Regional President Speech

TRAiNSITIQH FROM GOVERHIIBT CREDIT TO PRIVATE CREDIT Address of Karl R. Bopp Director of Research, Federal Reserve Rack of Philadelphia before dinner meeting of Robert Morris Associates Onion League, March 20, 1947 Since it Is obvious that most of the serious economic problems we now face had their origin In the war, it Is desirable to review briefly what has happened to our economy since 1939« Economists, like credit men, have their owa. technical jargon* One tool that Is useful Is what econo­ mists call the gross national product and its components« Gross national product is simply a phrase which means the total production or output of all goods and services* It may be divided into three components* The first is governmental expenditures for goods and services. That item Is clear as long as we remember that expenditures of both federal and local governments are included. The second item has a forbidding title. It is called private $ross capital formation, and Is made up of the gross amount - that is, allowing nothing for depreciation, etc. - of investment in build­ ings, machinery, inventories, and net exports* The last item consists of expenditures for consumers* goods and services« In these terms the major economic developments of the war were am enormous expansion in the total end a revolutionary change in the rela­ tive Importance of the three components* Gross national product increased from $89 billion in 1939 to $193 billion in 1944» the last full year of the war* One component» governmental expenditures, accounted for $81 bil­ lion of thla increase* At the peak such expenditures were half of the Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis • 2 - total* In other words* roughly half of the entire output of the country was purchased by government, both federal and local« In contrast» pri­ vate gross capital formation declined fro« |11 billion in 1939 to $2 billion In 1944« Considers1 expenditures for goods and services, how­ ever, Increased from $62 billion In 1939 to $99 billion In 1944« ■any economists «bo followed these developments concluded that this country would be In for a. first-class depression shortly after Day and especially If ?-J Say followed 'ihvvffo after V-E Day* Essentially they based their conclusion on the answer they gave to one all-important question» The question was; Bio will buy the products when government, a single customer taking half of all production* reduces its expenditures 3S 9 0 from roughly $100 billion a year to, say, 4M op $gf billion a yeart * Their answer was: Ho one* Hence they confidently predicted \mwmp] oywont of eight, of ten, of twelve ml lllan people within a few months after ¥-J Day* Vhat actually happened! Xdu know In general terms, but It Is worthwhile to review developments quantitatively* first of all, gross na­ tional product last year, the first full year of peace, was $194 billion or within a few per cent of the wartime maxi mam* Governmental expenditures for goods and serrices declined from $97 billion in 1944 to $35 billion last year* How did our economic system make up this difference? About half ease from private capital formation #ilch Increased by $30 billion* The other half name from consracr expenditures which increased by $36 billion» Bjb serious error of prediction Is accounted for largely fcy •& im­ portant omission In the analysis« the omission of finance* the mistake Is shoem in the way many economists answered the question« there did the Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis government get the money that it spent! The answer given tor eany was based on a different breakdown of gross national product* They said it came from taxes* from savings of individuals and of corporations* and from business reserves« low there is a sense in which this is true* After the event one can make such a classification if he wishes« For the problem with which they were dealing, however* I believe it is much acre useful to admit frankly that we simply created new money to pay for these expenditures and that such creation of money i* something different from what we customarily call savings* What do we find if we take a financial view of the war! The government spent approximately $380 billion« Of this amount it scoured $153 billion from taxes* Kow that is a let of taxes* as we all realise each time we make out our individual income tax returns. But it mas only 40 per cent of the amount spent* Another 35 per cent was borrowed from non- bank sources« Together thsse two account for three fourths of the total« The remainder* of course* had to be raised somehow. It mas raised by cell­ ing securities to banks* This method provided something like one-fourth of the cost of the war to the United States« iou have heard this to the point of being bored* but it bears repeating that every time a bank purchased Government securities it increased the money supply* This* them* is essen­ tially the way we financed the wart 40 per cent by means of income or taxes for the government| 35 per cent by means of borrowing from people*» income or from money that was already in existence! and the remaining 25 per cent by creating new and additional money* Bow* that new sad additional money was not blown up as were the it mas used to purchase* In large pert it is still with us* Add to Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 4 - a money supply of about $65 billion which we bad when the war broke out another $95 billion that was created during the war period and I t.Mnk you can reasonably expect a strong demand for go ds and services. Ve have had it* We turned out more goods during the war but unfortunately , great as was the Increase in the real things, it was nothing as great as the increase in the money supply. He were wore effective a&nufacturers of aoney than of many other things* Qx dinarilv one would have expected enormous increases in prices* During the war the government did not permit that to happen* Ve had direct oantrols over prices, wages, and distribution* so that the evidence of what we ordinarily call inflation were kept submerged* Even so the cost of living went up 30 per cent and the wholesale prises went up 37 per cent* When the controls were taken off we had further spectacular increases in prices* Mow* what al?out the year 1946 in banking? We can divide the developments into a number of parts« The first is the program of the United States Treasury* It was the financial operations of the Treasury throughout the war which was the most Important single aspect in the whole development* It gave the drive to these inflationary developments that 1 have mentioned. The Treasury happened to end the year^with the largest bond drive in all history* In part because people were quite sure it would be the last one and the last chance to get securities* the Treasury raised more money in the December 1945 drive than it had any need for* As it turns out* they raised seme $25 billion more than they needed* A fair share of this* of course* came from a shift of deposits from private individuals to the Treasury* A large part came from the creation of new deposits* which had Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis not been in existence before« What the Treasury did in 1946 vac to repay eoccessive borrowings of Decenber 1945« During the year 1946, the Treasury repaid $23 billion of securities, and it called down its balance by about that same amount* Now it is easy to look at total figures of deposits and to say that since the Treasury red«nption program has reduced deposits we need no longer worry about inflation* Before we do that, however, we should analyse the entire opera­ tion* Remember that the decline has. come In deposits which otherwise would net hare been spent* Where did the money go? That depends on who happened to hold the securities that were redeemed* To the extent that you as com­ mercial banks held them, what happened, although not precisely for each «■> bank, was that the Treasury drew on its War Loan Account with you, trans­ ferred funds first to the Federal fie serve Bank, and then to you as you pre­ sented maturing security for payment* The net result on your balance sheet was a reduction in War Loan Accounts offset by a reduction in your own security holdings* It reduced your earning assets, of course, but the War Loam Account wms a deposit that otherwise wouldn’t have been spent* Fart of the redeemed securities were held by nonbanks« In that ease the owner turned his security in and got his mooey from the Treasury« The Treasury called on Its War Loan Aeoouat to pay the private individual, who deposited the proceeds* That had an effect on your reserves because you were not required to keep a reserve against your War Loan Accounts bat are required to keep a reserve against your private individual accounts« So you had pressure on your reserve coming from that source« If one analyses inflation, however, he must reswmber that whereas the deposit of the Treasury was an Inactive account, the account of corporations or individuals who held Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 6 - the security that «as redeemed is an active account. Finally, some of the securities «ere held by the Federal Reserve. A call on your far Loan Account to pay the Federal Reserve produced a corresponding reduction in your reserves aa veil as in your deposits* The redemption of securities held by the Federal Reserve and by nonbank investors has produced periodic pressure on your reserveS* fiat it has not been deflationary because whenever you needed reserves you «ere able to get tham by selling Government securities* When necessary, the Federal Reserve purchased those securities. The second major hanking development in 1946 ooncems bank loans. Here there is both a long-term sad a short-term problem* The Rational Bureau of Economic Research has just published a book called Business Finance and The Bureau sails It the capstone study of seven years of mark on trends in Aaeriosn banking. In it, Beil H* Jacoby and R* J* Saulnlar trace banking developments since 1900* As one reads between the lines a little» one gets the impression that banks may not have been aware of the importance to themselves of tbs developments that «ere taking place* For example» banks did not go into financing the consumer* Even at the end of the last mar, they had no con­ sumer* s loan to speak of* Instead of that banks financed the institutions created to finance the con timers* Similarly» they vould not extend a loan that «as a little longer than the ordinary term» but they did buy bonds of long term* Ve developed in our financial organisation new institutions to meet the changing needs that developed in the period 1900 to 1940 and that banks did not meet* I point that oar merely ss background. It has not been true of banks in the last year or year and a half* Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 7 - Am you know, ve at the Federal Reserve have recently asked you to report to us the kinds of loans that you make* One reason for asking for that information is that we thought you noulxi be interested in the results* In the next issue of the Federal Be serve fallen there will be an article smearlsing the results* I think it is very such worth your while to read that article* The results for the Third District are given in the monthly review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia* For the country as a whole the year 1946 saw an increase of $5 billion in total loans* This is the largest increase for any twelve--month period going bade to 1919*1920» and even that period wasn’t larger; it was as large but not larger* This increase raised total loans to $32 billion» which is the highest voluae since 1930* Bow» let’s look at the distribution otf those loans for a noment* One type» loans on securities» declined* Such loans are far less now than after the First lorld far» in part because of different financing technique«« Of course at the sod of 1945» just after the war loan drive, we had an ex­ ceptional volume of loans on securities» In pert that explains the decline of $3§ billion* What kind of loans went up? First of all» business loans« Hers tfce increase was widespread, over the entire country and practically every type of business» at small banks and at large banks* lhat are the reasons» so far as they can be ascertained? First» costs are up* Prices are up» wages are up, and so the costs of doing business have increased} and firms have found it necessary to borrow a little more* Inventories are up» especially price-wise* nth the larger volume of business that firms are doing» they find their customers need a little more credit, and so you have some extensions of credit to customers» and an increase in that* likewise» Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 8 - locals for aooendzation and expansions loans to scne fircis because their operations have been interrupted br strikes, transportation difficulties, and 30 on * Now all of these tiling#, unless I read history wrong, are evidences of inflation* They fcre the very types of tilings that have oc­ curred every ti&e *e have had an inflationary development* In other words, we are in a typically inflationary period, as evidenced by the type of business loan* Consmer loans also ere up about 50 per cent over a year ago, a total of $1*5 billion* Real eatate loans are also up $2*5 billion, or 50 per cent. This gives se only a few minutes to go into the quandary about the fixture, or where do we go fro» here* What pussies Be about the present Bituatiosi is this* We have heard a great deal about the danger of banks getting a’f&y from their true function. Professor Robertson, an outstanding Raglish. economist of the present day, gave a talk to London bankers recent­ ly on *Is thsre a future for banking?* Be said that was a dramatic way cf asking the question* One thing that made him ask the question was the ap­ parent secular decline in the desire for the type of credit that banks like best to provide* *111 the decline continue? Will .banks develop new func­ tions and activities? If the only important decisions reselling for bankers a decade hence concern the maturities of the Governments it holds, then you cannot possibly ^©t as much fxax.out of banking as when you aake plans to help build up your rfeminity* That is one side of the picture. As I look at it, I say I an all for the extension of risk credit, the extension of private credit by basks, because, in ay jwlg&ent, that is the m y in which you build your coeumnlties and perfor* a real service, an indispensable function. If that were the only side I would be very happy about this de­ velopment 1a Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 9 - Is there another side to it? Why not just be happy about it? Well, there is another side* It becomes evident when ve ask* Where is the money cooing from that is being used to make the loans? In much earlier days* if I am informed correctly, bankers usually asked themselves this question before they made a new loan. They thought "If I make this loan, will I have to call a loan from somebody else?" There was an alternative, especially after the establishment of the Federal Reserve System; namely, borrowing, but no one wanted to borrow* You didn9t like to show borrowed money cm your statements* So you could either barrow or call in some other assets, and there was always the question of where the money was from* It seems to me that question isn’t being asked very much any more* It is assumed that the Government securities will be there and all that is necessary is to sell them* That apparent attitude bothers me for this reasons If banks sell their Governments and the Federal Reserve buys tham to maintain the market, what we are doing is to add monetisation of private credit on top of the great volume of public credit we have already monetised* My quandary arises from the fact that I mould not like to see happen in the short run what I think is desirable in the long run* If banks extend private credit on a large scale now, I greatly fear much of it will result in net additions to our money supply, which is already excessive* Oli the other hand, if they do not extend such credit now, will they ever be able to recapture this important function? Some people are disturbed by loan volume because they are afraid we are shortly going to have a business bust. I personally don’t think we shall} but, more important, I don’t think that is the critical problem* I ^Mnk that is faced with a much more serious problem in the long nan, sad that is the problem of whether we have a first class inflation Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 10 - from here on out* If we do» banking is in for really serious ’trouble* If, as we extend private credit, ve get the money by selling Government securities to the Federal Reserve, that, in my opinion, is exactly what we are going to have* So I am much more deeply disturbed than I would be with an early transitory and not very significant break* I don’t think are going to have that} but even if we did, it wouldn’t disturb me nearly as much as this other possible development* Veil, what’8 the way out? There is no easy answer* I think me as bankers should again ask the question as to where the money is coming from* That is one of the reasons wby, for my part, I ^ ms teemed Mp^ajelU the program that the Treasury has just announced to foster the purchase of a bond a month from deposit accounts* I think we should all get behind that program* As individuals buy bonds from the Treasury, the Treasury will have funds with which to redeem securities held by banka and thus reduce the volume of deposits* If every time a loan is made depositors buy an equal amount of Government securities, the total volume of deposits will not increase* In a broad sense» the depositors will provide the funds that the bank lends* On the other hand, if the bonds go to the Federal Reserve Banks, we shall have a further expansion of deposits* To follow this course will, in my judgment» lead to real trouble* So I would say that when we make a loan we should ask ourselves* there is the money coming from? Ve should also do everything possible to see that the Government securities now held by banks are bought by nonbank holders* If we do that» we can have a real from public to pri­ vate credit rather than an addition of private to public credit* If we do it» banks earn perform a function not only in building their own communities, bat aleo in protecting the eeoncey against the still serious threat and dangers of inflatlem* Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis THE TRANSITION FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE CREDIT Outline of talk Karl R. Bopp before Philadelphia Chapter Robert Morris Associates at the Union League Thursday, March 20, 1947 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis W QM "tCx Xi* <*■— /*’f y**%M 4+-L - 1 - U*~+fUL+0j f+L*t l*h ¿1 «*JkJliteAt»uufaf*n % k ^ i*<wU I* ^ I" I bhHQbHHEhkS& i %Jt *i 1« Sutetitvte a* Aston d# 8ui» ihrnxd, i M i U i b. Bob iilke rt, Tale, story Omaa^ c. tyM if, Frinectom * v d. itt. tat bqr kittlag far **a Bath kUOW )M(V;flftMll S OMI a. Hot a Virgil Jordan Can’t recite incomprehensible numerical abacadabra that will fore­ cast precisely when the Knodratief, Juglar, building, inventory, or fountain pen that will write under water cycles will turn. I believe that where we go from here depends on how we behave. b. May say things you already know - "I«m color blind" ■Yo sho is!" c. My suggestions at the end may sound like those of psychoanalyst. G.I. and psychoanalyst "Boy, is that guy confused I" Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 2 - I. Economic developments 1939-1945 A* How the money was spent Annual totals 1939 19(40 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 I.p................................ 88.6 97*1 120.2 152.3 187.4 197.6 199.2 vt expend, for ;oods and services 16.0 16.7 26.5 62.7 93.5 97.1 83.6 Ivate gross cap­ tai formation... 10.9 14-3 19-1 7.6 2.5 2.0 9.1 assumer goods and vices.«•...... 61.7 65.7 74-6 82.0 91.3 98.5 106.4 iome payments to Individuals...... 70.8 76.2 92.7 117.3 143.1 156.8 160.7 B. • Where the money came from for govt, expenditures and private capital formation 1. Customary breakdown a. Taxes b. Savings of individuals c. Savings of corporations d. Business reserves But that is merely what economists call an ex post truism 2* A more meaningful approach. Emphasis on source of Federal Government funds - June 1940 to December 1945 a. Amount raised - $380 bil. b. Tax»« - 153 bil. - 40% c. Borrowing - 228 bil. - 60% firea nonbaaks - $133 bil» fxm banks - 95 bil. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 3 - C. Some results When you add $95 billion to a money supply of $65 billion you are entitled to expect some spectacular results. We got them. 1. Increase in employment, output, etc. 2. Prices and vages held in check by direct controls 3* Nevertheless C. of L. up 30% and wholesale prices up 37% by 1945 D.&E. Thè dire predictions and the results Xor 1946 1945 1946 199.2 194.0 Govt, expenditures for goods 83.6 35.0 Private gross capital 9.1 32.0 Consumer goods and services.• 106.4 127.0 Income payments to individuals 160.7 163.7 F. The banking year 1946 in retrospect 1. Redemption by Treasury and its meaning a. Repaid $23 billion ca. equals decline in general fund balance b. Effect on reserves and total deposits (1) Bank held debt (2) Public held debt (3) Reserve Bank held debt Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis u - - F. 2. Banks'loans a. Long-term development (I) Business finance and banking Jacoby and Sauliner - NBER Bank shifted only gradually from commercial loans to financing those who finance the consuaer and then to direct consumer financing. Also bonds and real estate b. Developments in the past year Post-war revival in bank lending March FRB (I) Total loans In 1946 increase of $5 billion Largest in any 12-month period since 1919-1920. Raised total to $32 billion - highest since 1930* (II) Distribution of loans (A) On securities Drop from $7 to $3^ billion (B) Business loans Increase widespread despite large liquid asset holdings. Much at long term. (1) Reasons - not needed to maintain adequate demand (a) Costs up - prices and wages (b) Inventories up - especially price-wise (c) Credit to consumers on large volume of sales Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 5 - F. 2. b. (II) (B) (I) (d) Modernization and ex­ pansion (e) Strikes, transportation delays, shortages In summary, typical of inflationary period (C) Consumer loans up $l£ billion - 50% (D) Real estate loans up billion - 50% Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - 6 - Jl. What of the future? A* Quandary: 1. Functionless banks In Governments 2. Builders of community through vise and progressive attitude in extending private credit B. But where is the money coming from? 1* Earlier experience a* Didn't want to borrow b. Hence had to call other loans 2. Reallocation of resources 3« Creation of new money - sales of Governments to Federal Reserve Unfortunately individual bank can't tell where money is coming from for particular loan. C. Reconciliation? Aggressive sales of Governments to nonbank holders D. Remember each time we lend that it may be necessary to create the money Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Karl R. Bopp (1947, March 19). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19470320_karl_r_bopp

@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19470320_karl_r_bopp,
  author = {Karl R. Bopp},
  title = {Regional President Speech},
  year = {1947},
  month = {Mar},
  howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19470320_karl_r_bopp},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}