greenbooks · May 27, 1968
Greenbook/Tealbook
Prefatory Note
The attached document represents the most complete and accurate version available
based on original copies culled from the files of the FOMC Secretariat at the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This electronic document was created
through a comprehensive digitization process which included identifying the bestpreserved paper copies, scanning those copies, 1 and then making the scanned
versions text-searchable. 2 Though a stringent quality assurance process was
employed, some imperfections may remain.
Please note that some material may have been redacted from this document if that
material was received on a confidential basis. Redacted material is indicated by
occasional gaps in the text or by gray boxes around non-text content. All redacted
passages are exempt from disclosure under applicable provisions of the Freedom of
Information Act.
1
In some cases, original copies needed to be photocopied before being scanned into electronic
format. All scanned images were deskewed (to remove the effects of printer- and scanner-introduced
tilting) and lightly cleaned (to remove dark spots caused by staple holes, hole punches, and other
blemishes caused after initial printing).
2
A two-step process was used. An advanced optical character recognition computer program (OCR)
first created electronic text from the document image. Where the OCR results were inconclusive,
staff checked and corrected the text as necessary. Please note that the numbers and text in charts and
tables were not reliably recognized by the OCR process and were not checked or corrected by staff.
Content last modified 6/05/2009.
CONFIDENTIAL (FR)
SUPPLEMENT
CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Prepared for the
Federal Open Market Committee
By the Staff
Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System
May 24,
1968
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES
The Domestic Economy
Unit auto sales and stocks.
Dealer deliveries of new
domestic autos in the first 20 days of May were well above a year
earlier and were at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of about 8-1/2
million units as compared with 7.9 million in the month of April.
Consumer buying expectations.
The indexes of consumer
buying plans for the second half of 1968 for cars, household durables,
and houses were up sharply in April from last year according to the
Quarterly Survey of Consumer Buying Expectations (CBE).
The most
striking increase occurred in houses, partly reflecting a substantial
increase in the price which purchasers expected to pay.
In April
1968, prospective buyers expected to pay $20,474 for a house, 5.6 per
cent more than the $19,396
reported last year.
The index of buying
plans for houses was also up sharply from January but buying plans
for autos and household durables were only up slightly, and the changes
were too small to be significant.
The proportion of families reporting that their incomes
were "substantially higher" or "higher" than a year earlier rose to
41 per cent in April 1968, compared with 36.0 per cent a year ago, a
record for the six quarters of the survey.
Liberalized social security
benefits increased the proportion with rising incomes sharply among
families with an annual income of less than $3,000--28.5 per cent compared with 16.2 per cent a year earlier.
- 2 INDEXES OF EXPECTED NEW AND USED CAR PURCHASES
AND EXPECTED EXPENDITURES ON HOUSES AND HOUSEHOLD DURABLES:
Quarterly Surveys, January 1967-April 1968
(Average of January 1967 and April 1967 = 100.0)
Date of survey
New
Used
cars
cars
Houses
Household
durables
101.0
98.7
98.1
100.8
99.0
101.3
101.9
99.2
July 1967
104.7
101.0
106.6
100.9
October 1967
102.2
101.6
102.5
99.4
January 1968
103.9
103.4
105.7
100.1
April 1968
104.3
103.9
114.7
101.6
January 1967April 1967
1/ Not strictly comparable because of change in format.
The Domestic Financial Situation
After reaching new highs on May 21, yields on U.S. Government
securities have since declined rather sharply, as shown by the last two
columns in the key interest rate table.
This reversal of yield tend-
encies occurred in response to a statement by Chairman Mills that the
House will enact the proposed fiscal package in early June, and to a
subsequent news report that top economic aides of the President have
indicated support of the $6 billion tax cut.
Given this changed outlook,
rumors of an imminent increase in the Federal Reserve discount rate,
which had circulated rather widely among market participants, quickly
lost their credibility.
-3
-
KEY INTEREST RATES
1967
Nov.
_High
1
17-
Apr.
29
1968
May 21
May 24
Short-Term Rates
3-months
Treasury bills (bid)
Bankers' acceptances
Euro-dollars
Federal agencies
Finance paper
CD's (prime NYC)
Highest quoted new issue
Secondary market
6-months
Treasury bills (bid)
Bankers' acceptances
Commercial paper
Federal agencies
CD's (prime NYC)
Highest quoted new issue
Secondary market
1-year
Treasury bills (bid)
Federal agencies
Prime municipals
5.07
5.63
6.88
5.30
5.88
5.92
6.13
7.06
6.11
6.00
5.74*
6.13
7.13
6.10
6.00
5.25
5.30
5.88
5.95
6.00
6.15
6.00
6.20
5.13
5.64
6.00
5.94*
6.25
6.13
6.25
5.75
5.05
5.50 (12/29)
5.70 (12/29)
5.60
5.88
6.00
5.55
5.13
5.55
5.88
6.56
5.54
5.75
4.67
4.88
(12/5)
(12/29)
(11/28)
(12/29)
(1/6)
5.13
5.40
5.88
5.73
6.08
6.25
6.13
6.26
5.50 (12/29)
6.00 (12/29)
5.38
5.60
6.00
6.15
6.25
6.30
6.25
6.30
5.71 (12/29)
5.95 (12/29)
4.00 (12/29)
5.27
5.64
6.03
6.05Z
5.75
3.40
5.80
3.65
5.97
3.80
6.01
5.91 (11/13)
5.81 (11/20)
5.72
5.70
5.96
5.50
6.21
5.66
6.12**
5.65**
6.25 (12/28)
6.98 (12/28)
6.13
6.76
6.25
6.99
6.27
7.03
6.28**
7.07**
6.55 (12/7)
6.53
6.68
6.66
6.62
6.84
6.70 (12/1)
4.45 (12/7)
4.15 (12/28)
4.33
3.98
4.43
4.18
4.52
4.25
4.71
4.35
(12/1)
(12/29)
(1/16)
(12/29)
5.00
3.90
Intermediate and Long-Term
Treasury coupon issues
5-years
20-years
Corporate
Seasoned Aaa
Baa
New Issue Aaa
Uith call protection
Without call protection
Municipal
Bond Buyer Index
Moody's Aaa
FHA home mortgages
30-years
1/
2/
6.81 (Dec.)
6.77(Nov.)
Pre-devaluation yield levels.
When-issued quote on bill auctioned May 23.
*
**
6.94(Apr.)
- 1:15 p.m. quotations.
- May 23 close.
- 4 -
International Developments
The Bank of England yesterday tightened credit policy by
setting an inclusive ceiling on bank loans, at their present level.
The clearing banks and other banks were instructed to limit credit to
an amount 4 per cent above the level outstanding in November.
Four
per cent, seasonally adjusted, is the amount by which clearing bank
credit has increased since November.
The ceiling originally set when the pound was devalued was
not inclusive.
Categories of loans then exempted included those aiding
the balance of payments and those to local authorities and nationalized
industries.
The ceiling imposed yesterday applies to all loans except
to nationalized industries.
Since loans for exports and other purposes
which improve the balance of payments are still to receive priority,
non-priority loans will have to be reduced.
The Bank specifically calls for intensified restriction of
loans for imports, whether for consumption or for inventory buildup.
It also instructs the banks to reduce lending to local authorities.
Such lending was a significant factor in the rise of bank credit since
November, as local authorities found the cost of borrowing from their
customary sources very high.
The price of gold in London reached a peak of $42.60 an
ounce on Tuesday, May 21, and then dropped sharply on Wednesday and
Thursday to $41.40.
However, pre-weekend buying pushed the quotation
up to $41.75 this morning.
-5-
Work stoppages in France may have contributed to the sharp
rise in the gold price early in the week.
has been mostly suspended this week.
Trading in the French franc
The disorders disrupted communi-
cations and closed most of the banking system--including the foreign
exchange market and the Bank of France--and there has been little
trading of francs in exchange markets outside France because of uncertainty as to when payments can be made through French banks.
In the
New York market the French franc slumped sharply to 20.15 cents but
generally held above the 20.14 cent level at which the Bank of France
will support the rate.
Corrections
Page III - 31, in the text table.
June should be plus $3.5 billion, not minus.
The net cash drain for
SA -
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX A:
1
UNITED KINGDOM FOREIGN TRADE*
Continuation of large deficits in Britain's balance of
merchandise trade through April has stirred doubts that the balance
of payments will respond to last November's devaluation as planned.
Disappointment over Britain's trade performance has been an important factor in the recent weakness of sterling in foreign exchange
markets.
However, market pessimism about the success of the devaluation based on these trade developments would seem, at the least, to
be premature. More time must elapse before the full effects of the
November devaluation and the March budget measures can show up in
exports and imports. The export performance through April was encouraging. The main cause for concern has been the increase in the
volume of imports since devaluation; but imports fell off in March
and April and seem likely to decline further in the next few months.
The average monthly trade deficit on a balance of payments
basis (i.e., with imports f.o.b. rather than c.i.f.) was £90 million
($216 million) in March-April 1968, considerably greater than the
average deficit of only £24 million ($67 million at the old parity)
in January-September 1967, before the figures began to be distorted
by the dock strikes of October-November.
(See Table 1.)
Some deterioration in the trade balance in the months
immediately following devaluation was anticipated, since the initial
consequence of a devaluation is a sharper rise in import than in export prices (in domestic currency) while offsetting changes in trade
volume follow more slowly. However, the magnitude of the deterioration was surprising. For example, the National Institute of Economic
and Social Research as late as February had forecast a trade deficit
of only £115 million for the first half of 1968; the actual deficit
in January-April alone was £284 million.
Imports surge following devaluation
The explanation for the larger-than-expected trade deficit
lies in the unexpected surge of imports that took place following
devaluation. The physical quantity of imports, which was supposed
* Prepared by Martin J. Kohn, Europe and British Commonwealth
Section, Division of International Finance.
SA - 2
Table 1. United Kingdom Foreign Trade, 1967-68
(Seasonally adjusted monthly averages)
Period
Value (£ million)
Trade balance
with
with
Exports Imports imports imports
cif
fob 3/
cif)2/
(fob)/
Volume (1967-I = 100)
Imports
Exports
1967-I
II
III
IV
467
443
436
391
525
525
515
566
-58
-82
-79
-175
-8
-38
-27
-111
100
95
94
81
100
101
96
102
1968-I
513
642
-129
-66
104
109
1968-Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
April
518
515
506
504
617
656
652
645
-99
-141
-146
-141
-35
-70
-92
-87
106
105
101
l0e
106
112
110
108e
1967-Jan.-Sept.
449
522
-73
-24
96
99
1968-Mar.-April
505
649
-144
-90
101e
109e
e
Partly estimated.
1/ Includes re-exports.
2/ Excludes purchases of U.S. military aircraft.
3/ Balance of payments basis.
to stabilize after the devaluation, was about 10 per cent larger in
March-April 1968 than in January-September 1967, although down a little
from the peak reached in February 1968. (See Table 1.)
The post-devaluation rise in imports may partly have reflected
delayed effects of pre-devaluation developments. For example, if orders
were unusually heavy immediately before devaluation -- as importers
sought to beat an anticipated parity change -- imports might have been
correspondingly inflated in later months, given the lag between orders
and deliveries. Furthermore, the rise in imports may have been partly
attributable to a catching-up of deliveries delayed by the dock strike.
However, this latter factor -- though it played a major role in the advance of exports early in 1968 -- appears to have been of relatively
minor importance with respect to imports. Of much greater significance
were the boom in consumer spending, touched off by the devaluation and
anticipation of new restraints, and an apparent acceleration of inventory accumulation.
SA - 3
The vigor of the post-devaluation consumer spending boom
is illustrated by the sharp rises that took place in retail sales
(excluding autos) -- almost 5 per cent after correction for price
increases from October through March, with a better than 2 per cent
rise from the fourth to the first quarter.
(See Table 2.)
March
was a particularly active month. Automobile sales advanced at a
torrid pace; registrations of new cars increased by 9 per cent from
the fourth quarter to the first quarter, to a level 29 per cent
above that of a year earlier, despite a tightening of instalment
buying regulations in November.
Table 2. United Kingdom: Indicators of Consumer Spending
(Seasonally adjusted monthly averages, volume, 1967-I = 100)
Retail
New
Sales
(ex. autos)
Automobile
Registrations
1967-I
II
III
IV
100.0
99.7
101.3
102.7
100.0
88.3
103.6
118.2
1968-I
105.0
129.1
1968-January
103.7
133.6
104.7
106.6
n.a.
137.7
116 e
74 e
February
March
April
n.a. Not available.
e Partly estimated.
Consumer buying is now receding rapidly from the levels
reached in the period before the announcement on March 19 of a restrictive budget. New automobile registrations apparently fell by
about 15 per cent in March and 35 per cent in April. There are reports from retail outlets, particularly those specializing in consumer durables, of post-budget declines in sales. To the extent
that the import surge was associated with the consumer buying spree,
the decline in such buying since the budget should begin to be reflected soon in a decline in imports.
SA - 4
Statistical studies have demonstrated a close link for the
United Kingdom between movements in imports and inventory accumulation. The import figures for recent months, against the background
of inventory developments last year, strongly imply that business
has been building up inventories at a rapid rate.
There was very little increase in the physical volume of
inventories in 1967. In manufacturing alone stocks were run down,
on balance, during the year, by about £40 million at constant (1958)
prices; and the volume of inventories in other sectors were about
unchanged during the second half year, apart from those that represented strike-delayed exports. (See Table 3.) With inventories low,
and with a substantial expansion in economic activity under way and
expected to continue, both manufacturers and distributors have probably been trying to rebuild inventories recently. The very steep increase in imports of industrial materials -- 28 per cent in value
terms from the last four months of 1967 to the first four months of
1968 -- probably reflects a switch from inventory decumulation to
accumulation.
Table 3. United Kingdom: Inventory Changes
(Seasonally adjusted, £ million, 1958 prices)
Inventory Change
Total
Manufacturing
Change from end of preceding year
or quarter
1964
1965
1966
1967
590
365
199
1/96
354
217
129
-39
1967-I
37
-8
II
III
46
-22
11
-18
IV
1/35
-24
1/ These figures include an estimated £50 million of
export merchandise delayed by the dock strikes.
About 40 per cent of total British purchases abroad are
accounted for by industrial materials. The rapid rate at which these
expanded -- about twice as fast as total imports from SeptemberDecember to January-April -- suggests that industrial inventory building may have been the most important cause of the post-devaluation
climb in imports.
SA - 5
Identifying the causes of import expansion still begs the
question of why the rises were as large as they were, and especially
why import substitution appears to have made so little headway.
There are no ready answers, only more questions, such as whether import substitution is simply a slower process than many forecasters
thought or whether such non-price factors as speed and reliability
of delivery may overshadow price changes even of the magnitude entailed in a 14.3 per cent devaluation.
In this connection, the possibility has been suggested
that the British import propensities are undergoing an upward shift.
The principal evidence is the rapid rise in the quantity of imports
from late 1966 to late 1967, when industrial production and gross
domestic product, in real terms, were advancing only slowly. In
the previous three years, these measures of aggregate output and
imports had moved at similar rates. (See Table 4.)
Table 4. United Kingdom: Imports, Industrial Production, and GDP
(Seasonally adjusted; 3-quarter moving averages, centered)
Center of
period
Volume indexes, 1963-I = 100
Industrial
Imports
production
GDP
Ratios of indexes
Imports
Imports
to
to
Ind. prod.
GDP
1963-I
100
100
100
1.000
1.000
1966-11
118.7
117.2
113.5
1.013
1.046
1967-III
126.7
117.4
114.7
1.079
1.105
IV
130.5
118.7
n.a.
1.099
n.a.
n.a.
Not available.
Special factors, however, doubtless contributed to the rise
in the ratios of imports to output last year. These include the removal of the import surcharge at the end of November 1966 and, later
on, import purchases spurred by expectations of devaluation. In the
post-devaluation period, imports initially grew much faster than
total output, but, even if the various factors cited above cannot
wholly explain this development, it appears that the import/output
ratio is now retreating to lower levels. This is implicit in the
decline in the volume of imports in March and April, months when
total output appears to have been expanding, Thus the evidence of
rising import propensities is inconclusive at best.
SA - 6
Export developments have been encouraging
The performance of British exports since the devaluation
In contrast to imports, exports in the first
encouraging.
has been
four months of 1968 have lived up to expectations, closely conforming,
for example, to the National Institute's February forecast of a first
half total value of just over £3 billion. In fact, the volume of exports appears to have been greater thus far in 1968 than even the high
alternative in the Treasury's official forecast in March implied it
would be.
The favorable trend has been somewhat obscured by the
effects of last fall's dock strikes. With deliveries delayed by the
strike steadily diminishing (all told, such deliveries probably represented about 7 per cent of the total volume of exports in the first
four months of the year), exports have actually drifted downward during the year. The decrease was 2.7 per cent from January to April
in value terms and perhaps as much as 5 per cent in volume terms.
With exports having virtually ceased by now to be inflated
by deferred shipments, though, the extent of the underlying improvement is easier to gauge. The value of exports in April, for example,
was about 8 per cent higher than in the first quarter of 1967, indicating -- after allowance for price rises and possible small lingering effects of the dock strikes -- that exports in real terms have
reattained the record breaking highs reached in the first quarter of
1967.
The strengthening trend to date has probably been more a
function of recovery abroad than of devaluation, as is indicated by
the most notable export gains since last summer having been in shipThe value
(See Table 5.)
ments to the EEC and the United States.
of exports to the EEC (which accounted for 19 per cent of British
exports in 1967) increased from the third to the fourth quarter,
despite the dock strike. Exports as a whole declined by over 10
per cent in this period. In the first quarter exports to the EEC
increased by 18 per cent, and were 15 per cent higher than in the
first quarter of 1967. The corresponding year-to-year change for
total exports was about 10 per cent.
The gains in exports to the United States, which accounted
for about 12 per cent of the United Kingdom's total exports in 1967,
have been even larger. There was only a slight decline from the
third to the fourth quarter and then a 37 per cent increase from
October-December to January-March. The increase from first quarter
1967 to first quarter 1968 was 27 per cent.
SA - 7
Table 5.
United Kingdom:
Exports by Area
(Seasonally adjusted, L million, monthly average)
1968
S1967
North America
United States
Western Europe
EEC
Rest of world
Total 1/
I
April
142
II
144
138
130
97
150
75
55
67
50
68
49
67
51
93
70
83
n.a.
168
83
159
80
155
78
154
81
178
96
182
99
64
67
67
56
78
79
451
428
420
376
496
486
I
Sterling area
IV
III
/ Components may not add up to total because of rounding and
seasonal adjustments.
The outlook is for continuing strength in exports, with
the advance likely to gain speed toward the end of the year, assuming
that a high rate of economic activity is sustained among Britain's
major customers. This hopeful prognosis is based on the optimism expressed by British exporters themselves and on favorable (if somewhat
sketchy) data on new export orders, as well as on calculations of the
impact, both as regards magnitude and timing, that is to be expected
from the devaluation.
The numerous surveys of businessmen's expectations conducted
since the devaluation uniformly point to a significant improvement in
the prospects for exports. These soundings -- conducted at varying
intervals by the National Institute, the Confederation of British
Industries, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce and The
Financial Times -- do not in themselves provide a basis for precise
quantitative forecasts. Generally, the surveys elicit only qualitative information from respondents, such as whether they are more or
less optimistic about future prospects than they were at some previous date. In cases where quantitative predictions are made, the
past record for accuracy has varied widely. However, the consistently
sanguine character of the responses since the devaluation, combined
with the encouraging export returns and new orders information implies
that the outlook is in fact favorable.
The important aero-space and
machine tool industries have been the beneficiaries of particularly
large gains in new export orders.
SA -
8
As for what can be expected from the devaluation, research
on the price sensitivity of British exports indicates that the elasticity, for manufactures at least, which account for about 85 per
cent of total British exports, may be as high as two. That is, the
volume of exports can be expected to increase by 2 per cent for every
1 per cent decline in price, with the result of a 1 per cent rise in
value. Though estimates vary, it appears that foreign currency prices
of British exports to countries which did not devalue (such countries
buy over 80 per cent of the United Kingdom's exports) will be cut by
about half of the 14.3 per cent by which the pound was devalued. Thus
the foreign exchange value of British exports of manufactured goods
to non-devaluing importers could rise by as much as 7per cent over
what it would have been in the absence of devaluation, with a volume
increase twice that large.
Some items may respond quickly to devaluation. Automobile
manufacturers, for example, expect the volume of motor vehicle exports
(which were about 6.5 per cent of total exports in 1967) to rise by
35 per cent in 1968 over 1967, with approximately half of the anticipated gain being ascribed to devaluation; and, in fact, production
of automobiles for export has risen very rapidly this year (though
reported shortages of shipping have prevented a commensurate rise in
deliveries). Other goods, though -- particularly those where custom
building is an important element -- may not begin to reap substantial
benefits from devaluation for a year or more. Finding new customers
and negotiating contracts with them takes time, and there may be a
lengthy interval between the reception of an order and delivery of
the item ordered. A study of machine tool exports, for instance,
revealed that the waiting time between placing of orders and deliveries ranged from about eight months to a year.*
Thus the devaluation itself -- ignoring other influences -is unlikely to produce dramatic gains in exports in a few months. The
gains from devaluation are likely to be gradual, with the adequacy of
the new sterling parity as a stimulus to exports to be judged, in any
event, no sooner than late this year.
Conclusion
While the import surge in the post-devaluation months came
as a surprise and a disappointment, it can be largely explained in
terms of temporary influences. The consumer spending boom is already
waning, and the rapid rebuilding of inventories will begin to taper
off at some point. There was a small decline in the volume of imports in March and April, and further declines are to be expected.
* Steuer, M.D., Ball, R., and Eaton, J.R., "The Effect of Waiting
Time on Foreign Orders of Machine Tools," Economica, No. 132, November 1966.
SA - 9
Meanwhile the trend of exports, when corrected for carryover
from the dock strikes last fall, has been upward, and should continue
upward as the twin result of the November devaluation and the business
expansion in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, the prospects are for a very
substantial improvement in the trade balance in the months ahead.
It is too early to be sure that the balance of payments target that the United Kingdom is aiming at can be attained on schedule.
But the large deficits of early 1968 do not rule out the possibility
that the goal is achievable.
CONFIDENTIAL (FR)
SECOND SUPPLEMENT
CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Prepared for the
Federal Open Market Committee
By the Staff
Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System
May 27,
1968
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES
International Developments
U.S. exports of goods in April expanded by 18 per cent
(balance of payments basis) from the low March level.
This jump
reflects, in large measure, shipments delayed by the New York port
strike at the end of March.
Aircraft deliveries and shipments to
Canada were unusually low in March, and a recovery in such exports
may also have occurred in April (data not yet available).
However,
March-April exports were still about 3 per cent lower than those of
January-February combined.
Imports increased only slightly in April and this rise
may be largely an effect of the port strike.
Imports have remained
fairly stable in total during the first four months of this year;
March-April arrivals were only one per cent above those in JanuaryFebruary.
- 2-
U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE
Balance of Payments Basis
(seasonally adjusted annual rates; billions of dollars)
Balance
Imports
Exports
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
22.1
25.3
26.2
29.2
30.5
17.0
18.6
21.5
25.5
27.0
5.1
6.7
4.8
3.7
3.5
1967 -
I
II
III
IV
1968 I
30.6
30.8
30.5
29.9
31.7
26.7
26.4
26.2
28.6
31.3
3.9
4.4
4.3
1.3
0.4
1968 - Jan.
Feb.
2-month
average
Mar.
Apr.
2-month
average
32.8
33.1
31.4
31.2
1.4
1.9
32.9
29.3
34.5
31.9
1.6
31.3
31.4
31.7
-2.0
2.8
31.5
0.4
Cite this document
APA
Federal Reserve (1968, May 27). Greenbook/Tealbook. Greenbooks, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/greenbook_19680528_part1
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_greenbook_19680528_part1,
author = {Federal Reserve},
title = {Greenbook/Tealbook},
year = {1968},
month = {May},
howpublished = {Greenbooks, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/greenbook_19680528_part1},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}