speeches · September 27, 1917
Regional President Speech
Benjamin Strong · President
ADDRESS DELIVERED BY BENJAMIN STRONG
AT THE AMERICAN BANKERS* ASSOCIATION
ATLANTIC CITY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1917.
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ADDRESS DELIVERED BY BENJAMIN STRONG AT THE AMERICAN BANKERS'
ASSOCIATION, ATLANTIC CITY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1917.
The invitation which your officers were gooft enough to
extend to me to address this Convention was accompanied by the sugges
tion that I should say something about the relations of the Federal
Reserve System to government financing. Bat those who have sent sons
to France, find it difficult to djscuso the war in terms of dollars.
Some of us have just said good-bye to toys who are leaving their
homes to make the supreme sacrifice for their country. They are our
real investment in the war. Our return on that investment will not
he valued in rates of interest, but in the consciousness that it has
again been shown that our form of government and our institutions
develop in our citizens that generous altruism which is our proudest
national tradition.
We look to these armies of the best the nation has to
•offer for the victories which can only be won by individual heroism.
They look to us for the support which must be accorded through
personal self-denial.
The great military organization now being created is only
one part of the fighting machine with which we must equip ourselves
if the sacrifice of sons and husbands is not to be in vain. The
first army to be mobilized is the army which must shape and control
the economic activities of the American people, so as to produce
material for conducting warfare. Our battles can be won only by
turning over to our government as rapidly as needed billions of
dollars of credit, which must be drawn from the earnings and economic
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of the people of the country.
The general chaxacter of the financial organization needed
for the work had been determined by statutes already enacted before
our entrance into the war. Congress had for many years provided by
law that government bonds should be sold by popular subscription
without deduction of bankers ccnraissiono, and i£ December .1913,
when the Federal Reserve Act became ta*v the Secretary of the Treasury
was authorized to appoint the Federal Reserve Banks to act as the
Government's Fiscal Agents. These two brief paragraphs j.n our
statutes, supplemented by the patriotism and erergy of American
bankers and their aids, are all that was required to lay the founda
tion for an organization which I believe can be relied upon to fur
nish credit at a minimum cost just as rapidly as the government can
raise armies and the country can produce supplies.
Secretary McAdoo foresaw that upon this foundation he
could build up a machine for war finance which would bring into
co-operation in one great army, the bankers, the press and a multi
tude of other organizations not ordinarily related to the financial
operations of the governmentbut so co-ordinated that their servicen
would supplement those of the Treasury Department «.nd of its fiscal
agencies.
Each reserve bank was advised of its appointment as fiscal
agent and directed to proceed with the development of the machinery
needed to place the first Liberty Loan on ilay 3rd. 1917. While the
organizations were different in each district, the main character
istics were the same. Committees were appointed to co-operate with
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the reserve banks and upon these committees - largely composed of
bankers - there developed the duty of sub-dividing each Federal
reserve district into sub-districts suid even smaller divisions so
that ultimately in the Federal Reserve District of New York (and 1
believe practically all the others), we had committees or represen
tatives actively at work in every city and town within a few weeks
of the day we were told to start. In conjunction with the commit
tees appointed to actually sell bonds, publicity organizations were
created in all parts of the country, which had particular charge
of news, publicity, advertising, public speaking, distributing
posters and managing a great variety of other activities aimed to
educate the people of the country to the importance of saving and
of buying the bonds of the government^
Most of you are familiar with the way in which this
matter was handled. Notice was necessarily so short that it was
an almost superhuman task to cover the ground adequately between
the first of May and the middle of June* Plans made so hastily
cannot be expected always to work smoothly, nor did they when the
first loan was placed. But much of the difficulty was due to a
general lack of appreciation on all hands of the magnitude of the
task. Many bankers expected the bonds to be delivered immediately
upon payment; others failed to realize what a magnificent response
would result from this offering and were inadequately equipped with
clerks to handle the subscriptions; still others failed to take
into account that the placing of a loan for the government must be
handled by most precise methods requiring accurate reports which
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must be filed on time. Fe have learned how to do it better here
after. Whatever friction nothing can really mar the magnificence
of the response. During th6 last few days before the subscriptions
closed, when we were handling in the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York alone some thousands of telegrams and telephone calls each day,
we could feel the impending rush of subscriptions as one would sense
the approaoh of a storm. Nor need we be ashamed to admit that at
the close, the flood of subscriptions was completely beyond the
handling capacity of even some of the largest and best organized
banking institutions in the district.
It is stated that there were four million subscribers to
the loan. I believe this underestimates the actual number of sub
scribers by at least 25#. In the Second Federal Reserve District,
we have delivered 1,931,666 full paid interim certificates which in
number equals about 14$ of the population of the district. If less
than one-half of this proportion prevails throughout the country, it
would indicate at least five million subscribers, - a response which
makes this first war loan sin achievement of the first rank in govern
ment finance. The record in the City of Rochester indicates what is
possible in the whole country. I am told that with their population
of about 850,000 people they had no less than 61,000 subscribers.
Such a response by the whole country would produce 25,000,000 sub
scribers for a government loan.
Every detail of the last loan has been completed in the
Second Distriot with the exception of deliveries of the permanent
bonds. I think the same will be true in all Districts. Naturally,
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those who may decide to cotvert bonds of the first issue into bonds
of the second issue wiil prefer not to require of us the expense
and labor of two deliveries. The permanent bonds are rapidly being
prepared and I know that I am only expressing the wish of the
Secretary of the Treasury, as well as the officers of all the reserve
banks in asking that the bankers through whom these subscriptions
were originally made, cooperate with us in conducting this compli
cated operation of making deliveries.
Such complaint as has arisen regarding deliveries of
bonds fails to take into account the enormous physical labor involved
The requisitions for bonds by the reserve banks called for a total
of 8,783,000 pieces, which would require 20,000,000 sheets of paper
weighing 237^ tons* In the Second Distriot we have handled 4,005,65?
pieces in issuing interim certificates alone.
To indicate the amount of labor involved in placing these
government bonds, the clerical force of our bank has increased from
100 to about 600 people in a few months. The Publicity Division
of the Liberty Loan Committee employs about 100 people in addition
and the Committee Organization of the Second Federal Reserve Dis
trict now embraces about 15,000 individuals and will greatly exceed
that number when all appointments are made.
The actual machinery for selling the government*s bonds,
keeping proper records of their issue and making deliveries is
not, however, the most important part of the government’s financial
operations. Of much greater importance, is the problem of so
arranging this huge finanoial operation that it- may be conducted
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without disturbance to money markets, and consequently, causing a
di8-organization of business. Of this, I should like to speak
particularly from the standpoint of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and of the New York money market.
New York is the country's central money market. From it
radiate the principal currents of credit, so that an accurate view
of the New York position is illuminating as to the whole country.
Were I asked to state in the fewest words the functions
of the Reserve System in relation to government financing, I would
say that the reserve banks keep the books of. bank reserves and of
government credits for the entire country. In a banking sense they
run the general ledger* Present conditions afford the first
opportunity for you to judge whether they do it well cr not, and it
is desirable that you should have the facts so that you may judge
in this matter, because the confidence that is based upon under
standing of, and belief in, our banking system at this time is
essential to success - without it we shall fail - with it, we must
sucoeed*
The amount of banking accomodation required in any well-
organized country may be said roughly to correspond to the volume
of the country's business* As business increases, bank loans and
deposits increase in somewhat like proportion. As business declines,
liquidation takes place, bank loans and deposits go down and the
proportion of reserve to deposits increases. As an illustration of
thie formula, take our own experience in the past few years. When
the war broke out, after a short period of disturbed business, we .
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were flooded with war orderb, and at the same time flooded with
gold. Business became increasingly active. Bank deposits and loans
increased along with a rapid increase in our gold reserves. The
production of our mills had to be speeded up to meet these increas
ing demands, so at the same time, the circulation of credit had to
be speeded up to finance and increased trade. Now our government
has entered the war, and is making further demands upon our produc
tive capacity. The volume of these demands may be gauged - roughly,
it is true but still with a fundamental accuracy - by the amount of
the borrowings and increased tax collections of the government, and
we must again speed up the machine of credit to keep pace with the
machinery of production. The reserve banks form the center of hub
of this credit machine, and I will briefly describe how the conduct
of their operations is actually accelerated when the pressure is
applied.
mien the government makes an offering of securities,
whether of long term bonds or short term notes, the banks of the
country Immediately realize that their customers or clients will
subscribe to the offering, and that they, (the banks), will be
called upon to make the payment on the subscriptions in their re
spective localities. Banks located outside of New York City, practi
cally all of which have money on deposit there, prepare far this by
drawing on their New York balance or calling in their New York loans,
and withdrawing these credit balances to the interior. As a rule
they do not take cash but take credit on the books of the reserve
tank of their district or of their local reserve agent. This is
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the first spin of the wheel. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
receives from the other eleven reserve banks a vast sum of New York
exchange for collection and remittance in advance of each loan toe
ing placed. It must settle with the other reserve banks every
Thursday through the Geld Settlement Fund maintained in Washington.
This results in a pull on the reserves of all the banks in New York
City. The checks we collect from them reduce their reserve balance
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and cause the wide fluctua
tion in excess reserves shown by the New York Clearing House state
ment. To meet this drain the member banks in New York come to the
Federal Reserve Bank and borrow money in one form or another. Some-
times other means can also be employed re-coup their reserves. For
example, at the time of the last loan, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York purchased from the British Government $120,000,000 of gold
in a period of two weeks, and in addition received payment in gold
of certain international obligations amounting to over $50,000,000
which matured on June 20th. All of this gold came to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York but was for the credit of a large number
of New York banking institutions. Their reserves were immediately
built up and, to that extent, the drain was offset.
A further means of relieving the loss is to offset it by
transfers of government deposits from these sections of the country
which have drawn so heavily on New York that their own reserves have
been increased to an amount unnecessarily large. These transfers
are accomplished by telegraph through the Gold Settlement Fund, and
start currents flowing in the opposite direction, so that the move-
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ments between New York and each of the other Federal reserve dis-
✓
tricts largely offset each other, leaving only net amounts to be
transferred.
Still another method has been provided for achieving the
desired result with a minimum of delay: Every Federal Reserve Bank
has adopted a resolution authorizing its officers to rediscount its
portfolio with any other Federal reserve bank. This prooedure is
authorized by Section 11 of the Reserve Act which gives the Federal
Reserve Board, upon the affirmative vote of five members, the power
to require such rediscounts, and authorizes the Reserve Board to
fix the rates. At first this appears to be in the nature of a
borrowing operation, but in point of fact it is really not so at all.
The Federal reserve bank, in this case, New York, which loses its
reserves through the Gold Settlement Fund, is usually simply paying
out to the other reserve banks the reserve money which has been
deposited with it by its own member banks whose accounts are depleted
by these drafts from the interior. The reserve accounts of the
members in New York are restored by the New York bank rediscounting
their paper. If any considerable amount of reserves is moved to the
other reserve banks and the amount of these discounts becomes suffi
cient to impair the reserve position of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, then it can simply turn over its portfolio in part to
those reserve banks which are correspondingly strengthened. Express
ed differently insteai of settling balances through the Gold Settle
ment Fund with gold, we would in that case settle our debit balances
by the use of paper out of our portfolio, apportioning it with due
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regard to the reserve position of eaoh of the other reserve banks*
This plan for speedy and almost automatic transfers of oredit has not
yet been put into operation, though in the future it may become a
resource of vast strength.
This explanation seems necessary to make clear that the
normal function of the Reserve System expressly authorized by the
statute and very wisely providoi with regard to just such a situation
is simply being exercised for the benefit of the member banks as a
whole* The statute provides for the cooperative use of reserves
and credit facilities of the twelve reserve banks in time of emer
gency so that their combined strength may be as effective as though
they were one bank instead of twelve*
To return to our chronology; the next step in these
finanoial operations, after the subscriptions are closed ia their
actual payment into the reserve banks by the banking institutions
of the country. The preliminary readjustment of credit to enable
them to do so, you will observe, has already taken place. The
payments as made are credited to the government on the books of the
reserve banks, in some cases actually, in other cases only con
structively. ’"here actual payments are made, the reserve hanks,
acting as fiscal agents of the government, at onoe redeposit these
payments with the national and state banks where they originate.
Where the payment is constrmotive, it simply means that the bank
originally subscribing (either for itself or its customers) for
the government securities, instead cf making a remittance to its
reserve hank, merely credits the government on its books with the
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amount to be remitted, having previously furnished the government
vith collateral. At this stage the government has hundreds, and
possibly thousands, of accounts on the books or banks throughout
the country. It is now in position to make disbursements either
from its own purchases or for loans to the allied nations. But
as these payments must principally be made in New York at the present
time, it becomes necessary for the reserve banks gradually to
withdraw these deposits and shift them through the Gold Settlement
Fund to New Tork. Then a new set of entries must be made in what
we may call the general ledger. The deposits in other districts are
drawn down and remitted to New York through the Gold Settlement Fund.
As this may reduce the reserves of the banks that held the govern
ment deposits throughout the country, the reserve banks of those
district8 must stand prepared to discount the paper for them to
the extent neasssary to make good the reduced reserves. This was
done in a small way when the last loan was placed, and is being done
to some extent, although very moderately, to-day as a result of with
drawals of deposits now arising from sales of certificates of in
debtedness. As these funds are withdrawn to New York from the
interior reserve banks they axe immediately disbursed by the govern
ment in New York and increase the deposits and reserves of the New
York banks generally. The New York banks can then repay the advances
which they have received from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
which builds up its reserve. It can then in turn repay to other
reserve banks any paper which it previously might have delivered to
them if rediscount transactions had taken place between Reserve
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Banks. Gradually the whole set of entries arising from the prelimin
ary withdrawals from New York will have been reversed and cancelled
as a result of the ultimate disbursements of the Government. The
reserve banks have stepped into the breach simply to make some
temporary advances. They have provided the machinery to move a
great mass of credits rapidly from one part of the country to another
and back again. In a sense the placing of these huge government loam
is like moving a crop. When we have a large crop, the credit mach
inery must move faster. These large government borrowings make it
necessary to speed up the credit machine, and that is exactly what
the Reserve System is doing.
The figures of the Gold Settlement Fund illustrate what is
being done!
Gross Clearings, 3 months, ending June 30, 1916 $ 833,299,000
■ " 3 ■ « June 30, 1917 $5,101,317,000
Balances Paid: 1916 1917.
April $ 31,756,000 $ 75,519,000
May 43,994,000 319,363,000
June 38,733,000 317,648,000
Total $ 93,473,000 $ 513,430,000
Kit I think I am correct in assuming that you are more in
terested in a still later stage of this operation. It appears as
though at this point the ultimate effect of subscriptions to govern
ment loans, the withdrawal of their proceeds to New York and their
disbursement in New York by the government, has resulted in a perma-
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nent loss-of deposits, and consequently of reserves by the banks of
the interior. The fears many bankers have expressed to me on this
score would in some sections appear superficially to be well grounded
but the effect will not be permanent. If it were so, that section of
the country which suffered a permanent loss of deposits would suffer
permanently a corresponding contraction of savings realized from its
productive oapacity whether it was in manufactured goods, food
stuffs, the products of mines or of forests, or what not. This
great credit fund being expended by the government, with the excep
tion of the pay of soldiers abroad and of negligible purchases
abroad, is being expended in this country in the purchase of mater
ials of great variety, and the amounts loaned to our allies are al-
most entirely being spent here as well. It means that in all sec
tions of the,country these credits must inevitably move back to their
points of origin, directly or indirectly through government purchases
New ships, oil and coal, and products of mills, mines and forests in
every part of the country now go to the government and each pulls
back a share of this great fund. Even these sections which do
not directly receive government contracts indirectly receive the
benefit. Purchases of materials of various kinds in one part of the
country either develop demands for raw materials or create a vacuum
of goods which must be supplied or replaced from other sections.
The intricate commerce of the country is so interwoven that it is
difficult to exactly trace these movements, but the result is inevi
table, and in those sections where this movement does not reach, it
means that production and saving have been arrested, since the amount
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subscribed in any locality for loans to the government is measured by
the amount which that locality saves out of the profits on what it
produoes*
It must b.e admitted that our agricultural products, which
are one of the ohief instrumentalities for bringing about this re
adjustment, are in the main marketed at one short season of the year.
In the interval, withdrawals of bank credit from those sections
of the country will leave vacuum somewhat longer than in manufactur
ing sections where production and marketing are continuous the year
around. But when crops are moved and paid for this credit will
move b&Qk inevitably to the agricultural sections so long as profit
able orope are produced there.
I refer to this particularly and emphatically because of
the fears which some bankers entertain which might induce them to
withhold their best efforts from assisting the government in placing
the next loan. The last work of assurance on that point, very
properly must come from the reserve banks, for during the interval
between the marketing of one harvest and the next, when banks in the
agricultural sections must both finance the farmers and assist in
financing the government, reserves must be bridged by reasonable
accomodation at the reserve banks. That is what the reserve banks
are for. They expect to be used, and no time like the present will
ever arise in our history when this use of our new banking system
will be so important to every citizen.
Speaking of these matters from the standpoint of the
reserve banks themselves, I fear you may have heard careless dis-
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cussion of their possible intention to attempt arbitrary control
of these money matters. Only one kind of control is required, and
that is self-control. The reserve banks should not be expected
to tie up their reserves in permanent financing for the government
or anybody else* Their funotion is to make these temporary loans
during periods of strain, whether occasioned by war and government
financing, by domestic difficulties, or by any other cause. T$e
exercise of self-control in these matters means that the reserve
banks will see to it that the expansion which they afford to our
banking system is that temporary expansion which is represented by
a portfolio containing self-liquidating bills and loans which mature
within a reasonably short time and which Congress has wisely fixed
at ninety days and no longer.
I think I may use the experience of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to illustrate this point. On the first of June,
i
the discounts and loans of that bank, all maturing within ninety
days, amounted to $37,000,000 and its investments, which included
$20,000,000 of short term certificates of the government amounted to
$39,000,000. At about that time the interior drafts whioh I have
mentioned began to cone in, and during the month of June we were
obliged to settle debit balances to the interior reserve banks
aggregating about $550,000,000. During that short period our dis
counts rose from $37,000,000 on June 1st to $253,000,000 on June
19th. Of this $253,000,000 of discounts.
$173,,000,000 matured within fifteen days.
$ 19,000,000 matured within thirty days.
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$ 29,000,000 matured within sixty days and
$ 31,000,000 matured within ninety days.
By August 15th, our discounts had befen reduced to
$62,000,000 without any increase in rates being employed to force
the reduction. In other words, in two months we liquidated
$190,000,000 of paper taken from member banks with practically no
disturbance to the money market. On September 19th, our total dis
counts amounted to $87,000,000 of which
$29,000,000 matured within 15 days.
$17,000,000 * * 30 ■
$20,000,000 * " 60 ■
$21,000,000 " * 90 ■
Our investments totaled $8,900,000 of which only $1,300,000
consisted of long time bonds of the government, purchased under
statutory provision of the Act and $2,600,000 short term U. 8.
Treasury certificates of indebtedness.
With this liquidation automatically accomplished it leaves
us on September 19th with $658,000,000 of reserve, practically all
gold, being 89J& of our net deposit and note liabilities. The whole
Reserve System on September 14th held $1,415,000,000 of oash, practi
cally all gold, as reserve against the liabilities of the whole
system. With this magnificent foundation upon which to rest our
government’s banking transactions, how can things go wrong? There is
n? occasion for timidity on the part of our bankers in putting the
full weight of their influences, their energies and their resources
behind the government in the conduct of the war.
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In conclusion, I wish to say a few words in regard to the
Administration's financial policy. On this subject history speaks
in no uncertain voice. I wish you would read, as I have, the record
of the last one hundred and fifty years of financial operations in
war time of certain European governments. You will then realize
that any finance minister who has the courage to impose taxes at
the outbreak of a war heavy enough to pay bond interest, to rapidly
amortize bond issues when peace comes, and to pay a share of war
expenses, will have a minimum of difficulty in borrowing money. The
reoords of the British Government in the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean
War and even so recently as the Boer Far, demonstrate, by the mis
takes disclosed, this fundamental principle of war finance. But we
do not need to turn to Europe for examples on this subject* The
history of the financial operations of our own government in the
Civil War-is entirely adequate to justify the policy being pursued.
Within little more than six months of the outbreak of our Civil War
our tanks suspended specie payment. Our government was borrowing
money from the banks in 1861 at ruinous rates of interest, and only
too soon was driven to the disastrous expedient of issuing flat
money. In 1863, the government placed its leans at rates, which on a
gold basis produced a value of atout 96$ of par value for bonds bear
ing high rates of interest. The funds realized from loans placed
by the government in 1863 produced on a gold basis as low as 64%ft
of par value, and in 1864, as low as 4l£$.
On the other hand the clear war revenues from taxes in
1863 were but $53,000,000; in 1863, $113,000,000, whereas, in 1866,
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after the close of the war, the revenue legislation then in force
produced the enormous total for those days of $558,000,000* It is
obvious that the failure to support the government1s credit early in
the war by adequate tax revenues undoubtedly was one reason for the
unfortunate later indulgence in every variety of unsound financial
expedient, the effects of some of whioh have dogged our steps for
nearly fifty years.
Now, let us compare the present tax program with these
past experiences. Their dissimilarity is so striking as to be
almost startling; and is one of the most hopeful auguries for the
success of our whole financial undertaking. Personally, I rejoice
that the officers of our government have the courage to face the
criticism on the one hand of those who believe the progran rat taxa
tion is too heavy; on the other hand of those radicals who think it
is not heavy enough* Not enough taxes means declining credit, too
much taxes means declining industries. The only danger in exacting
heavy taxes On profits and incomes is the danger of not allowing
sufficient profit inducement to the industries of the country to
stimulate production. I confidently believe that our country can
pay all the taxes required to maintain its credit and to support all
the borrowings needed for the period of the war, without crippling
its vital industries, and that those who now cry calamity simply
because they don*t want to pay heavy taxes will some day see and
acknowledge their error. But our Congress must be careful not to
destroy the income sources which produce taxes. Industries whioh
must expand to meet war conditions, need earnings for plants and
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inventories which may be useless when war ceases* and yet they must
be-built. To take all their income will retard new construction.
These of us who have sent our boys to France are beginning
to realize that the war is. Our part in it and the motive behind
it will be an imperishable glory for this great nation. But we must
not lose our boys and lose the war for lack of money, nor must we
fail in providing the money simply because our financial army is in
adequately equipped. I am convinced that the only important weak
ness in our financial organization is the lack of State bank member
ship in the Federal Reserve System. One half of our financial army
is equipped with modern machinery by membership in the system.
The other half, equally patriotic, is ineffectively armed. You will
recall the disastrous results to the Russian Armies in the early
days of the war when large numbers were sent to the front without
arms and ammunition. Don't let us fail our duty for lack of the
strength we can only enjoy if we are united. It may indeed rest
with you state bank men to determine what shall happen to our boys
and they must cone home victorious.
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Cite this document
APA
Benjamin Strong (1917, September 27). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19170928_benjamin_strong
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19170928_benjamin_strong,
author = {Benjamin Strong},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1917},
month = {Sep},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19170928_benjamin_strong},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}