Financial Stability Report

Financial Stability Report November 2020 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Financial Stability Report November 2020 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System This and other Federal Reserve Board reports and publications are available online at www.federalreserve.gov/publications/default.htm. To order copies of Federal Reserve Board publications offered in print, see the Board’s Publication Order Form (www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/orderform.pdf) or contact: Publications Fulfillment Mail Stop N-127 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Washington, DC 20551 (ph) 202-452-3245 (fax) 202-728-5886 (email) Publications-BOG@frb.gov iii Contents Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. Asset Valuations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2. Borrowing by Businesses and Households. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3. Leverage in the Financial Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4. Funding Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Near-Term Risks to the Financial System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Figure Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Boxes Federal Reserve Actions and Facilities to Support Households, Businesses, and Municipalities during the COVID-19 Crisis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Federal Reserve Actions to Stabilize Short-Term Funding Markets during the COVID-19 Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A Retrospective on the March 2020 Turmoil in Treasury and Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 LIBOR Transition Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 The Implications of Climate Change for Financial Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Salient Shocks to Financial Stability Cited in Market Outreach . . . . . . . . . . 62 Note: This report generally reflects information that was available as of October 26, 2020. 1 Purpose This report presents the Federal Reserve Board’s current assessment of the resilience of the U.S. financial system. By publishing this report, the Board intends to promote public under- standing and increase transparency and accountability for the Federal Reserve’s views on this topic. Promoting financial stability is a key element in meeting the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate for monetary policy regarding full employment and stable prices. In an unstable financial system, adverse events are more likely to result in severe financial stress and disrupt the flow of credit, leading to high unemployment and great financial hardship. Monitoring and assessing financial stability also support the Federal Reserve’s regulatory and supervisory activities, which promote the safety and soundness of our nation’s banks and other impor- tant financial institutions. Information gathered while monitoring the stability of the finan- cial system helps the Federal Reserve develop its view of the salient risks to be included in the scenarios of the stress tests and its setting of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB).1 The Board’s Financial Stability Report is similar to those published by other central banks and complements the annual report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and includes the Federal Reserve Board Chair and other financial regulators. 1 More information on the Federal Reserve’s supervisory and regulatory activities is available on the Board’s website; see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020), Supervision and Regulation Report (Washington: Board of Governors, May), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/supervision-and-regulation-report.htm as well as the webpages for Supervision and Regulation (https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg.htm) and Payment Systems (https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems.htm). Moreover, additional details about the conduct of monetary policy are also on the Board’s website; see the Monetary Policy Report (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mpr_ default.htm) and the webpage for Monetary Policy (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy.htm). 3 Framework A stable financial system, when hit by adverse events, or “shocks,” continues to meet the demands of households and businesses for financial services, such as credit provision and payment services. In contrast, in an unstable system, these same shocks are likely to have much larger effects, disrupting the flow of credit and leading to declines in employment and economic activity. Consistent with this view of financial stability, the Federal Reserve Board’s monitoring framework distinguishes between shocks to and vulnerabilities of the financial system. Shocks, such as sudden changes to financial or economic conditions, are typically surprises and are inherently difficult to predict. Vulnerabilities tend to build up over time and are the aspects of the financial system that are most expected to cause widespread problems in times of stress. As a result, the framework focuses primarily on monitoring vulnerabilities and emphasizes four broad categories based on research.2 1. Elevated valuation pressures are signaled by asset prices that are high relative to eco- nomic fundamentals or historical norms and are often driven by an increased willingness of investors to take on risk. As such, elevated valuation pressures imply a greater possibil- ity of outsized drops in asset prices. 2. Excessive borrowing by businesses and households leaves them vulnerable to distress if their incomes decline or the assets they own fall in value. In the event of such shocks, businesses and households with high debt burdens may need to cut back spending sharply, affecting the overall level of economic activity. Moreover, when businesses and households cannot make payments on their loans, financial institutions and investors incur losses. 3. Excessive leverage within the financial sector increases the risk that financial institu- tions will not have the ability to absorb even modest losses when hit by adverse shocks. In those situations, institutions will be forced to cut back lending, sell their assets, or, in extreme cases, shut down. Such responses can substantially impair credit access for house- holds and businesses. 4. Funding risks expose the financial system to the possibility that investors will “run” by withdrawing their funds from a particular institution or sector. Many financial institu- tions raise funds from the public with a commitment to return their investors’ money on short notice, but those institutions then invest much of the funds in illiquid assets that are hard to sell quickly or in assets that have a long maturity. This liquidity and maturity 2 For a review of the research literature in this area and further discussion, see Tobias Adrian, Daniel Covitz, and Nellie Liang (2015), “Financial Stability Monitoring,” Annual Review of Financial Economics, vol. 7 (December), pp. 357–95. 4 Framework transformation can create an incentive for investors to withdraw funds quickly in adverse situations. Facing a run, financial institutions may need to sell assets quickly at “fire sale” prices, thereby incurring substantial losses and potentially even becoming insolvent. Histo rians and economists often refer to widespread investor runs as “financial panics.” These vulnerabilities often interact with each other. For example, elevated valuation pres- sures tend to be associated with excessive borrowing by businesses and households because both borrowers and lenders are more willing to accept higher degrees of risk and leverage when asset prices are appreciating rapidly. The associated debt and leverage, in turn, make the risk of outsized declines in asset prices more likely and more damaging. Similarly, the risk of a run on a financial institution and the consequent fire sales of assets are greatly amplified when significant leverage is involved. It is important to note that liquidity and maturity transformation and lending to households, businesses, and financial firms are key aspects of how the financial system supports the economy. For example, banks provide safe, liquid assets to depositors and long-term loans to households and businesses; businesses rely on loans or bonds to fund investment projects; and households benefit from a well-functioning mortgage market when buying a home. The Federal Reserve’s monitoring framework also tracks domestic and international devel- opments to identify near-term risks—that is, plausible adverse developments or shocks that could stress the U.S. financial system. The analysis of these risks focuses on assessing how such potential shocks may play out through the U.S. financial system, given our current assessment of the four areas of vulnerabilities. While this framework provides a systematic way to assess financial stability, some potential risks do not fit neatly into it because they are novel or difficult to quantify. In addition, some vulnerabilities are difficult to measure with currently available data, and the set of vulnera- bilities may evolve over time. Given these limitations, we continually rely on ongoing research by the Federal Reserve staff, academics, and other experts to improve our measurement of existing vulnerabilities and to keep pace with changes in the financial system that could cre- ate new forms of vulnerabilities or add to existing ones. Federal Reserve actions to promote the resilience of the financial system The assessment of financial vulnerabilities informs Federal Reserve actions to promote the resilience of the financial system. The Federal Reserve works with other domestic agencies directly and through the FSOC to monitor risks to financial stability and to undertake super- visory and regulatory efforts to mitigate the risks and consequences of financial instability. Actions taken by the Federal Reserve to promote the resilience of the financial system include its supervision and regulation of financial institutions—in particular, large bank holding companies (BHCs), the U.S. operations of certain foreign banking organizations, FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 5 and financial market utilities. Specifically, in the post-crisis period, for the largest, most sys- temically important BHCs, these actions have included requirements for more and higher- quality capital, an innovative stress-testing regime, new liquidity regulation, and improve- ments in the resolvability of such BHCs. In addition, the Federal Reserve’s assessment of financial vulnerabilities informs the design of stress-test scenarios and decisions regarding the CCyB. The stress scenarios incorporate some systematic elements to make the tests more stringent when financial imbalances are rising, and the assessment of vulnerabilities also helps identify salient risks that can be included in the scenarios. The CCyB is designed to increase the resilience of large banking organizations when there is an elevated risk of above-normal losses and to promote a more sustainable supply of credit over the economic cycle. 7 Overview This report reviews conditions affecting the stability of the financial system by analyzing vul- nerabilities related to valuation pressures, borrowing by businesses and households, financial leverage, and funding risk. It also highlights several near-term risks that, if realized, could interact with such vulnerabilities. Since the May 2020 Financial Stability Report was issued, asset prices have continued to move up, on balance, amid periods of volatility. Business and household earnings have fallen and business borrowing has risen, which leave households and firms more vulnerable to future shocks. Banks absorbed large losses related to the pandemic but remained well capi- talized throughout; moreover, capital ratios have since generally recovered to pre-pandemic levels. However, the COVID-19 shock highlighted how vulnerabilities related to leverage and funding risk at nonbank financial institutions could amplify shocks in the financial system in times of stress. Our view of the current level of vulnerabilities is as follows: 1. Asset valuations. Asset prices have generally increased since May of this year. The ele- vated levels of asset prices in various markets likely reflect the low level of Treasury yields, and meas ures of the compensation for risk appear roughly aligned with historical norms. Given the high level of uncertainty associated with the pandemic, assessing valuation pressures is particularly challenging, and asset prices remain vulnerable to significant declines should investor risk sentiment fall or the economic recovery weaken. 2. Borrowing by businesses and households. Debt owed by businesses, which was already historically high relative to gross domestic product (GDP) before the pandemic, has risen sharply as businesses increased borrowing to weather the period of weak earnings. The general decline in revenues associated with the severe reduction in economic activity has weakened the ability of businesses to service these obligations. Household debt was at a moderate level relative to income before the public health shock, but many households have lost jobs and seen their earnings fall. As many households continue to struggle, loan defaults may rise, leading to material losses. So far, strains in the business and household sectors have been mitigated by significant government lending and relief programs and by low interest rates. That said, some households and businesses have been substantially more affected to date than others, suggesting that the sources of vulnerability in these sectors are unevenly distributed. 3. Leverage in the financial sector. The pandemic stressed the resilience of banks, but they remain well capitalized. Leverage at broker-dealers also remains low. In contrast, meas- ures of leverage at life insurance companies are at post-2008 highs and remain elevated at 8 oVerVIew hedge funds relative to the past five years. Some nonbank financial institutions felt signifi- cant strains amid the acute period of extreme market volatility, declining asset prices, and worsening market liquidity earlier this year. Pressures eased as a result of policy actions, including Federal Reserve asset purchases and repurchase agreement (repo) operations, regulatory relief for dealers affiliated with BHCs, and support from the emergency lend- ing facilities. 4. Funding risk. Bank funding risk remains low, as they rely only modestly on short-term wholesale funding and maintain large amounts of high-quality liquid assets, which has helped banks manage heightened liquidity pressures. Banks also benefited from a surge in deposit inflows through the second quarter of 2020. In contrast, the large redemptions from money funds and fixed-income mutual funds, as well as the need for extraordinary support from emergency lending facilities, highlighted vulnerabilities in these sectors. While in place, those facilities substantially mitigate these vulnerabilities. The report also details how near-term risks have changed since the May 2020 report. The outlook for the pandemic and economic activity is uncertain. In the near term, risks associ- ated with the course of COVID-19 and its effects on the U.S. and global economies remain high. In addition, there is potential for stresses to interact with preexisting vulnerabilities in dollar funding markets or those stemming from financial systems or fiscal weaknesses in Europe, China, and emerging market economies (EMEs). These risks have the potential to interact with the vulnerabilities identified in this report and pose additional risks to the U.S. financial system. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 9 Federal Reserve Actions and Facilities to Support Households, Businesses, and Municipalities during the COVID-19 Crisis Since the beginning of the pandemic, the Federal Reserve has taken forceful actions to support the continued fl ow of credit to households, businesses, and state and local governments. At the onset of the pandemic, it became clear that businesses and families would face an extended period during which many forms of economic activity were curtailed for public health reasons. During this period, revenues and incomes would be sharply lower. Employers faced the prospect of being unable to pay wages and other obligations, which could force them to shut down permanently and, in turn, restrain the economy’s recovery. At the same time, the availability of credit sharply worsened, with many lend- ing markets commonly tapped by employers effectively shut. Supported by funds provided by the CARES Act, the Federal Reserve created, with the authorization of the U.S. Treasury Department, a number of emergency lending facilities.1 Collectively, the facilities support the fl ow of credit throughout the economy both by providing backstop measures that give investors confi dence that lending support is available should conditions deteriorate substantially and by supplying funding that is more directly used to meet credit demand.2 Backstops for larger firms and municipalities The Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF), Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF), and Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) were established to improve the fl ow of credit through bond markets, where large fi rms and municipalities obtain most of their long-term funding.3 The PMCCF stands ready to purchase new bonds and loans issued by investment-grade U.S. corporations so that they can maintain business operations and employment during the pandemic. The SMCCF supports trading in the bonds that corporations previously issued. The MLF helps state and local gov- ernments as well as certain multistate or revenue bond issuers manage their cash fl ow needs, which may be particularly acute given the potential mismatch between delayed or diminished tax receipts and higher-than-normal spending for unemployment insurance and other essential services. The announcements of the PMCCF, SMCCF, and MLF in late March and early April led to rapid improvements in corporate and municipal bond markets well ahead of the facilities’ actual opening. Spreads across a variety of debt markets quickly narrowed, permitting businesses and municipalities to borrow at sharply lower costs (fi gures A, B, and C). SMCCF purchases to date amount to about (continued on next page) 1 The CareS act (Coronavirus aid, relief, and economic Security act) authorized the Treasury’s equity contribution to many of the facilities, which collectively can support up to $2.6 trillion of credit to firms of all sizes and to state and local governments. 2 In addition, backstop facilities may also implicitly affect the prices at which credit is intermediated. For additional information on facilities’ price effects, see Sam Schulhofer-wohl (2020), “The Influence and Limits of Central Bank Backstops,” Federal reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed Insights (blog), august 17, https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/blogs/chicago-fed-insights/2020/the- influence-and-limits-of-central-bank-backstops. Though borrowers must meet eligibility standards and funds are not unlimited, these programs are designed to be broad based; taken together, they facilitate credit provision for sectors that account for more than 97 percent of all u.S. employment. See ryan Decker, robert kurtzman, Byron Lutz, and Chris Nekarda (forthcoming), “across the universe: Policy Support for employment and revenue in the Pandemic recession,” Finance and economics Discussion Series (washington: Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System). 3 For more details on the facilities, see the box “The Federal reserve’s monetary Policy actions and Facilities to Support the economy since the CoVID-19 outbreak” in Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System (2020), Financial Stability Report (washington: Board of Governors, may), pp. 9–15, https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20200515.pdf. 10 oVerVIew Federal Reserve Actions and Facilities (continued) $13 billion—just more than 0.2 percent of the $5.5 trillion of outstanding nonfi nancial corporate bonds. The MLF has, to date, purchased two issues totaling just more than $1.6 billion. However, since the announcement of the backstop facilities and funding market stabilization measures, more than $1 trillion in new nonfi nancial corporate bonds and more than $250 billion in municipal debt have been issued, purchased almost entirely by the private sector (fi gures D and E). Figure a. Corporate Bond Spreads to 10-Year Treasury Basis points Basis points 750 2200 Daily PMCCF/ 650 SMCCF PMCCF/ 1800 550 High-yield (right scale) SMCCF expanded 450 Triple-B (left scale) 1400 350 1000 250 Oct. 600 150 26 50 200 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Source: ICe Data Indices, LLC, used with permission. Figure B. municipal Bond Yields, by rating Figure C. municipal Bond Spreads, by rating Percent Basis points 5.0 500 Daily Daily 4.5 Triple-A 400 4.0 3.5 Triple-B 300 3.0 200 2.5 Oct. Oct. 100 2.0 16 16 1.5 0 Triple-A 1.0 −100 Triple-B 0.5 0.0 −200 2018 2019 2020 Feb. Apr. June Aug. Oct. 2020 Source: ICe Data Indices, LLC. Source: ICe Data Indices, LLC. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) provides additional support for consumers and businesses. The TALF supports the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, loans backed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), and certain other assets. A key market that benefi ts from the TALF is commercial real estate (CRE), as legacy commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and SBA securitizations collateralized by CRE mortgages are eligible for the TALF and have represented the bulk of the assets pledged as collateral for TALF loans. Similar to the other backstop facilities, while outstanding balances in the TALF have remained modest, spreads in ABS markets have narrowed considerably, and private market issuance has resumed (fi gure F). (continued) FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 11 Figure D. Cumulative Corporate Credit Issuance Billions of dollars Billions of dollars 2400 550 2200 Investment-grade (2020 YTD, left scale) 500 2000 High-yield (2020 YTD, right scale) 450 1800 Average investment-grade (2015–19, left scale) 400 1600 Average high-yield (2015−19, right scale) 350 1400 300 1200 250 1000 200 800 600 150 400 100 200 50 0 0 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 Week number Source: S&P Global, Leveraged Commentary & Data. Figure e. 2020 weekly municipal Bond Issuance, by rating Billions of dollars 28 Double-A 24 Triple-A A 20 Triple-B 16 < Triple-B 12 8 4 0 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. 2020 Source: Bloomberg. Figure F. Consumer aBS Spreads (3-Year Triple-a) Basis points 350 Weekly 300 TALF announcement FFELP student loans Fixed credit card 250 Fixed prime auto 200 150 100 Oct. 22 50 0 Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. 2020 Source: JPmorgan Chase & Co. (continued on next page) 12 oVerVIew Federal Reserve Actions and Facilities (continued) Funding for small and medium-sized businesses The Federal Reserve has taken actions to support lending by banks and nonbanks that specialize in small business loans. The Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) was established to extend credit to lenders that participate in the SBA’s Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which provides payroll support for small businesses. The PPP provides forgivable loans to small businesses in order for them to keep workers on their payrolls. The Main Street Lending Program (Main Street) targets fi rms that are often too small to issue corporate bonds or access capital markets. Through September 30, the Federal Reserve had made more than 11,000 PPPLF advances to nearly 800 banking institutions, totaling around $70 billion. Small community banks account for 50 percent of the advances and 90 percent of active borrowers. Moreover, 80 community development fi nancial institutions and minority development institutions, which serve communities in distress and minority communities, have received PPPLF advances supporting nearly $17 billion in loans. The average PPP loan size that the advances support was just more than $100,000, suggesting that the PPPLF funds were mostly directed to lenders that helped support small business employment. The $669 billion advanced under the PPP earlier this year may have restrained small business demand for bank loans, with many borrowers reportedly using the funds to pay down lines of credit. Main Street established fi ve types of loans: three for for-profi t businesses and two for nonprofi t organi- zations. Banks originate the loans, and the Federal Reserve, in turn, purchases 95 percent participation in them. Eligibility requirements and terms differ across loan types, but borrowers must have fewer than 15,000 employees or 2019 revenues of less than $5 billion. Main Street loans are designed specif- ically to help borrowers weather a period of sharply reduced revenues, featuring interest and principal payments that are deferred over the fi rst two years, underwriting criteria that generally look back to borrowers’ pre-pandemic fi nancial circumstances and post-pandemic prospects, and other elements. As of October 5, Main Street had purchased 303 loan participations, totaling nearly $3 billion. To date, Main Street loans appear to be fl owing to borrowers from the hardest-hit areas of the coun- try. For example, more loans are going to fi rms in states that experienced larger unemployment rate increases during the height of the pandemic. Loans have also covered a wide range of industries. Importantly, small and medium-sized banks, which tend to supply credit to small and medium-sized businesses, make up the majority of the loan participants. Community banks (defi ned as institutions with less than $10 billion in assets) have originated roughly 61 percent of the dollar value of extended loans. Main Street provides an important backstop should the recovery falter and a larger number of businesses need more access to credit. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 13 Federal Reserve Actions to S tabilize Short-Term Funding Markets during the COVID-19 Crisis At the onset of the pandemic in late March 2020, investors rapidly moved into cash and the most liquid fi nancial instruments, causing acute stresses in some short-term funding markets. Dislocations in mar- kets for U.S. Treasury securities occurred, and market functioning was unusually strained (see fi gure A and the box “A Retrospective on the March 2020 Turmoil in Treasury and Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets”). Investors shortened the horizon over which they would lend to companies in the commer- cial paper (CP) market. In addition, some prime money market funds (MMFs) experienced historically large redemptions. These stresses had the potential to amplify the shock of the pandemic, because a breakdown in short-term funding markets could leave companies unable to meet near-term obligations and households and businesses unable to access accounts they routinely use to make payments. Figure a. Indicative u.S. Treasury Bid-ask Spreads Cents per $100 Billions of dollars 60 2800 Daily Asset Cumulative Fed UST purchases since March 1 (right scale) 50 purchases On-the-run bid-ask spread (left scale) 2400 announced Asset purchases First off-the-run bid-ask spread (left scale) 2000 40 expanded 1600 30 1200 20 800 10 400 0 0 Mar. Mar. Apr. May May June July July Aug. Sept. Sept. 6 27 17 8 29 19 10 31 21 11 25 Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York. The Federal Reserve, with the support of the Department of the Treasury, quickly responded and announced the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) to stabilize funding markets, backstop against further stress, and improve the fl ow of credit to households and businesses. The facilities gave investors confi dence that they could access their cash when needed and that companies would be able to roll over CP when needed, relieving selling pressures. Consequently, redemptions among prime MMFs fell dramatically, spreads on corporate CP narrowed, and term CP volumes of fi ve days and greater stabilized (fi gure B). Although balances in the PDCF, CPFF, and MMLF have fallen from their initial highs to very low levels, the facilities continue to serve as important backstops against further market stress and support the fl ow of credit as the pandemic persists (fi gure C). (continued on next page) 14 oVerVIew Federal Reserve Actions to S tabilize Funding Markets (continued) Figure B. 1-month Funding market Spreads for Investment-Grade Nonfinancial Corporations Basis points 600 Daily AA nonfinancial CP 500 CPFF and MMLF A2/P2 nonfinancial CP terms adjusted 400 300 200 100 0 Feb. 14 Apr. 4 May 25 July 16 Sept. 5 Oct. 26 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System; DTCC Solutions LLC, an affiliate of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. Figure C. outstanding Balances of emergency Lending Facilities Billions of dollars 80 Weekly PDCF MMLF 60 CPFF 40 20 0 Mar. Apr. May May June July July Aug. Sept. Sept. 25 15 6 27 17 8 29 19 9 30 Source: Federal reserve Board, Statistical release H.4.1, “Factors affecting reserve Balances.” 15 1. Asset Valuations Asset prices have generally increased since May, and, when adjusted for low interest rates, valuation pressures appear roughly in line with their historical norms At the time of the May Financial Stability Report, improvements in investor risk sentiment and market functioning had started to boost asset prices. Over the past six months, asset prices in key markets have continued to rise in light of the rebound in economic activity, policy actions to mitigate the financial amplification of the COVID-19 shock, and inves- tor optimism. The U.S. broad-market stock price index has risen substantially from its low point this year and touched record highs in recent months, although volatility remains high and there is considerable uncertainty about the path of earnings. Spreads on corporate bonds and leveraged loans have decreased significantly. After accounting for the low level of interest rates, however, measures of the compensation for risk are roughly in line with their historical norms. Prices for commercial properties have started to fall, although they remain elevated relative to incomes. Low transaction volumes—especially for distressed properties—make commer- cial property valuations particularly difficult to judge. Farmland prices remain elevated rel- ative to rents and incomes. Supported by low mortgage rates, housing prices have increased along with strong home sales. Asset prices remain vulnerable to significant declines, given a high degree of uncertainty around the course of the pandemic and the pace of the recovery Prompt and forceful policy responses—including fiscal stimulus, lower interest rates, and various asset purchase and emergency lending programs—have supported a stronger- than-expected economic recovery. However, uncertainty remains high, and investor risk sentiment could shift swiftly should the economic recovery prove less promising or progress on containing the virus disappoint. Some segments of the economy, such as energy as well as travel and hospitality, are particularly vulnerable to a prolonged pandemic. Within CRE, retail, office, and lodging properties exhibit the highest vulnerability. Table 1 shows the size of the asset markets discussed in this section. The largest asset markets are those for residential real estate, corporate public equities, CRE, and Treasury securities. 16 aSSeT VaLuaTIoNS Table 1. Size of Selected Asset Markets Growth, Average annual growth, Outstanding 2019:Q2–2020:Q2 1997–2020:Q2 Item (billions of dollars) (percent) (percent) residential real estate 39,290 4.6 5.6 equities 37,188 4.5 8.0 Commercial real estate 20,444 2.0 7.0 Treasury securities 19,867 25.1 8.8 Investment-grade corporate bonds 6,354 8.7 8.6 Farmland 2,561 1.3 5.3 High-yield and unrated corporate bonds 1,572 20.0 7.6 Leveraged loans* 1,185 –.6 14.3 Price growth (real) Commercial real estate** –.9 2.5 residential real estate*** 3.7 2.1 Note: The data extend through 2020:Q2. Growth rates are measured from Q2 of the year immediately preceding the period through Q2 of the final year of the period. equities, real estate, and farmland are at market value; bonds and loans are at book value. * The amount outstanding shows institutional leveraged loans and generally excludes loan commitments held by banks. For example, lines of credit are generally excluded from this measure. average annual growth of leveraged loans is from 2000 to 2020:Q2, as this market was fairly small before then. ** one-year growth of commercial real estate prices is from June 2019 to June 2020, and average annual growth is from 1998:Q4 to 2020:Q2. Both growth rates are calculated from value-weighted nominal prices deflated using the consumer price index. *** one-year growth of residential real estate is from June 2019 to June 2020, and average annual growth is from 1997:Q4 to 2020:Q2. Nominal prices are deflated using the consumer price index. Source: For leveraged loans, S&P Global market Intelligence, Leveraged Commentary & Data; for corporate bonds, mergent, Inc., Corporate Fixed Income Securities Database; for farmland, Department of agriculture; for residential real estate price growth, CoreLogic; for commercial real estate price growth, CoStar Group, Inc., CoStar Commercial repeat Sale Indices; for all other items, Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States.” Treasury yields are near historical lows Treasury yields across the maturity spectrum have generally changed little since May and are near historical lows (figure 1-1). Model estimates of Treasury term premiums remain at record lows (figure 1-2).3 The low yields of longer-dated Treasury securities and historically low term premiums are consistent with market expectations for interest rates to be low for a long time. In addition, a forward-looking measure of Treasury market volatility derived from options prices dropped to a historical low, in sharp contrast to the turmoil in March (figure 1-3). 3 Treasury term premiums capture the difference between the yield that investors require for holding longer-term Treasury securities—for which realized returns are more sensitive to risks from future inflation or volatility in interest rates than the realized returns of shorter-term securities—and the expected yield from rolling over shorter-dated ones. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 17 Federal Reserve actions, including asset purchases, continue to sustain the functioning of Treasury markets. Measures that capture the market’s ability to absorb large orders without significant price disruptions, such as the quantity of outstanding offers to buy and sell Treas- ury securities, have largely recovered to pre-pandemic levels (figure 1-4). 1-1. Yields on Nominal Treasury Securities Percent, annual rate 8 monthly 2-year 7 10-year 6 5 4 3 2 oct. 1 0 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board, Statistical release H.15, “Selected Interest rates.” 1-2. Term Premium on 10-Year Nominal Treasury 1-3. Implied Volatility of 10-Year Swap rate Securities Basis points Percentage points 300 monthly 2.5 monthly 250 2.0 1.5 200 1.0 150 0.5 oct. 100 0.0 −0.5 oct. 50 −1.0 0 −1.5 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: Barclays. Source: Department of the Treasury; wolters kluwer, Blue Chip Financial Forecasts; Federal reserve Bank of New York; Federal reserve Board staff estimates. 1-4. Treasury market Depth millions of dollars millions of dollars 35 350 5-day moving average 5-year (right scale) 30 300 10-year (right scale) 25 30-year (left scale) 250 20 200 oct. 15 26 150 10 100 5 50 0 0 Feb. apr. June aug. oct. Dec. Feb. apr. June aug. oct. 2019 2020 Source: repo interdealer broker community. 18 aSSeT VaLuaTIoNS Corporate debt market spreads returned to historical norms, market functioning improved, and issuance resumed 1-5. Corporate Bond Yields Supported by very low Treasury yields, yields Percent on corporate bonds dropped to historically 24 monthly 22 low levels (figure 1-5). Spreads of yields on 20 High-yield 18 corporate bonds over comparable-maturity 16 Triple-B Treasury yields narrowed considerably and 14 12 stand at about their historical medians oct. 10 8 (figure 1-6).4 However, spreads in sectors 6 heavily affected by the pandemic, such as the 4 2 energy, airline, and leisure industries, remain 0 quite elevated. Reflecting a pickup in risk 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: ICe Data Indices, LLC, used with permission. appetite, the excess bond premium—measured as the gap between corporate bond spreads and expected credit losses—fell below its historical median (figure 1-7).5 1-6. Corporate Bond Spreads to Similar-maturity 1-7. Corporate Bond Premium over expected Treasury Securities Losses Percentage points Percentage points Percentage points 12 24 5 11 monthly 22 monthly 4 10 Triple-B 20 9 (left scale) 18 3 8 16 7 High-yield 14 2 6 (right scale) 12 1 5 oct. 10 4 8 0 3 6 Sept. −1 2 4 1 2 −2 0 0 −3 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: ICe Data Indices, LLC, used with permission. Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database (warga); Intercontinental exchange, Inc., ICe Data Services; Center for research in Security Prices, CrSP/Compustat merged Database, wharton research Data Services; S&P Global market Intelligence, Compustat. The announcement of a range of measures to support market functioning and the flow of credit in late March, particularly the corporate credit facilities, led to significant improvement in corporate bond market functioning and provided a backstop to support borrowing by cor- porations (see the box “Federal Reserve Actions and Facilities to Support Households, Busi- nesses, and Municipalities during the COVID-19 Crisis”). Bid-ask spreads have tightened. 4 Spreads between yields on corporate bonds and comparable-maturity Treasury securities reflect the extra compensation investors require to hold debt that is subject to corporate default or liquidity risks. 5 For a description of the excess bond premium, see Simon Gilchrist and Egon Zakrajšek (2012), “Credit Spreads and Busi- ness Cycle Fluctuations,” American Economic Review, vol. 102 (June), pp. 1692–720. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 19 Corporate bond issuance by both investment- and speculative-grade firms has been very strong, as companies have increased their cash buffers and refinanced their debt at lower interest rates and longer maturities. Despite the decline in spreads and the increase in new issuance, corporate credit quality has deteriorated since May—as evidenced by defaults and firm ratings downgrades—though it has shown some signs of stabilization in recent months. Spreads on leveraged loans in the secondary market have tightened significantly since the spring and are now close to their post-2008 medians (figure 1-8). Spreads on newly issued leveraged loans have also tightened. 1-8. Secondary market Spreads of Leveraged Loans Basis points 3000 weekly B 2500 BB 2000 1500 oct. 1000 30 500 0 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: S&P, Leveraged Commentary & Data. Equity prices rose sharply, with higher valuations supported, in part, by low interest rates Valuations in equity markets have risen substantially as equity prices have continued to move up since the previous Financial Stability Report. Prices relative to forecasts of corporate earnings have also risen considerably and are currently near the top of their historical distri- 1-9. Forward Price-to-earnings ratio of S&P 500 Firms bution, even though there is significant uncer- ratio tainty in the earnings outlook among market 30 monthly participants (figure 1-9). However, while the 27 24 oct. gap between the forward earnings-to-price ratio 21 and the expected real yield on 10-year Treasury median 18 15 securities—a rough measure of the premium 12 that investors require for holding risky cor- 9 6 porate equities—has declined since May, it 3 remains above its historical median due to the 0 low level of Treasury yields (figure 1-10). This 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 development suggests that investor risk appe- Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations using refinitiv (formerly Thomson reuters), Institutional Brokers estimate tite, though higher since May, is still within System estimates. historical norms. 20 aSSeT VaLuaTIoNS 1-10. Spread of Forward earnings-to-Price ratio of S&P 500 Firms to 10-Year real Treasury Yield Percentage points 10 monthly 8 oct. 6 median 4 2 0 −2 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations using refinitiv (formerly Thomson reuters), Institutional Brokers estimate System estimates; Department of the Treasury; Federal reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional Forecasters. While equity price volatility has fallen since the late spring, it remains elevated by historical standards. Further, option-implied volatility, a close proxy for expected volatility, did not fall as much as realized volatility (figure 1-11). Elevated volatility and the divergence between expected and realized volatility suggest investors are pricing in concerns about downside risks and considerable uncertainty about future outcomes. 1-11. S&P 500 return Volatility Percent 70 monthly option-implied volatility 60 realized volatility 50 40 oct. 30 20 10 0 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. Prices of commercial properties are still elevated relative to incomes Since the May Financial Stability Report, CRE prices have declined moderately (figure 1-12). However, capitalization rates, which measure annual income relative to prices for recently transacted commercial properties, have remained near historically low levels, suggesting ele- vated valuation pressures may still exist (figure 1-13).6 6 Capitalization rates reflect the reported incomes used for underwriting loans on new transactions. They therefore represent a selected sample of properties and, as transaction volumes remain depressed, may not reflect the loss of income other data sources are reporting. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 21 1-12. Commercial real estate Prices (real) 1-13. Capitalization rate at Property Purchase Jan. 2001 = 100 Percent 200 10.0 monthly monthly 180 9.5 equal- weighted 160 9.0 Value- 140 8.5 weighted aug. 8.0 120 7.5 100 7.0 80 Sept. 6.5 60 6.0 40 5.5 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: CoStar Group, Inc., CoStar Commercial repeat Sale Source: real Capital analytics; andrew C. Florance, Norm G. Indices; Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index via miller, ruijue Peng, and Jay Spivey (2010), “Slicing, Dicing, and Haver analytics. Scoping the Size of the u.S. Commercial real estate market,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, vol. 16 (may– august), pp. 101–18. Evidence of significant strains are present in other data sources. Vacancy rates have turned higher, and rent growth has either slowed or turned negative. Prices of real estate invest- Net percentage of banks reporting 100 ment trusts (REITs) that invest in lodging 80 and retail properties remain well below their 60 40 pre-pandemic levels, although prices of those 20 that invest in industrial properties have some- 0 −20 what recovered since the spring. Additionally, −40 delinquency rates on CMBS, which normally −60 −80 contain riskier loans, have spiked. Finally, −100 the July Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 on Bank Lending Practices (SLOOS) indi- cated that a major fraction of banks reported weaker demand for CRE loans and tighter lending standards, on net, in the second quar- ter of 2020 (figure 1-14). 1-15. Farmland Prices 2019 dollars per acre Farmland prices remain high relative 7000 annual to rents midwest index 6000 united States According to data through the second quarter 5000 of 2020, farmland prices continued to decline 4000 modestly at the national level and at a slightly median 3000 faster pace in several midwestern states, 2000 where prices were more elevated (figure 1-15). Despite the declines, farmland prices remain 1000 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 high relative to rents (figure 1-16). Source: Department of agriculture; Federal reserve Board staff calculations. gninethgiT gnisae 1-14. Change in Bank Standards for Commercial real estate Loans Quarterly Q2 Source: Federal reserve Board, Senior Loan officer opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices; Federal reserve Board staff calculations. 22 aSSeT VaLuaTIoNS 1-16. Farmland Price-to-rent ratio House price growth accelerated over the ratio summer, while the price-to-rent ratio 35 annual remains slightly above its long-run trend midwest index 30 united States Since the previous Financial Stability Report, 25 average house price growth has accelerated 20 somewhat (figure 1-17). Nationwide, prices median appear to be a little above their long-run 15 average relationship with property rents 10 (figure 1-18). Housing price-to-rent ratios 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 continued to vary significantly across regional Source: Department of agriculture; Federal reserve Board staff calculations. markets (figure 1-19). 1-17. Growth of Nominal Prices of existing Homes 1-18. Housing Price-to-rent ratio 12-month percent change Trend at July 2020 = 100 20 150 monthly Zillow monthly 140 CoreLogic 15 130 10 120 July 5 Price-to-rent ratio 110 aug. 0 100 90 −5 Long-run 80 −10 trend 70 −15 60 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 2020 Source: For house prices, CoreLogic; for rent data, Bureau of Source: CoreLogic real estate Data; Zillow, Inc., Zillow real Labor Statistics. estate Data. 1-19. Selected Local Housing Price-to-rent ratio Indexes Jan. 2010 = 100 240 monthly 220 Phoenix 200 miami Los angeles 180 median 160 middle 80 percent of markets aug. 140 120 100 80 60 40 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Source: For house prices, CoreLogic real estate Data; for rent data, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The strength in the housing sector reflects robust demand from households and is being sup- ported by the low level of interest rates. However, downside risk remains, given the unusually large number of mortgage loans in forbearance programs and the uncertainty around their ultimate repayment. 23 2. Borrowing by Businesses and Households Historically high levels of business debt and the weakening in household finances could pose a significant medium-run vulnerability for the financial system Vulnerabilities arising from business debt, which were already elevated at the start of the pandemic, have grown further. Business debt levels increased notably earlier this year as businesses borrowed heavily to weather the pandemic-related shutdowns. However, some of that debt was extended through the PPP and may be eligible for forgiveness, and the low level of interest rates means that businesses can carry more debt. In contrast to business bor- rowing, household borrowing advanced more slowly than overall economic activity before the COVID-19 crisis and remained heavily concentrated among borrowers with high credit scores. As a result, vulnerabilities arising from household debt were at more modest levels on the eve of the shock; nonetheless, a substantial number of households are facing increasing financial distress. Table 2 shows the amounts outstanding and recent historical growth rates of forms of debt owed by nonfinancial businesses and households as of the end of the second quarter of 2020. Total outstanding private credit was split about evenly between businesses and households, with businesses owing $17.6 trillion and households owing about $16.1 trillion. Accelerating debt growth and the decline in gross domestic product in the second quarter led to a sharp increase in the ratio of credit to gross domestic product Before the onset of the pandemic, the combined total debt owed by businesses and house- holds expanded at a pace similar to that of nominal GDP for several years. Between the end of 2019 and June, credit growth accelerated and reached about 9 percent in annualized terms, mostly reflecting strong business borrowing. The precipitous drop in GDP following the outbreak and the increase in business borrowing have caused a dramatic rise in the credit- to-GDP ratio to historical highs (figure 2-1). The household debt-to-GDP ratio had fallen steadily over the long expansion but has jumped recently, returning to levels last seen in 2012 (figure 2-2). Business debt outstanding has grown rapidly so far in 2020 as companies take advantage of low interest rates to bolster cash reserves needed to manage through the pandemic Borrowing by businesses, likely seeking to bridge pandemic-related interruptions to revenues, was extremely high in the first half of 2020 (figure 2-3). Most of the growth in the first quar- ter was driven by a surge in bank credit-line draws in March, while the growth in the second quarter was driven by very strong corporate bond issuance and by approximately $500 bil- lion in loans extended under the PPP. However, a significant fraction of the PPP loans may be eligible for forgiveness, as noted earlier, and banks’ loan extensions not tied to the PPP 24 BorrowING BY BuSINeSSeS aND HouSeHoLDS Table 2. Outstanding Amounts of Nonfinancial Business and Household Credit Growth, Average annual growth, Outstanding 2019:Q2–2020:Q2 1997–2020:Q2 Item (billions of dollars) (percent) (percent) Total private nonfinancial credit 33,669 6.7 5.7 Total nonfinancial business credit 17,604 10.5 6.2 Corporate business credit 11,041 11.2 5.6 Bonds and commercial paper 7,126 9.4 6.1 Bank lending 1,684 25.7 4.5 Leveraged loans* 1,126 −.6 14.3 Noncorporate business credit 6,564 9.3 7.6 Commercial real estate 2,551 5.7 6.2 Total household credit 16,065 2.8 5.2 mortgages 10,592 3.0 5.4 Consumer credit 4,079 .8 4.8 Student loans 1,677 4.0 8.9 auto loans 1,198 3.1 4.9 Credit cards 954 −8.0 2.3 Nominal GDP 19,487 −6.0 3.7 Note: The data extend through 2020:Q2. Growth rates are measured from Q2 of the year immediately preceding the period through Q2 of the final year of the period. The table reports the main components of corporate business credit, total household credit, and consumer credit. other, smaller components are not reported. The commercial real estate (Cre) row shows Cre debt owed by both corporate and noncorporate businesses. The total household-sector credit includes debt owed by other entities, such as nonprofit organizations. GDP is gross domestic product. * Leveraged loans included in this table are an estimate of the leveraged loans that are made to nonfinancial businesses only and do not include the small amount of leveraged loans outstanding for financial businesses. The amount outstanding shows institutional leveraged loans and generally excludes loan commitments held by banks. For example, lines of credit are generally excluded from this measure. The average annual growth rate shown for leveraged loans is computed from 2000 to 2020:Q2, as this market was fairly small before 2000. Source: For leveraged loans, S&P Global, Leveraged Commentary & Data; for GDP, Bureau of economic analysis, national income and product accounts; for all other items, Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States.” 2-1. Private Nonfinancial-Sector Credit-to-GDP ratio ratio 2.0 Quarterly Q2 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.8 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on Bureau of economic analysis, national income and product accounts, and Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States.” FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 25 2-2. Nonfinancial Business- and Household-Sector Credit-to-GDP ratios ratio ratio 1.1 0.95 Quarterly 0.90 1.0 0.85 0.9 0.80 0.8 0.75 0.70 0.7 Q2 0.65 0.6 Nonfinancial business 0.60 0.5 (right scale) 0.55 Household (left scale) 0.50 0.4 0.45 0.3 0.40 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on Bureau of economic analysis, national income and product accounts, and Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States.” declined in the second and third quarters as 2-3. Growth of real aggregate Debt of the Business Sector some firms started to repay their credit lines Percent change, annual rate and as the loan supply tightened. Firms’ liquid 20 Quarterly Q2 assets increased notably in the first and second 15 quarters, suggesting that firms were keeping 10 their borrowed funds largely as a buffer. More- over, historically low interest rates continue to 5 somewhat mitigate investor concerns about 0 default risks arising from high leverage. The −5 net issuance of riskier forms of business debt— −10 high-yield bonds and institutional leveraged 2002 2008 2014 2020 loans—had remained high overall through 2019 Source: Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States.” but slowed during the acute market strains earlier this year. In the second quarter, net issuance of high-yield bonds rebounded, while leveraged loan net issuance contracted. In the third quarter, both high-yield bond and leveraged loan net issuances returned to roughly average historical levels (figure 2-4). 2-4. Net Issuance of risky Business Debt Billions of dollars 110 Quarterly Institutionalleveraged loans 90 High-yield andunrated bonds 70 50 Q3 30 10 −10 −30 −50 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Source: mergent, Fixed Income Securities Database; S&P Global, Leveraged Commentary & Data. 26 BorrowING BY BuSINeSSeS aND HouSeHoLDS After significantly increasing in the aftermath of the pandemic, business debt vulnerabilities have moderated more recently but appear high relative to their historical range An indicator of the leverage of large businesses—the ratio of debt to assets for all publicly traded nonfinancial firms—was at its highest level in 20 years at the end of the second quar- ter (figure 2-5).7 An alternative indicator of business leverage that subtracts cash holdings from debt—net leverage—also remains near 20-year highs, but it ticked down in the second quarter as firms’ cash position improved. 2-5. Gross Balance Sheet Leverage of Public Nonfinancial Businesses Percent 55 Quarterly 50 75th percentile 45 Q2 40 35 all firms 30 25 20 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on S&P Global, Compustat. Despite lower interest rates, the ratio of earnings to interest expenses (the interest coverage ratio) dropped sharply in the second quarter. The decrease was driven by the significant earnings declines as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. The interest coverage ratio for the median firm is now down to its historical median, and the ratio is negative for many firms because of negative earnings (figure 2-6). 2-6. Interest Coverage ratios for Public Nonfinancial Businesses ratio 5 Quarterly median 25th percentile 4 3 2 Q2 1 0 −1 −2 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on S&P Global, Compustat. 7 The dashed sections in the series in the first quarter of 2019 reflect a structural break due to a new accounting standard that requires operating leases, previously considered off-balance-sheet activities, to be included in measures of debt and assets. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 27 In part reflecting the declines in earnings, credit quality deteriorated notably after the onset of the pandemic but showed signs of stabilization, particularly among large firms, in the third quarter. The pace of corporate bond downgrades was elevated through the spring but slowed considerably in the summer. At the end of the third quarter, about half of nonfinancial investment-grade debt outstanding was rated in the lowest category of the investment-grade range (triple-B)—near an all-time high. As has been mentioned in pre- vious Financial Stability Reports, widespread downgrades of investment-grade bonds to speculative-grade ratings could lead investors to accelerate the sale of downgraded bonds, possibly generating market dislocations and downward price pressures in a segment of the corporate bond market known to exhibit relatively low liquidity. Expected bond defaults rose sharply in March to the highest post-crisis levels and, while they have moved down since then, remain above their long-term medians. However, only about 5 percent of outstanding bonds are due within one year, and less than 20 percent of outstanding bonds are due within three years. Vulnerabilities in the leveraged loan market appear to have lessened somewhat since May, especially for sectors less affected by COVID-19 and for large firms. The share of newly issued loans to large corporations with high leverage—defined as those with ratios of debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization greater than 6—dropped in the first quarter but returned in the second and third quarters to the historical highs reached in recent years (figure 2-7). While realized defaults have increased since May, there is some evidence that expected future defaults have decreased over this time frame (figure 2-8). Moreover, downgrades of leveraged loans, which rose sharply in the second quarter, slowed significantly in the third quarter and have returned to pre-pandemic levels. This evidence suggests a more stable outlook for future defaults than in May. 2-7. Distribution of Large Institutional Leveraged 2-8. Default rates of Leveraged Loans Loan Volumes, by Debt-to-eBITDa ratio Percent Percent 14 160 monthly Debt multiples ≥ 6x 12 Debt multiples 5x−5.99x 140 10 Debt multiples 4x−4.99x 120 Debt multiples ≤ 4x Q3 8 100 6 80 4 60 Sept. 2 40 0 20 −2 0 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: S&P Global, Leveraged Commentary & Data. Source: S&P Global, Leveraged Commentary & Data. Small businesses have been substantially more affected to date by the effects of COVID-19, and strains associated with the performance of small business debt may worsen significantly Credit quality for small businesses has worsened notably since the COVID-19 outbreak and has not yet stabilized, with many small businesses closing or scaling back operations 28 BorrowING BY BuSINeSSeS aND HouSeHoLDS significantly during the crisis. Short- and long-term delinquencies at small businesses in August were at elevated levels last seen in 2011. Many small businesses relied on PPP loans to weather the pandemic-related period of low earnings, but the PPP ceased extending loans in August. Survey evidence suggests that credit availability has tightened for small businesses. Moreover, many small businesses report having scarce cash on hand and antici- pate financial strains in coming months as they exhaust PPP funds and as accommodation measures expire. While stresses on households have grown, credit quality has been supported by new and expanded government programs that have lifted household incomes Although households were generally in sound financial condition before the pandemic, they have experienced a significant loss in earnings due to the spike in unemployment and busi- ness closures. Moreover, job losses were heavily concentrated among the most financially vulnerable, including lower-wage workers, young people, women, and minorities. The dete- rioration in household credit quality to date was mitigated by new and enlarged government programs that have supported household incomes—including expanded unemployment insurance and direct stimulus payments in the CARES Act—and by a moderate improve- ment in economic activity. However, most COVID-related support for households has already expired or will expire in the coming months, which risks increasing financial stress for many low- to moderate-income households. Strains associated with the performance of household debt may worsen significantly and affect lenders throughout the financial system. Borrowing by households continued rising at a modest pace in the first half of 2020, with new extensions of credit skewed toward prime-rated borrowers . . . 2-9. Total Household Loan Balances Through September of this year, house- Billions of dollars (real) 10600 hold debt (after an adjustment for general Quarterly 9800 price inflation) edged higher, on net, with 9000 8200 debt owed by households with prime credit 7400 Prime 6600 scores continuing to account for most of 5800 5000 the growth. By contrast, inflation-adjusted Near prime 4200 loan balances for the remaining one-half of 3400 Q3 2600 borrowers with near-prime and subprime Subprime 1800 1000 credit scores have changed little since 2014 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 (figure 2-9). Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/equifax; Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index via Haver analytics. . . . but the sudden increase in unemployment in the spring and sharp decline in earnings have led to a sharp rise in the share of mortgages that are either delinquent or in loss mitigation . . . Mortgage debt accounts for roughly two-thirds of total household credit, with mortgage extensions skewed toward prime borrowers in recent years (figure 2-10). Although many households are facing substantial losses in earnings, widespread loss-mitigation measures FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 29 2-10. estimate of New mortgage Volume to Households Billions of dollars (real) 1400 annual Subprime 1200 Near prime Prime 1000 800 600 400 200 0 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/equifax; Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index via Haver analytics. have helped damp the effect of COVID-19 on 2-11. mortgage Loss mitigation and Delinquency mortgage delinquencies (figure 2-11).8 The Percent 10 percentage of mortgages that are either delin- Quarterly/monthly Delinquent/loss mitigation quent or in loss mitigation stood at 7 percent 8 in August, below the 2007–09 financial crisis 6 peak of 9 percent, with the caveat that, unlike Delinquent 4 aug. during the Great Recession, most are currently 2 in a loss-mitigation program rather than being 0 delinquent. Note also that some borrowers in loss mitigation have kept making mortgage 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 payments. Although the severe decline in Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit economic activity and tightening of lending Panel/equifax. standards originating from the COVID-19 shock might put downward pressure on house prices, at the end of the second quarter, the estimated share of outstanding mortgages with negative equity is very low (figure 2-12). The ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to home values at the end of the second quarter remains at the level seen in the relatively calm housing market of the late 1990s (figure 2-13). 2-12. estimate of mortgages with Negative equity 2-13. estimates of Housing Leverage Percent 1999:Q1 = 100 40 150 Zillow Quarterly 140 CoreLogic relative to model- relative to 30 130 implied values market value 120 20 110 100 Q4 10 Q2 90 June 80 0 70 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: CoreLogic; Zillow. Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/equifax; CoreLogic; Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver analytics. 8 Loss mitigation is a broad term that describes a variety of loan relief programs implemented by banks to help borrowers cope with payments, including the loan forbearance programs described in the May Financial Stability Report, payment deferrals (including partial payment deferrals), loan modifications (including federal government plans), and loans with zero scheduled payments and a nonzero balance. 30 BorrowING BY BuSINeSSeS aND HouSeHoLDS Higher levels of homeowner equity generally reduce the likelihood of borrower defaults and provide lenders with a degree of protection against credit losses even as borrowers take advantage of loss-mitigation measures. These considerations lessen concerns that a deterio- ration in lenders’ balance sheets might impede future credit issuance and further worsen the economic outlook. . . . and some households are struggling to make debt payments 2-14. Consumer Credit Balances The remaining one-third of total debt owed Billions of dollars (real) by households, commonly referred to as con- 1800 Quarterly sumer credit, consists mainly of student loans, 1600 Student loans auto loans, and credit card debt (figure 2-14). 1400 1200 Table 2 shows that consumer credit rose Q3 1000 0.8 percent over the year ending in the second 800 quarter and currently stands at a little more auto loans Credit cards 600 than $4 trillion. 400 200 Borrowers with subprime credit scores 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit accounted for about one-fifth of outstand- Panel/equifax; Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index ing auto loan balances as of the end of the via Haver analytics. third quarter (figure 2-15). Despite the long economic expansion and low interest rates, delinquency rates on auto loans for subprime borrowers were elevated during the past sev- eral years. In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the share of auto loans that were either delinquent or in loss mitigation jumped and, by August, was about 50 percent higher than the share observed in January, although this share is notably down from May and June (f igure 2-16). Similar to mortgage borrowers, many—but not all—auto loan borrowers in loss mitigation have stopped making payments. As of August, 4.5 percent of all auto loan borrowers had not made a payment since at least April. 2-15. auto Loan Balances 2-16. auto Loss mitigation and Delinquency Billions of dollars (real) Percent Quarterly 7 7 0 5 0 0 10 Quarterly/monthly 650 8 600 550 500 Delinquent/loss mitigation 6 Q3 Prime 450 Near prime 400 4 350 300 Delinquent aug. 2 250 Subprime 200 0 150 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/equifax; Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index Panel/equifax. via Haver analytics. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 31 Consumer credit card balances contracted sharply in response to depressed consumer spend- ing and declines in credit card utilization rates (figure 2-17). Subprime and near-prime bor- rowers, taken together, account for about half of consumer credit card balances. The share of credit card balances in delinquency fell since May (figure 2-18). This improved performance is likely driven in part by COVID-related accommodations provided by lenders. 2-17. Credit Card Balances 2-18. Credit Card Delinquency rates Billions of dollars (real) Percent 500 30 Quarterly Prime 450 Quarterly 25 400 20 350 Q3 Near prime 300 Subprime 15 250 10 200 Near prime Q3 5 Subprime 150 Prime 100 0 50 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2002 2008 2014 2020 Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/equifax; Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index Panel/equifax. via Haver analytics. Finally, the already elevated delinquency rates on student loans highlight the state of finances for some households going into the COVID-19 outbreak. The risk that student loan debt poses to the financial system appears limited at this time; the majority of loans were issued through government programs, and protections originally introduced in the CARES Act, which were later extended, guarantee payment forbearance and stop interest accrual through December 31. 32 BorrowING BY BuSINeSSeS aND HouSeHoLDS A Retrospective on the March 2020 Turmoil in Treasury and Mortgage- Backed Securities Markets The U.S. Treasury market and the market for agency residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) are among the most liquid securities markets in the world. These markets are critical to the overall functioning of the fi nancial system and to the effective transmission of monetary policy to the broader economy. Many companies and investors treat Treasury securities as risk-free assets, almost as cash, and expect to be able to quickly sell them to raise money to meet any need for liquidity. In mid-March, however, as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on fi nancial markets intensifi ed, Treasury and RMBS markets experienced severe dislocations and market functioning became unusually strained. Intense and widespread selling pressures in a context of unprecedented uncertainty appeared to strain dealers’ intermediation capacity or willingness to absorb further sales and intermediate in both mar- kets. The Federal Reserve responded through a series of policy actions aimed at supporting smooth market functioning. Following these actions, the acute stresses receded, and market functioning has since largely been restored. We look back at the March events and examine the roles of some institu- tional participants—in particular, foreign institutions, hedge funds, mortgage REITs (mREITs), principal trading fi rms (PTFs), and dealers—which have all been reported as having contributed signifi cantly to the March turmoil. A range of other institutional investors, such as mutual funds, may also have con- tributed to the turmoil and is the subject of ongoing analysis. The March turmoil In late February and early March, as fears about the economic effects of the coronavirus intensifi ed and investors moved into the safety of U.S. Treasury securities, Treasury yields fell sharply, and agency RMBS spreads widened (fi gure A). Daily trading volumes in both on- and off-the-run securities in the Treasury market increased substantially, and daily volumes in the agency RMBS market also spiked.1 Consistent with previous episodes of heightened volatility, measures of trading costs increased nota- bly; for example, indicative bid-ask spreads for the 10-year on-the-run and fi rst and second off-the-run Treasury securities began to rise sharply (fi gure B). Figure a. Yields on Nominal Treasury Securities and agency rmBS Spread Percent Basis points 4 200 Daily 10-year yield (left scale) 30-year yield (left scale) 3 Agency RMBS spread (right scale) 150 2 100 1 50 0 0 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. 2020 Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York; Federal reserve Board staff calculations; JPmorgan Chase & Co. (continued) 1 In general, the most recently issued Treasury securities are the most frequently traded and thus the most liquid. These securities are known as “on the run” securities, while less recent issues are called “off the run” securities. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 33 Figure B. 10-Year Indicative Bid-ask Spreads Cents per $100 Asset Asset Daily purchases purchases announced expanded 50 On-the-run bid-ask spread 40 First off-the-run bid-ask spread Second off-the-run bid-ask spread 30 20 10 0 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. 2020 Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York, New Price Quote System. Trading conditions deteriorated rapidly in the second week of March as a range of investors sought to sell Treasury securities, particularly those viewed as less liquid, in order to raise cash. Amid unusually poor market functioning and extreme volatility, Treasury yields increased (as shown in fi gure A), while agency RMBS spreads widened sharply. While trading volumes of both securities remained robust, bid-ask spreads widened dramatically, particularly for off-the-run Treasury securities (as shown in fi gure B). Stresses soon spilled over into the more liquid on-the-run segment of the Treasury market as well as into the Treasury futures market. Stresses were also evident in a breakdown of the usually tight link between Treasury cash and futures prices, with the Treasury cash–futures basis—defi ned as the difference between prices of Treasury futures contracts and prices of Treasury cash securities eligible for delivery into those futures contracts—widening notably. The Federal Reserve’s actions to support market functioning The Federal Reserve took a number of steps to support smooth market functioning. First, between March 9 and March 17, the Federal Reserve expanded its overnight and term repo operations to address disruptions in Treasury fi nancing markets and ensure that the supply of reserves remained ample. Second, on March 15, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) authorized the purchase of at least $500 billion and $200 billion of Treasury securities and agency RMBS securities, respectively, and on March 23, the FOMC announced it would expand the size of asset purchases in the amounts needed to support smooth market functioning. Third, on March 17, the Federal Reserve established the PDCF to support dealer-intermediated markets by expanding primary dealers’ access to term funding against a wide range of collateral. Fourth, on March 31, the Federal Reserve established the FIMA (Foreign and International Monetary Authorities) Repo Facility to give central banks and other international monetary authorities the ability to access dollars for liquidity purposes without having to sell their Treasury securities outright. This facility complemented the additional provision of dollar fund- ing through the expansion and enhancement of dollar liquidity swap lines announced by the Federal Reserve and several other central banks during the third week of March. Finally, on the regulatory front, on April 1, the Federal Reserve announced a temporary change in its supplementary leverage ratio rule by excluding U.S. Treasury securities and reserve balances from the calculation of the ratio for BHCs.2 (continued on next page) 2 For an overview of these and other Federal reserve actions to mitigate the economic effects of the CoVID-19 pandemic, see the box “The Federal reserve’s monetary Policy actions and Facilities to Support the economy since the CoVID-19 outbreak” in Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System (2020), Financial Stability Report (washington: Board of Governors, may), pp. 9–15, https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20200515.pdf. 34 BorrowING BY BuSINeSSeS aND HouSeHoLDS A Retrospective on the March 2020 Turmoil (continued) While these actions helped support smooth market functioning, it is important to identify and better understand the drivers behind the March turmoil. To do so, we next provide a (necessarily preliminary) discussion of the likely roles played by several important groups of market participants as the March events unfolded. The role of foreign institutions Large-scale sales of U.S. Treasury securities by foreign investors likely contributed to the March turmoil. Indeed, based on Treasury International Capital data, foreign investors are estimated to have sold a record amount of more than $400 billion of Treasury securities in March.3 More than half of this decline refl ected liquidations by foreign offi cial institutions, as foreign central banks sought to raise U.S. dollar cash in order to hold precautionary liquidity and to intervene in foreign exchange (FX) mar- kets. The precautionary demand was refl ected in a sizable March increase in deposits in the Federal Reserve’s foreign repo pool. The introduction of the temporary FIMA Repo Facility helped broaden the reach of the Federal Reserve’s provision of U.S. dollar liquidity overseas beyond its dollar swap lines and contributed to the stabilization in the U.S. Treasury market. The role of hedge funds Treasury market functioning over this period may also have been affected by the activities of hedge funds, particularly those engaged in relative value (RV) trades. These trades, which generally involve trading to take advantage of small price differences between Treasury cash securities and futures, between on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury securities, and between Treasury securities and MBS, align the relative prices of these assets and typically promote market functioning. They usually entail investors being long in one instrument and short in the other.4 For instance, the Treasury cash–futures basis trade consists of a long cash Treasury position and a short position in a Treasury futures contract with a similar maturity. These trades often involve signifi cant leverage, which is obtained by fi nancing the cash Treasury position in repo markets. Under normal circumstances, this type of trading activity acts to keep the cash–futures basis narrow. In late February and early March, as Treasury market volatility increased, repo rates rose, and the Treasury cash–futures basis began to widen, many RV hedge funds reportedly reduced their Treasury positions as they unwound their basis trades, which may have contributed to further basis widening.5 Indeed, market commentary has pointed to the sale of Treasury positions by RV funds exiting their basis trades and their sudden role reversal from net buyers of less liquid Treasury securities to net sell- ers as principal factors contributing to the Treasury market dislocations in mid-March. However, due to a lack of comprehensive data on hedge funds’ Treasury cash and derivatives positions, it is unclear what the actual volume of Treasury sales by RV hedge funds was in March and how large a role RV funds played in amplifying the March Treasury market illiquidity. (continued) 3 See also Carol Bertaut and ruth Judson (2014), “estimating u.S. Cross-Border Securities Positions: New Data and New methods,” International Finance Discussion Papers 1113 (washington: Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System, august), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2014/1113/ifdp1113.pdf. 4 If investors have a long position, they have bought and own the asset, while if they have a short position, they have sold the asset but do not yet own it. 5 Hedge fund deleveraging was reportedly due in part to a combination of factors, including increased margin requirements on futures positions, margin calls on losing trades, and compliance with internal risk-management practices. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 35 That said, a set of proxy indicators can be used to shed some light on hedge funds’ arbitrage activity in March. For instance, a measure of U.S. hedge funds’ holdings of Treasury securities published in the Enhanced Financial Accounts of the United States indicates that hedge funds reduced their cash Treasury positions by about $35 billion (or 3 percent) in the fi rst quarter of the year, consistent with the narrative that hedge fund selling contributed to the Treasury market selloff.6 On the futures side of the basis trade, data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission show that leveraged funds, including hedge funds, had sizable net short positions in Treasury futures con- tracts before the COVID-19 outbreak. In March, leveraged funds reduced their net short futures posi- tions by about $80 billion, suggesting that hedge funds unwound some of their Treasury cash–futures basis trades.7 In addition, most RV funds’ basis trades require funding, which is typically provided by dealers through repo. Supervisory data indicate that hedge fund Treasury fi nancing from dealers increased in late Feb- ruary through late March, suggesting that dealers continued to fi nance hedge fund Treasury activities even as market volatility spiked. Similarly, in the June Senior Credit Offi cer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms (SCOOS), dealers reported no changes in funding volume collateralized by Treasury securities to RV funds in mid-March relative to mid-February volumes. However, about one-fourth of dealers reported that demand for Treasury fi nancing by these funds increased during the selloff, while a similar fraction of dealers indicated that the availability of such fi nancing decreased. Together, super- visory data and the SCOOS results suggest that the decline in hedge funds’ Treasury holdings, in the aggregate, was likely not driven by their inability to fi nance these positions. In sum, the reduction in hedge fund Treasury positions may have contributed notably to Treasury mar- ket volatility in mid-March amid a massive repositioning by a wide range of investors. However, so far, the evidence that large-scale deleveraging of hedge fund Treasury positions was the primary driver of the turmoil remains weak. The role of mortgage real estate investment trusts Similar to the Treasury market, liquidity in the agency RMBS market deteriorated signifi cantly in March. Reportedly contributing to the March turmoil were mREITs, which are leveraged investment compa- nies that invest in pools of agency RMBS and other mortgage-backed assets.8 Such fi rms primarily fund their holdings of these long-maturity assets using short-term borrowing in the agency RMBS repo market through dealers. At the same time, they typically hedge their interest rate risk by taking short positions in Treasury securities or swaps (or both). As a result, mREITs have leveraged exposures to RMBS–Treasury spreads and RMBS–swap spreads, fi nanced by repo loans that can be rapidly withdrawn. As RMBS spreads began to widen in late February and spread volatility rose, mREITs’ hedges fell in value, triggering margin calls. Because mREITs generally maintain low levels of unencumbered assets that can be used to satisfy the increased margin requirements, the margin calls likely precipitated the (continued on next page) 6 Quarterly hedge fund balance sheet estimates in the enhanced Financial accounts are based on the Securities and exchange Com- mission Private Funds Statistics form and reflect hedge funds’ positions in cash Treasury securities. See Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System (2020), “enhanced Financial accounts: Hedge Funds,” webpage, https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ efa/efa-hedge-funds.htm. 7 of note, although the decline in leveraged funds’ Treasury futures positions was significant, it was not outsized relative to the volatility of the positions in previous months. 8 mBS holdings of mreITs predominantly consist of agency securities. 36 BorrowING BY BuSINeSSeS aND HouSeHoLDS A Retrospective on the March 2020 Turmoil (continued) unwinding of some of the mREITs’ agency RMBS positions. The substantial forced selling and rapid deleveraging intensifi ed stresses in the agency RMBS market and contributed to a further widening of spreads, creating a feedback loop between spread widening and forced deleveraging of mREITs’ portfolios. However, following the Federal Reserve’s March 23 announcement of increased purchases of Treasury securities and agency RMBS, agency RMBS market functioning improved considerably, with agency RMBS spreads rapidly tightening and spread volatility slowly diminishing. By late March, the pace of agency RMBS selling from mREITs and other levered investors had slowed substantially. The role of principal trading firms PTFs are active in the electronic segments of the Treasury cash and futures markets, where trading takes place using a central limit order book (CLOB).9 In the cash market, PTFs predominantly transact in the most liquid on-the-run Treasury securities. PTFs, along with some dealers, are known to adopt high-speed automated trading strategies that account for a signifi cant share of trading and liquidity provision.10 The 2015 Joint Staff Report showed that in previous periods of market stress, PTFs have contributed to keeping quoted bid-ask spreads in these parts of the Treasury market relatively tight.11 More precisely, PTFs—and dealers employing high-speed trading technology—are able to keep spreads tight by reducing posted depth and replenishing the order book faster to manage their expo- sure to volatility. During the March turmoil, however, unprecedented strains were also witnessed in the on-the-run segment of the Treasury market, with market depth plummeting and quoted bid-ask spreads widening sharply, raising questions about the role of PTFs in the turmoil (fi gure C). Some research suggests that the observed widening in bid-ask spreads for on-the-run Treasury securities during the March events points to an unusual reduction in the speed with which high-speed trading entities were replenishing quotes on the order book in response to trades.12 Order book replenishment was not suffi ciently fast to avoid signifi cantly heightened bid-ask spread levels and increased volatility as PTFs and other high-speed trading entities scaled down Treasury market-making activity, in aggregate. The reduction in high-speed market-making activity appears to have contributed to the spread of pandemic-related stresses to even the most liquid segments of fi nancial markets. The reasons behind this reduction (continued) 9 on a CLoB, participants can post quotes for buying and selling securities, with incoming orders matched to outstanding quotes using an electronic matching engine. 10 PTFs have become increasingly important in electronic Treasury markets over the past several years. They now account for the major- ity of traded volumes on electronic interdealer broker platforms in the Treasury market, playing an important role in the provision of liquidity by posting quotes and replenishing those quotes quickly. See Doug Brain, michiel De Pooter, Dobrislav Dobrev, michael Flem- ing, Pete Johansson, Collin Jones, Frank keane, michael Puglia, Liza reiderman, Tony rodrigues, and or Shachar (2018), “unlocking the Treasury market through TraCe,” FeDS Notes (washington: Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System, September 18), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/unlocking-the-treasury-market-through-trace-20180928.htm; and James Collin Harkrader and michael Puglia (2020), “Principal Trading Firm activity in Treasury Cash markets,” FeDS Notes (washington: Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System, august 4), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/principal-trading- firm-activity-in-treasury-cash-markets-20200804.htm. 11 For further details, see u.S. Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System, Federal reserve Bank of New York, u.S. Securities and exchange Commission, and u.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2015), Joint Staff Report: The U.S. Treasury Market on October 15, 2014 (washington: Treasury, Board of Governors, FrBNY, SeC, and CFTC, July), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Joint_Staff_report_Treasury_10-15-2015.pdf. 12 See Dobrislav Dobrev and andrew meldrum (2020), “what Do Quoted Spreads Tell us about machine Trading at Times of market Stress? evidence from Treasury and FX markets during the CoVID-19-related market Turmoil in march 2020,” FeDS Notes (washing- ton: Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System, September 25), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/ what-do-quoted-spreads-tell-us-about-machine-trading-market-stress-march-2020-20200925.htm. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 37 Figure C. on-the-run market Depth Millions of dollars Millions of dollars 250 Daily 5-year (left scale) 10-year (left scale) 30-year (right scale) 25 200 20 150 15 100 10 50 5 0 0 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. 2020 Source: repo interdealer broker community. merit further analysis but would most likely include the considerably elevated economic uncertainty in mid-March, the exceptionally high volatility of Treasury yields, and the breakdown in typical correla- tions within the Treasury market as well as between the prices of Treasury securities and other assets. The role of dealers Dealers play a central role in U.S. Treasury and agency RMBS markets by participating in primary markets, buying and selling securities from clients, and providing Treasury and agency RMBS fi nancing to other market participants. Dealers were holding unusually high levels of these securities even before the pandemic, refl ecting in part strong Treasury issuance over recent years. Beginning in late Febru- ary, as a wide range of investors, both domestic and foreign, rushed to obtain liquidity or to rebalance their portfolios in the face of the pandemic, dealers absorbed large amounts of less liquid securities, including off-the-run Treasury securities and agency RMBS, onto their balance sheets. By the second week of March, amid expanding inventories, imbalanced client trading fl ows, and heightened volatil- ity, some dealers reportedly reached their intermediation capacity or became increasingly unwilling to absorb further sales.13 At the same time, investor demand for repo fi nancing rose sharply, in particular against Treasury collateral, putting further pressure on dealer balance sheets and pushing up dealer funding costs.14 Market commentary pointed to dealer balance sheet constraints and their reluctance to intermediate as important factors behind the deterioration in the functioning of Treasury and agency RMBS markets in early March. Following the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s asset purchases, dealer balance sheet pressures eased in late March as dealers were able to offl oad some of their inventories, and Treasury and agency RMBS market functioning improved. Indeed, dealer inventory holdings of U.S. Treasury securities declined from their mid-March peak as the Federal Reserve’s Treasury purchases picked up, suggest- ing that asset purchases absorbed some of the Treasury securities that might have otherwise been (continued on next page) 13 Limits on dealers’ intermediation capacity may be driven by their internal capital, liquidity, and risk-management practices; their compli- ance with regulations; or concerns over their profit and loss statements. 14 Dealers typically use repo to fund both their cash Treasury positions and their lending to clients through Treasury reverse repos. Thus, the ability and willingness to engage in repo, which increases the size of dealers’ balance sheets, will affect their willingness to take on additional inventories and provide lending through reverse repos. 38 BorrowING BY BuSINeSSeS aND HouSeHoLDS A Retrospective on the March 2020 Turmoil (continued) held on dealer balance sheets (fi gure D). Similarly, the increase in agency RMBS purchases following the March 23 announcement coincided with some reduction in dealer inventories of agency RMBS securities toward the end of March, indicating that the agency RMBS purchases also helped alleviate balance sheet constraints related to agency RMBS. Figure D. Fed uST Purchases and Dealer uST Inventory Billions of dollars Billions of dollars 280 1800 Daily Cumulative Fed UST purchases since March 1 (right scale) 1600 260 UST inventory (left scale) 1400 240 1200 1000 220 800 200 600 400 180 200 160 0 Mar. 5 Mar. 12 Mar. 19 Mar. 26 Apr. 2 Apr. 9 Apr. 16 Apr. 23 Apr. 30 Source: Federal reserve Board, Form Fr 2052a, Complex Institution Liquidity monitoring report. Overall, asset purchases were effective in freeing up dealer balance sheet capacity and improving dealers’ willingness to intermediate these markets. Funding conditions for dealers also gradually improved following the expansion of repo operations and the announcement of the PDCF, with bor- rowing rates for dealers declining notably. In addition, dealer Treasury fi nancing volumes increased in late March, indicating that dealers were able to use their spare balance sheet capacity to support their clients’ activities. Looking ahead The functioning of Treasury markets, including the capacity of dealer balance sheets to absorb extraor- dinary fl ows, was discussed extensively at a recent conference sponsored by the members of the interagency working group (the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U.S. Treasury Department).15 Participants discussed a number of proposals to ensure that dealer capacity could be used effectively in an environment of growing Treasury supply, including the possibility of wider clearing in Treasury cash and repo markets and the potential for use of “all to all” trading platforms that allow buyers and sellers to trade without a dealer intermediary. Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed changes to Treasury market reg- ulation that could encourage wider access to Treasury market trading platforms and thereby promote forms of all-to-all trading.16 15 See Federal reserve Bank of New York (2020), “The 2020 u.S. Treasury market Conference,” press release, September 29, https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/events/markets/2020/0929-2020. 16 See Securities and exchange Commission (2020), “SeC Proposes rules to extend regulations aTS and SCI to Treasuries and other Government Securities markets,” press release, September 28, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-227. 39 3. Leverage in the Financial Sector Leverage at banks and broker-dealers remains low; in contrast, measures of leverage at life insurance companies are at post-2008 highs and remain elevated at hedge funds relative to the past five years Table 3. Size of Selected Sectors of the Financial System, by Types of Institutions and Vehicles Growth, Average annual growth, Total assets 2019:Q2–2020:Q2 1997–2020:Q2 Item (billions of dollars) (percent) (percent) Banks and credit unions 22,780 16.7 6.6 mutual funds 16,776 .6 9.1 Insurance companies 11,553 7.4 6.0 Life 8,828 7.7 6.1 Property and casualty 2,725 6.2 5.6 Hedge funds* 7,623 −3.0 7.3 Broker-dealers 3,507 .6 4.8 Outstanding (billions of dollars) Securitization 10,492 5.3 5.4 agency 9,725 5.2 5.9 Non-agency** 1,217 6.2 3.2 Note: The data extend through 2020:Q2. Growth rates are measured from Q2 of the year immediately preceding the period through Q2 of the final year of the period. Life insurance companies’ assets include both general and separate account assets. * Hedge fund data start in 2012:Q4 and are updated through 2020:Q1. ** Non-agency securitization excludes securitized credit held on balance sheets of banks and finance companies. Source: Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States”; Federal reserve Board, “enhanced Financial accounts of the united States.” Banks continue to be well capitalized, though challenging conditions remain The pandemic has tested the resilience of banks. The ratio of tangible capital—a measure of bank equity that excludes items such as goodwill—to total assets at large banks decreased in the first half of the year (figure 3-1). The common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio—a regulatory risk-based measure of bank capitalization—also declined significantly in the first quarter as many firms tapped credit lines at the onset of the pandemic, but the ratio recovered to pre-pandemic levels in the second quarter for most banks as demand for bank credit waned and earlier drawdowns were generally repaid. The initial decline in the CET1 capital ratio 40 LeVeraGe IN THe FINaNCIaL SeCTor was also driven by a temporary pickup in risk-weighted assets related to banks’ trading oper- ations amid heightened volatility in many financial markets. The CET1 capital ratio at both the largest banks and other BHCs remained well above required minimum levels (figure 3-2). 3-1. ratio of Tangible Bank equity to assets Percent of total assets 12 Quarterly 10 Q2 8 6 other BHCs 4 Large non–G-SIBs G-SIBs 2 0 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 2020 Source: Federal Financial Institutions examination Council, Consolidated reports of Condition and Income (Call report). 3-2. Common equity Tier 1 ratio of Banks Percent of risk-weighted assets 16 Quarterly Preliminary Q3 14 12 Q2 10 8 6 other BHCs 4 Large non–G-SIBs G-SIBs 2 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board, Form Fr Y-9C, Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies. In June, the Federal Reserve released the results of the 2020 Dodd-Frank Act stress tests and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review along with a sensitivity analysis to assess the resilience of large banks under three hypothetical downside scenarios that could have resulted from the coronavirus event. The analysis under the more severe downside scenarios, which did not incorporate the effects of planned capital distributions, showed that most banks would remain well capitalized but several would approach their minimum capital levels.9 Given the heightened uncertainty in the economy and markets at that time, the Federal Reserve announced that it would require banks to resubmit their capital plans in the fourth quarter of 2020. The scenarios to be used for the resubmission were released on September 17, 2020, and the Federal Reserve will release bank-specific results of its inde- 9 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020), “Federal Reserve Board Releases Results of Stress Tests for 2020 and Additional Sensitivity Analyses Conducted in Light of the Coronavirus Event,” press release, June 25, https://www. federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200625c.htm. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 41 pendent assessment by the end of the year.10 The Federal Reserve also took steps in June to restrict capital distributions in the third quarter by banks with more than $100 billion in assets, including prohibiting share repurchases and limiting dividends based on the previous four quarters of earnings. On September 30, the Federal Reserve voted to extend restrictions to the fourth quarter.11 As of the second quarter of 2020, the credit quality of bank loans had deteriorated consider- ably. Commercial and industrial (C&I) and CRE loans in loss-mitigation programs increased sharply in the second quarter and remain elevated, despite some recent moderation. The credit quality of firms taking C&I loans contin- ued to deteriorate through June, as measured 3-3. Borrower Leverage for Bank Commercial and Industrial Loans by credit rating downgrades, and remained one Debt as percent of assets of the largest drivers of the increase in loan loss 36 Quarterly provisions. Furthermore, as of the second quar- 34 ter of 2020, the leverage of firms that obtained Q2 32 C&I loans from the largest banks stood at his- 30 torically high levels (figure 3-3). Credit quality of CRE loans also continued to deteriorate, as 28 Non-publicly-traded firms rental income declined, vacancies increased, Publicly-traded firms 26 and consumer spending weakened, particularly 24 in COVID-affected properties such as hotels 2014 2016 2018 2020 and retail establishments. Consumer loans and Source: Federal reserve Board, Form Fr Y-14Q (Schedule H.1), Capital assessments and Stress Testing. mortgages in loss-mitigation programs also increased. Because of the implementation of loss-mitigation programs, government stimulus pay- ments, and PPP loans, the true status of credit quality is not reflected in loan delinquencies. As these programs expire, some of these accounts in loss mitigation could roll into and be reflected in higher bank delinquency rates later this year and early next year, followed by higher charge-off rates and losses. All told, a great deal of uncertainty about the future path of these losses remains. Allowances for loan losses surged in the first half of 2020 as large banks implemented the current expected credit losses (CECL) accounting standard and reassessed their losses (espe- cially in credit card loans and corporate lending) in light of the COVID-19 shock.12 Under 10 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020), “Federal Reserve Board Releases Hypothetical Scenarios for Second Round of Bank Stress Tests,” press release, September 17, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/ bcreg20200917a.htm. 11 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020), “Federal Reserve Board Announces It Will Extend for an Additional Quarter Several Measures to Ensure That Large Banks Maintain a High Level of Capital Resilience,” press release, September 30, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200930b.htm. 12 Under accounting rules, banks prepare for possible loan losses before they actually occur. Loan loss provisions, in the bank’s income statement, are expenses set aside for uncollected loan payments and are added to the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL), which is renamed to allowance for credit losses for banks adopting CECL. On a bank’s balance sheet, total 42 LeVeraGe IN THe FINaNCIaL SeCTor CECL accounting standards, banks must set aside allowances for the expected losses over the life of a loan. Under the previous method, banks were not able to provision for loan losses until later in a credit cycle, when the losses were incurred. The increase in loan loss allowances along with the expectation that interest rates will remain low for a longer time weakened the bank profitability outlook, a key factor in banks’ abil- ity to accumulate equity capital. Net income contracted sharply in the first half of the year because banks set aside a higher fraction of revenues as loan loss provisions and net interest margins were compressed. An increase in trading and investment banking revenues partly offset these downward pressures on income. Data from the July 2020 SLOOS indicate that banks continued to tighten standards on C&I loans in the second quarter (figure 3-4). Banks cited the uncertain economic outlook and industry-specific problems as the main reasons. More broadly, banks reported tightening across all loan types. In particular, nearly all major credit card lenders reported lending standards becoming stricter. While most Net percentage of banks reporting 100 banks reported that the level of C&I lending Quarterly 80 standards is on the tighter end of the range 60 of standards that has prevailed since 2005, 40 20 only a modest share reported standards as 0 being at the tightest point. This information −20 −40 suggests that banks’ strong capital positions at −60 the onset of the pandemic may have mitigated −80 some of the disruption in credit availability −100 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 relative to during the 2007–09 financial crisis. The contraction in credit availability was also mitigated by the PPP, under which approxi- mately $500 billion in PPP loans were placed on banks’ balance sheets at the end of the second quarter. However, tighter lending stan- dards may make obtaining credit difficult for some creditworthy businesses and households. Credit availability contributes to a more robust recovery, which, in turn, improves credit quality and thus leads to better financial stability outcomes. Based on preliminary earnings data, CET1 capital ratios at the U.S. global systemically important banks slightly increased above pre-pandemic levels in the third quarter (as shown in figure 3-2), as the required restrictions on capital payouts continued. Declines in risk- loans are reported net of ALLL. For more details, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020), “Allow- ance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL),” webpage, https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/alll.htm. gninethgiT gnisae 3-4. Change in Bank Lending Standards for Commercial and Industrial Loans Q2 Source: Federal reserve Board, Senior Loan officer opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices; Federal reserve Board staff calculations. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 43 weighted assets, driven in part by slowed loan demand and tighter lending standards, also contributed to the rise in CET1 capital ratios. Large banks improved earnings relative to the first two quarters of 2020, predominantly because of lower loan loss provisions. As a result, allowances for losses remained about the same at large banks in the third quarter. Leverage is at historically low levels at broker-dealers . . . Leverage at broker-dealers changed little in the first half of 2020 and stayed at historically low 3-5. Leverage at Broker-Dealers levels (figure 3-5). The deterioration in liquidity ratio of assets to equity 50 in March across dealer-intermediated markets Quarterly demonstrated that, despite dealers’ low lever- 40 age, fragilities still remain and pose a concern 30 for financial stability (see the box “A Retrospec- 20 tive on the March 2020 Turmoil in Treasury Q2 and Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets”). 10 Dealer usage of the PDCF, established in 0 March 2020 amid an extraordinary increase in 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 demand for dealer intermediation and financ- Source: Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States.” ing, has steadily declined to less than $1 billion. Dealers reported strong earnings in the third quarter, after having had record earnings in the second quarter, driven by high underwriting and trading revenues. Net borrowing of primary dealers is unchanged since May but remains high relative to recent years. Primary dealers’ Treasury positions declined slightly, on net, during the same period but remain at the upper end of their historical range. . . . but is at post-2008 highs at life insurance companies . . . Leverage at life insurance companies rose to 3-6. Leverage at Insurance Companies post-2008 highs (figure 3-6). This leverage ratio of assets to equity 15 Quarterly measure is calculated using the book value of Life Property and casualty 12 assets and thus does not immediately reflect the decrease in asset market values—notably, of 9 corporate bonds—in the first quarter and the Q2 6 subsequent improvement. Life insurers hold a sizable proportion of their assets as corporate 3 bonds and remain vulnerable to significant 0 decreases in corporate bond prices. In addition, 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 poor performance of CRE debt in life insur- Source: S&P Global market Intelligence, regulatory filings of large insurance groups. ers’ general accounts could harm their capital 44 LeVeraGe IN THe FINaNCIaL SeCTor positions. Meanwhile, based on information through the second quarter of 2020, leverage at property and casualty insurers stayed at lower levels relative to historical averages. . . . and remains elevated at hedge funds relative to the past five years Gross leverage of hedge funds decreased somewhat in the second half of 2019, the most recent data available, but still remained near the upper end of its historical distribution (f igure 3-7).13 More recently, in the SCOOS, most dealers reported that the use of leverage by hedge fund clients declined between February and May, but few dealers reported additional changes in the use of leverage by hedge funds between May and August (figure 3-8). More- over, several indicators of leverage intermediated by dealers on behalf of hedge funds have reverted to their pre-pandemic levels near the upper ends of their historical distributions. The COVID-19 shock exposed vulnerabilities at hedge funds. Extreme market volatility and lower liquidity in asset markets led to substantial losses at some hedge funds and siz- able margin calls (see the box “A Retrospective on the March 2020 Turmoil in Treasury and Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets”). As a result of these losses and, to a lesser extent, 3-7. Gross Leverage at Hedge Funds ratio 9 monthly 8 7 mean 6 5 Dec. 4 median 3 2 1 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on Securities and exchange Commission, Form PF, reporting Form for Investment advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool operators and Commodity Trading advisors. 3-8. Change in the use of Financial Leverage Net percentage 60 Quarterly 40 20 Q3 0 −20 Hedge funds Trading reITs −40 Insurance companies mutual funds −60 −80 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board, Senior Credit officer opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms. 13 Comprehensive data on hedge fund leverage are available only with a long lag. The Federal Reserve supplements these data with more timely but less comprehensive measures. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 45 outflows, hedge funds’ assets dropped substantially in the first quarter. In the second quarter, hedge funds’ assets partially recovered from these losses as market conditions improved, but outflows continued, albeit at a slower pace. Securitization volumes increased after coming to a halt in March but remain significantly below 2019 levels . . . Securitization allows financial institutions to bundle loans or other financial assets and sell claims on the cash flows generated by these assets as tradable securities, much like bonds. This process often involves the creation of securities with different levels of seniority, or “tranches,” and thus represents a form of credit risk transformation whereby some highly rated securities can be produced from a pool of lower-rated underlying assets. Examples of the resulting securities include collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), ABS, CMBS, and RMBS. Issuance volumes of non-agency securities—that is, those not guaranteed by a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) or by the federal government—have resumed after coming to a halt from mid-March to early April but remain about 20 percent lower through September of this year compared with the same period in 2019 (figure 3-9). The recovery, facilitated by the reestablishment of the TALF by the Federal Reserve in March, was uneven across asset classes. Securities backed by asset classes perceived to be less risky, such as auto and credit card ABS, recovered earlier than other securities, such as CMBS, and have experi- enced more robust issuance amid strong investor demand. However, the September SCOOS showed easing in credit conditions for non-agency CMBS. 3-9. Issuance of Non-agency Securitized Products, by asset Class Billions of dollars (real) 2800 annual other 2400 Private-label rmBS Non-agency CmBS 2000 auto loan/lease aBS CDos (including aBS, CDo, and CLo) 1600 1200 800 400 0 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Source: Green Street advisors, LLC, Commercial mortgage alert (cmalert.com) and asset-Backed alert (abalert.com); Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index via Haver analytics. . . . and bank lending to nonbank financial firms decreased in the second quarter, as credit drawdowns in the first quarter were repaid quickly The outstanding amount of bank loans to financial institutions operating outside the bank- ing sector—such as finance companies, asset managers, securitization vehicles, and REITs— increased $113 billion (about 15 percent) in the first quarter of 2020, reflecting drawdowns of credit lines. The outstanding amount then declined $89 billion in the second quarter (about 10 percent) as nonbank financial institutions repaid the drawn amounts. Committed 46 LeVeraGe IN THe FINaNCIaL SeCTor lines of credit from large banks to nonbank financial firms, which include undrawn amounts, edged down slightly in the second quarter of 2020 but remained close to $1.5 trillion (figure 3-10).14 3-10. Large Bank Lending to Nonbank Financial Firms: Committed amounts Billions of dollars 2500 Quarterly 2250 1. Financial transactions processing 7. Special purpose entitites, CLos, and aBS 2000 2. Private equity, BDCs, and credit funds 8. other financial vehicles 3. Broker-dealers 9. real estate lenders and lessors Q2 1750 4. Insurance 10. Consumer lenders, other lenders, and lessors 1 1500 5. reITs 3 2 1250 6. open-end investment funds 4 6 5 1000 7 750 8 500 9 250 10 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board, Form Fr Y-14Q (Schedule H.1), Capital assessments and Stress Testing. 14 Data on this type of bank lending can be informative about the use of leverage by nonbanks and shed light on the credit exposures of banks to these institutions. The Federal Reserve is able to monitor the exposures of the largest U.S. banks to businesses more closely than in the past because those banks now report detailed information about their loan commitments on regulatory form FR Y-14Q. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020), “Report Forms: FR Y-14Q,” webpage, https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/reportforms/reportdetail.aspx?sOoYJ+5BzDZGWnsSjRJKDwRxOb5Kb1hL. 47 4. Funding Risk The COVID-19 shock exposed vulnerabilities at nonbank financial firms that contributed to market turmoil and required the Federal Reserve to establish emergency facilities to restore the functioning of markets for short-term funding and corporate bonds As of the second quarter of 2020, the total amount of liabilities most vulnerable to runs, including those of nonbanks, had increased 17.1 percent over the past year to $17.3 trillion (table 4). Banks rely only modestly on short-term wholesale funding and maintain large amounts of high-quality liquid assets, in part because of liquidity regulations and supervi- sory programs introduced after the 2007–09 financial crisis and the improved understanding and management by banks of their liquidity risks.15 Table 4. Size of Selected Instruments and Institutions Outstanding/ Growth, Average, annual growth, total assets 2019:Q2–2020:Q2 1997–2020:Q2 Item (billions of dollars) (percent) (percent) Total runnable money-like liabilities* 17,349 17.1 4.8 uninsured deposits 6,229 28.9 11.7 Domestic money market funds** 4,635 44.8 6.3 Prime 762 13.8 .9 Government 3,743 56.2 16.0 Tax-exempt 130 −4.9 −1.3 repurchase agreements 3,884 −1.9 5.5 Commercial paper 1,006 −7.7 2.3 Securities lending*** 649 .1 7.4 Bond mutual funds 4,445 7.0 9.0 Note: The data extend through 2020:Q2. Growth rates are measured from Q2 of the year immediately preceding the period through Q2 of the final year of the period. Total runnable money-like liabilities exceeds the sum of listed components. Items not included in the table are variable-rate demand obligations (VrDos), federal funds, funding-agreement-backed securit ies, private liquidity funds, offshore money market funds, and local government investment pools. * average annual growth is from 2003:Q2 to 2020:Q2. ** average annual growth is from 2001:Q2 to 2020:Q2. *** average annual growth is from 2000:Q2 to 2020:Q2. Source: Securities and exchange Commission, Private Funds Statistics; imoneyNet, Inc., offshore money Fund analyzer; Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Securities Industry and Financial markets association: u.S. municipal Variable-rate Demand obligation update; risk management asso- ciation, Securities Lending report; DTCC Solutions LLC, an affiliate of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation: commercial paper data; Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on Investment Company Institute data; Federal reserve Board, Statistical release H.6, “money Stock and Debt measures” (m3 monetary aggregate); Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States”; Federal Financial Institutions examination Council, Consolidated reports of Condition and Income (Call report); morningstar, Inc., morningstar Direct; moody’s analytics, Inc., CreditView, asset-Backed Commercial Paper Program Index. 15 The large increase in uninsured deposits shown in table 4 is mostly excluded from this definition of short-term wholesale funding. 48 FuNDING rISk As noted in previous Financial Stability Reports, the financial system’s vulnerability to funding risks had increased because of the renewed growth in prime MMFs during 2018 and 2019 as well as the increase in corporate debt held by long-term mutual funds since 2008. These developments, discussed in more detail later in this section, contributed to consider- able funding strains in March. These strains, in turn, prevented a range of employers from obtaining access to credit markets during a period when borrowing needs were particularly acute; in response, the Federal Reserve undertook several actions, including establishing emergency lending facilities and providing regulatory relief, to ensure the smooth function- ing of various markets and to support the flow of credit to households and businesses. For more information, see the boxes “Federal Reserve Actions to Stabilize Short-Term Funding Markets during the COVID-19 Crisis” and “Federal Reserve Actions and Facilities to Support Households, Businesses, and Municipalities during the COVID-19 Crisis.” Going forward, regulatory agencies, including the Federal Reserve, are exploring reforms that will address structural vulnerabilities in the nonbank financial institutions sec- tor that have required emergency interventions during both the 2007–09 financial crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. Banks continue to have high levels of liquid assets and stable funding At most large banks, liquid asset positions increased substantially in the second quarter, reflecting an increase in reserves (figure 4-1). In addition, their liquidity ratios are well above regulatory requirements. At the onset of the pandemic, bank reliance on the most unstable sources of funding stood at historically low levels (figure 4-2). Strong capital and liquid- ity buffers enabled banks to accommodate drawdowns when businesses relied heavily on their lines of credit as the COVID-19 shock hit. Banks also managed liquidity pressures by increased borrowing from the discount window and Federal Home Loan Banks. In addi- tion, banks experienced heavy deposit inflows, consistent with investors becoming more risk averse and credit-line borrowers depositing the proceeds from line draws taken as precau- tionary measures. Core deposits continued to increase across the banking system through September 2020. 4-1. Liquid assets Held by Banks 4-2. Short-Term wholesale Funding of Banks Percent of assets Percent of assets 32 40 Quarterly Quarterly Q2 28 35 other BHCs Large non−G-SIBs 24 30 G-SIBs 20 25 16 20 12 15 8 Q2 10 4 5 0 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board, Form Fr Y-9C, Consolidated Source: Federal reserve Board, Form Fr Y-9C, Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies. Financial Statements for Holding Companies; Federal Financial Institutions examination Council, Consolidated reports of Condition and Income (Call report). FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 49 Funding strains on mortgage servicers eased after policy actions, but uncertainties remain As discussed in the May Financial Stability Report, mortgage servicers are responsible for advancing payments on behalf of a borrower that requests forbearance under the CARES Act. This responsibility can cause strains for nonbank mortgage servicers because they do not have the kinds of strong capital and liquidity buffers that banks have built to weather shocks or access to the same sources of liquidity as banks. Instead, nonbanks have relied on their internal cash or, in some cases, fairly expensive private-market financing to fund these payments. Liquidity pressures on nonbank mortgage servicers eased in April, as Ginnie Mae established a facility to lend against advances of principal and interest (but not taxes and insurance) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency limited servicing advances up to four months. Mortgage servicer liquidity positions also benefited from an increase in refinancing activity through the second quarter. However, strains may emerge again if mortgage forbear- ance take-up increases substantially or the fiscal support provided to households under the CARES Act that enables them to continue to make mortgage payments is not extended. Money markets have stabilized but would be vulnerable without the emergency facilities in place Money-like liabilities that are prone to runs—an aggregate measure of private short-term debt that can be rapidly withdrawn in times of stress—increased substantially and stood at about 92 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2020 (figure 4-3). The growth in runnable liabilities over the first half of 2020 was largely attributable to a surge in domestic MMFs and uninsured deposits. 4-3. runnable money-Like Liabilities as a Share of GDP, by Instrument and Institution Percent of GDP 120 Quarterly 1. other 4. Domestic money market funds 2. Securities lending 5. repurchase agreements Q2 100 3. Commercial paper 6. uninsured deposits 1 2 80 3 60 4 40 5 20 6 0 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: Securities and exchange Commission, Private Funds Statistics; imoneyNet, Inc., offshore money Fund analyzer; Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Securities Industry and Financial markets association: u.S. municipal Variable-rate Demand obligation update; risk management association, Securities Lending report; DTCC Solutions LLC, an affiliate of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation: commercial paper data; Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on Investment Company Institute data; Federal reserve Board, Statistical release H.6, “money Stock and Debt measures” (m3 monetary aggregate); Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial accounts of the united States”; Federal Financial Institutions examination Council, Consolidated reports of Condition and Income (Call report); moody’s analytics, Inc., CreditView, aBCP asset-Backed Commercial Paper Program Index; Bureau of economic analysis, gross domestic product via Haver analytics. 50 FuNDING rISk Prime MMFs, particularly institutional funds, experienced runs in March, with outflows reaching the same proportion of assets redeemed during the run on MMFs in 2008. Heavy redemptions from these funds were prompted in part by investor concerns about the possi- bility of liquidity fees and redemption gates. Retail prime funds and tax-exempt funds also suffered heavy redemptions. As investors fled to safety, short-term funding markets became severely dislocated. Actions by the Federal Reserve were required to slow redemptions and restore the functioning of short-term funding markets (see the box “Federal Reserve Actions to Stabilize Short-Term Funding Markets during the COVID-19 Crisis”). Assets under man- agement at prime MMFs regained most of the decrease in late March and remained stable from May through August 2020 (figure 4-4). 4-4. Domestic money market Fund assets Billions of dollars (real) 6000 monthly 5250 1. Government only 3. retail prime aug. 4500 2. Tax exempt 4. Institutional prime 3750 3000 1 2250 1500 2 750 3 4 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board staff calculations based on Investment Company Institute data; Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index via Haver analytics. Emergency measures undertaken by the Federal Reserve with the support of the Treasury have temporarily lowered the risk of adverse events associated with vulnerabilities in the nonbank sector in the near term, but remaining vulnerabilities call for structural fixes in the longer term. In addition, other cash-management vehicles similar to institutional prime funds, such as dollar-denominated offshore funds and short-term investment funds, do not directly benefit from the backstop provided by the MMLF. Between $400 billion and $1 tril- lion of these vehicles’ assets under management closely mirror institutional U.S. prime funds, and heavy redemptions may destabilize short-term funding markets even in the presence of the MMLF. Depressed asset prices due to fire sales could lead to mark-to-market losses for other investors, including U.S. prime funds. Outflows from long-term mutual funds that hold less liquid assets have mostly reversed, but the redemption waves had run-like characteristics that highlighted significant structural vulnerabilities in the sector U.S. corporate bonds held by mutual funds increased substantially in the second quarter of 2020 and reached $1.7 trillion after contracting in the first quarter (figure 4-5). Mutual FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 51 funds are estimated to hold about one-sixth of 4-5. u.S. Corporate Bonds Held by mutual Funds outstanding corporate bonds. These open-end Billions of dollars (real) 1800 mutual funds engage in liquidity transforma- Quarterly Q2 1500 tion by offering daily redemptions to inves- tors, notwithstanding the liquidity profile of 1200 a fund’s underlying assets. Funds investing 900 substantially in corporate bonds and bank 600 loans may be particularly exposed to liquidity 300 transformation risks given the relative illiquid- 0 ity of such assets. 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 Source: Federal reserve Board staff estimates based on Federal reserve Board, Statistical release Z.1, “Financial The record outflows from fixed-income accounts of the united States”; Bureau of Labor Statistics, mutual funds in March caused considerable consumer price index via Haver analytics. strains for the affected funds, and their forced sales contributed to a deterioration in liquidity in fixed-income markets. The magnitude of investor redemptions was unprecedented, and heavy redemptions occurred among a wide range of funds, including investment-grade corporate bond funds and municipal bond funds. There were no reports of mutual funds failing to meet investor redemptions, but funds were forced to sell assets under worsening market conditions, further draining liquidity from cor- porate bond markets. The announcement of a number of emergency 4-6. Bank Loan and High-Yield Bond mutual Fund assets lending facilities, including those designed to Billions of dollars (real) support corporate borrowing, improved bond 525 monthly market liquidity significantly and eased strains 450 Bank loan mutual funds faced by mutual funds. Investment-grade and High-yield aug. 375 bond mutual funds high-yield bond funds received inflows since 300 May, and assets under management now 225 exceed their pre-pandemic levels (figure 4-6). 150 Bank loan mutual funds, which faced record 75 redemptions in March, subsequently had more 0 modest outflows through August (figure 4-7). 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 Their total assets under management have Source: Investment Company Institute; Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index via Haver analytics. decreased about 25 percent since February and stood at $64 billion in August. The fire-sale dynamics in March associated with open-end mutual funds concentrated in fixed-income assets demonstrated the severity of structural vulnerabilities highlighted in previous Financial Stability Reports. By providing a backstop in the corporate bond market, the emergency lending facilities significantly alleviated the stress of large outflows faced by investment-grade corporate bond funds, and the backstop’s effect has also flowed through to high-yield bond funds and bank loan funds. Even so, the March turbulence demonstrated 52 FuNDING rISk 4-7. mutual Fund Net Flows Billions of dollars Monthly 100 Investment-grade bond mutual funds 80 Bank loan mutual funds 60 High-yield bond mutual funds 40 20 0 Mutual fund assets under management −20 (as of Aug. 2020) −40 Investment grade $2,393B −60 −80 High yield $268B −100 Bank loan $63B −120 −140 Feb. May Aug. Nov. Feb. May Aug. Nov. Feb. May Aug. Nov. Feb. May Aug. 2017 2018 2019 2020 Source: Investment Company Institute. that fixed-income mutual funds continue to be vulnerable to large, sudden redemptions, and sizable outflows can still lead to a deterioration in market liquidity of underlying assets. This structural vulnerability may call for structural reforms. Central counterparties continue to manage risks amid elevated volatility Meanwhile, driven largely by increased clearing of over-the-counter derivatives, central coun- terparties (CCPs) intermediate a larger share of transactions across more markets than at the time of the 2007–09 financial crisis. CCPs have supported market functioning throughout the pandemic, effectively managing the increased risks posed by elevated volatility and miti- gating counterparty risks. However, the volatile environment continues to imply heightened tail risks for clearinghouses and their members. Further market stresses, as well as resulting increases in cash and collateral requirements by CCPs, could increase liquidity pressures on market participants, potentially even beyond the heightened pressures met during the acute phase of the COVID-19 shock. Collateralized loan obligation fundamentals have improved in recent months but are still weak compared with pre-pandemic levels CLO issuance declined about 33 percent through September 2020 compared with the same period in 2019. These securities fund more than 50 percent of outstanding institutional lev- eraged loans—loans that have been under significant price pressures, as previously discussed. Unlike open-end mutual funds, CLOs do not generally permit early redemptions or rely on funding that must be rolled over before the underlying assets mature. As a result, CLOs avoid the run risk associated with a rapid reversal in investor sentiment. Overall, CLO fundamen- tals have improved in recent months but are still weak compared with pre-pandemic levels, and some risks remain. For example, the surge in underlying loan downgrades and defaults led to a spike in the number of CLOs that failed collateral tests in recent months. Manag- ers of CLOs that failed overcollateralization tests typically attempted to cure those failures by selling risky collateral. To the extent that CLO managers fail to remedy impairments in junior CLO tranches, the resulting downgrades of those tranches may force some CLO FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 53 investors, including leveraged funds, to sell their CLO holdings. Such sales have the potential to put pressure on the prices of junior CLO tranches. Liquidity risks at life insurers are at post-2008 highs and have been increasing Over the past decade, life insurers have widened the gap between the liquidity of their assets and the liquidity of their liabilities, potentially making it harder for them to meet sudden claims. Life insurers have been increasing the share of illiquid, risky assets on their balance sheets. These assets—including CRE loans, less liquid corporate debt, and alternative invest- ments—edged up to 35 percent of general account assets, the same level as just before the 2007–09 financial crisis (figure 4-8). Meanwhile, the share of liquid liabilities remains above its level during the financial crisis, in part because of increasing nontraditional liabilities (figure 4-9). 4-8. Less Liquid General account assets Held by u.S. Insurers Percent share Billions of dollars 1. other asset-backed securities 4. alternative investments Share of life insurer assets 2750 50 2500 2. Commercial real estate 5. Illiquid corporate debt Share of P&C insurer assets 2250 40 3. Commercial real estate, 6. Illiquid corporate debt, 2000 securitized securitized 1750 30 1500 1250 20 1000 750 10 500 250 0 0 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Source: Staff estimates based on data from Bloomberg Finance L.P. and NaIC annual Statutory Filings. 4-9. Nontraditional Liabilities of u.S. Life Insurers, by Liability Type Billions of dollars (real) Billions of dollars (real) 300 100 Quarterly Quarterly repurchase agreements F F u H n L d B in a g d -a va g n re c e e m s ent-backed Q2 250 Securities lending 80 Q2 securities 200 60 150 40 100 20 50 0 0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price index via Haver analytics; moody’s analytics, Inc., CreditView, asset-Backed Commercial Paper Program Index; Securities and exchange Commission, Forms 10-Q and 10-k; National association of Insurance Commissioners, quarterly and annual statutory filings accessed via the S&P Global market Intelligence platform; Bloomberg Finance L.P. 54 FuNDING rISk LIBOR Transition Update Recognizing the potential instability in LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) and other similar inter- bank offered rates (IBORs), the Group of Twenty asked the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Offi cial Sector Steering Group in 2012 to identify more robust potential alternative rates, while seeking to strengthen the existing IBORs to the extent possible. Although LIBOR has undergone substantial reforms since that time, most panel banks are forced to base their submissions on expert judgment because their reliance on the type of wholesale unsecured funding that LIBOR is meant to represent has declined signifi cantly. In 2017, after some banks had started leaving IBOR panels, the LIBOR reg- ulator, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), brokered a voluntary agreement with the remaining panel banks to continue their participation through the end of 2021. The FCA has warned that market participants should prepare for the possibility that LIBOR will end at that time or thereafter. The FSB has stated that the LIBOR transition remains a priority even during the COVID-19 crisis. Overview The pace of preparation for the cessation of LIBOR publication has picked up in recent months. Changes to infrastructure are now in place or expected to be ready soon. Although disruptions from COVID-19 caused many fi rms to slow some transition activities temporarily, a recent survey of fi nancial institutions by Moody’s indicates that most surveyed fi rms believe they are on track in their prepara- tions for LIBOR cessation.1 However, LIBOR use remains predominant despite continued warnings from the offi cial sector that participants should prepare for the risk that it will cease to be published after the end of 2021, and critical work is still needed to ensure that LIBOR cessation does not cause signifi cant fi nancial market disruptions. The Alternative Reference Rates Committee (ARRC) released Best Practices for Completing the Tran- sition from LIBOR in May.2 The document provides guiding steps and timelines for a smooth transition from LIBOR for fl oating-rate notes, business loans, consumer loans, securitizations, and derivatives, including recommendations that no new LIBOR fl oating-rate debt be issued after 2020 and no new LIBOR loans be issued after June 2021. While LIBOR-submitting banks have made a commitment to providing rates through the end of 2021, many of the steps necessary for a smooth transition need to occur much sooner. Two important milestones in the derivatives market have been reached recently. First, on October 16, 2020, the two main interest rate derivatives clearinghouses (CME and LCH) switched from discounting cleared U.S. dollar swaps using the federal funds rate to using the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR). The switch has been associated with increased SOFR-based trading activity as market partici- pants seek to hedge discounting exposures. Second, the International Swaps and Derivatives Associa- tion (ISDA) supplemented its protocol for derivatives contracts to facilitate the use of risk-free reference rates upon the cessation or nonrepresentativeness of LIBOR. The ISDA protocol has been promoted as the most effi cient way for derivatives market participants to mitigate the risks associated with LIBOR discontinuation. These two events will solidify the transition away from LIBOR for derivatives. (continued) 1 See moody’s Investors Service (2020), IBOR Phaseout 15 Months Away, but Hurdles Could Stretch beyond Finish Line, sector in-depth report (New York: moody’s, September 22). 2 See alternative reference rates Committee (2020), “arrC announces Best Practices for Completing Transition from LIBor— Provides Date-Based Guidance, Including when No New LIBor activity Should Be Conducted,” press release, may 27, https://www. newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/microsites/arrc/files/2020/arrC_Press_release_Best_Practices.pdf. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 55 Official-sector actions Efforts by the U.S. offi cial sector have removed potential impediments to the transition away from LIBOR. Swap margin rules have been amended to permit swaps entered into before an applicable compliance date to retain their legacy status if they are modifi ed to replace LIBOR. Similarly, the Finan- cial Accounting Standards Board provided optional expedients and exceptions for applying generally accepted accounting principles to contract modifi cations and hedging relationships that reference LIBOR, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury is nearing similar measures in its fi nal rules for tax relief. Consumer-oriented agencies such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development have proposed regulatory amendments to facili- tate the transition. The CFPB has also updated its consumer handbook for adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) to provide guidance to consumers about reference rates. Issuance and trading activity Issuance and trading of SOFR-referencing instruments have grown but remain clearly lower than activity referencing LIBOR, although GSEs have been successfully moving to issuance of SOFR-based products. Issuance in the fl oating-rate note market, in which GSEs have a large presence, was mostly SOFR based in the fi rst half of 2020 (fi gure A). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are accepting SOFR- referenced ARMs and have announced that they will no longer accept LIBOR-referenced ARMs after 2020; Ginnie Mae has announced similar restrictions that will be enacted in early 2021. Loan issuance remains mostly LIBOR based, although inclusion of fallback language is growing. Figure a. Floating-rate Notes Issuance, by reference rate Billions of dollars 220 SOFR LIBOR Fed funds T−bill 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. 2019 2020 Source: Bloomberg. The trading volume of SOFR derivatives reached a high point in March 2020, as interest rate volatility led to increased derivatives market activity (fi gures B and C). Since then, the reduction in policy rates and the high degree of certainty that interest rates will stay near zero have contributed to less trading of all types of short-term interest rate derivatives, including SOFR derivatives. Derivatives trading in SOFR-based products increased in October with the switch to SOFR discounting. Market participants appear to be prepared for this switch: Awareness is high, trading systems have been updated, and SOFR trading volumes as a share of total volumes have been growing in the swaps and futures mar- kets, albeit slowly. (continued on next page) 56 FuNDING rISk LIBOR Transition Update (continued) Figure B. monthly SoFr Swap Volumes Billions of dollars 200 Outright Fed funds LIBOR Cross Swaption basis basis currency 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. 2019 2020 Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Bloomberg Valuation Service (BVaL); Federal reserve Bank of New York staff calculations. Figure C. average Daily Notional SoFr Futures Units 300 CME 1M CME 3M ICE 1M ICE 3M 250 200 150 100 50 0 Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. 2019 2020 Source: Cme and ICe via Bloomberg. Legacy contracts The ARRC has had recommended fallback language for new LIBOR issuances in the most commonly used products in place for some time. Use of the ARRC recommendations, or similar language, has been prevalent in fl oating-rate debt issuance for more than a year and in most syndicated loans. For contracts that either do not address a permanent end to LIBOR or have ambiguous fallback language, interest payment uncertainty could lead to complex problems for parties or courts to sort out and cre- ate uncertainty in fi nancial markets. Many fi nancial products and agreements that reference LIBOR are governed by New York law. As a result, the ARRC has proposed New York State legislation that would substitute the recommended benchmark replacement in legacy contracts where the contract language is silent or the fallback provisions prescribe LIBOR use. 57 Near-Term Risks to the Financial System The course of the pandemic and the ultimate extent and duration of the resulting economic and financial consequences remain one of the most significant risks to the financial sys- tem. The realization of this risk continues to depend largely on the success of public health measures and other government actions to contain the spread of COVID-19, on the steps households and businesses take to resume economic activity, and on the duration of the gov- ernment lending and relief programs that have, so far, ameliorated the most adverse potential economic outcomes. The Federal Reserve routinely engages in discussions with domestic and international policy- makers, academics, community groups, and others to gauge the set of risks of particular concern to these groups. As noted in the box “Salient Shocks to Financial Stability Cited in Market Outreach,” contacts were mostly focused on the risks associated with the evolution of the pandemic and the policy support to contain its effects as well as on the uncertainties related to the elections in November. The following analysis considers possible interactions of existing vulnerabilities with four broad categories of risk, some of which were also raised in these discussions: a prolonged slowdown in U.S. economic growth, disruptions in dollar fund- ing markets, risks emanating from Europe, and risks originating in China and other EMEs. The effects of the pandemic have increased the vulnerabilities of the financial system to future shocks, including additional waves of substantial COVID-19 outbreaks Most forecasters expect a moderate recovery in economic output in the United States and abroad following a global recession, but uncertainty surrounding this outcome is unusu- ally high. The sharp slowdown in economic activity has disproportionately affected some businesses and households, and a further weakening in the balance sheets of those that are especially vulnerable could affect the financial system. Furthermore, monetary and fiscal pol- icy tools have limited ability to moderate some dimensions of what is fundamentally a public health shock. If the pandemic persists for longer than anticipated—especially if there are extended delays in the production or distribution of a successful vaccine—downward pressure on the U.S. economy could derail the nascent recovery and strain financial markets and financial institu- tions, particularly if many businesses are shuttered again and many workers are laid off and left without a normal income for a long period. If that were the case, a number of the vulner- abilities identified in this report could grow further, making them more likely to amplify neg- ative shocks to the economy. Investor risk appetite and asset prices have increased in recent months but could suffer significant declines should the pandemic take an unexpected course or the economic recovery prove less sustainable. Given the generally high level of leverage in the nonfinancial business sector, prolonged weak profits could trigger financial stress and defaults. In addition, a protracted slowdown could further harm the finances of even high- credit-score households, which could lead to defaults and place financial pressure on banks 58 Near-Term rISkS To THe FINaNCIaL SYSTem The Implications of Climate Change for Financial Stability Climate change refers to the trend toward higher average global temperatures and accompanying environmental shifts such as rising sea levels and more severe weather events. Climate change adds a layer of economic uncertainty and risk that we have only begun to incorporate into our analysis of fi nancial stability. Different sectors of the economy and geographic regions face different risks that will diverge from historical patterns. In this discussion, we focus on how climate change, which increases the likelihood of dislocations and disruptions in the economy, is likely to increase fi nancial shocks and fi nancial system vulnerabilities that could further amplify these shocks. These climate risks are present over various horizons. The fi gure illustrates how these risks become fi nancial stability risks. Acute hazards, such as storms, fl oods, droughts, or wildfi res, can quickly alter, or reveal new information about, future economic conditions or the value of real or fi nancial assets. Moreover, in the presence of rapid shifts in public perceptions of risk, chronic hazards (like a slow rise in sea levels) have the potential to produce similar abrupt repricing events. These repricing events and direct losses associated with climate hazards can result in an increased frequency and severity of fi nancial shocks; the timing and repercussions of these shocks are diffi cult to predict in advance. Possible Transmission from Climate-related risks to Financial System Vulnerabilities Examples of climate- Vulnerabilities change-related features Nonlinear effect Asset valuations on financial risks and models Borrowing by businesses and households Timing uncertainty Leverage in the Incomplete contracts financial sector Opacity of exposures Funding risks Source: Federal reserve Board staff. Features of climate change can also increase fi nancial system vulnerabilities, as illustrated in the fi gure. Opacity of exposures and heterogeneous beliefs of market participants about exposures to climate risks can lead to mispricing of assets and the risk of downward price shocks. Similarly, uncertainty about the timing and intensity of severe weather events and disasters, as well as the poorly under- stood relationships between these events and economic outcomes, could lead to abrupt repricing of assets. Climate risks thus create new vulnerabilities associated with nonfi nancial and fi nancial lever- (continued) ycneuqerf desaercnI ytireves desaercnI Climate-related risks Acute climate hazards Chronic climate shifts Climate policies Technological advances Investor/consumer perceptions FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 59 age. In regions affected by severe events, households and businesses could become overlevered if the value of their assets or income prospects become impaired. Levered fi nancial institutions may be exposed to losses from disasters made more likely by climate change that are not accurately refl ected in current fi nancial models; for example, fi nancial models may lack suffi cient geographical granular- ity to accurately connect local physical damages to fi nancial exposures. The fi nancial system is also vulnerable to amplifi cation effects of these damages if contracts are incomplete and do not capture all damages and if poorly understood fi nancial exposures cause spillover effects or fi nancial contagion. One example of how climate change is likely to increase fi nancial stability risks is through real estate exposures. Some residential and commercial properties will be subject to acute hazards such as storm surges associated with rising sea levels and more intense and frequent hurricanes. Continued produc- tive use of these properties would require investment and adaptation. As inundations or storm surges become more frequent, the expected value of exposed real estate may decrease, which may in turn pose risks to real estate loans, mortgage-backed securities, the holders of these loans and securities, and the profi tability of nonfi nancial fi rms using such properties. With perfect information, the price of real-estate-linked assets and the valuations of claims linked to such assets—held by banks, insurers, investment funds, and nonfi nancial fi rms—would already refl ect these climate-related risks. However, given the uncertain timing and severity of future climate-related fl ooding and the associated opacity of asset exposures, investors in real-estate-linked assets may react abruptly to new information about a region’s exposure to climate-related fi nancial risks. A sharp repricing, in turn, could create incentives to fi re sale such assets by leveraged fi nancial and nonfi nan- cial fi rms. These asset valuation changes would be amplifi ed by fi nancial and nonfi nancial leverage, funding risks, and interconnections across holders of the collateral-based assets, thereby creating risks to fi nancial stability. Several policies or other factors could moderate climate-related fi nancial vulnerabilities or the likeli- hood of large shocks. Within the fi nancial system, increased transparency through improved measure- ment and disclosure could improve the pricing of climate risks, such as an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, thereby reducing the probability of sudden changes in asset prices. Continued research into the interconnections between the climate, the economy, and the fi nan- cial sector could strengthen knowledge of transmission, clarify linkages and exposures, and facilitate more effi cient pricing of risk. Outside the fi nancial system, efforts to mitigate or adapt to the physical effects of climate change through technological advances and policy changes could also reduce cli- mate risks in the long run. Staff members throughout the Federal Reserve System continue to research the relationships among climate risks and economic and fi nancial risks and, ultimately, to better identify the transmission channels through which climate risks could affect the fi nancial sector. This work is conducted in close consultation with other U.S. agencies and international groups in an effort to strengthen the knowledge and understanding of this growing economic and fi nancial stability issue. The Federal Reserve is evaluating and investing in ways to deepen its understanding of the full scope of implications of climate change for markets, fi nancial exposures, and interconnections between mar- kets and fi nancial institutions. It will monitor and assess the fi nancial system for vulnerabilities related to climate change through its fi nancial stability framework. Moreover, Federal Reserve supervisors expect banks to have systems in place that appropriately identify, measure, control, and monitor all of their material risks, which for many banks are likely to extend to climate risks. 60 Near-Term rISkS To THe FINaNCIaL SYSTem and other lenders. Broader solvency issues could impair the ability of some financial institu- tions to lend or induce increased asset sales and redemptions of withdrawable liabilities. Although leverage remains at modest levels at banks, broker-dealers, and other financial institutions, the leverage of some nonbank financial institutions, such as life insurance com- panies and hedge funds, is high, exposing them to risks stemming from sharp drops in asset prices and funding illiquidity risks. Furthermore, prime MMFs and fixed-income mutual funds remain vulnerable to funding strains and sudden redemptions, as demonstrated during the acute period of extreme market volatility and deteriorating asset prices earlier this year. While government support has lowered the risk of adverse events associated with vulnerabil- ities in the nonbank sector, this sector would be vulnerable to funding risk should the gov- ernment support be withdrawn. Disruptions in global dollar funding markets remain an important source of risk As was highlighted by the period of acute financial stress in March, disruptions in global dollar funding markets are also an important risk to the U.S. financial system. In many advanced foreign economies and EMEs, the reliance of banks and nonbank financial institu- tions on short-term dollar funding markets, including through off-balance-sheet instruments such as FX swaps, remains a vulnerability.16 Disruptions in offshore dollar funding markets can adversely affect these foreign financial institutions, which may reduce lending to U.S. res- idents and liquidate holdings of U.S. assets in order to obtain dollars, harming U.S. house- holds and businesses. These risks are mitigated, however, by the Federal Reserve dollar swap lines with other central banks and the FIMA Repo Facility.17 Stresses emanating from Europe also pose risks to the United States because of strong transmission channels . . . European financial institutions and businesses play an important role in global financial intermediation and have notable financial and economic linkages with the United States. Faced with the largest decline in economic activity in postwar history due to the COVID-19 pandemic, European authorities have used fiscal support, accommodative monetary policy, and bank regulatory and supervisory measures to mitigate the effect of the pandemic on households and businesses. However, if a material worsening of the pandemic suppresses economic activity more than expected, continued regulatory forbearance and further expan- sionary policies may lead to concerns about debt sustainability in some countries. If debt sustainability were to markedly deteriorate in some of the highly indebted European sover- eigns and corporates, stresses could materialize in debt markets and credit losses could be 16 FX swaps are widely used by market participants to borrow dollars for fixed periods of time—for instance, to fund purchases of U.S. securities. In such a transaction, a participant exchanges foreign currency for U.S. dollars at the current exchange rate while contracting at the same time to reverse the transaction at a future date at an agreed-upon exchange rate (the “forward” rate). In effect, such an FX swap is a dollar loan collateralized with foreign currency. 17 For more information, see the box “Federal Reserve Tools to Lessen Strains in Global Dollar Funding Markets” in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020), Financial Stability Report (Washington: Board of Governors, May), pp. 16–18, https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20200515.pdf. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 61 realized in certain European financial institutions. Stresses in Europe could, in turn, affect the U.S. economy and the financial system through a further deterioration in risk appetite and losses due to direct and indirect credit exposures. In addition to the risks related to COVID-19, the possibility of a no-trade-deal Brexit contin- ues to pose risks to the European and U.S. financial systems. Although the United Kingdom formally left the European Union (EU) in January, it remains under the EU’s trade rules and financial regulations until the end of this year. The failure to reach a final trade agreement could lead to supply chain disruptions in Europe, aggravate negative effects of COVID-19 to the real economy, and increase losses at U.K. financial institutions. Accordingly, a no-trade- deal Brexit could lead to strains in global financial markets, resulting in a tightening of U.S. financial conditions. . . . and adverse developments in emerging market economies with vulnerable financial systems could spill over to the United States China entered the pandemic with elevated corporate and local government debt, high financial-sector leverage, and stretched real estate prices. After an acute downturn, real activ- ity in China has rebounded more sharply than in other countries in part because China was able to contain the spread of the virus more quickly. Although policy continues to support the broader economy, authorities have continued to introduce measures to tamp down on speculation in real estate markets. A sudden price correction in domestic property markets, along with weakened global demand from abroad due to a resurgence of COVID-19, could put pressure on certain firms, particularly Chinese property developers, which are already highly indebted. This development, in turn, could substantially stress the vulnerable financial sector and local governments. This situation, along with heightened trade tensions, could further strain global financial markets and disrupt regional supply chains and exports to and from China. Moreover, a reduction in risk appetite, aggravated by other geopolitical risks, could negatively affect the United States, given the size of China’s economy and financial system, and its extensive trade linkages with the rest of the world. Widespread stresses in EMEs have abated somewhat, in no small part because of an improvement in global financial conditions, but faltering economic growth, both within EMEs and elsewhere, could lead to a reemergence of financial strains in EMEs, with non- trivial repercussions for the United States. In particular, EMEs with vulnerable financial sys- tems could see another wave of capital outflows because of a drop in global risk appetite or an escalation of problems in their banking systems. Under these circumstances, authorities may find it difficult to curb the possible amplification of financial stresses because of limited fiscal capacity. For oil exporters, these dynamics could be exacerbated if oil prices fall pre- cipitously because of weak demand or a marked increase in the supply of oil. Further dollar appreciation due to widespread stresses in EMEs could potentially put additional strains both on EME firms with currency mismatches and on U.S. firms that rely on exports and supply chains for their business operations. Some U.S. financial institutions may be directly affected by their exposures to these U.S. firms, in addition to the stressed EME firms and sovereigns themselves. 62 Near-Term rISkS To THe FINaNCIaL SYSTem Salient Shocks to Financial Stability Cited in Market Outreach As part of its market intelligence gathering for this report, the Federal Reserve staff solicited views from a wide range of contacts on risks to U.S. fi nancial stability. From early September to mid-October, the staff surveyed 24 contacts at banks, investment fi rms, academic institutions, and political consultan- cies. As shown in the fi gure, respondents frequently cited concerns about U.S. political uncertainty as well as the risk of a COVID-19 resurgence generating renewed restrictions. Relatedly, a large share of respondents highlighted uncertainty surrounding the likelihood and effi cacy of a policy response to economic weakness as well as concerns over the potential for increased insolvencies among nonfi nan- cial corporates and small businesses. most Cited Potential Shocks over Next 12 to 18 months U.S. political uncertainty Corporate & SME stress/defaults Insufficient fiscal stimulus COVID resurgence Stretched asset valuations U.S.–China tensions Inflation surprises USD collapse/currency war Monetary policy space/efficacy Bank asset quality/bank profitability CRE defaults/CMBS stress Sharp rise in real interest rates Geopolitical risks Brexit Cyber attacks Percent LIBOR transition 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Source: Federal reserve Bank of New York survey of 24 market contacts from early September to mid-october. U.S. political uncertainty A signifi cant share of respondents pointed to U.S. political uncertainty as a major source of risk. Many contacts highlighted the prospect that a contested presidential election or delayed election result could amplify investor uncertainty, and some pointed to increased market-implied volatilities covering the election as signaling a relatively high degree of uncertainty over the path of asset prices. COVID-19 resurgence Contacts were also focused on the risk that a large COVID-19 wave in the fall and winter could lead to new lockdown measures, inhibiting the recovery or causing another downturn. Several highlighted related concerns regarding the risk of delays, or failures, in developing and deploying a vaccine, and a few noted that market prices refl ected excessive optimism in the timing of a vaccine and the ability to avoid new restrictions. (continued) FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 63 Policy fatigue or limits A related concern was that recurring outbreaks would fail to galvanize a fi scal and monetary response as forceful or effective as during the initial outbreak. A number of contacts worried that a deepening political divide could delay timing or reduce the size of additional fi scal stimulus. Moreover, with policy rates near zero, several respondents identifi ed risks surrounding the limits and effi cacy of monetary policy stimulus in the event that the recovery stalls or reverses. Increases in business defaults Market participants noted the risk of sharply rising default rates among nonfi nancial corporates and small businesses, especially if the pandemic is prolonged or containment measures are reinstated. Contacts referenced the elevated levels of leverage in the corporate sector and expressed concern regarding the long-run effects of the virus on business models and consumer behavior. Several respon- dents noted that rising defaults could weaken bank asset quality and underpin a sharp retrenchment in credit to businesses. 65 Figure Notes Box: Federal Reserve Actions and Facilities to Support Households, Businesses, and Municipalities during the COVID-19 Crisis Figure A The shaded area with a top cap represents an expanded window focusing on the period from February 17 onward. The triple-B reflects the effective yield of the ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch triple-B U.S. Corporate Index (C0A4), and the high yield reflects the effective yield of the ICE BofAML U.S. High Yield Index (H0A0). Treasury yields from smoothed yield curve are estimated from off-the-run securities. Spreads over 10-year Treasury yield. PMCCF is the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility, and SMCCF is the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility. Figure C Spreads on municipal bonds are relative to comparable-maturity Treasury yields. Figure E Key identifies bars in order from bottom to top. Figure F TALF is the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. Spreads are to the swap rate for credit card and auto asset-backed securities (ABS) and to 3-month LIBOR (London inter- bank offered rate) for student loans. FFELP is Federal Family Education Loan Program. Box: Federal Reserve Actions to Stabilize Short-Term Funding Markets during the COVID-19 Crisis Figure A Indicative bid-ask spreads for 10-year Treasury note. The bid-ask spread for a security is the difference between the bid price and the ask price, where the “bid” is the price to buy a security and the “ask” is the price to sell it. On March 15, the Federal Open Market Com- mittee announced an increase of its holdings of Treasury securities by at least $500 billion and its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities by at least $200 billion. On March 23, the Federal Reserve announced it would continue to purchase Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities in the amounts needed to support smooth market func- tioning and effective transmission of monetary policy to broader financial conditions. UST is U.S. Treasury securities. Figure B All spreads are to overnight index swaps of the same tenor. CP is commercial paper and CPFF is the Commercial Paper Funding Facility. MMLF is the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility. MMLF operations began on March 23. On the same day, the Federal Reserve announced that the MMLF would be expanded to include negotiable certificates of deposit and variable-rate demand notes. CPFF operations began on April 14. Neither DTCC Solutions LLC nor any of its affiliates shall be responsible for any errors or 66 FIGure NoTeS omissions in any DTCC data included in this publication, regardless of the cause, and in no event shall DTCC or any of its affiliates be liable for any direct, indirect, special, or conse- quential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including lost income or lost profit, trading losses, and opportunity costs) in connection with this publication. Figure C PDCF is Primary Dealer Credit Facility. MMLF is the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquid- ity Facility. CPFF is the Commercial Paper Funding Facility. Figure 1-1 The 2- and 10-year Treasury rates are the constant-maturity yields based on the most actively traded securities. Figure 1-2 Term premiums are estimated from a three-factor term structure model using Treasury yields and Blue Chip interest rate forecasts. Figure 1-3 Implied volatility on 10-year swap rate, 1 month ahead, derived from swaptions. Figure 1-4 Market depth is defined as the average top three bid and ask quote sizes for on-the-run Treasury securities. Figure 1-5 The triple-B series reflects the effective yield of the ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch triple-B U.S. Corporate Index (C0A4), and the high-yield series reflects the effective yield of the ICE BofAML U.S. High Yield Index (H0A0). Figure 1-6 The triple-B series reflects the options-adjusted spread of the ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch triple-B U.S. Corporate Index (C0A4), and the high-yield series reflects the options-adjusted spread of the ICE BofAML U.S. High Yield Index (H0A0). Figure 1-8 The data show secondary-market discounted spreads to maturity. Spreads are the constant spread used to equate discounted loan cash flows to the current market price. Figure 1-9 Aggregate forward price-to-earnings ratio of S&P 500 firms. Based on expected earnings for 12 months ahead. Figure 1-10 Aggregate forward earnings-to-price ratio of S&P 500 firms. Based on expected earnings for 12 months ahead. Real Treasury yields are calculated from the 10-year consumer price index inflation forecast and the smoothed nominal yield curve estimated from off-the-run securities. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 67 Figure 1-11 Realized volatility estimated from 5-minute returns using an exponentially weighted moving average with 75 percent of the weight distributed over the past 20 days. Figure 1-12 Series deflated using the consumer price index and seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board staff. The data begin in 1998 for the equal-weighted curve and 1996 for the value-weighted curve. Figure 1-13 Data are a 12-month moving average of weighted capitalization rates in the industrial, retail, office, and multifamily sectors, based on national square footage in 2009. Figure 1-14 Banks’ responses are weighted by their commercial real estate loan market shares. The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–June 2009, and February 2020–June 2020. Survey respondents to the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Sur- vey on Bank Lending Practices are asked the changes over the quarter. Figure 1-15 The data for the United States start in 1997. Midwest index is a weighted average of Corn Belt and Great Plains states that comes from staff calculations. Values are given in real terms. Data are through July 2020. Figure 1-16 The data for the United States start in 1998. Midwest index is the weighted average of Corn Belt and Great Plains states. Data are through July 2020. Figure 1-18 Log of the price-to-rent ratio. Long-run trend is estimated using data from 1978 to 2001 and includes the effect of carrying costs on the expected price-to-rent ratio. The last value of the trend is normalized to equal 100. Figure 1-19 The data are seasonally adjusted. The data for Phoenix start in 2002. Monthly rent values for Phoenix are interpolated from semiannual numbers. Percentiles are based on 19 metropolitan statistical areas. Figure 2-1 The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: January 1980–July 1980, July 1981–N ovember 1982, July 1990–March 1991, March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–June 2009, and February 2020–June 2020. GDP is gross domestic product. Figure 2-2 The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: January 1980–July 1980, July 1981– 68 FIGure NoTeS November 1982, July 1990–March 1991, March 2001–November 2001, December 2007– June 2009, and February 2020–June 2020. GDP is gross domestic product. Figure 2-3 Nominal debt growth is seasonally adjusted and is translated into real terms after subtracting the growth rate of the price deflator for core personal consumption expenditure price. Figure 2-4 Institutional leveraged loans generally exclude loan commitments held by banks. Key identi- fies bars in order from top to bottom. Figure 2-5 Gross leverage is an asset-weighted average of the ratio of firms’ book value of total debt to book value of total assets. The 75th percentile is calculated from a sample of the 2,500 larg- est firms by assets. The dashed sections of the lines in the first quarter of 2019 reflect the structural break in the series due to the 2019 compliance deadline for Financial Accounting Standards Board rule Accounting Standards Update 2016-02. Figure 2-6 The interest coverage ratio is earnings before interest and taxes over interest payments. Firms with leverage less than 5 percent and interest payments less than $500,000 are excluded. Figure 2-7 Volumes are for large corporations with earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) greater than $50 million and exclude existing tranches of add-ons and amendments as well as restatements with no new money. Key identifies bars in order from top to bottom. Figure 2-8 The data begin in December 1998. The default rate is calculated as the amount in default over the past 12 months divided by the total outstanding volume at the beginning of the 12-month period. The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–September 2009, and February 2020–June 2020. Figure 2-9 Subprime are those with an Equifax Risk Score below 620; near prime are from 620 to 719; prime are greater than 719. Scores are measured contemporaneously. Student loan balances before 2004 are estimated using average growth from 2004 to 2007, by risk score. The data are converted to constant 2019 dollars using the consumer price index. Figure 2-10 Year-over-year change in balances for the second quarter of each year among those house- holds whose balance increased over this window. Subprime are those with an Equifax Risk Score below 620; near prime are from 620 to 719; prime are greater than 719. Scores were measured a year ago. The data are converted to constant 2019 dollars using the consumer price index. Key identifies bars in order from left to right. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 69 Figure 2-11 Loss mitigation includes tradelines that have a narrative code of forbearance, natural disas- ter, payment deferral (including partial), loan modification (including federal government plans), and loans with zero scheduled payment and a nonzero balance. Delinquent includes loans reported to the credit bureau at least 30 days past due. The line break represents the data transitioning from quarterly to monthly beginning January 2020. Figure 2-12 Estimated share of mortgages with negative equity according to CoreLogic and Zillow. For CoreLogic, the data are monthly. For Zillow, the data are quarterly and, for 2017, are avail- able only for the first and fourth quarters. Figure 2-13 Housing leverage is estimated as the ratio of the average outstanding mortgage loan balance for owner-occupied homes with a mortgage to (1) current home values using the CoreLogic national house price index and (2) model-implied house prices estimated by a staff model based on rents, interest rates, and a time trend. Figure 2-14 The data are converted to constant 2019 dollars using the consumer price index. Figure 2-15 Subprime are those with an Equifax Risk Score below 620; near prime are from 620 to 719; prime are greater than 719. Scores are measured contemporaneously. The data are converted to constant 2019 dollars using the consumer price index. Figure 2-16 Loss mitigation includes tradelines that have a narrative code of forbearance, natural disas- ter, payment deferral (including partial), loan modification (including federal government plans), and loans with zero scheduled payment and a nonzero balance. Delinquent includes loans reported to the credit bureau as at least 30 days past due. The line break represents the data transitioning from quarterly to monthly beginning January 2020. Figure 2-17 Subprime are those with an Equifax Risk Score below 620; near prime are from 620 to 719; prime are greater than 719. Scores are measured contemporaneously. The data are converted to constant 2019 dollars using the consumer price index. Figure 2-18 Delinquency is at least 30 days past due, excluding severe derogatory loans. The data are four-quarter moving averages. Subprime are those with an Equifax Risk Score below 620; near prime are from 620 to 719; prime are greater than 719. Credit scores are lagged four quarters. Box: A Retrospective on the March 2020 Turmoil in Treasury and Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets Figure A Smoothed yield curve estimated from off-the-run Treasury coupon securities. Agency resi- 70 Figure Notes dential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) spread is the difference between the yield on the 30-year 2.5 percent coupon uniform mortgage-backed security and the duration-matched Treasury yield. Figure C Market depth is defined as the average top three bid and ask quote sizes. Figure D UST stands for U.S. Treasury. The volume of dealers’ non-rehypothecated Treasury repur- chase agreements serves as a proxy for the total dealer securities inventory. Figure 3-1 Bank equity is total equity capital net of preferred equity and intangible assets, and assets are total assets. The data are seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board staff. G-SIBs are U.S. global systemically important banks. Large non–G-SIBs are bank holding com- panies (BHCs) and intermediate holding companies with greater than $100 billion in total assets that are not G-SIBs. The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: July 1990–March 1991, March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–June 2009, and February 2020–June 2020. Figure 3-2 The data are seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Board staff. Sample consists of domes- tic bank holding companies (BHCs) and intermediate holding companies (IHCs) with a substantial U.S. commercial banking presence. G-SIBs are global systemically important U.S. banks. Large non–G-SIBs are BHCs and IHCs with greater than $100 billion in total assets that are not G-SIBs. Before 2014:Q1 (advanced-approaches BHCs) or before 2015:Q1 (non-advanced-approaches BHCs) the numerator of the common equity Tier 1 ratio is Tier 1 common capital. Afterward, the numerator is common equity Tier 1 capital. The denom- inator is risk-weighted assets. The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER): March 2001– November 2001, December 2007–June 2009, and February 2020–June 2020. Figure 3-3 Weighted median leverage of nonfinancial firms that borrow using commercial and indus- trial loans from the 26 banks that have filed in every quarter since 2013:Q1. Leverage is measured as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets of the borrower, as reported by the lender, and the median is weighted by committed amounts. Figure 3-4 Banks’ responses are weighted by their commercial and industrial loan market shares. Survey respondents to the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Prac- tices are asked about the changes over the quarter. Results are shown for loans to large and medium-sized firms. The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–June 2009, and February 2020–June 2020. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 71 Figure 3-5 Leverage is calculated by dividing total assets by equity. Figure 3-6 Ratio is calculated as (total assets − separate account assets)/(total capital − accumulated other comprehensive income) using generally accepted accounting principles. The largest 10 publicly traded life and property and casualty insurers are represented. Figure 3-7 Leverage is computed as the ratio of hedge funds’ gross notional exposure to net asset value. Gross notional exposure includes the nominal value of all long and short positions and derivative notional exposures. Options are delta-adjusted, and interest rate derivatives are reported at 10-year bond equivalents. Data are reported on a three-quarter lag. Figure 3-8 Net percentage equals the percentage of institutions that reported increased use of finan- cial leverage over the past three months minus the percentage of institutions that reported decreased use of financial leverage over the past three months. REIT is real estate invest- ment trust. Figure 3-9 The data from the first, second, and third quarters of 2020 are annualized to create the 2020 bar. CMBS is commercial mortgage-backed securities; CDO is collateralized debt obligation; RMBS is residential mortgage-backed securities; CLO is collateralized loan obligation. The “Other” category consists of other asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by credit card debt, student loans, equipment, floor plans, and miscellaneous receivables; resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (Re-REMIC) RMBS; and Re-REMIC CMBS. The data are converted to constant 2020 dollars using the consumer price index. Key identifies bars in order from top to bottom. Figure 3-10 Committed amounts on credit lines and term loans extended to nonbank financial firms by a balanced panel of 26 bank holding companies that have filed Form FR Y-14Q in every quarter since 2013:Q1. Nonbank financial firms are identified based on reported North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. In addition to NAICS codes, a name-matching algorithm is applied to identify specific entities such as real estate investment trusts (REITs), special purpose entities, collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), and asset- backed securities (ABS). REITs incorporate both mortgage (trading) REITs and equity REITs. Broker-dealers also include commodity contracts dealers and brokerages and other securities and commodity exchanges. Other financial vehicles include closed-end investment and mutual funds as well as financial planning and pension funds. BDC is business develop- ment company. Figure 4-1 Liquid assets are cash plus estimates of securities that qualify as high-quality liquid assets as defined by the Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirement. Accordingly, Level 1 assets and 72 FIGure NoTeS discounts and restrictions on Level 2 assets are incorporated into the estimate. G-SIBs are U.S. global systemically important banks. Large non–G-SIBs are bank holding companies (BHCs) and intermediate holding companies with greater than $100 billion in total assets. Figure 4-2 Short-term wholesale funding is defined as the sum of large time deposits with maturity less than one year, federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase, deposits in foreign offices with maturity less than one year, trading liabilities (excluding revaluation losses on derivatives), and other borrowed money with maturity less than one year. The shaded bars with top caps indicate periods of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: March 2001–November 2001, December 2007– June 2009, and February 2020–June 2020. Figure 4-3 The black striped area denotes the period from 2008:Q4 to 2012:Q4 when insured deposits increased because of the Transaction Account Guarantee program. “Other” consists of variable-rate demand obligations (VRDOs), federal funds, funding-agreement-backed securi- ties, private liquidity funds, offshore money market funds, and local government investment pools. Securities lending includes only lending collateralized by cash. GDP is gross domestic product. Values for VRDOs come from Bloomberg beginning in 2019:Q1. See Jack Bao, Josh David, and Song Han (2015), “The Runnables,” FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 3), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/the-runnables-20150903.html. Figure 4-4 The data are converted to constant 2020 dollars using the consumer price index. Figure 4-5 The data are converted to constant 2020 dollars using the consumer price index. Figure 4-6 The data are converted to constant 2020 dollars using the consumer price index. Key identi- fies series in order from top to bottom. Figure 4-7 Key identifies series in order from top to bottom. Mutual fund assets under management as of August 2020 included $2,393 billion in i nvestment-grade bond funds, $268 billion in high- yield bond funds, and $63 billion in bank loan funds. Figure 4-8 Securitized products include collateralized loan obligations for corporate debt, private-label commercial mortgage-backed securities for commercial real estate, and private-label residen- tial mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities backed by autos, credit cards, consumer loans, and student loans for other asset-backed securities. Illiquid corporate debt includes private placements, bank/syndicated loans, and high-yield bonds. Alternative invest- ments include assets filed under Schedule BA. P&C is property and casualty. Key identifies series in order from top to bottom. FINaNCIaL STaBILITY rePorT: NoVemBer 2020 73 Figure 4-9 The data are converted to constant 2020 dollars using the consumer price index. FHLB is Federal Home Loan Bank. Key identifies series in order from top to bottom. Box: LIBOR Transition Update Figure A Key identifies series in order from bottom to top. SOFR is the Secured Overnight Financing Rate. LIBOR is the London interbank offered rate. Figure B Key identifies series in order from bottom to top. SOFR is the Secured Overnight Financing Rate. LIBOR is the London interbank offered rate. Figure C Key identifies series in order from bottom to top. SOFR is the Secured Overnight Financing Rate. CME is the formal name of what used to be the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. ICE is the Intercontinental Exchange. 1M and 3M are 1-month and 3-month securities. Box: Salient Shocks to Financial Stability Cited in Market Outreach Figure Responses are to the following question: “Over the next 12–18 months, which shocks, if realized, do you think would have the greatest negative effect on the functioning of the U.S. financial system?” SME is small and medium-sized enterprises. CRE is commercial real estate. CMBS is commercial mortgage-backed security. LIBOR is London interbank offered rate. 75 Corrections On November 10, 2021, the data in figure 3-2 was corrected to fix a coding error. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System www.federalreserve.gov 1120

Federal Reserve (2020, November 8). Financial Stability Report. Financial Stability, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/financial_stability_report_20201109

@misc{wtfs_financial_stability_report_20201109,
  author = {Federal Reserve},
  title = {Financial Stability Report},
  year = {2020},
  month = {Nov},
  howpublished = {Financial Stability, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/financial_stability_report_20201109},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}