bluebooks · May 14, 2001
Bluebook
Prefatory Note
The attached document represents the most complete and accurate version
available based on original copies culled from the files of the FOMC Secretariat at the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This electronic document was
created through a comprehensive digitization process which included identifying the bestpreserved paper copies, scanning those copies, 1 and then making the scanned versions
text-searchable. 2 Though a stringent quality assurance process was employed, some
imperfections may remain.
Please note that this document may contain occasional gaps in the text. These
gaps are the result of a redaction process that removed information obtained on a
confidential basis. All redacted passages are exempt from disclosure under applicable
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.
1
In some cases, original copies needed to be photocopied before being scanned into electronic format. All
scanned images were deskewed (to remove the effects of printer- and scanner-introduced tilting) and lightly
cleaned (to remove dark spots caused by staple holes, hole punches, and other blemishes caused after initial
printing).
2
A two-step process was used. An advanced optimal character recognition computer program (OCR) first
created electronic text from the document image. Where the OCR results were inconclusive, staff checked
and corrected the text as necessary. Please note that the numbers and text in charts and tables were not
reliably recognized by the OCR process and were not checked or corrected by staff.
Strictly C onfide ntial (F.R.)
Class II – FOMC
May 10, 2001
M ONETARY P OLICY A LTERNATIVES
Recent D evelopm ents
(1)
The 50-basis-point reduction in the target federal funds rate at the
March 20 meeting was less than some investors had expected, but the accompanying
statement contributed to expectations that an intermeeting ease would follow.1 Those
expectations gradually diminished over subsequent weeks as incoming data and
statements by several Federal Reserve officials evidently were read by investors as
suggesting less weakness in the economy going forward. Thus, the 50-basis-point
reduction in th e federal funds ra te on Apr il 18 caught inv estors by surprise . Shortterm interest rates declined in response, as market participants marked down the
expected path of the federal funds rate over the next year or so. M ore recently,
surprisingly w eak employ ment data a dded to the a mount o f near-term easin g built
into asset prices. Futures rates currently indicate that market participants expect the
federal funds rate to be cut another 50 basis points at the May meeting to 4 percent
and to decline to about 3¾ percent by fall–-about ½ percentage point lower than was
anticipated before the March meeting (chart 1). On balance over the intermeeting
period, short-term interest rates fell ½ to 1 percentage p oint.
(2)
Despite the sharp decline in short-term interest rates, longer-term yields
rose on balance over the intermeeting p eriod. Most of the increase occurred before
1. Over the intermeeting p eriod, federal fu nds have trad ed at rates near the target levels.
The Desk redeemed $11.8 billion of Treasury securities, including $7.5 billion of bills and
$4.4 billion of coupon securities, to continue bringing SOMA holdings into conformance
with the guidelines on per-issue limits. To offset the resulting reserve drain and m eet longerterm reserve needs, the Desk purchased outright $13.6 billion of Treasury coupon securities
in the market and $486 million of Treasury bills from foreign customers. The volume of
outstanding lo ng-term R Ps was kep t unchange d at $12.0 billion .
Chart 1
Financial Market Indicators
Expected Federal Funds Rates Estimated from
Percent
Financial Futures*
Selected Treasury Yields
Percent
7.00
6.75
6.50
6.25
6.00
5.75
5.50
5.25
5.00
4.75
4.50
4.25
4.00
Daily
4.75
Two-year
4.50
March 19, 2001
4.25
Ten-year
4.00
May 10, 2001
3.75
May
Jul
Sep
2001
Nov
Jan
Mar
May
2002
Jul
Jun
Aug
Oct
2000
Dec
Feb
Apr
2001
*Estimates from federal funds and eurodollar futures rates with an
allowance for term premia and other adjustments.
Selected Equity Indexes
Selected Private Long-Term Yields
Index(5/31/00) = 100
Percent
140
Daily
14
13
120
Percent
12
Daily
11
High Yield
(left scale)
12
Wilshire 5000
100
DJIA
10
Corporate BBB
(right scale)
11
9
10
8
80
9
Nasdaq
60
Jun
Aug
Oct
2000
Dec
Feb
Apr
Ten-year Swap
(right scale)
8
Jun
2001
7
Thirty-year
Mortgage
(weekly, right scale)
Aug
Oct
2000
6
Dec
Feb
Apr
2001
Merrill Lynch BBB index is for maturities of seven to ten years.
Selected Risk Spreads*
Basis Points
800
300
Daily
Spread of Low-Tier CP Rate
over High-Tier CP Rate*
Basis Points
160
Daily
140
700
High Yield
(left scale)
120
600
200
100
500
80
400
60
100
BBB
(right scale)
300
40
20
200
Jun
Aug
Oct
2000
Dec
Feb
Apr
2001
*These spreads are the difference between the yields on the Merrill Lynch
175 and BBB indexes and that on ten-year swap rate.
Jun
Aug
Oct
2000
Dec
*30-day nonfinancial, A2/P2 rate less AA rate.
Note: Solid vertical line indicates last FOMC meeting; dotted vertical line indicates intermeeting policy easing.
Feb
Apr
2001
2
the intermeetin g policy mo ve, as investors beca me mo re confident tha t output gro wth
will pick up; the growing likelihood of substantial federal tax cuts also m ay have added
pressure on long-term yields. Although yields on longer-term nom inal Treasury
securities increased nearly ½ percentage point, those on com parable inflation-indexed
securities drifted lower.2 The implied run-up in inflation compensation left that
measure ab ove the levels ob served before its sh arp decline in late 2000 associated with
emerging w eakness in the eco nomy. Th e improved sentiment ab out the econ omic
outlook and the surprise intermeeting policy easing may have contributed to a
narrowing of risk premiums, especially on lower-grade corporate debt securities, and
to a rise in stock prices. Equity markets were also bolstered by first-quarter earnings
reports, which generally came in above sharply reduced expectations, although
analysts continued to lower forecasts for earnings in subsequent quarters. Over the
intermeeting period, the W ilshire 5000 index gained mo re than 7½ percent, leaving it
about 5 perc ent below its year-end level.
(3)
Equity prices and long-term yields rose in other industrial countries as
well, likely reflecting in part the importance of the United States for the global
economy and the perceived improvement in prospects for globally important
industries, including those in the high-technology area. The increase in equ ity prices
was particularly large in Japan–about 15 p ercent–reflecting in part a favorable market
reaction to the Bank of Japan’s announcement of policy changes the day before the
March FOMC m eeting, which included a return to a zero interest rate target, and the
formation of the new Koizumi-led government in late April. Short-term yields abroad
2. Some of the increase in the ten- and thirty-year nominal constant maturity Treasury
yields reflected a decline in the on-the-run premium that is typical of the Treasury auction
schedule. At the ten-year maturity, the narrowing of this premium is estimated to have
added about 10 basis points to the increase in the constant maturity yield over the
intermeeting p eriod.
3
generally declined, although by less than in the United States. The European Central
Bank ended its “wait and see” p olicy recently with a 25-basis-point cut in its policy
rates. The reduction came amid increasing indications of economic weakness in the
euro area and despite some signs o f increased inflationary pressure. Policy rates also
were cut by 25 basis points in Canada and Switzerland and by 50 basis points in two
steps in the United Kingdo m since the March F OMC meeting. The dollar appreciated
against a basket of major currencies early in the intermeeting period , but it later
retraced that m ovement, pa rticularly after the FO MC’s sur prise interest rate cut in
mid-April, and finished the intermeeting period about unchanged (chart 2).
over the
intermeeting period
(4)
U.S. authorities did not intervene.
The dollar was also essentially unchanged on balance against a basket of
currencies of our other important trading partners. Argentine financial markets were
roiled by growing uncertainties about the country’s financial situation and speculation
that its exchange rate peg might be m odified, as well as by an open dispute between
the Argentine governm ent and central ban k over the use of reserve requirements.
Market pressures spilled over to Brazil, where the real fell almost 5 percent against the
dollar. Risk spreads on dollar-denominated Argentine and Brazilian debt moved up
sharply. In contrast, the Mexican peso appreciated abo ut 4 percent against the dollar,
as monetary authorities held to their tight policy stance, and spreads on Mexican debt
narrowed. The Turk ish lira regained some of its previously lost ground, and T urkish
financial markets calmed, as the country’s financial problems appeared to have been
brought under better control partly in response to the prospect of additional funding
from the IM F and W orld Bank. T he Indone sian rupiah an d the Philipp ine peso both
declined sharp ly against the do llar in reaction to fin ancial problem s and dom estic
political turmo il.
4
(5)
The debt of nonfederal sectors in the United States is estimated to have
advanced at a round an 8 percent rate o n average ove r March a nd April, ab out equal to
its robust pace of the second half of 2000 and early 2001 (see chart 2). Ho wever,
growth of b usiness debt fell ba ck in recent m onths, likely reflecting a reduction in
inventory and capital investment and in merger and acquisition activity. Firms
continued to borrow h eavily in the corp orate bond market, but th ey reduced th eir
reliance on sho rt-term financin g markets. C omme rcial paper ou tstanding ran off
further in March and April, albeit at a much slower pace than earlier in the year, and
business loans at commercial banks also declined very recently, possibly damped by
the further tightening of credit conditions indicated in the most recent Senior Loan
Officer Opinion survey. Household borrowing also has showed some signs of
slowing in recent months. G rowth in consum er credit declined moderately in Ma rch
and is estimated to have slowed further in April, as outlays on durable goods appear
to have fallen back from the surprisingly strong pace early in the year. Mortgage debt
growth, by co ntrast, seems to h ave largely sustaine d its rapid pace, reflectin g strength
in the residential housing sector and substantial refinancing activity. State and local
government borro wing picked up further in M arch and April, as lower interest rates
fueled advan ce refunding o f existing debt. Th e federal govern ment, in con trast, paid
down a considerable amount of debt in April, which pulled down the growth of total
domestic nonfinancial debt that month.
(6)
Spurred by the drop in its opportunity cost, M2 expanded at an average
pace of 12½ percent over M arch and A pril, with particula r strength in liqu id deposits
and retail money funds. M2 growth was boosted by several special factors, including
extensive mortgage refinancing activity and, in April, households' accumulation of
liquid balances to make nonwithheld tax payments, which increased by more than
allowed for b y seasonal factors. In a ddition, portfo lio flows into safe, liqu id assets
Chart 2
Exchange Rates and Financial Flows
Nominal Trade-Weighted Dollar Exchange Rates
Index(5/31/00) = 100
110
FOMC
Daily
108
Major
Currencies
Index
106
Broad
Index
Other Important
Trading Partners
104
102
100
98
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
2000
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
2001
Apr
May
Solid vertical line indicates last FOMC meeting; dotted vertical line indicates intermeeting policy easing.
Growth of Nonfederal Debt
Growth of Business Debt
Percent
16
Annualized
p
p
2000
J
2001
F M
16
Annualized
14
14
12
12
10
10
8
8
p
6
1999
p - Preliminary.
Percent
Sum of Selected Components*
p
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
1999
2000
2001
J F M
p - Preliminary.
*Bonds, commercial paper, and C&I loans.
A
A
M2 Opportunity Cost*
M2 Growth
Percent
Percentage Points
16
Annualized
3.5
Monthly
14
3.0
12
2.5
p
10
2.0
8
1.5
6
1.0
4
April
2
0.5
0
1999
p - Preliminary.
2000
J
2001
F M
0.0
1999
2000
A
* Yield on three-month Treasury bill minus average
return on M2 assets.
MARA:DS
5
amid volatile movements in equity prices likely added to M2 grow th in re cent m onths .
However, weekly data suggest that M2 growth has slowed some of late, perhaps
reflecting an unwinding of tax-related balances and the resumption of more normal
portfo lio flow s into equities. M3 a lso exp anded at a rap id pace in recent months .
Growth of institution-only money funds remained very brisk, in part because rates on
those funds do not decline as quickly as short-term market rates. Managed liabilities
included in M3 also increased in April, apparently to help finance a pickup in bank
credit growth and a shift in bank fund ing from foreign to U.S. sources.
6
MONEY AND CREDIT AGGREGATES
(Seasonally adjusted annual percentage rates of growth)
2000
Jan 2001
Feb 2001
Mar 2001
Apr 2001 (p)
M2
6.2
12.4
10.8
14.5
10.2
M3
9.2
16.0
9.8
10.4
17.4
Domestic nonfinancial debt
Federal
Nonfederal
5.4
-6.7
8.6
4.0
-7.1
6.6
6.4
-3.0
8.5
7.2
1.2
8.6
4.2
-11.5
7.7
Bank credit
Adjusted1
10.0
9.4
11.5
12.0
3.1
3.1
1.9
0.4
5.2
5.1
1.4
2.0
11.2
10.8
3.3
3.3
2.4
2.9
7.0
7.5
Money and Credit Aggregates
Memo:
Monetary base2
Adjusted for sweeps
1. Adjusted to remove the effects of mark-to-market accounting rules (FIN 39 and FASB 115).
2. Adjusted for discontinuities associated with changes in reserve requirements.
p -- preliminary
7
Policy Alternatives
(7)
The staff forecast for this meeting embodies a weaker outlook for
aggregate demand than in the March Greenbook, reflecting in part incoming
information suggesting lower-than-expected trajectories for investment and
consump tion spendin g. With pro jected spendin g on capital eq uipment so fter than in
the last forecast and estimates of multifactor productivity growth over recen t years
revised down, the staff has trimmed its estimate of the growth of structural
productivity somewhat, which further damps prospective aggregate demand. The
staff has assumed that the Federal Reserve will respond to this more negative outlook
by easing policy 50 basis points a t this meeting. T hereafter, the federal fu nds rate is
held u nchan ged at a level o ne percentag e poin t below that of the last Gree nboo k.
Earnings disappointm ents are expected to trigger some near-term declines in stock
prices, but long-term interest rates and the dollar are expected to hold near current
levels given this policy path. The impetus provided by the cumulative policy easings
and the support to investment and real income from continuing efficiency gains
engendered by new technologies contribute to a strengthening of the growth of
spending over the forecast period. In addition, fiscal stimulus spurs consumption
demand beginning late r this year. By the end of the projec tion period, eco nomic
growth rises back to a rate close to that of its potential. With slack emerging in labor
and product mark ets and energy prices declining, core PCE inflation slips back u nder
2 percent in 2 002.
(8)
In considerin g the approp riate stance of policy , it may be useful to
compare the real federal funds rate with estimates of the current level of the
equilibrium real federal funds rate. The equilib rium rate is defin ed here to be th e rate
that, if maintained, eventually would return output to potential once the effects of any
transitory disturb ances have dissip ated. Thus, the eq uilibrium rea l federal funds rate
8
reflects the longer-term forces shaping the outlook for the real econom y and so
provides one benchmark for judging the implications of alternative policy stances. To
be sure, the appropriate stance of policy relative to that equilibrium rate in a given
instance will depend on policymakers’ objectives, the current levels of output and
inflation, and an assessment of the transitory factors that may influence the paths of
inflation and output over the next few years.
(9)
The chart on the next page shows a range of estimates of the equilibrium
real federal funds rate, as well as the actual real funds rate and its historical average.3
The range is constructed from several individual e stimates of th e equilibrium real rate.
Two are derived from the FRB/US model; two others are calculated from the
relationship be tween the real fu nds rate and th e output gap using a statistical filter to
separate perm anent chang es in that relationsh ip from tem porary deviatio ns. In both
of these appro aches, one estim ate is based on h istorical data wh ile the other aug ments
these data with the staff forecast throu gh 2002. A fifth estimate, which begins in
1998, is inferred from actual indexed debt yields. As can be seen in the chart, the
estimates imply some decline in the equilibrium rate over recent quarters, likely owing
in part to the longer-term effects on demand of an increase in the equity premium,
which reduces wealth, and of a slowing in the growth of potential output, which holds
down the expansion of permanent real income and earnings. The FOMC’s current
target for the nominal funds rate implies a real federal funds rate of about 2¾
percent–around the low er end of the range. The chart also shows the real fun ds rates
implied by the three policy alternatives discussed below.4
3. All measures of the real federal funds rate are calculated using the core PCE inflation
rate over the previous four quarters as a proxy for expected inflation.
4. Note that since expected inflation is assumed to equal past actual inflation, a given
change in the nomina l federal funds ra te target translates into an e qual imm ediate change in
the real federal funds rate.
Chart 3
Actual Real Federal Funds Rate and
Range of Estimated Equilibrium Real Rates
Percent
5
Quarterly
Actual Real Funds Rate
4
Historical Average: 2.81
(1966Q1-2001Q1)
3
2
●
Current Rate
●
25 b.p. Easing
●
50 b.p. Easing
●
75 b.p. Easing
1
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Note: The shaded range represents the maximum and the minimum values each quarter of the five estimates of the equilibrium real federal funds
rate described in the text. Real federal funds rates are calculated using four-quarter lagged core PCE inflation. The values of the real federal
funds rate in the second quarter of 2001 and under the three policy alternatives include the staff projection of core PCE inflation for that quarter.
9
(10)
If the Committee, like the staff, anticipates a prolonged period of weak
aggregate demand, it might cho ose the 50 basis point reduction in the target federal
funds rate assumed in the staff forecast. While such a reduction would leave the real
funds rate noticeably below the range of the estimates of its equilibrium value, an
accommod ative policy stance may be seen as needed for a time to co unter temporary
restraints on aggregate demand. In particular the Committee may be concerned about
household spending in an environment of a weaken ing job market and abo ut business
investment outlays in view of the drags from the previous slowdown in final demand
and the over -accumulatio n of capital in som e sectors. In these circu mstances, grow th
would remain slugg ish for a time even after further policy easing, lessening pressures
on resources and likely rolling back the recent upticks in inflation and inflation
expectations. Indeed, the Committee may view the resource gap likely to open up
under this scenario as sizable enough to imply a margin in which spending could snap
back faster than expected without producing a deterioration in the inflation
environm ent. Market p articipants already expect a substan tial reversal of policy in
2002, suggesting that they would be prompter than usual in bringing forward in time
and increasing the size of the anticipated tightening if evidence of such a snap-ba ck
emerged. As long as the Committee reinforced such sentiment with its words and
actions, the resulting increase in real interest rates would work to stabilize the
econo my an d constrain inflatio n.
(11)
Investors are exp ecting a 50 basis p oint move at this meeting, alo ng with
a statement ind icating that the b alance of risks rem ains weighted toward eco nomic
weakness, to be followed by an additional 25 basis point move by fall. Validating
market expectations for this meeting would leave interest rates, equity prices, and the
foreign exchan ge value of the d ollar largely unch anged. The C ommittee may find this
outcome especially attractive if it believes that the balance of risks is sufficiently tilted
10
toward w eakness to m ake the added policy easing bu ilt into asset prices a reaso nable
possibility.
(12)
The Com mittee migh t choose a m ore mod est 25 basis point reduction
in the federal funds rate at this meeting if it views aggregate demand going forward as
likely to be noticeably less weak than in the staff forecast, perhaps because it sees the
large cumulative easing of policy since the start of the year as providing m ore support
for demand than in that forecast. Among financial indicators, the rapid growth of
money an d the steepness o f the yield curve m ay suggest that co nsiderable stim ulus is
already in place. In these circumstances, with the real funds rate at the low end of the
range of estimates of its equilibrium level, and with equity m arkets having risen
appreciably over the intermeeting period, the C ommittee may believe that a m ore
forceful policy action at this meeting would create unaccep table odds of a policy
overshoot, w ith potentially ad verse consequ ences for inflation. C oncerns in this
regard might be accentuated by the recent firmer tone of the inflation data and the
increases in survey and market measures of expected inflation. Thus, even if the
Comm ittee suspects that ad ditional easing m ight well be ap propriate at som e point, it
might cho ose a smaller p olicy step at this m eeting to allow time for mo re evidence to
accumulate on wh ether the economy will be soft enou gh to contain inflation pressures
and w arrant additional easing .
(13)
Market participants would b e surprised by a 25 basis point easing. Even
if such a policy move is accompanied by a statement that the balance of risks remains
weighted toward econ omic weakness, short-term interest rates would rise as investors
marked up their expectations for the path of the federal funds rate over coming
months. Higher interest rates, together with a sense that mo netary policy is less
focused on fostering a return to robust econ omic growth, wou ld lead to a fall in stock
prices. If the drop in equity prices is quite substantial, longer-term interest rates also
11
might declin e, reflecting the weak er outlook fo r the econom y. These effects in
financial markets would be attenuated if, in light of the statement accompanying the
policy announcement, the Federal Reserve is seen more as stretching out the timing of
its policy moves than as reducing the total amount of easing that will be forthcoming.
(14)
If the Com mittee believes th at the outlook for aggregate d emand is
probably weaker than in the staff forecast, or that the risks around that forecast are
skewed substantially to the downside, it might choose a 75 basis point reduction in
the target federal funds rate. Such weakness could ow e, for example, to a more
protracted falloff in high-tech investment as businesses reconsider the profitability of
these capital projects, which in turn would damp structural productivity growth and
be reflected in a m ore prono unced declin e in the equilibriu m real fund s rate. Even if
the Committee agrees with the staff forecast of output and employment, it still may
view their projected paths as unacceptably weak, justifying a larger cut in the federal
funds rate than is assumed in that forecast. For example, the Committee may think
that the unem ployment r ate does not n eed to rise as m uch or as qu ickly as in the staff
forecast to keep inflation in check.
(15)
A 75 basis p oint easing acco mpanied by a statemen t that the risks rem ain
weighted toward economic weakness would lower the expected near-term path of
policy, reducing other shorter-term interest rates and easing financial conditions m ore
generally. The larger-than-expected policy move w ould presumably bo lster
expectations of eco nomic grow th and corpo rate earnings, boosting sto ck pric es.
Effects on long er-term nom inal interest rates are less cle ar. Such rates w ould tend to
be pulled down by th e change in near-term policy expectations and th e associated
decline in real inter est rates, but that tend ency could b e more than offset by a rise in
inflation premiums if market participants read the larger-than-expected policy move as
increasing th e odds of a sig nifican t picku p in inflation .
12
(16)
Although m arket participants expect the Comm ittee to retain its view
that the balance of risks is weighted toward economic weakness, the Committee might
believe that the level of rates selected at this meeting is sufficiently low to balance the
risks of economic weakness with those of increased inflation pressures. If, for
example, rates are cut by 50 or 75 basis points, the Committee might view the
resulting real federal funds rate of 2¼ or 2 percent as low en ough to make the
reduced risks of economic wea kness comparable to the increased risks of higher
inflation. Most investors would probably read a shift by the Committee to a
statement of balanced risks as indicating that the current cycle of policy easing had
ended. As a r esult, a combin ation of a 50 ba sis point policy m ove and a sh ift to
balanced risks would cause interest rates to back up and stock prices to decline, as
investors take out the additional easing that had been expected in the near term. By
contrast, a 75 basis point reduction in the target federal funds rate accomp anied by a
statement of b alanced risks w ould tend to lower interest rate s a little, since it would
move up the timing of policy easing that is already expected, and boost stock prices
slightly. However, market participants might view a move to balanced risks as
suggesting that the Committee could be less likely to react quickly to future signs of
econom ic weakness, in w hich case stock p rices might slip, cau sing long-term rates to
fall a bit further.
(17)
Under the staff forecast, a significant furth er tightening o f credit
conditions is not anticipated in coming quarters, although with the economy soft and
profits not rebounding, lenders are likely to remain cautious. The expansion of
domestic nonfinancial sector debt is projected to slow to about a 5 percent pace from
April to December. Expected federal surpluses result in further substantial paydowns
of Treasury debt in coming months before the need to finance the projected tax
rebate requires the Treasury to temporarily become a net borrower. Nonfederal debt
13
growth is projected to moderate some, but it remains considerably faster than the
expansion in nominal sp ending. Alth ough m ortgage grow th is expected to r emain
brisk, household debt growth should slow as weaker consumption spending damps
the expansion of consumer credit. Business borrowing also is anticipated to soften, as
a widening of the gap betw een internally gen erated funds an d capital expen ditures in
the second half of the year is more than offset by a reduction in eq uity retirements.
(18)
Under the Greenbook forecast, M2 is projected to expand at a 5½
percen t pace from A pril to December , well below its average rate in recent months .
The deceleration owes in part to the projected slowdown in the growth of nominal
spending and the waning effects of policy easings on opportunity costs. In addition,
some of the special factors that have boosted M2 growth of late–including mortgage
refinancing an d tax-season effects, an d perhaps so me safe haven flows out of eq uity
markets–are expected to u nwind ov er coming m onths. M3 growth is pr ojected to
decline to a 7 percent pace over the April-to-December period, reflecting the
moderation in M2 expansion and smaller increases in institutional money funds as
their rates ad just to lower market inter est rates.
14
Directive and Balance-of-Risks Language
(19)
Presented below for the mem bers' consideration is draft wording for
(1) the directive and (2) the “balance-of-risks” sentence to be included in the press
release issued after the meeting (no t part of the directiv e).
(1) Directive Wording
The Federal Open Market Comm ittee seeks monetary and financial
conditions th at will foster price stab ility and prom ote sustainable g rowth in
output. To fu rther its long-run objectives, the Co mmittee in th e immed iate
future seeks conditions in reserve markets consistent with MAINTAINING/
INCREASING /reducing the federal funds rate AT/to an average of around
___4½ percent.
(2) “Balance-of-Risks” Sentence
Against the background of its long-run goals of price stability and
sustainable economic growth and of the information currently available, the
Committee believes that the risks [ARE BALANCED WITH RESPECT TO
PROSPECTS FOR BO TH GOALS] [ARE WEIGHTE D MAINLY
TOWARD CONDITIONS THAT MAY GENERATE HEIGHTENED
INFL ATIO N PR ESSU RES ] [are CON TINU E TO BE weig hted main ly
toward con ditions that m ay generate eco nomic w eakness] in the forese eable
future.
M2
--------------------------Ease
Ease
Ease
75 bp
50 bp
25 bp
---------------------------
M3
--------------------------Ease
Ease
Ease
75 bp
50 bp
25 bp
---------------------------
M2
M3
Debt
--------------------------Greenbook Forecast*
---------------------------
Monthly Growth Rates
Jan-2001
Feb-2001
Mar-2001
Apr-2001
May-2001
Jun-2001
Jul-2001
Aug-2001
Sep-2001
Oct-2001
Nov-2001
Dec-2001
12.4
10.8
14.5
10.2
2.9
6.6
6.3
6.6
6.6
6.2
6.4
5.9
12.4
10.8
14.5
10.2
2.7
6.0
5.5
5.8
6.0
5.8
6.0
5.5
12.4
10.8
14.5
10.2
2.5
5.4
4.7
5.1
5.4
5.3
5.6
5.2
16.0
9.8
10.4
17.4
6.9
7.5
7.3
7.4
7.3
7.1
7.2
6.8
16.0
9.8
10.4
17.4
6.8
7.2
6.9
7.0
7.1
6.9
7.0
6.6
16.0
9.8
10.4
17.4
6.7
6.9
6.5
6.7
6.8
6.7
6.8
6.4
12.4
10.8
14.5
10.2
2.7
6.0
5.5
5.8
6.0
5.8
6.0
5.5
16.0
9.8
10.4
17.4
6.8
7.2
6.9
7.0
7.1
6.9
7.0
6.6
4.0
6.4
7.2
4.2
3.8
5.7
4.7
6.1
6.5
4.0
3.8
4.4
Quarterly Averages
2000 Q4
2001 Q1
2001 Q2
2001 Q3
2001 Q4
6.4
10.8
9.3
6.1
6.4
6.4
10.8
9.2
5.4
5.9
6.4
10.8
9.0
4.8
5.4
7.1
12.4
11.7
7.4
7.2
7.1
12.4
11.6
7.0
7.0
7.1
12.4
11.5
6.7
6.8
6.4
10.8
9.2
5.4
5.9
7.1
12.4
11.6
7.1
7.0
4.6
5.5
5.2
5.3
4.8
Growth Rate
From
To
Dec-2000 Dec-2001
Dec-2000 Apr-2001
Apr-2001 Dec-2001
8.2
12.2
6.0
7.9
12.2
5.5
7.5
12.2
5.0
9.7
13.6
7.3
9.5
13.6
7.1
9.3
13.6
6.8
7.9
12.2
5.5
9.5
13.6
7.1
5.2
5.5
4.9
2000 Q4 Apr-2001
2000 Q4 May-2001
2000 Q4 Dec-2001
11.4
10.0
8.3
11.4
9.9
7.9
11.4
9.9
7.6
13.2
12.2
9.8
13.2
12.2
9.7
13.2
12.2
9.5
11.4
9.9
7.9
13.2
12.2
9.7
5.6
5.3
5.3
6.2
8.4
6.2
8.1
6.2
7.7
9.2
10.0
9.2
9.9
9.2
9.7
6.2
8.1
9.2
9.9
5.4
5.3
1999 Q4
2000 Q4
2000 Q4
2001 Q4
* This forecast is consistent with nominal GDP and interest rates in the Greenbook forecast.
Cite this document
APA
Federal Reserve (2001, May 14). Bluebook. Bluebooks, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/bluebook_20010515
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_bluebook_20010515,
author = {Federal Reserve},
title = {Bluebook},
year = {2001},
month = {May},
howpublished = {Bluebooks, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/bluebook_20010515},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}