speeches · May 5, 1921
Regional President Speech
Benjamin Strong · President
CQNFEftEHCE OF STATISTICS DHPAJBTMfflT
ilay 6, 1921.
SOBJBCT: The lnflnande of the Discount Rata......... By Governor Strong.
Mr. Sayder opened the Besting, saying: *1 am sore we are vary much
flattered to have the Governor with us to-day, and I an rare he is going to say
some vary interesting things. Ve are vary onich indebted that he should come*11
(Governor Strong)
"I understand that there are much more important natters relating
to the organisation of the bank coming up later this afternoon, at this present
■eating, and I am going to try and shorten ay remarks toa point where they
will not interfere with that important business, Mr. Snyder. Furthermore,
now that the time has come for any statements I an about to sake Z should say
that I am appearing here in fear and trembling, because Mr. Sqydar and his
able assistants in his department put such a topic before me as the influence
of the bank rate. I am always afraid I am going to match ay theory with Mr.
Icyder's.
"The original compary of thirteen, as I recall the figure, that
started the Federal Beserve Bank, are the only ones that can go back to the
days of our discussion of what rate was proper and would be satisfactory when
this bank was organized. The conditions that existed at that time were
those brought an by the outbreak of the war. Ve had called upon two agencies
in the United States to meet the great crisis in credit and currency. The
crisis in bank credit was met by issues in clearing house and loan certificates,
bearing Interest. A vast amount of credit was manufactured through the
agency of clearing house issues, and that credit was bearing interest at from
6 to 7 per cant, and I think, in some eases, higher* In addition to that,
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credit was manufactured through the agency of the Aldrich-Vreeland Associa
tion, which was organized mider the * Aldrich-Vreeland Act** Tha existence
of that g&eat mass of credit which was bearding various rates of interest
throughout the country determined our bank rate. I thlnfc that the reserve
rates established ware from 6 to 6 l/Z per cent, and the rate was high enough
so that it kept down heavy borrowing at a low rate, so that the first busi
ness conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the rate level
which was established was trifling, and we were gradually able tore duce our
rates over quite a period, until finally, as I recall, we were buying bankers'
bills, - that is, acceptances - as low as Z % in the open market* We had,
in fact, a rate for that class of paper in Hew York that averaged frcn 2 to
S per cent at the same time that paper of similar character was selling in the
London market at froa ? 1/2 to 5 per cent. The rate in the London market was
as low as it was because of the American mass of credit ,shich was artificially
manufactured there.
"In discussing tha influence of the bank rate, you have got to bear
in mind that the bank rate has no influence uoless you have got an account
on both sides. If you have no existing loans, you canTt jbring about con
traction by an advance in rate.
■All that we were intare3tad in doing in the early days of the
Federal Reserve Bank was to earn a mere dividend of 6 per cent for the member
banks, after paying all ouf expenses. I might say in these days we had a
very distinct contrast in the character of the relations of the He3erve banks
to what we have now. This is the great money market of the country where
dealings in short time paper especially centered. AH of these bankers'
acceptances came to tills market as a rule and opened up a market where the
short-time Municipal borrowings were generally negotiated and consequently we
had a peculiarly advantageous position in Hew York «h$ch enabled us to entice
our funds. It resulted in an arrangement between the Eeserve banks by whlck
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we divided up the various banks. I think it la no exaggeration to 8ay that
this has worked out to better advantage than we had expactad.
*1 aa not going to attempt to re vie* the period of the war, ■siien we
export®ced all the difficulties of adjusting rates* It is a bife subject, and
it is full of controversy. Ur* Snyder gently suggested that that would be an
interesting thing to talk about, and I chicked it* In gefaeral, I think I aa
safe in spying that we aade about as many mistakes - I say •je" for we were
sinply one bodjjr after all, the Treasury and Reserve banks - as could be ex
pected, but, on the *hole, I think we aade fewer mistakes than our friaods an
the other side of the water aade, and certainly very fewer mistakes than the
enengr on the other side of the water aade in financing the war* Skipping that
point, I want to cone right damn to the pres ant and nhat is taking place now*
I want to i&lAdtrate this by giving a few of ay observational
•On Hay 9, 1901, I happened to be in the Stock Exchange, and oa that
day, between 10 a$d 1 o’clock, we saw Northern Pacific stock advance to $1,000
a share and money lending at about 100 per cent. There had been previously no
such complete collapse of values in Wall Street as had occurred that day up to
1 o* clock. Towards tile middle of the day they sent word vexy frankly that
their boxes were empty and they could not send in aore aarglns* Our loans got
so low that If we had attempted to liquidate them the proceeds of the collateral
would have been insufficient to pay the faco of the loan* In other words, if
very aany of the loans had Matured and the sale of the collateral took place,
it would have resulted in the complete collapse of Wall StBeat. Later a plan
had resulted In the sale of lorthexn Pacific stock and Kr* Morgan and his asso
ciates sent out word that they would not be unduly severe in the sending oat ht
aargins, and later prtes had risen to a point i&ere the loans could be aade
good and mon^y was practically unlandable*
"The point I an trying tobzing oat, in telling this sfeory, is ttat
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it presents a picture of a complete collapse of valuis which resulted in a con
dition that meant insolvency. Monoy was over, and money got back to normal rates
all in a period of about five hours. In similar fashion, that is what happened in
the United States, and in fact the whole world in coaaodity valnes. Speculation
and extravagance worked oat their own natural conclusion. There are those who say
that 3ooe defeigh of man or men, or paesibly the reserve banks, by advancing rates,
had brought about this state of affairs. I do not believe it for a minute, and I
do not think most people do. In general, I would say that no man or men had the
power to stop that great wave of speculation, and no man or men had the power to
stop the break which took place. On the other hand, I would say that certain poli
cies might have been adopted so that it should not have readied its extrsae limits.
"Evaiyone now is satisfied that something must be done to stabilize the
values of goods* and they will be stabilized to some level. Cartain houses that
retail goods, or certain houses that wholesale goods, or certain houses that manu
facture goods, by reason of foresight or some other circumstances that gave them a
more favorable posit ion than other competitors, may be out of debt and not have
large inventories, and are able now to biqr and stock up with goods that are coming
along from producers, manufactured out of cheaper raw materials and by cheaper labor
than the goods and existing stocks which are being carried upon borrowed money. The
tendency among retail stores at present is to keep new goods and cheaper goods in
competition with high prices. It is forcing down the sailing prices of ths old
ones and there are some new levels taking place from it. The same thing is happen
ing in bank credit. Put yourself in the position of any bank officer in this city
and see what happens in the daily trend of your business. At the end of the day he
may find that he has a surplus of reserves on deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank.
That surplus is the result of a great variety of transactions in the member banks.
The member banka may have made some new loans. I may have loans out. The net
results of all these movements may have had some bearing on his reserves. That is
going on every day. It goes on both sides of the account. The bank ifcich is short
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in Its reserves willcome here to borrow. In fact, the number of banks that are
borrowing from us now is, I think, more than 100* is soon as a bank gets in that
position where it has a credit balance at the clearing house, then it has a choice
of what to do with that credit balance; than it goes out to seek an investment,
and, under the conditions that exist to-day, it seeks the very best and safest
investments it can get*
’The banker is a little timid just now and he is willing to debit his
competitor for good commercial paper only. The influence of the lending bankers
that are out of debt is the influence that will bring the market rate for mon^
down to or below our rate* That process continued indefinitely would, of course,
liquidate all of our loans* If the traditional policy of fixing the rates of the
Federal Reserve Banks should prevail, I should presume we should always have our
rate a little bit above the market rate. Of course, we should always provide for
seasonal movements, or crop making, or withdrawals of gold from the United States,
or hea-vy borrowings. This process I describe is what is liquidating the loan
accounts in the reserve banks to a great extent* I want to coma up to the point
of describing, or prognostigating, if you please, a little bit about the future.
Before referring to the future, I want to refer to another important influence an
our rates and an important rate consideration in the Reserve bank.
"You know that every time the Treasury of the United States puts out a
loan and places that loan, as it does, through the reserve bonks and the member
banks, the first transaction is for the member bank to buy the certificate, to
make payment by credit, and then, if they can do so, to sell the certificate to a
customer and to the public and make a profit on the deposit. You can see that
if the member bank can't sell the certificate of Indebtedness they can't make this
profit* It is the thing that did the damage in 1918-1920, and the policy of the
reserve banks and TrtAPUiy Departs ait together should be designed to get the
largest amount of money that can be obtained for the Treasuzy1 s notes at the
lowest rates of interest and at tho largest security to tha ptfblic. You may say
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that the rate allowed by the Treasury must be sufficiently attractive to the
public to enable the public to biy then, but sufficiently unattractive to the
banks to make it unwise for the banks to retain them, and have every stimulus
existing to sell these certificates to the public just as promptly as possible*
"It has been necessary for the past three years to determine rates be
tween the Treasury and the Reserve banks i&ich will enable the Treasury to suc
cessfully float its certificates, and at the same time to relieve the reserve
banks and its members of any chance of loss. On the whole it is working now and
the certificate Issues are almost immediately distributed to the public when they
are offered*
"I want to refer a little bit to the future, is to whore we might land
if all of our loans were paid off and we had a huge bank building and a payroll,
and doing all sorts of things for nothing, with a gre&t big expense account and
nothing coming ift. I do not think that is going to happen right away, however,
as we have two billion dollars going to the reserve banks now* Let us assume that
the day is coming whan the banks of the United States are not going to find it
necessary to borrow from usthe way they do. Ho banks like to borrow money* There
is not very much profit to then when they are paying 6 or 7 per cent*
■We deal principally in the Federal Be serve Banks with three kinds of
credit instruments* One is commercial.paper, another government securities (the
government's long loans and certificates of indebtedness) and the third accep
tances, which principally are drami to represent importations of goods from Europe*
"When all the commercial paper gets out and a considerable part of the
borrowings on government securities are repaid, we will be able to put our rates
dom. From personal observations while 1 was abroad, and a comparison of banking
methods generally, unless I am mistaken, through the influence of the Federal Re
serve System, we could use this great reeervois in financing great ccaaodities
throughout the world*
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■For the first time in the history of the United States, ve are in the
position of being a lending natiog, instead of a borrowing nation. Europe for
years is gafag to be pressed for capital to rebuild her industries and to re
establish France, and they are going to be burdened with enormous debts, and this
country has, in proportion to its wealth, a ouch smaller public debt than the
European nations* It has a great mass of fluid capital, which can be anployed,
1 hope, and for the first time can compete with the eomerce at the world in doing
a real banking business* X should suppose we now have #500,000,000 or $600,000,000
of bills representing international transactions and commodities. If we had
#2,500,000,000 the rate could be changed* Z do not think I could do better than
read you a paragraph from a very able document that appears on that very matter,
a paragraph from the so-called "Ounliffe's Report." It is from a select committee
appointed to make a report an foreign exchanges after the war, in London:
(At this point Gov* Strong read tho paragraph referred to,
beginning with "The adverse condition of the exchanges Was
due not merely to seasonal fluctuations, but to circumstances
pointing to ....n and ending with the sentences *New enter
prises were therefore postponed and the demand for construc
tive materials and other goods was lessened**)
"The point is this: that the Federal Re carve System, up to date, has
been engaged in a purely donestic, local war operation. We have been financing
the war fcr ourselves, to a great extent. Tou can trace almpst the entire bor
rowings of the Federal reserve bank directly to the war. The time is coning
when the American people will gradually repay this debt and the Federal Reserve
System will be free of government borrowing and then we have got to take our
position in the world, and, unless I an very much mi?taken, that will come as
the result of converting a very large amount of the paper which we now have in
our vault into this paper which old Rothschild described as "salt water paper,"
because it had crossed the ocean And represented the payment for international
goods. But there is one thing that we mist bear in mind in connection with this,-
and Mr* Snyder has notified me that he ha.- three reservations - in connection
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with this prognostigation. The reasons for this are theses 1 put the first
reason beyond all others* The general feeling that 1 have observed throughout
various par$s of the world is that the English banks aro safe banks to do
business with* The second great reason is that they have built up the facili
ties to do the business well, carefully, Intelligently and promptly, and the
third influence is that London has had a great reservoir of fluid capital to
«nplcy in this business. How our condition at present cooprises just those three
fundamental influences* We have our integrity, our character, and our ability,
just as good as that which is produced in the British Isles or elsewhere. I think,
in other words, that the character test can be met by American bankers just as
ouch as by any other bankers. Next we have got, or we should have in tile near
future, that great surplus, fluid banking capital to esploy in this Mmi of busi
ness. One thing we have not gob in the oachinezy* Wo have not got that great
net-woxk of pipes connecting this reservoir. It takes years to create that* The
British bankers have been at it for some generations. We con, however, do it
promptly enough to place our reserves at the service of tha world, and we have
got to try and do it the way the British have done it. Ve iiave got to tzy
establidi agencies here of any foreign banks that can coma horc and also abroad,
and to do business Jji out aarkrt and borrcr money. A benk would not be worth a
dant if it just received money and did not lend it out. We should encourage the
landing of money abroad and we should employ any agency we can got hare to help
us along this line.
■Mr, Snyder, I /marant'sed to tire - this enthusiastic audicnca in hftlf an
hour. I have no talked for nearly 4E minutes# Have you any points to make in
connection with this matter?
Mr* ^lydar remarked, in reply: "I am sore that, now that we have the
Governor here, wa would like to ask him soma questions**
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Ur, Oasa was called upon by Mr. Snyder, and reaaxfcedj ■Why do you
pick an me? I do ^ picking with the Governor do^n—stairs. I am going to leave
Mm alone for the present. How about picking on Ur. Skjyder?"
(Mr. ^toyder)
"How can wa become world bankers if we do not make money interest rates?
Is not that the great obstacle now to this country becoming world bankers?
England* s rates are always better than oars. Th&t is the source of their great
strength.
(Governor Strong)
■When I was in London I always us^d to say, with perfect good faith,
that I did not think there was vary grest danger of their losing their business
so long as the opportunity for the employment of capital in this country was as
great. I really think conditions have changed, I think the/ have changed be
cause they* are going to be put to it for capital for a time. I think so and I
guess you think so. Where they are going to lose is in ths enormous daaand upon
them to pay debts, and it is going to tax their reserves to the utmost to pay
debts - to pay debts to this country and to pay the interest due this country.
Th^r willtake some of our investment money, if we are willing to let them have it,
at pretty high rates, and I frankly bali*ve that this Federal Reserve System, by
a capable adjustment of rates, will have plentjr of reserves to coapete with than,
to a reasonable degree, in financing at least our own important trade. I have
real confidence that, with the resources we have here, we can get our share of any
foreign trade we go after.*
(Mr. Snyder)
"How can we get our rates down, so as to meet this competition and still
not have another big wave of inflation? Do you see aqjr practical means, consider
ing politics and everything else, of meeting Just that thing?*
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(Governor Strong)
"What I +-Mnir x do see, Mr. Efaydar, is this: that the developaent to
which I referred is not going to t Ofce place over night, nor in a year, nor even
five years possibly - nor even a longer period. I would be afraid of it if it
did. But I can see gradually creeping into our market bare thorns conditions
which would be most conveniently drawn for geographical reasons, because they
represent our import trade* Where it becomes a convenience, at a competing rate,
to do business in this market, 1 do not see any prospect of easier money in
Europe, do you? Think about thatI"
(Hr. Case)
"Well, Governor, London was the world's banking center before the war,
and all these bills, iaport and ecport bills, were largely financed by London*
Isn't it a fact that the world war has upset that to such an extent that she
does not seek, at the prese t time, to do more than to look after her own import
and export financing, and is very glad to have diverted to this market any import
and export transaction that properly belongs here? She is Jot no position to
continually finance the world's business. She did before the war* We are getting
our machinery up to the point where we can compete for it row*
(Governor Strong)
"What happened is this: they took increasing control of all the imports
and no one could prqperly import anything without a license and the great bulk of
the imports wire for account of British companies. All supplies and all things,
in fact, were required for the any and navy, as well as the civic population* How
the British Government paid cash, and the British treasury borrowings took place
in adiftBM, in London, of this mass of bills that otherwise would have been drawn
to represent the imports of the civic population. The facilities to do business
still existed — like the Bank of Shanghai, and so on* The standards of civilisation
are Increasing fcfca in the east* There is a greater consumption of goods* There ii
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ft greater aarount of business to go around. We will do still more than we do sow
through the foreign institutions of the world* Certainly, if it is possible to
Sevelop some hundreds of millions of bills at the present tine, we gill continue
to do it in the future.®
(Hr* Morgan)
■Do you think it would be in order to tall us what effect you tJHwif
the change in the discount rates in this country will have upon the moveasnt of
gold? Do you think conditions are sufficiently normal now?*
(Governor Strong)
■Tour question is a little bit like the question where the State asked
the witness whether he is still beating his wife* I as assuming that the interest
rates will decline. Ve have reduced one of our rates a little bit. I do not
believe it is possible to answer that question, Ur. Morgan, except speculatively.
— Turning to Mr. Snyder —) Did you put him up to ask that?" (Laughter)
(Question)
"Mr* Snyder has possibly lost sight of the fact that we haw two facil
ities. We have a rediscount rate which is offered to various lines of business
which do not necessarily have to do with our foreign trade. We have our open
market purchase rate. We might keep our rediscount rate up to within a point
where it is now and this would enable us to advance the business and still keep
in with other lines of domestic business?
(Governor Strong)
"That opens up a field of discussion. It enables ma, first, to side
step Shepard Morgan’s' questions. I think it is a aistake to assume that a special
rate on import bills is going tp be any check to inflation or expansion in this
country) because, after ally you can’ k identify these dollars and insure that
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they ard just below that type of transaction, and, eyan if you did, it would
release other dollars for employment in other directions* The fact is that,
according to ny theory, what we dispense at the Beserve bank is credit* It is
not one kind of credit, because it Is exchanged for a commercial bill, or a
commercial note, or & banker’s acceptance, or a government band, but it ife Just
credit, and unless you meet that credit through this bank, it does not perform
its function, and it does not make any difference whether you get it out wifch a
rake, or a hoe, or a spade, - it doe? its business ju,st the same. You can get
at these reserves of ours with any kind of an instrument you please. By estab
lishing this preferential rate we ase able to compete in a certain line of busi
ness, it is true.
"Veil, Ur* Snyder, I have doubled ny promised time and now eveiybody
expects to leave at 5 o’clock, as they have a dance an**
(Mr* Ssyder)
"I am sure we are extremely indebted to the Governor for casing here
and let us ask him questions and giving as such an <n.m<n*«ng prospect of
this country entering the world war* Our best thanks Governor!*
Maotftng Adjourned.
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Cite this document
APA
Benjamin Strong (1921, May 5). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19210506_benjamin_strong
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19210506_benjamin_strong,
author = {Benjamin Strong},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1921},
month = {May},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19210506_benjamin_strong},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}