memoranda · May 25, 1970
Memorandum of Discussion
MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION
A meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee was held in
the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, May 26, 1970, at 9:30 a.m.
PRESENT:
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Burns, Chairman
Hayes, Vice Chairman
Brimmer
Daane
Francis
Hickman
Maisel
Mitchell
Robertson
Sherrill
Swan
Morris, Alternate for Mr. Heflin
Messrs. Galusha and Kimbrel, Alternate Members of
the Federal Open Market Committee
Messrs. Eastburn and Coldwell, Presidents of the
Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia and
Dallas, respectively
Mr. Holland, Secretary
Mr. Broida, Deputy Secretary
Messrs. Kenyon and Molony, Assistant
Secretaries
Mr. Hexter, Assistant General Counsel
Mr. Partee, Economist
Messrs. Axilrod, Craven, Gramley, Hersey, Hocter,
Jones, Parthemos, and Solomon, Associate
Economists
Mr. Holmes, Manager, System Open Market Account
Mr. Bernard, Assistant Secretary, Office of the
Secretary, Board of Governors
Mr. Cardon, Assistant to the Board of Governors
Mr. Coyne, Special Assistant to the Board of
Governors
5/26/70
Messrs. Wernick and Williams, Advisers,
Division of Research and Statistics,
Board of Governors
Mr. Keir, Associate Adviser, Division of
Research and Statistics, Board of
Governors
Mr. Baker, Economist, Government Finance
Section, Division of Research and
Statistics, Board of Governors
Miss Ormsby, Special Assistant, Office of the
Secretary, Board of Governors
Miss Eaton, Open Market Secretariat Assistant,
Office of the Secretary, Board of Governors
Messrs. Black, Fossum, and Baughman, First Vice
Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of Richmond,
Atlanta, and Chicago, respectively
Messrs. Eisenmenger, Link, Taylor, and Tow,
Senior Vice Presidents, Federal Reserve
Banks of Boston, New York, Atlanta, and
Kansas City, respectively
Messrs. Bodner, Scheld, and Green, Vice
Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of New
York, Chicago, and Dallas, respectively
Messrs. Gustus and Kareken, Economic Advisers,
Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia and
Minneapolis, respectively
Mr. Sandberg, Securities Trading Officer,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
By unanimous vote, the minutes of
actions taken at the meeting of the
Federal Open Market Committee held on
May 5, 1970, were approved.
The memorandum of discussion for the
meeting of the Federal Open Market Commit
tee held on May 5, 1970, was accepted.
Before this meeting there had been distributed to the members
of the Committee a report from the Special Manager of the System Open
Market Account on foreign exchange market conditions and on Open
Market Account and Treasury operations in foreign currencies for the
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5/26/70
period May 5 through 20, 1970, and a supplemental report covering
the period May 21 through 25, 1970.
Copies of these reports have
been placed in the files of the Committee.
In supplementation of the written reports, Mr. Bodner said
the private gold market had seen a flurry of activity at the begin
ning of this period as a result of the heightened tensions in the
Middle and Far East, and the price in London moved up to a high of
$36.24 in fairly active trading.
The market subsequently quieted
down, however, and since mid-month the price had been below $36.00.
On the official side there had been no transactions of any conse
quence and the Stabilization Fund's gold holdings remained at over
$500 million.
He should perhaps note, however, that the Treasury's
final arrangements for cleaning up the Dutch and Belgian swap draw
ings involved use of a total of $20 million of Special Drawing
Rights, the first use of SDR's by the United States.
The foreign exchange markets had been rather more active
and unsettled in the last few weeks than at any time this year,
Mr. Bodner reported.
However, the general pattern of orderly
trading still prevailed in most currencies and European concerns
about the health of the U.S. economy did not seem to have seriously
affected the exchange markets.
Sterling had fallen rather sharply
to very close to par and, indeed, would have gone below par at the
end of last week had it not been for firm support by the Bank of
England.
The weakness in sterling was accounted for by a number
of factors, including the tapering off of the seasonal strength in
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the overseas sterling area and somewhat poorer trade results in the
United Kingdom itself.
The main sources of the pressure, however,
were a sharp rise in Euro-dollar rates at a time when interest rates
in the United Kingdom were somewhat easier and, of course, the
uncertainties introduced by the setting of the election date for
June 18.
There had been some modest pressure in the forward market,
with a little precautionary selling of sterling, and that contributed
to the selling of spot sterling.
All of those factors had combined
to put some modest pressure on sterling and no doubt some weakness
would continue to be seen between now and election time.
Nevertheless,
although the wage pressures continued to build, there was no reason
at this point to think the British would be in serious trouble in
the near future.
However, it was quite possible that the British
would have to reactivate their swap line to help tide them over the
pre-election period.
As Mr. Coombs had reported at the last meeting, Mr. Bodner
continued, the Italian lira had been looking a bit healthier and the
Italians were making reserve gains over and above their new
borrowings in foreign markets.
Consequently, they had been able to
pay off another $400 million in swap drawings from the System--$200
million on May 19 and $200 million today--leaving just $200 million
outstanding.
However, in the last week the lira had come under
renewed pressure and had required regular modest support by the
Bank of Italy.
Increasing labor strikes, particularly one-day strikes,
the uncertainties generated by the forthcoming regional and local
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elections in Italy, and a sharp break in the Italian bond market
had combined to put pressure on the lira.
In addition to support
ing the exchange rate, the Italians were forced once again to come
in to support the bond market, although they hoped to be able to
withdraw from that market fairly quickly.
Mr. Bodner remarked that the other side of the coin was
the picture in the Canadian dollar market.
The Bank of Canada had
continued to take in very large amounts of dollars with the rate at
the ceiling, and there were widespread rumors of at least a widen
ing of the margins to the full 1 per cent permitted by the
International Monetary Fund--and even, possibly, a revaluation.
Canadian reserve gains so far this year had approached $1.2 billon,
thanks in part to a very sharp bulge in exports following the
settlement of the nickel and steel strikes in Canada in late 1969
and unexpectedly large shipments of wheat and barley.
In addition,
Canadian interest rates had been highly competitive and had pulled
in funds from the United States.
As the Committee was no doubt
aware, the Bank of Canada acted to reduce the interest rate in
centive by cutting its discount rate to 7-1/2 per cent. Nevertheless,
funds had continued to move into Canada, especially with the
increasing rumors of an exchange rate adjustment.
The Bank of
Canada had now begun to try to head off some of that speculative
activity by operating in the forward market to reduce the premium
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on the forward Canadian dollar and at the same time to push
forward some of their potential reserve gains.
Those operations
began in a modest way on Friday (May 22) and continued yesterday.
It was still too early to tell how effective they would be, but
the Canadians were satisfied with the initial results.
Elsewhere the exchange markets had been generally quiet,
Mr. Bodner continued.
in $250 million.
Earlier in the month the Swiss had taken
That led directly to a System swap drawing of
$200 million, since the inflow put the Swiss
uncovered dollar
position at over $800 million--a level which the National Bank
found uncomfortable.
Since that infusion of liquidity into the
Swiss market, however, the franc had been somewhat easier and no
further operations had been necessary.
Similarly, the Germans
took in $200 million on one day in mid-month, but the rate had
held below the ceiling since then.
Finally, Mr. Bodner remarked,he should say a word about
the Euro-dollar market, where rates had moved up quite sharply to
about 9-1/4 per cent for most intermediate maturities.
The rise
in the rate reflected renewed bidding from U.S. banks, the draw
down by the Italian electricity authority of its $400 million
Euro-borrowing, and some bidding by German and Japanese banks.
As he indicated earlier, those developments put some pressure on
sterling and no doubt contributed to the easier tone of the Swiss
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franc and French franc.
They had not caused any serious problems,
however, and today there was some easing in demands.
By unanimous vote, the System
open market transactions in foreign
currencies during the period May 5
through 25, 1970, were approved,
ratified, and confirmed.
At the Chairman's invitation, Mr. Hayes commented briefly
on the meeting he had recently attended in Basle.
He reported
that it had been an unusually quiet meeting, since no acute exchange
problems currently existed, but that universal concern had been
apparent about inflation and high interest rates.
After summari
zing the comments at the meeting on the situation in various
individual countries, Mr. Hayes noted that there had also been
discussion of the prospects for greater monetary cooperation within
the Common Market.
He regarded the issue as largely academic, at
least for the present, because of the wide differences of view
existing among member countries.
Mr. Solomon then presented the following statement on
international developments:
At the moment, members of the Committee are no
doubt preoccupied with pressures in financial markets.
My presentation today looks beyond these immediate
pressures to the period, which may be close, when U.S.
short-term rates will have declined again and funds will
be moving back to the Euro-dollar market, with adverse
effects on the balance of payments.
In the February 10 chart show we projected an
underlying liquidity deficit for 1970 of about $4 billion,
reflecting an improvement in the current account of the
balance of payments and a deterioration of the capital
account.
The results so far this year are not much out
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of line with the February projection. We should note, how
ever, that preliminary indicators show rather heavy deficits
for April and early May. In any event, whatever the size
of the liquidity deficit this year, any net repayment of
Euro-dollar borrowings by U.S. banks will make the official
settlements deficit that much larger.
The first question one may ask is, why do we care if
the official settlements deficit is large? On the one hand,
we can recognize that there is considerable scope for a
sizable deficit on official settlements this year, after
two years of surplus. The first quarter has already pro
duced a recorded deficit in the magnitude of about $3
billion--not at an annual rate. Up to now the surpluses
corresponding to U.S. deficits have accrued mainly to
countries that either are prepared to hold dollars--Canada
and Japan--or have debts to repay--France and the United
Kingdom. A number of other foreign monetary authorities
are short of dollars and would welcome additional holdings.
Furthermore, our gold reserves have increased, we have about
$900 million of SDR's, and a reserve position in the Fund of
well over $2-1/2 billion. Nevertheless, while there may not
be any immediate problem, good reasons exist to limit the
outflow of dollars. A large return flow of dollars to
Europe would tend to undermine the efforts of European
central banks to control inflation and would be resented,
just as, last year, there was resentment over the upward
pressures the United States was putting on European money
markets. In addition, a massive and apparently prolonged
deficit--reflected in a big reduction in U.S. reserves or a
big increase in foreign official dollar holdings--would no
doubt reflect on the status of the dollar and have a deeply
disturbing effect on the international monetary system. It
would also jeopardize the future of the SDR system. Thus,
it is not a matter of indifference to the United States how
large the official settlements deficit turns out to be this
year and next.
For most components of the balance of payments, there
is little that can be done in the short run. It is hoped
that the trade surplus will continue to improve in response
to the cooling off here, while abroad demands are strong
and prices are rising rather rapidly. The trade statistics
for April--to be announced today--show a surplus at an an
nual rate of $2.2 billion--about the same as for the first
quarter. As to foreign purchases of U.S. stocks, one can
only hope that neither uncertainties regarding political and
economic developments in the United States nor the troubles
of Investors Overseas Services will do more than interrupt
what appeared to be, in 1968-69, a basic shift in prefer
ences by foreign investors toward acquisition of U.S. equities.
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As for U.S. private capital, there is considerable lee
way in the existing restraint programs administered by the
Commerce Department and the Federal Reserve. No significant
relaxation of these programs has been made this year.
This brings us to a major swing item in the balance of
payments--the flow of Euro-dollars between American banks
and their branches.
From mid-December to last week, U.S. banks repaid
about $2 billion to their branches. This figure over
estimates--perhaps by $700 million--the reflow of dollars
to the rest of the world, since to that extent official
funds were switched from foreign branches of American banks
to head offices.
It is understandable that in the first quarter of this
year banks were repaying Euro-dollar funds. Regulation Q
ceilings were advanced, short-term market rates came down
here, and banks increased their recourse to sales of com
mercial paper. Meanwhile, monetary restraint was intensi
fied in Europe. In the past six weeks, U.S. rates have
risen again and, on balance, American banks have not made
further Euro-dollar repayments. It seems likely, however,
that our short-term rates will turn down again before long.
As this happens, European rates are unlikely to follow very
far, and U.S. banks will once again have an incentive to
repay Euro-dollar liabilities to their branches.
This incentive to repay high cost Euro-dollar borrow
ings is tempered by the feature of the marginal reserve
requirement that provides that banks will lose their reserve
free base to the extent that their liabilities fall below
the level of May 1969.
If and when U.S. short-term rates ease off, we should
expect the few banks that are still well above their reserve
free bases, by an aggregate amount of about $1-1/2 billion,
to come down to those levels. The big question is, will the
banks act to hold on to the rest of their Euro-dollar bor
rowings in order to preserve this reserve-free money? If
banks were to decide that the reserve-free base is not worth
preserving, there would be a potential reflow of several
billions of dollars out of the $11.1 billion of reserve-free
bases.
The individual banks that are calculating the value of
preserving the base need to try to estimate their future
need for funds. If they expect to have to call on the Euro
dollar market again before too long, it is worth some
short-run sacrifice to save the reserve requirement in the
future. No doubt the upturn in short-term rates in the last
six weeks has helped in this respect--by demonstrating to
the banks that they cannot count on not needing to tap the
Euro-dollar market.
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For the future, the Federal Reserve's policy with
respect to Regulation Q will have a significant influence
on bank behavior with respect to Euro-dollars. If, for
example, Q ceilings were altered in a way that led banks
to feel confident that there would not again be a squeeze
such as they experienced in 1966 and 1969, they would
place considerably less value on keeping their reserve
free base. From the point of view of the balance of pay
ments alone, a case could perhaps be made against relaxing
Regulation Q ceilings at all. If domestic considerations
call for a change in these ceilings, it would be desirable
to leave banks uncertain regarding their freedom from Q
ceilings in the future.
Federal Reserve action regarding bank-related com
mercial paper would also have an effect on bank willingness
to hold on to Euro-dollars. The imposition of a reserve
requirement on commercial paper would make Euro-dollars
relatively more attractive. Perhaps there are other
measures worth considering.
The Board's staff is study
ing the matter.
Apart from consideration of specific measures that
the System might adopt as a way of protecting the balance
of payments, I would in conclusion bring to the Committee's
attention once again the rather obvious point that, when
doubt exists as to whether and how far monetary policy
should be eased, balance of payments considerations weigh
in on the side of caution.
Before this meeting there had been distributed to the
members of the Committee a report from the Manager of the System
Open Market Account covering domestic open market operations
for the period May 5 through 20, 1970, and a supplemental report
covering the period May 21 through 25, 1970.
Copies of both
reports have been placed in the files of the Committee.
In supplementation of the written reports, Mr. Holmes
commented as follows:
An atmosphere of abject gloom and despair continued
to pervade the securities markets over most of the period
since the Committee last met. Stock prices plummeted to
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new lows, while yields on corporate and municipal
bonds rose above the peaks reached late in 1969.
The market for Government securities attempted to
stabilize on occasion, but the effort appeared to
be half-hearted at best and very short-lived.
The markets generally tended to ignore indications
of a slowing economy, focusing instead on evidence
of continued inflation and on what many participants
considered to be a lack of direction in national
policy. There was cynicism about fiscal policy;
uncertainty over the future course of monetary
policy; concern over Southeast Asia and the Middle
East, over domestic unrest, and over the general
state of health of financial markets; and growing
fear about the ability of the money and capital
markets to meet the public and private demands
for funds expected in the second half of the year.
As is often the case, the financial community may
have talked itself into a more pessimistic state
of mind than is warranted by the circumstances.
The best medicine would be some relatively good news
from Southeast Asia or on the domestic inflationary
front. Lacking that, and even better in connection
with some favorable news, some more basic change
may be required in national policy--in fiscal
policy and/or by adoption of some form of income
price policy along the lines suggested by the Chair
man and Vice-Chairman of this Committee. Meanwhile,
the markets are vulnerable to any sudden shock and
official assurances that all is well, or will soon
be, appear to be doing more harm than good.
While the Treasury bill market has benefited
from an improved technical position and from investor
concern for liquidity and safety, rates have moved
erratically over the period--particularly for longer
dated bills. Given all the uncertainties, dealers
are generally unwilling to build up inventories and
are trying to protect themselves by widening trading
spreads and by exacting a higher underwriting spread
in the regular Treasury bill auctions. In the regular
Treasury bill auction held a week ago bidding was more
normal than in the preceding two auctions, and rates
generally tended to stabilize. By Friday, however,
dealers began to focus on the fact that, in addition
to the regular weekly auction yesterday, they would
have to bid on 9-month and 1-year bills today; and
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rates backed up sharply. In yesterday's auction, average
rates of 7.13 and 7.36 per cent were established for
three- and six-month bills, respectively, down 4 and
14 basis points from the high rates set in the near
disorderly auction just prior to the last meeting
of the Committee, but well above the low points reached
about May 8. As the blue book 1/indicates, one would
normally expect a seasonal decline in bill rates
between now and the end of June, and given the techni
cal position of the bill market such a decline might
result from even a modest increase in demand. But
given the market's mounting concern over the size of
the Treasury's cash needs in July and August--most
of which is expected to be met by sales of tax
anticipation bills--rates may continue to move
erratically.
I am sure that the Committee needs no detailed
account of the outcome of the Treasury's May refinanc
ing, which has been covered in detail in the written
reports to the Committee. It was touch and go on the
$3-1/2 billion cash portion of the financing, with
the outcome in doubt until the very last minute. The
need to allot 100 per cent of subscription--many
market participants had expected only a 50 to 60 per
cent allotment at worst--left subscribers, of course,
with more of the 18-month note than they wanted.
With the new issue being pressed on the market
in early trading on Friday, May 8, Treasury support
of the market was required--including the purchase of
$130 million of the when-issued securities on a go
around conducted at the Trading Desk at 9:30 a.m.,
a half hour before the market normally begins to
trade. All in all, Treasury trust accounts acquired
nearly $300 million of the 7-3/4's of 1971 and the
8's of 1977, mainly the former. Fortunately for
the Treasury's cash position, however, the refunding
portion of the financing turned out better than
anticipated, with $1 billion more cash raised than
had been expected.
Open market operations over the period faced the
delicate and unhappy task of trying to restore some
degree of order to the market for Treasury securities
at a time when bank credit and the money supply appeared
to be growing more rapidly than the Committee desired.
1/ The report, "Monetary Aggregates and Money Market Conditions,"
prepared for the Committee by the Board's staff.
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There has been a fair amount of confusion about the nature
and extent of System support of the Treasury financing.
It should be made clear that at no time during the period
did the System purchase rights or when-issued securities,
although--as I mentioned at the last meeting--we were
prepared to do so if necessary. Our support was confined
to the massive purchase of Treasury bills reported at the
last meeting; and I might note in passing that, while the
emergency action of the Committee to suspend the $2 billion
leeway until today was not needed, there was only $27
million left of the leeway by the close -f business on
May 5.
Despite the fact that System bill purchases lightened
dealer portfolios markedly, and bill rates temporarily
declined sharply, the market was apprehensive lest the
System turn into an aggressive seller of bills in the
May 13 statement week in order to recapture the reserves
supplied by bill purchases in the previous week. While
we did indeed supply more reserves in the week ended
May 6 than we would have in the absence of the Treasury
financing, the market generally tended to exaggerate the
over-supply. Roughly $700 million of the daily average
of $1,170 million reserves supplied by System operations
was needed to offset reserves drained by market factors
and by required reserves. And, in any event, we were
able in the May 13 statement week to get the reserve
situation back under control while avoiding any general
operations to absorb reserves in the market. This happy
event was partly planned but mainly the result of good
luck. On the planned side, the Treasury had earlier
agreed to run its balance with the Reserve Banks on the
high side, and in addition we were fortunate enough to
be able to sell Treasury bills in some volume directly
By the May 20 statement week the
to foreign accounts.
had
turned
into
a modest supplier of reserves.
System
On May 18, after payment date for the new Treasury issues,
the System made its first purchases of coupon securities
in half a year, buying $113 million in a market go-around,
including $75 million of the issues involved in the
Treasury financing. While this particular operation
served to reduce the continued overhang of Treasury
coupon issues in the market, it was consistent with
our basic reserve objectives and reflected the availabil
ity of coupon issues relative to Treasury bills.
While I believe market participants are a shade
less concerned that increased System attention to
monetary and credit aggregates will be to the exclusion
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of any attention to money market conditions or to interest
rates, an atmosphere of skepticism remains. In particular
there is a strong fear that, now the Treasury financing is
out of the way, the System may tighten up money market
conditions once again in order to restrain further expan
sion of bank credit and the money supply. Consequently,
every move made by the Trading Desk is subject to
especially close scrutiny, and the risk of over-interpre
tation of anything we do has probably never been greater.
This attitude, together with the general state of market
uncertainty, cautions us to approach day-to-day operations
with as much flexibility as we can muster. I might note
in passing that even a very modest go-around to sell very
short bills last Thursday raised a fair amount of market
concern.
Turning to the aggregates, it appears that both
money supply and bank credit have been rising faster in May
than the Committee desired and are likely to exceed the
4 per cent target over the second quarter as a whole,
according to current projections. How much weight we
should put on the projections is still hard to determine.
I find it interesting, but not particularly illuminating,
that the New York Bank's second-quarter projections for
both money supply and the adjusted credit proxy, partic
ularly the latter, are weaker now than they were three
weeks ago--suggesting that we have made some modest
progress towards getting back to the target path. This
would be somewhat reassuring were it not for the fact
that Board staff projections have moved in precisely
the opposite direction and are now much stronger than
three weeks ago.
In any event, the growth in money supply clearly
registered in April and May indicates that firmer money
market conditions than were feasible over the Treasury
financing period will probably be required if the Commit
tee wants to work back towards the 4 per cent target for
the second quarter as a whole. Given the unsettled near
crisis state of the financial markets, we at the Trading
Desk very much need a clearcut view of the intensity with
which the Committee wants to resist what is apparently a
greater demand for money and credit than had earlier been
anticipated or felt desirable. In general, alternative A
of the directive drafts 1/ as presented in the blue book
1/ The alternative draft directives submitted by the staff for
Committee consideration are appended to this memorandum as Attachment A
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5/26/70
would call for more resistance, while alternative B would
accept a 6 to 6-1/2 per cent growth rate for money supply
and bank credit for the second quarter. Both versions
include a proviso calling for the modification of operations
as needed to moderate excessive pressures in financial
markets and it would be most helpful to have the Committee's
views on how that proviso should be interpreted.
Mr. Mitchell remarked that he thought the Desk had done an
excellent job in a very difficult situation during the past three
weeks.
By unanimous vote, the open
market transactions in Government
securities, agency obligations, and
bankers' acceptances during the
period May 5 through 25, 1970, were
approved, ratified, and confirmed.
The Chairman then called for the staff economic and financial
reports, supplementing the written reports that had been distributed
prior to the meeting, copies of which have been placed in the files
of the Committee.
Mr. Partee made the following statement concerning economic
developments:
It is even more difficult today than it was three
weeks ago to reach a judgment, with any confidence, about
the course of economic activity over the months ahead.
The business statistics, though a little weaker in some
areas, are on balance not significantly worse--or betterthan had been assumed in staff projections for the
Inventory investment has been sharply curtailed,
Committee.
industrial production relatively well maintained, and per
sonal income bolstered by large additions resulting from
the increases, with retroactive features, in social
security and Federal pay. This would imply the probability
of a bottoming out soon in the business decline, with
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moderate economic recovery the likely prospect for the
remainder of the year. Unemployment would probably rise
moderately further, since the recovery initially is
expected to remain below our growth potential, but, by
the same token, demand pressures as a factor in inflation
would remain in abeyance.
The financial underpinnings for this relatively opti
mistic projection, however, have grown increasingly suspect
in recent weeks. The stock market has declined sharply
further, with the New York Stock Exchange composite off
now by 24 per cent just since the beginning of April andby
38 per cent from the late 1968 high. This is by far the
largest and longest decline of the postwar period. Long
term interest rates have rebounded to earlier peaks, with
the Aaa new-issue corporate rate again above 9 per cent
and the Bond Buyer's municipal index for the first time
above 7 per cent. And rumors of impending financial
distress involving both financial and nonfinancial
businesses are growing; in a few instances, there is
evidence that such rumors may be true. In such an envi
ronment, one wonders what may be happening to the strength
of future spending and investment plans.
The main potential hazard to the economy, of course,
does not lie in the decline that has taken place in paper
values, massive as it is, or in the possibility of a few
failures or corporate reorganizations. Stock market
values do not appear to be particularly important sources
of financing for goods expenditures, and financial failures
are to be expected from time to time in a risk-taking
economy. But these developments both reflect, and add
fuel to, a sharply deteriorating public psychology. This
is reflected in some of the District reports contained in
the new red book 1/ prepared for the Committee, and it is
very evident in the meetings of business and financial
people that one attends. There is deep concern with the
performance of the economy, exhibiting at the same time
the continuation of strong inflationary pressures, rising
unemployment, and falling profits and financial asset
values. There is underlying concern, also, about the
increasing questioning of the social and moral values of
our society, and of the quality of life that it produces.
1/ The report, "Current Economic Conditions by District,"
prepared for the Committee by the staff.
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Under the circumstances, the sharp decline in the
market is widely taken as an index of the trouble we are
in, and a flurry of failures now among larger business
and financial firms, should it occur, would tend to con
firm the worst of these fears. In short, for the first
time in my experience, there appears to be some possibility
of a crisis of confidence in the viability of our economy.
The odds still seem high that anything like this will be
averted, and a dramatic improvement in the military situa
tion in Southeast Asia might still do wonders for public
psychology. But the very fact that we have reached the
point where a confidence crisis seems conceivable must
have, unless the trend is quickly reversed, major impli
cations for the economic outlook.
As I pointed out to the Committee last time, the
Board's econometric model assigns a significant weight
to the value of financial asset holdings as a marginal
determinant of spending. The main effect shows up in
consumption within a quarter or two, although business
fixed investment is influenced later on and there are
important secondary effects on inventories and incomes.
Taking account of the decline in stock prices that had
occurred through last Friday, and assuming that there
is neither a further decline nor a recovery, the model
would forecast consumption expenditures, by the fourth
quarter, $10 billion lower than otherwise; and a GNP
down $19 billion in current dollars, and $13 billion
in real terms, from what it would be in the absence of
the stock price decline. This model projected the
course of consumption expenditures very well in the stock
market declines of 1957-58 and 1966, but it underestimated
spending somewhat following the 1962 market break, when
there was little subsequent weakening in the economy.
I should point out that the model is, of course, based
on average postwar experience, whereas the current
market decline has been of considerably larger than
average dimensions.
The staff projection presented in the green book 1/
does not make specific allowance for this possible stock
market effect, although we do provide for a relatively
high personal savings rate and for a gradual leveling
off in business plant and equipment expenditures on
1/ The report, "Current Economic and Financial Conditions,"
prepared for the Committee by the Board's staff.
5/26/70
-18-
other grounds. We will attempt a careful examination of
the plausibility of significant weakness in both areas in
the chart show planned for the next meeting of the Commit
tee. Meanwhile, we will be watching for signs that secon
dary effects of the financial market reverses are beginning
to appear.
So far, consumption appears to be holding up well.
Retail sales, according to the preliminary report, increased
about 1-1/2 per cent in April, which would be a comparatively
strong showing, and the weekly data thus far in May suggest
that sales are holding at about the April level. Domestic
new car sales in the first 20 days of May were at a 7.5
million rate, which is a little higher than in the first
quarter, although a sales contest for General Motors
dealers appears to have affected the most recent 10-day
results. The expectation has been for a rise in retail
sales, of course, in view of the large additions to the
income stream that were paid out in April and early May.
On this basis, we have continued our earlier projection
of a relatively strong showing in consumer expenditures
for the second quarter.
Our current projections, on the other hand, now call
for some moderation in the uptrend in business fixed invest
ment. A small further rise is still expected in the aggre
gate of such spending for the second and third quarters,
followed by a leveling off in the fourth, but the increase
for the year as a whole has been cut back to 6 per cent
from the 8 per cent gain shown in earlier projections.
Such an adjustment seems warranted on the basis of the
continued flatness in new orders for machinery and equip
ment, and by the further decline in manufacturers' new
capital appropriations reported by the National Industrial
Conference Board survey for the first quarter. I am also
informed, on a confidential and highly judgmental basis,
that early returns from manufacturers in the current
Commerce-SEC survey suggest a downward adjustment of 3 to
4 percentage points in planned capital outlays for the
year from the 10 per cent gain indicated by the previous
survey.
The leveling off in capital spending represents the
principal change we have made in our current projection,
and accounts for the more modest recovery in real GNP now
expected in the second half of the year. This projection,
I believe, is a reasonable one, assuming that confidence
and spending plans have not been seriously eroded by
-19-
5/26/70
financial market developments. The problem is that it
seems quite possible that such an erosion is occurring,
and that the performance of the economy may therefore
fall significantly short of our projections. For this
reason, and because there is at present some possibility
of real financial distress, I would urge that the Commit
tee's policy for the time being be one of deliberate,
accomodative monetary growth. A further increase in
interest rates, as well as the indication that markets
may be tightening, should be resisted strongly until we
can get a better fix on what the problems of the finan
cial markets may mean for the course of business activity.
Mr. Axilrod made the following statement concerning financial
developments:
At this point in time, with respect to financial
variables, the critical question for the FOMC to consider
is whether to adjust upwards the growth rate it is willing
to see for monetary aggregates. As the documentation
presented to the Committee makes clear, the growth rates
for both money supply and bank credit are currently running
above what the Committee earlier contemplated. So the
practical question is whether, or to what extent, the FOMC
should attempt to adjust its reserve policy so as to move
these aggregates back toward the moderate growth path
previously desired.
Consideration of this question requires some analysis
of why the monetary aggregates have been behaving as they
have. One reason has to do with the large credit demands
on longer-term markets. Since the last meeting of the
Committee, long-term interest rates have moved around 20
to 25 basis points higher, as a result of the continued
heavy private and Governmental financing demands in
combination with a variety of expectational jolts. Munic
ipal as well as corporate and Treasury bond yields have
now moved above their late 1969 highs. The pressure on
long-term markets both affected and was intensified by
the Treasury's mid-May refunding. While more cash was
raised through the Treasury refunding than was expected,
it was not without its difficult moments and not without
some cost in terms of reserves supplied through open
market operations.
5/26/70
-20-
A second reason for the greater rise in monetary
aggregates is partly related to the first. There has
been, I believe, an attempt on the part of the public
to improve their liquidity. This has occurred for a
number of reasons. Consumers may be uncertain about
future income prospects--not to mention their eroding
wealth positions as stock prices plummet--and as a
result may be attempting to increase their saving in
the form of liquid assets, such as deposits and sav
ings and loan shares. Moreover, security markets, and
particularly the stock market, are in a state of
considerable apprehension because of uncertainties
about future economic developments as well as about
the fabric of society. Under the circumstances,
investors have probably moved, at least temporarily,
into cash and very short-dated debt instruments.
A third reason for the greater rise in monetary
aggregates, particularly the money supply, has to do
with price increases. If there has indeed been an upward
shift in cash balance demands, the growth in money supply
thus far this year--at about a 6 per cent annual ratehas been very little more than the minimum necessary to
permit any increase at all in the real value of cash
balances, since the GNP price deflator has risen at a
rate of more than 5 per cent. And it is presumably the
real, and not the dollar, value of cash balances which
is relevant to the public when cash is being held for
precautionary or similar purposes. I am not sayingit should be clear--that money supply ought to grow
more just because the price level is rising more
rapidly. What I am saying is that if the public has
shifted to wanting to hold and not spend, more cash in
relation to GNP, then this desired cash has to be
considered in constant-price terms. If the outstanding
money supply is not permitted to rise sufficiently,
interest rates or stock yields will rise as the public
sells earning assets to seek, insofar as it proves
possible, the real cash balances it wants to hold.
Back of these various reasons given for the greater
growth in monetary aggregates is the basic presupposition
that the nation's liquidity was severely constrained in
1969 and that some effort is now being made, and should
be made, to restore it. The liquidity data available
are consistent with this hypothesis, even after allowance
is made for the secular downward movement in holdings of
5/26/70
-21-
cash and liquidity in the post-World War II years.
For
example, from the first quarter of 1969 to the first
quarter of 1970, corporate liquidity ratios have dropped
about 5 percentage points, a drop greater than that which
occurred between the third quarters of 1965 and 1966,
the previous period of severe monetary restraint--and a
drop greater than appears consistent with the normal
downward trend of the past several years.
As to institutional liquidity, there was, of course,
a very sharp decline in the liquidity of banks and sav
ings and loan associations in the course of 1969 and
through the first two months of 1970. Since then there
has been some improvement, but the position of commercial
banks still appears to be about as strained as in the
second half of 1966, and savings and loan associations
and mutual savings banks still appear to be considerably
worse off than in that period--although for S&L's regu
latory efforts to make them more content with a reduced
level of liquidity have of course been made. These
rough aggregate liquidity measures do not, of course,
indicate anything about potential trouble spots for indi
vidual business firms or financial institutions, including
stock houses, except insofar as a sustained strain on
liquidity generally increases the probability of particular
trouble spots developing.
The liquidity strains of the last half of 1966 were
eased in the first half of 1967, and this easing was
accompanied by a shift to a 6-1/2 per cent annual rate of
growth in the money supply and a 10 per cent growth rate
in bank credit, from a period of virtually no change in
money during the last half of 1966. I happen to believe
that the System's policy in the first half of 1967 was
right. The problems that subsequently developed seem
to me to have been the result of sustaining the rapid
money and bank credit growth over the next 18 months
against the background of a dilatory and uncertain fiscal
policy.
I believe it would be prudent in the current period
to permit a growth in money similar to that of the first
half of 1967 in order to help ease the liquidity and
other financial market strains now evident in the economy.
This should not, of course, be construed as suggesting
that the FOMC should continue on such a growth path over
a very sustained period. But I would not tighten money
markets between now and the next meeting of the Committee
in an effort to move back onto the aggregate path adopted
at the previous meeting. Rather, one approach over the
next few weeks would be to keep the Federal funds rate
5/26/70
-22-
at around an 8 to 8-1/8 per cent rate, or even to shade
the funds rate lower if that proved necessary to permit
at least a seasonal decline in the bill rates and an
associated easing in financial market tensions generally.
It is possible, but not certain, that more of an expan
sion in money and bank credit might then ensue over the
short run than targeted in either alternative A or B;
but the extent to which the Manager permits this to
happen would be made to depend on market conditions and
with the understanding that the aggregates should not,
if at all possible, exceed the levels now projected for
June and more desirably might be somewhat lower. A
generous interpretation of alternative B might be
consistent with this approach--that is, an interpretation
that permitted a modest easing of money market conditions
over the short run.
In addition to the problem of financial market
tensions, there is another reason for encouraging modera
tion of market interest rate pressures over the next few
weeks, even at the cost of a little more expansion in
the aggregates than may be desired over the longer run.
I would suspect that the real rate of return on capital
is now declining, as indicated in part by the current
and expected reduced rate of corporate profits. Ordinar
ily one would expect long-term market interest rates to
decline in reflection of a reduced real return on capital.
That long-term market interest rates have been rising is
under these conditions an anomaly--an anomaly that cannot
be explained, I suspect, by rising inflationary expectations,
and an anomaly that could, if continued, lead to monetary
restraint that is excessive for current economic conditions.
Chairman Burns said it might be useful at this point to remind
everyone present of the need to preserve the confidentiality of the
Committee's discussions.
The Committee's record had been very good in
that respect, but it would be well to be especially careful at present
in view of the sensitive conditions prevailing in financial markets.
At the Chairman's suggestion the Committee then engaged in
a general discussion of the economic and financial situation and
5/26/70
-23
outlook.
Among the subjects considered were the nature and impli
cations of recent changes in liquidity positions and desires,
recent and prospective savings flows to nonbank thrift institutions
and their implications for housing activity, the effect of strikes
on business activity in individual industries and in the economy
as a whole, and the outlook for the balance of payments.
With respect to the general economic outlook, Mr. Hickman
remarked that, although recent evidence indicated that the economic
contraction had continued in April and probably in May, there were
signs that the stage had been set for renewed expansion in real
activity during the second half of the year, along the lines suggested
by the Board staff's projections.
A similar assessment had been
reached by the group of Fourth District business economists meeting
at his Bank on May 15.
Those economists also were optimistic about
improvements in the price situation.
Mr. Hayes observed that recent economic statistics seemed
a bit weaker.
However, he still saw no evidence of an accelerating
downturn and thought that, on balance, the chances of a serious
recession were small.
On the price issue, businessmen in his
district--and he himself--were very discouraged, in contrast to
the optimism reported by Mr. Hickman.
The decline in stock prices
obviously was a source of concern, with consequences for business
that were hard to predict.
all effect would be limited.
He suspected, however, that the over
He was, of course, highly concerned
5/26/70
-24
about existing conditions in financial markets generally, and
thought it was clear that those conditions had to be a major factor
in the Committee's policy decision today.
Mr. Baughman remarked that the expectations for economic
activity of Seventh District economists also tended to resemble
those of the Board's staff, as they had for some time.
However,
the views of businessmen--which had been more optimistic earlierhad shifted, and now were in line with or more pessimistic than
those of the economists.
Mr. Francis commented that appropriate policy actions taken
in 1969 had inevitably resulted in some cutbacks in production and
other well-publicized developments that had disturbed many people.
Nevertheless, over-all activity continued at a near-record level
and declines in the past six or nine months had been modest compared
with those in the postwar
recessions.
Mr. Coldwell observed that on some counts--particularly
the cutback in business capital spending plans--the longer-run
outlook might be said to have improved recently.
In his judgment,
however, the over-riding consideration at the moment was the crisis
of confidence reflected in the decline of common stock prices.
He
thought the existing psychology was a result of a variety of factors,
including events in Cambodia, evidence of persisting inflation,
weakness in the economy, and--to some extent--the System's recent
shift toward increased emphasis on the monetary aggregates and
5/26/70
-25
reduced emphasis on money market conditions.
now was to provide a background of stability.
The Committee's task
In general, he
concurred in Mr. Axilrod's prescription for policy.
Mr. Kimbrel agreed that confidence was at a low ebb, but
he thought that perhaps was traceable more to the price situation
than to indications of economic weakness.
He wondered whether the
current anxiety over developments in the stock market was not
exaggerated.
In any case, he thought the System might make its
best contribution to public confidence by demonstrating its own
confidence in the aggregative targets it had set forth in January
and February--targets which he still considered appropriate for
the longer run.
He recognized that the Desk had to have flexibility
to deal with current pressures and that it would not be feasible to
move back abruptly to the target path of moderate growth in the
aggregates, but he hoped those targets would be kept in mind.
Mr. Morris remarked that the sharp decline in security
values could have a substantial impact on spending, and called into
question other kinds of evidence suggesting that economic activity
would turn up as projected.
Mr. Daane commented that the overtones of financial crisis
were sufficiently pervasive already to be affecting prospects for
the projected rise in real activity in the second half, and if the
crisis atmosphere were to deepen the outlook would be materially
-26
5/26/70
affected.
In his judgment the Committee's present problem clearly
was that of devising ways and means for coping with the emerging
financial crisis.
Mr. Swan agreed that the deterioration in psychology
appeared to be running considerably ahead of the deterioration in
economic activity.
Like others, he was concerned about existing
conditions in financial markets and thought the System had to do
what it could in that area.
At the same time, it was worth noting
that the problem of inflation was still one of the major sources
of uncertainty.
Continued advances in prices and perhaps unsophis
ticated interpretations of recent fiscal policy developments were
creating widespread interest in direct wage and price controls.
That interest was reaching almost compelling proportions among
the public generally and on the part of a great many businessmen.
Messrs. Hayes and Baughman also reported growing interest
in their Districts in some form of wage and price controls.
Chairman Burns said that he would agree with much of what
had been said about the respective states of business psychology
and present economic conditions and the apparent inconsistencies
between the two.
He thought it would be a mistake, however, to
take too much comfort from the indications that the economy had
deteriorated less than business psychology; it should be remembered
that, to an important extent, the state of psychology today would
shape the state of the economy tomorrow.
5/26/70
-27The Chairman noted that in recent meetings of the Committee
a good deal had been said about the threats of recession and infla
tion.
It had been generally recognized that threats of both types
existed, although the members had differed in the way they assessed
their relative importance.
Recession and inflation were, of course,
traditional concepts in business cycle theory.
But there was a
third traditional concept to which, fortunately, it had been
unnecessary to pay much attention in the postwar period--the con
cept of financial crisis.
He thought the atmosphere was now one
of near-crisis--if in fact a crisis was not already at hand--and
that the problems of inflation and recession had to be judged against
the background of a possible crisis.
The essential characteristic of a financial crisis, the
Chairman continued, was that for any of a large number of reasons
people became concerned about the future and sought to get into a
liquid position.
Normally businesses sought to maximize profits;
at other times they concentrated instead on maintaining solvency
and their goal became a strong, or relatively strong, liquidity
position.
It was an atmosphere of this second sort with which the
Committee now had to deal.
It was his basic view, Chairman Burns commented, that,
if the President were in a position to tell the nation that the
Cambodian operation had been successfully completed and that troops
were being withdrawn ahead of schedule, the effect on financial
5/26/70
-28
markets would be electrifying; the present atmosphere of gloom
would vanish.
He believed that such an announcement would
be forthcoming, although probably not in the immediate future.
In
the meantime, the System had to play the traditional role of a
central bank in circumstances such as those now prevailing--by
acting as a lender of last resort, by maintaining orderly markets,
by keeping interest rates from rising and,
if
possible,
by moderating
interest rates somewhat.
The Chairman noted that in recent months the Committee had
moved toward increased emphasis on the monetary aggregates in
formulating policy.
He thought that move had been a constructive
one, and that such emphasis remained appropriate--for "normal"
times.
However, these were not normal times.
In view of the
current rapid deterioration of business psychology and the possible
consequences for the economy and for society, it was necessary
temporarily to put aside the objective of moderate growth in the
monetary aggregates and to undertake the classical functions of a
central bank when a crisis existed--or was near at hand, or seemed
to be approaching--however
the members chose to describe the present
situation.
In sum, Chairman Burns said, he thought that the real economy
was basically sound but that it was not likely to remain so unless
the deterioration of business psychology was corrected.
The basic
-29
5/26/70
cure probably would have to come from a source other than the Federal
In the
Reserve--such as a Presidential statement on Southeast Asia.
meantime, the Federal Reserve was in a position to make a significant
contribution by attending to the liquidity needs of the economy.
Chairman Burns then called for the go-around of comments and
views on monetary policy.
With respect to the second paragraph of
the directive, he noted that in addition to alternatives A and B
proposed by the staff there had been distributed other proposals
by Messrs. Hayes, Daane, and Mitchell, as well as a modified version
of Mr. Hayes' proposal which had been labeled "alternative E."1/
Mr. Hayes began the go-around with the comment that he
agreed with the general tenor of the Chairman's observations.
He
then proceeded with the following statement:
The basic economic situation has not changed
appreciably since our last meeting, although most recent
statistics suggest if anything a little more weakness
than had been expected. Certainly there is no indica
tion of an accelerated decline. Renewed expansion
around the middle of the year still seems probablewith, however, a continued updrift in unemployment.
The spirit of great uneasiness pervading the financial
markets and the country generally represents an intangi
ble factor that is hard to evaluate but could be
important. On the other hand, I have the feeling that
the current unease is a good deal more acute in financial
markets than among businessmen generally.
1/ These additional alternatives are shown in Attachment B to
this memorandum.
5/26/70
-30-
Meanwhile, we are confronted with a continuing
upward spiral of wages and prices, and little progress
on this front seems likely over the coming months.
Expectations of further inflation are widespread and
deeply imbedded. Efforts to improve our trade balance
are being largely frustrated by persistent inflation.
I feel much troubled over the outlook for the
Federal budget. A number of developments could produce
a deficit for fiscal 1971 well above the latest official
estimate, and this at a time when monetary policy needs
a strong fiscal ally. The prospective heavy volume of
Treasury borrowing in the second half of calendar 1970
will complicate our task of maintaining moderate expan
sion of the monetary aggregates, which already show
signs of excessive growth in the current quarter.
The credibility of our anti-inflation effort might be
further jeopardized if we were to publish increases at
annual rates of 6 per cent or more in the money supply
over an extended period.
I would favor retaining a growth rate of roughly
4 per cent for the money supply as the longer-run
objective of policy, bank credit being a less useful
target under present circumstances. I therefore reject
the idea of actively seeking more liberal growth rates
as suggested by alternative B of the directive drafts.
At the same time, however, I am acutely aware that the
current state of the financial markets means that
attempting to get back to appropriate growth rates in
a short period of time might prove disastrous for finan
cial markets and for interest rates. I would be willing
to accept a temporary expansion in growth rates of the
monetary aggregates to the extent that this is required
to avoid further pressures in financial markets. In
other times, the current low state of confidence and
the fears of a liquidity crisis might suggest a very
liberal approach on the part of the Desk. But in the
present setting, with much of that lack of confidence
attributable to defeatism on the whole anti-inflation
campaign, the Manager will have to walk a thin line
between equally dangerous hazards. I have given the
Secretary suggested language for a variation on direc
tive A, and have asked him to circulate it. The
Secretary has distributed a further modification of
this directive, labeled alternative E, and I find this
quite acceptable. I would also suggest a small change
of wording in the first paragraph, in recognition of the
fact that growth of the money supply in May is apparently
rapid.
5/26/70
-31
After discussion of Mr. Hayes' final point, it was agreed
that the statement in question should be revised to read "...
in
May... the money supply appears to be expanding rapidly."
Mr. Francis remarked that, as the Committee knew, he had
been deeply concerned about the risk that the monetary aggregates
would expand at a rate that would delay the cure of inflation.
Although he continued to be concerned on that score he was
impressed by the Chairman's analysis of the situation.
Accordingly,
for the directive he was prepared to support alternative E, which
he understood would permit whatever rate of expansion was necessary
to cope with the immediate situation.
However, he looked forward
to the time when it would be possible to return to the Committee's
longer-run objectives for the aggregates.
Mr. Kimbrel said that he, too, would like to return to the
longer-run objectives when possible, but would favor alternative E
today in view of the Chairman's statement and other comments.
Mr. Eastburn said that alternative E also seemed appropriate
to him.
However, he hoped the Manager would keep the Committee's
longer-run objectives in view to the extent possible while coping
with the immediate situation in the market.
That seemed to be
particularly desirable when one looked ahead to the problems the
Committee might be facing in the latter part of the year.
the lags in monetary policy, the Committee might want to be
Given
-32
5/26/70
pursuing a fairly restrictive policy then, but even keel considera
tions were likely to be in effect about half the time.
Mr. Hickman said he concurred in Mr. Eastburn's comments.
It seemed clear that the Committee could not return now to its earlier
target path of 4 per cent annual rates of growth in bank credit and the
money supply for the second quarter, given the reserve injections already
made in connection with the Treasury financing, the conditions pre
vailing in financial markets, and the fact that a failure to meet
the large liquidity demands of the public could cause an undesirable
contraction of business and consumer spending.
While he did not
like the wording of the staff's alternative B, he thought the
target growth rates for the aggregates associated with that alterna
tive were more appropriate to the current situation.
Because of the
crisis atmosphere existing, he would view upward deviations from.those
targets as more acceptable in the period until the next meeting than
was normally the case.
He would not, however, want to depart from
the longer-run target paths for an extended period and hoped that,
by the time of the next meeting, the pressures in financial markets
would have been greatly reduced.
On balance, he favored alternative
E for the directive.
Mr. Sherrill also found alternative E
acceptable.
He
thought the Chairman's description of the prevailing situation was
5/26/70
-33
accurate.
There was little doubt that the Committee was faced with
a crisis--in confidence if not in any more fundamental sense--but
he believed that it would be relatively short-lived; it was
likely that the situation would be calmed by an announcement of the
conclusion of U.S. operations in Cambodia, and perhaps also by the
beginning of summer vacations at the nation's colleges.
Meanwhile, Mr. Sherrill said, it was essential to avoid
further deterioration of conditions in financial markets.
He
considered that to be of great importance because he agreed with
Chairman Burns that the state of psychology during this crisis
period could have significant implications for the real economy
over the longer run.
Mr. Brimmer remarked that he did not share the view that
the present situation was one of crisis; if he did, he would favor
more drastic policy measures than contemplated by alternative E.
In his judgment it was correct to say that financial markets were
under considerable strain.
He agreed that the System should do
what it could to moderate the strain.
At the same time, it should
keep an eye on its longer-run targets for bank credit and the money
supply--and, more fundamentally, on its goal of bringing about some
reduction in the rate of inflation.
In effect, Mr. Brimmer continued, the Committee was being
temporarily diverted from its desired course by the need to cope
5/26/70
-34
with the immediate situation.
He thought the directive should convey
the impression that that development was the consequence of unfortu
nate happenstance.
Specifically, he would propose a modified version
of alternative E in which the opening sentence was divided into two,
reading as follows:
"To implement this policy, the Committee desires
to see only a moderate growth in money and bank credit over the months
ahead.
However, it recognizes that current market uncertainties and
liquidity strains make it necessary to accommodate--temporarilysomewhat larger growth rates in the near term than would be desirable
in the longer run."
The concluding sentence would be identical to
that of alternative E.
Mr. Maisel remarked that the Committee was properly dividing
the issue facing it into two parts--relating, respectively, to its
general policy posture and to the kind of provisos it should add.
Unlike Mr. Brimmer, he would consider it improper to suggest that
the Committee intended to deviate only temporarily from its earlier
targets.
Indeed, he thought alternative E,even before Mr. Brimmer's
proposed modifications, went too far in that direction, and that the
staff's alternative B was better in that respect.
What was called for today, Mr. Maisel continued, was not an
authorization for the Manager to deviate temporarily from earlier
targets but an instruction to the Manager for the next four weeks to
-35
5/26/70
seek more rapid growth in the aggregates.
At the previous meeting
he had favored somewhat higher target growth rates than were in fact
selected,in order to compensate for the unduly low levels that had
resulted from the negative growth rates for most of the aggregates
in the past year.
more rapid growth.
Now there were two additional reasons for favoring
First was the increased demand for liquidity.
In
his judgment, the accommodation of shifts in the liquidity function
was a basic responsibility of the Committee--not something it should
be willing to do only temporarily or grudgingly.
Secondly, although
the staff had not changed substantially its point estimates of GNP
in coming quarters, the probabilities of sizable downward deviations
from those estimates had greatly increased.
On that account also
the Committee should be prepared to seek somewhat higher growth rates
in the aggregates, as called for by alternative B.
The remaining question concerned the Manager's mode of
operations under such a directive, Mr. Maisel said.
Obviously the
Manager should be very cautious if he thought it was necessary to
lower total reserves in order to bring the annual rate of growth in
M1 in the third quarter down to the 5 per cent target specified under
alternative B. Operations should be conducted very carefully and
flexibly vis-a-vis market conditions, rate movements, and the impact
on the market's view of Federal Reserve targets.
5/26/70
-36
Mr. Maisel observed that such caution was particularly
necessary since the most recent estimates of the aggregates were
suspect.
He would not feel unduly alarmed if the levels of the
aggregates were somewhat above the targets in June.
However, while
the alternative B targets should be treated as minimums, he hoped
that they would not be exceeded by more than half the difference
between the June and July targets under that alternative.
On that basis, Mr. Maisel concluded, he would have no
objection to replacing the second sentence of alternative B with
the second sentence of alternative E, which began "Open market
operations until the next meeting of the Committee...."
Mr. Daane observed that he had arrived at his preferences
for the directive against the background of his disquiet regarding
the financial situation.
If he were acting on his own he would
favor a directive of the sort he had had distributed before the
meeting--calling for moderation of existing pressures on the money
market whatever the implications for the aggregates.
However, in
light of the views of other Committee members concerning the aggre
gates, he was prepared to accept alternative E with certain
modifications.
In his judgment, Mr. Daane continued, the need was to issue
instructions to the Desk that would permit it to show its hand
-37
5/26/70
in the market in which it operated.
He thought that objective
could be encompassed within alternative E if the first sentence
was revised by deleting the words "only a" before "moderate growth,"
and the word "somewhat" before "larger growth rates;" and by sub
stituting "temporarily" for "in the second quarter."
The sentence
would then read, "To implement this policy, the Committee desires
to see moderate growth in money and bank credit over the months
ahead, but it recognizes that current market uncertainties and
liquidity needs require larger growth rates temporarily than would
be desirable in the longer run."
Those changes would be helpful, Mr. Daane believed, partly
because it was not clear at present how much of an increase in
growth rates would be involved in meeting liquidity needs, nor how
long the higher growth rates were likely to be required.
Also, in
the next sentence he would suggest deleting the standard phrase
"until the next meeting of the Committee" after the words "open
market operations," because the need to moderate pressures might
be quite temporary.
However, he felt less strongly about that
suggestion than about the others.
Mr. Mitchell remarked that the problem the Committee was
concerned with might appear to be wholly one of semantics.
He
thought, however, that there was a more fundamental matter in
volved--namely, a concern that the Committee might find itself
-38
5/26/70
backing away from the policy posture it considered best for the
long run.
The recent success in arresting the inflationary psy
chology of investors had been a year or so coming, and it would
be unfortunate if that gain was now dispelled by an indication
to the market that easy money was here again.
Thus, the choice
of directive language was of some importance from the point of
view of the record as well as in connection with instructing the
Manager.
Mr. Mitchell observed that he did not like the staff's
alternative B but he could accept alternative E, perhaps with some
of the amendments that had been suggested.
He also had an amend
ment of his own to propose; he would prefer to say that current
market uncertainties and liquidity needs "now entail"--rather than
"require"--larger growth rates in the aggregates.
He also agreed
that the reference to the second quarter in that clause was unde
sirable because it was not possible to say how long the current
difficulties would last.
Mr. Black said he favored alternative E as modified by
Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Tow remarked that he found alternative E acceptable,
in part because it made clear that the Committee was maintaining
its basic goal of moderate growth in money and bank credit and
was deviating from that goal only on a short-term basis.
He was
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5/26/70
not disturbed by the reference to the second quarter, because it
should be obvious that the duration of the current difficulties
could not be predicted at this time and because the Committee
would be meeting again before the end of the quarter.
It was apparent, Mr. Tow continued, that it would be neces
sary to pay increased attention to money market conditions in
coping with existing strains.
He hoped, however, that money market
conditions would not be eased--and growth in the aggregates stimu
lated--any more than necessary, and he assumed that that was the
intention underlying the final clause of alternative E.
At times
in the past when the System was pursuing an expansive policy it
had unintentionally let its policy become too expansive, as the
cumulative result of actions taken at successive meetings.
He
thought caution was needed to prevent that from happening again.
Mr. Baughman observed that the general format of several
of the proposed directives was to indicate the Committee's allegiance
to the longer-term goal of moderate growth in money and bank credit
while accepting the need to ease pressures in financial markets in
the short run.
He thought that posture was appropriate under the
circumstances and had no objections to the specific language of
alternative E.
Mr. Galusha said alternative E was quite satisfactory.
Unlike
Mr. Daane, he would not want to delete the word "somewhat" before
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5/26/70
"larger growth rates" or to remove the reference to the second
quarter.
He noted that today's directive would not be released
for 90 days, when the current crisis in financial markets presumably
would be a matter of history.
If the qualifying terms in question
were not included readers at that time might conclude that the
Committee had overreacted to the present situation by moving
further toward ease than necessary.
The Committee had been the
target of such criticism in the past--he thought deservedly.
He
hoped that in dealing with the present temporary situation it
would be possible to stay reasonably close to the longer-run goals.
Mr. Swan remarked that the Committee members appeared to
be essentially in agreement regarding the basic needs of the
present situation.
He could accept alternative E for the direc
tive, preferably with the modifications suggested by Messrs. Daane
and Mitchell.
He thought, however, that the first sentence of E
was rather confusing, and that it was likely to be even more
confusing when the directive was published in 90 days.
It seemed
to him that a more straightforward second paragraph was desirable,
such as the following:
"To implement this policy, in view of current market
uncertainties and liquidity strains, open market operations
until the next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted
with a view to moderating pressures on financial markets,
while, to the extent compatible therewith, maintaining bank
5/26/70
-41
reserves and money market conditions consistent with the
Committee's longer run objectives of moderate growth in
money and bank credit."
Mr. Coldwell remarked that he had planned to suggest
directive language similar to that Mr. Swan had proposed.
In his
judgment the key question facing the Committee today was whether
or not a crisis existed or was approaching.
If the answer was
affirmative, the central bank's main responsibility was to preserve
the stability of financial market conditions, even if that meant
giving up longer-run objectives temporarily.
In his judgment the
prime focus of the directive should be on the objective of moderat
ing financial market pressures, as in the first part of Mr. Swan's
proposal, and it might even be desirable to delete for the time
being the remaining language concerning longer-run objectives.
One
other possibility would be to add a proviso clause relating to
possible further deterioration in financial markets, but he did not
think such a clause was required at present.
Mr. Morris asked how the Manager would interpret the
difference between an instruction to operate, on the one hand, "with
a view to moderating pressures on financial markets," as in alterna
tive E and Mr. Swan's proposal; and, on the other hand, "with a
view to attaining somewhat easier money market conditions," as in
the proposal of Mr. Daane's that was distributed before the meeting.
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5/26/70
In reply, Mr. Holmes said that he would interpret alter
native E and Mr. Swan's language as being consistent with stable
money market conditions in the event it proved possible--as he
thought it might--to moderate pressures in financial markets without
moving the Federal funds rate down below its recent levels around
8 per cent.
In contrast, he would interpret Mr. Daane's proposed
language as calling for easier money market conditions whether or
not easier conditions were required in order to moderate financial
market pressures.
Mr. Morris then said he could support alternative E, but
he thought that the modifications proposed by Mr. Swan were quite
sensible.
It was desirable to make clear in the record that the
Committee was deviating temporarily from its longer-run objectives
in order to deal with the crisis in financial markets, and he
considered Mr. Swan's proposal better in that respect.
Mr. Robertson made the following statement:
We are passing through a phase of our cooling-off
process that is particularly conducive to exaggerated
reactions--and we are certainly seeing some of those
around us. Moreover, there is no law that such reac
tions have to meet our usual standards of consistency.
So the stock market can drop under the weight of
punctured profit expectations, the bond markets can
sag under the cloud of seemingly endless offerings,
and both amateur and professional economy-watchers
can conclude that the Administration game plan for
controlling the inflation is a failure.
To be sure, the feeling that "things are out of
control" in this country extends well beyond the
economic sphere. What that does to the economic
5/26/70
-43-
system is to sap some of its confidence and resilience,
making it still more sensitive to shocks. Thus, with
hopes reduced and fears heightened, I think it should
be no surprise that a rising number of cries for help
are being directed at the Federal Reserve.
In this kind of atmosphere, I am convinced that
the best prescription for monetary policy is to display
a steady hand on the tiller and a cool head at the helm.
Dumping reserves into the banking system to try to
assuage liquidity fears would be counterproductive, I
think, both in the short run and in the somewhat longer
run. Its immediate effect could be to make the Federal
Reserve also seem panicky; and over the weeks and months
ahead it could give rise to expectations of renewed
tightness on the assumption that the Fed would try to
reel back in the monetary bulge that would be the
inevitable consequence of any bail-out operation.
I grant that many of the considerations here are
matters of degree. A modest easing up on our part
runs less of these risks than would a drastic move.
But on balance I favor trying to hold as closely as
we reasonably can to a moderate monetary course.
This means that I would like the Trading Desk to try
to keep edging back toward the moderate growth rates
in the aggregates set down in the last blue book and
further amplified in the latest blue book in the para
graph associated with alternative A for the directive.
I am concerned enough about what the blue book calls
"the fragility of market conditions" so that I would
not urge any abrupt move in this direction. I would
not even want the Manager to be as strenuous in his
aggregate-taming efforts as he was during April, follow
ing our previous aggregate bulge. In effect, I want him
to stop short of efforts that could cause a significant
further rise in interest rates. But I would encourage
him to press gradually, when and as he can without so
elevating interest rates, in the direction of the 7 per
cent and 4 per cent annual rates of growth in bank
credit and money, respectively, that were targeted for
alternative A in the blue book.
This seems to me the course of action most likely
to harmonize our short-run and long-run objectives. With
this view in mind, I would vote in favor of the language
of draft alternative A, interpreted along the foregoing
lines, or alternative E if interpreted in the same way.
-44-
5/26/70
Chairman Burns observed that all of the members, with
the possible exception of Mr. Maisel, apparently were willing to
accept some variant of alternative E or Mr. Swan's proposal for
the second paragraph of the directive.
Mr. Maisel asked how the Manager would interpret those
alternatives.
Mr. Holmes said he saw no operational implications to the
differences in language.
He thought that both would call for
operations to moderate the pressures in financial markets if they
continued.
On the other hand he assumed that, if the pressures
should suddenly disappear, under either directive the Committee
would want the Desk to move back toward the longer-run targets for
the aggregates associated with alternative A in the blue book.
Mr. Maisel then asked about the speed with which the Mana
ger would propose to move back to the alternative A targets in
the event the pressures disappeared.
He noted that he would not
be prepared to vote favorably on the directives in question if he
thought the contemplated move was too rapid.
Mr. Holmes replied that any such move would be quite slow
and gradual.
The Chairman asked whether the Manager would attempt to
accomplish the move in question by the time of the next meeting
if the pressures disappeared, and Mr. Holmes replied in the negative.
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5/26/70
Chairman Burns then noted that an amended version of alterna
tive E, reflecting certain of the suggestions made in the go-around,
had been worked out.
The final sentence was unchanged from the
original, and the preceding language read as follows:
"To imple
ment this policy, the Committee desires to see moderate growth in
money and bank credit over the months ahead.
However, it recog
nizes that current market uncertainties and liquidity strains may
now entail larger growth rates than would be desirable in the
longer run."
He proposed that the Committee members be polled
informally on each of the three main possibilities--alternative E
in its original form and as amended, and Mr. Swan's proposal.
Following the polls, the Secretary reported that the pref
erences of members appeared to be about evenly divided between
Mr. Swan's proposal and the amended version of alternative E, with
the latter favored by Messrs. Hayes, Brimmer, Francis, Hickman,
Mitchell, and Robertson.
However, all members had indicated that
they would find Mr. Swan's proposal acceptable.
The Chairman then suggested that the Committee vote on a
directive with a first paragraph consisting of the staff's draft
amended in the manner Mr. Hayes had suggested earlier, and Mr. Swan's
proposed language for the second paragraph.
By unanimous vote, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York was author
ized and directed, until otherwise
directed by the Committee, to execute
5/26/70
-46transactions in the System Account
in accordance with the following
current economic policy directive:
The information reviewed at this meeting indicates
that real economic activity declined more than previously
estimated in the first quarter of 1970, but little further
change is projected in the second quarter. Prices and costs
generally are continuing to rise at a rapid pace, although
some components of major price indexes recently have shown
moderating tendencies. Since early May most long-term
interest rates have remained under upward pressure, partly
as a result of continued heavy demands for funds and pos
sible shifts in liquidity preferences, and prices of common
stocks have declined further.
Attitudes in financial
markets generally are being affected by the widespread
uncertainties arising from recent international and domestic
events, including doubts about the success of the Govern
ment's anti-inflationary program. Both bank credit and the
money supply rose substantially from March to April on
average; in May bank credit appears to be changing little
while the money supply appears to be expanding rapidly.
The over-all balance of payments continued in considerable
deficit in April and early May. In light of the foregoing
developments, it is the policy of the Federal Open Market
Committee to foster financial conditions conducive to
orderly reduction in the rate of inflation, while encourag
ing the resumption of sustainable economic growth and the
attainment of reasonable equilibrium in the country's
balance of payments.
To implement this policy, in view of current market
uncertainties and liquidity strains, open market operations
until the next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted
with a view to moderating pressures on financial markets,
while, to the extent compatible therewith, maintaining bank
reserves and money market conditions consistent with the
Committee's longer run objectives of moderate growth in
money and bank credit.
Chairman Burns then noted that a memorandum from the directive
committee, entitled "Publication of material related to the study of
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5/26/70
the directive," had been distributed on April 28, 1970.1/
He invited
Mr. Maisel to comment.
Mr. Maisel said that, in accordance with the memorandum
the Chairman had mentioned, he would recommend that the Open Market
Committee approve the publication of the staff papers that had been
submitted to the committee on the directive and that constituted
appendix D of the committee's report.
He would not recommend pub
lishing the report itself or appendixes A, B, and C, the last of
which contained the staff recommendations.
Mr. Maisel expressed the view that publication of the staff
papers would improve understanding of how the Federal Reserve had
operated both in the past and under the current directive.
It
seemed clear to him that there had been a fair amount of misunder
standing about what had been done and what was being done.
The
Editorial Committee for the Federal Reserve Bulletin would be
responsible for the order and timing of publication of the individ
ual papers and for ensuring that they met the proper standard of
competence.
It would be made clear that the views expressed were
those of the individual authors.
He thought that if the papers
were published in a careful manner there would be highly positive
results, both in making the facts clear and in demonstrating the
System's concern over the matters considered.
1/ A copy of this memorandum has been placed in the Committee's
files.
5/26/70
-48After discussion the Chairman suggested that the Open Market
Committee approve the directive committee's recommendations, subject
to the understanding that proposals by the Editorial Committee to
publish staff papers would be reviewed by the Board and, if the
Board's reaction was favorable, by the Open Market Committee.
There was general agreement with the Chairman's suggestion.
In a final observation Chairman Burns said he had found useful
the initial issue of the red book and he considered the experiment
a success thus far.
For later issues he would suggest a somewhat
fuller summary at the front.
Also, he would suggest that an effort
be made to get some information on what might be called the "quality"
of consumer purchases.
For example, were new car buyers interested
in a great deal of optional equipment or were they favoring stripped
down models?
Were department store customers tending to shop in
the main store or in the basement departments?
He had found informa
tion of that type quite helpful at times in the past
when economic
conditions resembled those of today.
It was agreed that the next meeting of the Federal Open
Market Committee would be held on Tuesday, June 23, 1970, at 9:30 a.m.
Thereupon the meeting adjourned.
Secretary
Attachment A
May 25, 1970
Drafts of Current Economic Policy Directive for Consideration by the
Federal Open Market Committee at its Meeting on May 26, 1970
FIRST PARAGRAPH
The information reviewed at this meeting indicates that
real economic activity declined more than previously estimated
in the first quarter of 1970, but little further change is pro
jected in the second quarter. Prices and costs generally are con
tinuing to rise at a rapid pace, although some components of major
price indexes recently have shown moderating tendencies. Since
early May most long-term interest rates have remained under upward
pressure, partly as a result of continued heavy demands for funds
and possible shifts in liquidity preferences, and prices of common
stocks have declined further. Attitudes in financial markets
generally are being affected by the widespread uncertainties arising
from recent international and domestic events, including doubts
about the success of the Government's anti-inflationary program.
Both bank credit and the money supply rose substantially from March
to April on average; in May bank credit appears to be changing little
while the money supply is expanding further. The over-all balance
of payments continued in considerable deficit in April and early
May. In light of the foregoing developments, it is the policy of
the Federal Open Market Committee to foster financial conditions
conducive to orderly reduction in the rate of inflation, while
encouraging the resumption of sustainable economic growth and the
attainment of reasonable equilibrium in the country's balance of
payments.
SECOND PARAGRAPH
Alternative A
To implement this policy, the Committee desires to see moderate
growth in money and bank credit over the months ahead. System open
market operations until the next meeting of the Committee shall be
conducted with a view to maintaining bank reserves and money market
conditions consistent with that objective; provided, however, that
operations shall be modified as needed to moderate excessive
pressures in financial markets, should they develop.
-2
Alternative B
To implement this policy, the Committee desires to see
somewhat greater growth in money and bank credit over the months
ahead than previously sought. System open market operations until
the next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to
maintaining bank reserves and money market conditions consistent
with that objective; provided, however, that operations shall be
modified if excessive pressures develop in financial markets, or
if implementing actions are leading to unduly easy money market
conditions.
Attachment B
Members' proposals for second paragraph of current economic
_ policy directive distributed in advance of meeting
Mr. Hayes' proposal:
To implement this policy, the Committee desires
to see only a moderate growth in money and bank credit
over the months ahead, but it recognizes that current
market uncertainties and liquidity needs may require
somewhat larger growth rates in the second quarter than
would be desirable in the longer run. Open market opera
tions until the next meeting of the Committee shall be
conducted with a view to maintaining bank reserves and
money market conditions consistent with the Committee's
longer run objectives; provided, however, that somewhat
greater growth of money and bank credit may temporarily
be accommodated if this proves necessary to avoid
excessive pressure in financial markets.
Mr. Daane's proposal:
To implement this policy, the Committee desires
to see continued moderate growth in money and bank credit
over the months ahead. Under present circumstances in
financial markets, however, System open market operations
shall be conducted with a view to attaining somewhat
easier money market conditions, even if this results,
temporarily, in greater than previously desired growth
in money and bank credit.
Mr. Mitchell's proposal:
To implement this policy, the Committee recognizes
the desirability of accommodating for the time being a
somewhat greater growth in money and bank credit than it
has previously sought. System open market operations
until the next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted
with a view to maintaining bank reserves and money market
conditions consistent with that objective; provided,
however, that operations shall be further modified if
excessive pressures develop in financial markets or if
implementing actions are leading to unduly easy money
market conditions.
-2
Modified version of Mr. Hayes' proposal ("Alternative E"):
To implement this policy, the Committee desires
to see only a moderate growth in money and bank credit
over the months ahead, but it recognizes that current
market uncertainties and liquidity needs require some
what larger growth rates in the second quarter than
would be desirable in the longer run. Open market
operations until the next meeting of the Committee shall
be conducted with a view to moderating pressures on
financial markets, while, to the extent compatible
therewith, maintaining bank reserves and money market
conditions consistent with the Committee's longer run
objectives.
Cite this document
APA
Federal Reserve (1970, May 25). Memorandum of Discussion. Memoranda, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/memorandum_19700526
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_memorandum_19700526,
author = {Federal Reserve},
title = {Memorandum of Discussion},
year = {1970},
month = {May},
howpublished = {Memoranda, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/memorandum_19700526},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}