speeches · October 2, 1922
Regional President Speech
Benjamin Strong · President
MISC. 3B.2-4/«7
OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
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Because of the very markable conditions now obtaining, In 'the
United States and in the chiaf nations with which it has closest relations,
tiiere are matters of unusual inport which it seems to ms it is the present
business of the bankers of this country to consider with the groatest care.
I mean our relations as bankers to the economic, social and, I would even
add, political welfare of this country.
I need not remind you as to the nature of these present conditions,
nor need we delay over questions as to how they have arisen. I would dwell
upon one point, and that is that, in an eoonondo sense, the four years which
have elapsed since the end of the great war have been for the Itaited States
without any parallel in its history. It is usual at the close of a long war
that there should be a large and often precipitate decline from the higfc levels
of prices which modem wars almost invariably engender. We had, following
the world war, no such decline. Contrary to the widest general expectation,
I *
instead of a decline we had, piled high upon the enormous increases in the
war, the greatest rise in prices which this country has ever known in peaee
times. This was accompanied, as is almost invariably the case, by a great
wave of speculative activity which swept the whole nation.
Then, following this post war boom, as it has been termed, came the
most drastic collapse in prices, measured in percentages, which this country
has ever known; and with this collapse an unusually severe decline in pro
duction and trade, in some lines probably, beyond any previous precedent.
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But this critical depression proved as short lived as it was in
tense and we have now had, from the lowest point of that depression, a re
covery in the last twelve or thirteen months that is likewise probably with
out a precedent in its rapidity. In many lines, at least, this is a cer
tainty.
Now, I have no need to remind you that in all these abnormal move
ments our banks and our bankers participated to an unusually intimate degree*
The post-war rise in prices and the speculative boom that went with it was
accompanied by perhaps the most rapid expansion of bank loans, in peace timee,
of which we have any record* I think it is clear to everyone that, in its
extent, this post-war boom and this rise in prices would have been impossible
without this corresponding expansion of bank loans. Without dwelling upon
causes or upon extenuations, these are the certain facts.
Now, gentleman, I venture to suggest to you that at the present time
we stand in much the seme position as, let us say, the late summer of 1919;
but with certain very vital differences. We have not now any huge and ominous
floating debt. Imperative necessities for Government funds do not now exist.
General interest rates have undergone an extended decline. We have gone
through a period of very thorough liquidation. A large amount of bank loans
has been funded and largely absorbed by investors, though not to the degree
which might have been desired. \our banks have been heavy investors, especially
within the present year, in Governmental and other securities, and this fact
has undoubtedly been a potent factor in arresting the precipitous decline which
began in the spring of 1920. \ From the depths of the depression we have had
not only this remarkable recovery in production and trade but an equally notable
rise in wholesale prices. In times of very wide fluctuations wholesale prices
are not an authentic index of the general price level, meaning by thie the
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general level of wages, salaries, rents, and prices at retail as veil as
wholesale* Nevertheless, it is clear that the broad movement of vho 1 esale
prices precedes and determines the general level of all prices; and these
pricas are, therefore, barometric to and in some degree prophetic of the gen
eral price level.
The broadest index of wholesale prices which we have is that of the
Department of Labor, and I wish to point out to you that this index, within
the present year, has risen already 17 points, and in percentages more than
the widest variation in wholesale prices, from low to hi^i, that occurred in
the five years which preceded the opening of the world war* For the month of
July the rise in wholesale prices was one of the heaviest ever recorded by
this index, and only a few times excesded, even in the violent activities of
the war. ^At the Federal Reserve Bank we maintain an index of the twenty most
important commodities, basic to all industry, and this index, which has dear
ly marked the tendency of wholesale prices in advance of any other, gives now
no evidence of any arrest of this movement of rising prices. I believe we
must squarely face the implications of this fact*
It is A. B. C. that if this tendency to advancing prices continues
it must, with the rapid recovery in production and tirade, soon lead to a re
newed dan and for funds to finance industry. For more than a year and a half
there has been a steady though, for the last tec months, very slow decline in
so-called commercial loans, that is to say, loans other than those upon
Government and corporate bonds and stocks. This liquidation, as I have
poinjted out, has been in part achieved by the inflow of more than a billion
of gold since the summer of 1920, and in part by public issues to a very con
siderable degree taken by the banks themselves. It is clear that the banks
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cannot long continue to absorb these securities, and maintain a condition of
healthful balance, nor can they continue to absorb Government funds.
The demands of industry and trade will soon utilize all of the
funds available. I think it is clear, likewise, that beyond this the banks
inevitably
wiU/be called upon to finance a higher level of commodity prices. And this,
gentlemen, I need not point out to you is the beginning of the vicious circle.
The banker understands clearly enough the simple mechanism by which
prices rise and fall; but this mechanism is not clearly understood by the
laity and is the occasion, as I believe, for a very large part of that unrest,
social discontent, ill feeling, and violent propaganda which has been so much
in evidence since the war closed. The mechanism, as we know, is simply this:
his
If trade becomes unusually brisk, and the retailer finds/nerdiandise slipping
from his shelves, he is promptly alert to see that it is replenished in
order that he may serve his elastomers and conserve his trade. Now, in such
tines he usually finds that others in his line are doing exactly the seme;
with the result that deliveries are retarded. Jobbers' stocks are quickly
reduced and the mills must be speeded up to meet the increased demand. To
obtain quickened deliveries the retailer may offer or the wholesaler and the
jobber may may suggest a alight premium for preference orders; or, simpler
still, the jobbers first to fell the effect of this demand may advance their
p ri ces •
At the same time they make increased demands upon the mills, and
here again the pressure is not upon a single mill but upon all, with the re- ,
suit of an unusual demand for labor. And if this demand for goods is sus
tained the result is the offering of hitgier wages in order to attract more
hands to the mills. So the producer finds his costs advancing and increasee
his prises, and this increase must be passed along to ths retailer and by
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in it,
hlo to the ccnauning public. There is no mystery about it/ and, as you
gentleman very well know, extraordinarily little of^his "conscience!ass
profiteering” of which w* heard so much in and after tho war.
Now, it is equally dear that this unusual demand for goods will
soon come to an end, first by the natural check of advancing prices but more
distinctly by the consequent reduction in the purchasing power of the public
at large, unless there be a corresponding increase in this purchasing power.
But this latter is impossible in our present-day money and credit economy,
without an exactly equivalent increase in the outstanding volume of money and
credit— for all practical purposes in the amount of actual currency in cir
culation and of bank credit extended by banks*
Without considering activating causes, which is perhaps a barren
waste of time, it is clear, and there is practically no one to deny, that in
the final analysis the limiting factor in a continuing rise in the general
price level is, for all practical purposes in this country, the total amount
now
of bank credit. Fbr us the actual amount of the currency is/a very minor
although still an important item. It is perfectly clear that the movement
of the cotton crop, from the cotton plantation through the mills and the
shops to the final consumers of cotton goods, cannot be financed,as it must
be financed, with the same amount of credit, vdth cotton at 20 or 30 or 40 cents
per pound ae against, say, 10 or 12 oents.
Our vast wheat crop will require, roughly, twice the amount of credit
to be moved from the farms through the mills and the stores to the ultimate
buyer, at $2 a bushel, than it would at $1 a bushel*
Special causes may operate and do operate to produce the widest
oscillation in the prices of individual commodities, or even of great groups
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of coonoditiea, like the products of the fame. But it is clear that a
general advance in the level of all prices, or even in the larger nunber
of prices, cannot take place without a corresponding increase in the
nation's purchasing pover. You cannot sell the total of the nation's
product valued, let us say, in 1913 at 25 billions, at, let us say, 50 to
60 billions in 1918, with but a moderate increase in the actual quantity of
goods exchanged, without a corresponding increase in the total of funds avail
able for these 'purchases* We simply have no mechanism by which this miracle
could be achieved. The business habits of our people are more or less
fixed. The average turnover of goods from year to year appears to change
but little. The only thing that can and apparently does change is the
total of circulating currency and the total of bank loans.
Now, if all this be reasonably true, and it seene to me incontro
vertible in the li;£rt of the experience of the last ton years, if not through
out all known economic history, then, gentlemen, it seams to me that, as an
association of bankers in charge of the actual financing of the nation's
at this time mere than ever
business, we musy consider our relation to and responsibility towards the
general welfare of the whole people. j_I do not need to remind you that
the present situation is radical^and vitally different from that which ob
tains in what we may oall ordinary or normal times. In normal or ordin
ary times the banker has little to consider beyond the oondition of hie own
portfolio, the atataments of his customers, and the general banking position.
In times of crisis, such as have been characteristic with such curious regular
ity in our business life, the banker has, indeed, then a far wider responsibility
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tegawaWAfe and that is his dxrby towards the comunity and, in a consider
able degree, towards all other banks.
It seems to me that ye have now a mush deaper responsibility,
partly engendered by the steadily advancing importance of the banker in
all our business and economic affairs, his increasingly vital economic
function, but directly precipitated by the extraordinary condition which
now subsists. |^Never before in the history of this country did we ever,
in the space of eighteen months or of twice or three times that period, im
port, as we did just preceding our entry into the war, a billion dollars of
epld.
Uever before, in the history of this country, in the space of about
a year, or in two or three or four times that period, did we ever suffer a loss
of more than 400 millions of gold as in 1919-'30.
And never before in the history of this country, in peace times,
did we ever import a second billion of gold, as we have done within the last
two years. conditions which have brought to
us this huge and profitless accession of gold. And it has come to us at
a time when, of all times, it was least needed and perhaps most dangerous.
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At the present time the total of banking loans and investments
in the United States is roughly double to that preceding the war. The
average of all commodity prices at wholesale, on the Department of Labor
index, is now but 55 per cent, above the 1913. If we combine all the
indices we have of the averages of wages, retail prices, security prices,
rents, the average cost of living and the like, it is certain that the
average of all prices, the general price level, can scarcely be more than
75 per cent, above the pre-war level, if it be so high as that.
It would seem therefore that the present volume of our currency
and bank credit should be more than completely adequate to the full financ
ing and carrying on of all our industry and trade, even at a high pitch
of activity. We now know, definitely and conclusively, that the total
of the nation's physical product of goods, the total of all crops and
coal and iron and lumber, with all the immense machinery for transporta
tion, manufacture and distribution which these require - can increase but
very slowly from year to year, and only with the increase of population
and economic and industrial efficiency^ and by ingenious invention. \ The
average rate of this increase of the whole product of the nation we now
know to be very close, throughout the last half century and more to 3$- per
cent per annua; and this increase can rarely be greatly augmented save
momentarily in the change from very slack to very active times^ and through
an unusually abundant yield of the soil. And at con
stant general price levels the normal credit and banking requirements of
industry and trade can grow only at a slightly higher rate. |^Any increase
in the credit volume beyond this point can in time mean only a rise in the
general price level. This rise will be reflected first in the average
prices of the great basic commodities, next in the general average of all
commodities at wholesale, than in prices at retail, then in wages, salaries,
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rents and security prices^
^ These seem to be the unequivocal facts which recent research
and the experience of the last 50 years have established.
The thing that I now wish to bring to your attention is, I be
lieve , almost the most vital of all. It is simply that any undue
and needless expansion of bank loans and banking credit and of the cur
rency as well, can take place now only through the mediuaa of the Federal
Reserve banks.
*
The resources of the member banks 0f the Federal Reserve System
now constitute about two-thirds of the resources of all the commercial
banks, excluding the savings banks, of the country. Neither in these member
banks, nor in the 20,000 or 21,000 chiefly smaller banks which still re
main outside of the Federal Reserve System, are there any considerable cash
reserves upon which to posit any notable expansion of credits.
Practically speaking the banks of the nation now keep in cash
only needful till money and very little more. They no longer carry
any large cash reserves as heretofore. Practically speaking, the entire
monetary reserve of the nation is now deposited with the Federal Reserve
Banks.
This means that no notable expansion is now possible without
drawing upon this central reserve. To expend their loans and to
obtain the needful currency which in the long run will accompany any con
siderable expansion,the member banks of the system must rediscount at the
Federal Reserve banks, in order first to increase their required reserves,
and secondly to obtain the needful supply of additional currency required.
Beyond very modeet proportions therefore the control of the financial
situation is today to an unusual and, I would say unexpected degree in the
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hands of the Federal Reserve banks,
Nov I have no need to remind you gentlemen that the Federal
Reserve System waa established as a vast cooperative institution, not
merely for the safety and increased efficiency of the banks, but for
of—
the public good and for the good of the whole nation. firiv requires
for its working the active cooperation and the friendly support of the
CW et. ^
larger part of the banks of the country. There was no compulsion
that any bank should be a mamber of this system. Any national bank
that wished to decline this support could give up its charter as a national
bank. But, on the contrary, practically every national bank has remained
in the system and in addition more than 1600 of the most important state
banks and trust companies which were eligible have become members.
This vast cooperative organization, with resources now exceeding
3 -2 billions, was not created as a source of additional profit,
but for mutual protection and for the public welfare. The Federal
Reserve banks were aMatod to hold the reserve and not to be a source of
profits at all.
As you know, all of their net earnings beyond the 6 per cent on
the modest amount the member banks contribute as capital, and a small
allowance for surplus, goes entirely to the Government. Into the hands
of a Governmental body is given the final eupervision and control of the
system. And that body is appointed not by the shareholders, the member
banks, but by the president of the nation.
It was never in the conception of those who, for more than a
generation labored to perfect and secure the passage of the act creating
the Federal Reserve System, that this system should become an engine of
needless expansion of credit, with all the demoralizing and dierupting
industrial and social consequences which such an expansion invariably
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entails. I nay add that probably not one of the long and distinguished
line of those who labored towards the creation of this system ever dreamed
of the curious situation which has been precipitated upon us, in consequence
first of the war, and secondly of the abandonment of the gold standard, by
the chief commercial nations of Europe. The repercussion from the Europ-
•an situation and our j4ii pesitiun of vast natural resources hare presented
us with a problem such as the banking fraternity and the economic minds
of this nation have never faced before. j I think it may be added that
no other great commercial nation could supply us with any precedent for
our present guidance. But the nations of Europe in the war and after the
war, not merely the actual participants but the neutral nations which did
not participate, and the new nations #iich hare been created out of the old,
with no debts and no burdens, have abundantly and overwhelmingly supplied
us with the proof that we cannot increase the real wealth of a people by
fictitious additions to the money supply. f If we could do that, than all
that would be necessary would be to chop our own paper dollars and our gold
dollars in two, to double the product of our machines and of ths 40,000,000
of our people gainfully employed. All this every sane man knew long ago.
It is so clear now that he who runs may read.
Biit it is not so clear, I think I may say, even to many of our
bankers and our publicists and our statesmen that it makes no substantial
difference whether we increase the purchasing power of our people by ex
cessive expansion of bank credit than as though we printed billions of paper
money as have Russia, and Poland, and Germany and other states. The ef
fect is essentially the eame. This is the fact which mint become a part
of the consciousness of all enlightened opinion in America. l _ 2 - must
so become because of the peculiar and unusual conditions of banking devel
opment in this country. In other great nations like Eh gland and 0er>
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.
many and France and the rest, banking is carried on largely through the
agenci^^of a email number of great joint stock banks, with large numbers
of branches throughout the several countries; usually also with a
powerful central bank. Si this country as you know, «m n
30,000 individual banks^locally owned, locally managed, locally
controlled, accustomed but little to cooperation or even to very wide mutual
consideration.
Of this enormous total of 30,000 banks, more than 20,000 of them
are outside even of the cooperative influences which were created in the
new Federal Reserve System. And in turn the support and maintenance of
that system itself is dependent upon nearly 10,000 individual banks, scat
tered through every state of the union, and with widely varying interests,
associations and prejudices.
In other lands the influence of a relatively small number of
experiences men, usually men of distinguished ability and training, is
pre-potent. In this country nothing of the sort exists. So
from that between the different banks
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there is oftan a vide divergence of policies and view and often-a real feel
ing of antagonism. The so-called country banks have likewise a certain
jealousy of the largo banks in the larger cities, and these in turn something
of the same sort of feeling towards the great banks of Chicago and New York.
And there is always with us the universal apprehension of the supposed in
fluence of Wall Street and the "money power.” I need not remind you that
Thomas Paine and Thogas J ef ferson were writing a@iinst this sane money power
wan in those far days, and this sort of writing has never ceased from that
time to this, agitation against the imagined policies of the Federal
t
Reserve Banka is but a part of a feeling that is as old as the oldeet bank
in this country.
The second Bank of the United States certainly, and probably to a
large extent likewise the first Bank of the Uni tad States, had its career
terminated by the antagonism and jealousy of the State Banks which were than
springing up in such extraordinary number, laying then the foundations for
that powerful prejudice against any form of a central bank which for three-
quarters of a century prevented in this country the adoption of a sound bank
ing and currency system.
Wide and steadfast cooperation between even ^large portion of the
30,000 banks of the United States is, tharefore, an extremely difficult matter.
I will even add that I have found in my experience, even among Member Banka of
the System, a certain prejudice, and almost a feeling of antagonism, towards
the Federal Reserve Banks. And yet there never was a time in the history of
the country, it seeme to me, when a solidarity of policy and purpose( and that
policy and purpose one of enlightenment and high public
present time.
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anti amen of the Executive Council, it is my deep belief that your
body and the Association of /marican I-ankers has before it no more important
function than the achievement of such a solidarity of policy and purpose, to
the end that, in so far as our banks say be a contributing factor, the pro
foundly agitating instability of our economic conditions growing out of the
war and its consequences may a®a.in be reduced, as in the five years just pre
ceding the war, t0 the no ratal and utmost minimum.
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Cite this document
APA
Benjamin Strong (1922, October 2). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19221003_benjamin_strong
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19221003_benjamin_strong,
author = {Benjamin Strong},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1922},
month = {Oct},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19221003_benjamin_strong},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}