powers, its organization, its functioning. In such an undertaking you will have the cooperation of all of us who are devoting our lives and our energies to what we believe to be a worthwhile public service. In the struggle of ideas and ideals which now divides the world this is a minor front. But it is a fighting front. It is no place for a neutral. Digitized for FRASER https://fraser.stlouisfed.org Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Allan Sproul (1949, November 1). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19491102_allan_sproul

@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19491102_allan_sproul,
  author = {Allan Sproul},
  title = {Regional President Speech},
  year = {1949},
  month = {Nov},
  howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19491102_allan_sproul},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}