bluebooks · September 25, 1995
Bluebook
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Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class I FOMC
MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee
By the staff
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Strictly Confidential FR
Class I - FOMC
September 22,
1995
MONETARY POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Recent Developments
(1) Over the intermeeting period, the federal funds rate
averaged 5-3/4 percent, the Committee's intended level.1
Other
market interest rates fell appreciably over most of the period, though
they have reversed a portion of those declines in recent days.
On
net, yields on short-term Treasury securities decreased 15 to 25 basis
points and longer-term Treasury yields dropped about 35 basis points.
Lower interest rates, together with optimism about prospects for corporate earnings and a continued brisk pace of merger announcements and
share buybacks, propelled broad stock price indexes to record levels
during the period, though they have ended off their highs.
(2) Contributing to the drop in rates were further evidence
of subdued price pressures and indications that the rebound in output
growth would be modest; as a consequence, the gradual fall-off in
inflation expectations evidenced in survey data in recent years probably has been extended (chart).
Greater confidence that the budget
process would produce a significant reduction in federal deficits may
also have fostered declines in rates.
Changes in forward rates,
which--atypically--dropped as much at longer horizons as at intermediate horizons, are consistent with the inference of downward revisions to market forecasts of the secular paths of federal deficits and
inflation.
Market participants see a greater likelihood of further
monetary policy easing over the balance of the year now than they did
1. The allowance for adjustment and seasonal borrowing was
maintained at $275 million over the intermeeting period; actual
borrowing averaged close to the allowance.
Chart 1
Federal Funds Futures
**..
.....
Treasury Interest Rates
Percent
Percent
FOMC
August 22
September 22
\I
Sep
Aug
I
I
Nov
Oct
1995
I
Dec
I
Jan
J FMAMJ
J ASONDJ
1994
Weekly. Daily after Aug 22
Treasury Yield Curves
FOMC
.* .
.
...
..
J AS
1995
Bass
Points
Change in Forward Rates
SSince August 22
Percent
-.
8/22/95
FMAMJ
-1
70
..
9/22/95
I
I
I
I
I
I
I_
1
3
5
7
10
20
30
3
Maturity inYears
10
Years Ahead
Long-term Inflation Expectations
Percent
I
Michigan Survey*
Exchange Rates
F
Index
Mark'
Philadelphia FRB
Survey
-..."
*...
.
* ....
* *. **
11111
1990
1991
SQuarterly average
1992
1993
1994
1995
J FMAMJ
J ASON
1994
SIndex, Jan 1994=100
Weekly Daily after Aug 22
D J FMAMJ
J AS
1995
in mid-August, but little chance of a move at the September meeting.
In recent days, expectations of ease have been trimmed and market
rates have backed up, associated in part with a reversal of previous
dollar strength.
(3) The dollar's weighted-average exchange value declined
2-1/2 percent, on balance, over the period since the August FOMC meeting; the dollar rose 2-1/2 percent against the yen but fell against
other major currencies.
For most of the period, the weighted-average
dollar had moved higher, owing in part to monetary easings abroad.
German short- and long-term rates declined about 35 and 15 basis
points,
respectively, as the Bundesbank reduced its official lending
rates by 1/2 percentage point.
The Bank of Japan lowered its discount
rate 1/2 percentage point and call money rates nearly as much on
September 8.
Japanese bond yields declined substantially, reversing
much of the backup in earlier weeks.
The Japanese policy easing was
accompanied by massive intervention to strengthen the dollar against
the yen, which was apparently successful at least for a time.
Aug-
menting the dollar's rise against the yen were Japanese trade figures
for July, which showed Japan's current account surplus finally turning
down in dollar terms.
Late in the period, however, the yen reversed
course after the announcement of the new Japanese fiscal package, and
the mark rose as prospects for European monetary union seemed to dim;
the dollar declined against other major currencies as well.
Dollar
weakness may have been exacerbated by concern about the possibility of
a default by the U.S. Treasury on its debt.
The U.S. monetary authorities did
not intervene during the period.
(4) Private debt growth appears to have moderated in recent
months from the pace set earlier this year.
The expansion of business
loans at commercial banks slowed to an annual rate of just 3 percent
in August, owing in part to stronger commercial paper issuance, and
has
remained sluggish this month.
Issuance of corporate bonds in
public markets also was light in August;
a resurgence has been evident
in the first half of September in response to declining interest
rates, and the calendar of pending issues is full.
In the household
sector, bank loan data adjusted for securitizations indicate that
consumer credit growth has continued to decelerate.
Home mortgage
borrowing, however, likely has been buoyed by declining interest rates
and stronger home sales.
Credit supply conditions remain favorable.
Banks still seem to be eager providers of funds to businesses, where
delinquency rates remain low, and spreads of loan rates over market
rates continued to narrow this summer.
In the household sector, how-
ever, some evidence of rising debt service difficulties appears to be
prompting a shift toward a less aggressive stance by banks.
In the
open markets, yield spreads on junk bonds have widened slightly but
remain relatively low, and spreads on higher-rated private paper relative to Treasuries have stayed narrow.
Federal debt has been about
flat over August and September, as the Treasury has financed the
deficit mainly by drawing down its cash balance.
Total domestic
nonfinancial sector debt rose at only a 3-1/4 percent annual rate in
August, bringing growth from the fourth quarter to 5-1/2 percent, near
the middle of its 3-to-7 percent annual range.
(5) The broad monetary aggregates have decelerated somewhat
in September, though their trend growth remains fairly strong.
M2
and M3 are estimated to be expanding this month at rates of 3-3/4 and
4-1/2 percent, respectively, leaving M2 somewhat below and M3 appreciably above the upper ends of their annual ranges.
The velocities of
the broad aggregates appear to have fallen significantly in the
current quarter as they did in the second quarter, marking the first
back-to-back declines in more than four years.
The drop in market
interest rates, and associated declines in the opportunity costs of M2
assets, seems to be the primary factor behind the decline in the
velocity of this aggregate, which is being mirrored in sluggish
demands for some instruments outside of M2.
Net noncompetitive
tenders for Treasury securities, for example, have turned negative
since earlier this year, and flows into bond mutual funds have
remained anemic.
stayed heavy. 2
Purchases of shares in stock funds, however, have
M3 growth has continued to be supported by brisk
issuance of the managed liabilities included in the aggregates as well
as by institution-only money funds.
(6) In contrast to the broader aggregates, M1 growth has been
quite weak in recent months; this aggregate has contracted at a 4-1/2
percent pace in September and has fallen 1 percent at an annual rate
since the fourth quarter of 1994.
M1 has been depressed appreciably
this year by the introduction by additional banks of programs to sweep
NOW account balances into nonreservable MMDAs.
Apart from the effects
of such sweep accounts, M1 has expanded at an estimated 2-1/2 percent
rate in September and at a 1-1/2 percent rate for the year to date.
2. With a strong contribution from capital gains, M2 plus bond and
stock funds is estimated to have expanded at a 12 percent annual rate
in the third quarter, following growth at a rate 9-1/2 percent in the
second quarter.
(A more detailed discussion of OCD sweep arrangements and their effects on the monetary and reserve aggregates appears in an appendix.)
Currency growth has remained moderate in September, perhaps reflecting
a continuation of slower net shipments of U.S. currency abroad.3
3. The monetary base is estimated to have grown at a 1-1/2 percent
rate in September. Adjusted for the effects of OCD sweeps, the base
has risen at a 3-1/4 percent rate this month.
Total reserves have
fallen at a 3-1/2 percent rate, while abstracting from sweeps they
would have risen at an estimated 10 percent rate.
MONEY, CREDIT, AND RESERVE AGGREGATES
(Seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth)
QIV
Jul
Aug.
Sept.
to
Sept.
1.2
1.8
-1.4
3.3
-4.4
2.5
-0.9
1.6
M2
6.0
8.3
3.8
4.6
M3
8.3
8.0
4.4
6.7
Domestic nonfinancial
debt
Federal
Nonfederal
3.0
4.1
2.6
3.3
1.9
3.9
----
5.5
5.1
5.7
Bank credit
3.2
5.3
--
8.8
4.3
-1.1
-3.4
-4.2
Total reserves
Adjusted for OCD sweeps
6.3
7.5
-2.9
6.4
-3.6
10.1
-4.2
0.6
Monetary base
Adjusted for OCD sweeps
-0.4
-0.2
3.3
4.6
1.4
3.2
4.3
5.0
Money and credit aggregates
M1
Adjusted for OCD sweeps
Reserve measures
Nonborrowed reserves
Memo:
2
(Millions of dollars)
Adjustment plus seasonal
borrowing
Excess
1.
2.
reserves
371
282
272
1090
985
935
QIV to August for bank credit and debt aggregates.
Includes "other extended credit" from the Federal Reserve.
NOTE:
Monthly reserve measures, including excess reserves and borrowing, are calculated by prorating averages for two-week reserve
maintenance periods that overlap months.
Reserve figures for
September incorporate assumptions of $1 billion for excess reserves and $275 million for adjustment and seasonal borrowing
in the maintenance periods ending September 27 and October 11.
Reserve data incorporate adjustments for discontinuities
associated with changes in reserve requirements.
Policy Alternatives
(7) The incoming information since the last FOMC meeting has
not altered the general patterns of the staff economic forecast.
staff projection assumes no change in the federal funds
The
rate until
late in 1996, with bond yields foreseen as staying around their recent
lower levels.
Output is still projected to expand at a pace just
below that of its potential through the end of next year, while the
unemployment rate drifts up to 6 percent.
The staff projects infla-
tion in the CPI to come in a little below 3 percent this year and
next; with the level of output slightly below its potential in 1996,
core CPI inflation moderates a little next year.
The staff outlook
for output growth and unemployment is consistent with the central tendencies of the July forecasts of the Governors and Presidents for
these two years.
The outcomes for the total CPI would undershoot the
central tendency for this year but would be well within the central
tendency specified for next year.
In 1997, the staff's forecast of
economic growth in the 2 percent area and CPI inflation around this
year's pace is accompanied by a slight easing in the nominal funds
rate at the end of 1996.
(8) The staff forecast assumes that aggregate spending is not
significantly disrupted in the process of determining the new federal
budget.
The first potential difficulty occurs over the intermeeting
period when budget authority for annual appropriations expires on
October 1.
However, Congress and the Administration are discussing
continuing resolutions that would permit spending while negotiations
are ongoing.
In any case, a lapse in appropriations, even if it were
to persist for several weeks, would not have much direct effect on
GDP. in part because a considerable volume of government spending
would persist.
Moreover, multiplier effects are likely to be minimal
as government employees draw on savings to maintain consumption
levels in the face of a temporary income loss.
With normal government
spending and revenue patterns disrupted, however, projections of the
Treasury balance, and hence reserve supply, would be more uncertain.
(9) The staff currently estimates that a cash constraint
owing to the debt ceiling will become binding on November 15--the date
of the next scheduled FOMC meeting--assuming no unprecedented steps by
the Treasury to avoid default.
A default on federal debt, even if
interest on accrued obligations were paid belatedly, would add a risk
premium to interest rates on Treasury debt.
The impact on private
securities markets is difficult to predict.
On the one hand, default
risk on private issues would not necessarily increase, and indeed,
demands for these securities may benefit as substitutions for Treasuries.
On the other hand, market psychology could deteriorate, with
some possibility of a more generalized flight from dollar assets.
In
addition, in the event of default, innumerable problems of clearing
and settlement could arise and the liquidity position of individual
transactors counting on timely Treasury payments could be impaired.
Either a shutdown or a default would necessitate a more flexible provision of liquidity by the Federal Reserve--both through open market
operations and the discount window.
Whether an adjustment to the
stance of policy itself might be warranted by such developments might
be seen as best determined on the basis of information available at
the time.
(10) The case for keeping the funds rate at 5-3/4 percent as
under alternative B could rest on an assessment that the current funds
rate may well provide the
appropriate monetary impulse, at
least for
the time being.
The staff forecast could be viewed as representing
both a likely occurrence under a stable funds rate, even with the
substantial fiscal restraint assumed, and a satisfactory balance between the Committee's inflation and employment objectives.
Moreover,
with the dollar recently under downward pressures, and financial markets looking for clues as to how the Federal Reserve evaluates and
will respond to the evolving fiscal situation, any change in the
stance of policy could risk market overreaction and misinterpretation.
Under these conditions, even if the Committee saw some odds that the
economy or inflation would come in below the staff forecast, it might
choose to stand pat until easing was more clearly called for by incoming economic data.
(11) Although the data received over the intermeeting period
have strengthened market participants' conviction that Federal Reserve
easing has become more likely by year-end, only a small probability of
a move at the September meeting is seen.
Thus, choice by the Commit-
tee of alternative B's unchanged funds rate likely would engender just
a minor increase of short-term rates.
Any immediate reaction in bond
or foreign exchange markets should be muted.
Over the upcoming inter-
meeting period, economic reports consistent with the subdued growth in
the staff forecast could keep alive expectations of subsequent monetary easing, allowing intermediate- and long-term interest rates to
remain near current trading ranges.
would be little changed.
The exchange value of the dollar
Of course, markets may be buffeted by
developments in the legislative process suggesting shifting odds on
the extent of deficit reduction.
(12) If the Committee saw reasonably high odds of more
restrictive effects on the economy than the staff forecast, it might
-10-
favor an easing of the funds rate, as under alternative A.
Such
effects would come at a time when the economy already is expected to
be expanding at a rate less than the growth rate of its potential and
with monetary policy possibly seen as also on the restrictive side.
In July, the Committee reversed only a portion of the move toward
policy restraint it made last winter when the risks to the economy of
rising inflation were much larger.
Real rates across the maturity
spectrum remain elevated by historical standards, though, to be sure,
the level of equilibrium real rates is uncertain.
Moreover, real
rates could move up a little further over time with an unchanged funds
rate, as current expectations of a policy ease were frustrated.
(13)
The downward adjustment of short-term market interest
rates that would accompany the unanticipated implementation of alternative A would be a little smaller than the 1/2 percentage point cut
in the funds rate operating target.
Market participants may well
interpret the action as responding to prospective fiscal restraint or
to receding inflation pressures, so inflation expectations might not
react adversely.
On the other hand, they are not likely to project
significant further rate cuts pending new information on these factors, limiting rate decreases.
On balance, the associated declines in
intermediate- and longer-term interest rates probably would be smaller
than the fall in short-term rates, which is the historically typical
market reaction.
The dollar's exchange value could be expected to
extend its most recent decline.
(14) The 1/2 percentage point policy tightening of alternative C could be favored if the inflation performance projected by the
staff to accompany an unchanged federal funds rate were seen as representing an insufficiently rapid approach to the Committee's ultimate
-11-
objective of price stability.
Indeed, the staff forecast shows very
little downward tilt to inflation rates.
Moreover, the current un-
employment rate is a little below the staff's estimate of the NAIRU,
and economic growth going forward at a pace below potential is by no
means assured--especially in light of current bond rates and stock
prices.
On the basis of relationships embodied in the Greenbook
alternative simulation, a policy tightening of the dimensions of
alternative C would nudge economic growth to below 2 percent over the
next two years, opening up enough slack in labor and product markets
to make more noticeable progress toward price stability in 1997 and
beyond.
(15) The 1/2 percentage point hike in the funds rate of
alternative C would catch market participants off guard.
Their inter-
pretation of the action, of course, would be conditioned by the wording of the accompanying announcement, which presumably would emphasize
more aggressive pursuit of the Committee's longer-run price stability
objective.
In that context, the sharp jump in money market interest
rates may be accompanied by a much more muted increase in bond yields,
if longer-term inflation expectations were favorably affected.
If the
impact on inflation expectations were negligible, though, an appreciable selloff in the bond market could result.
In any event, some
intermediate-term rates--real and nominal--would rise significantly as
market participants revised up their expected path for short-term
rates for some time into the future.
The exchange value of the dollar
likely would strengthen.
(16) Without serious disruptions to governmental operations,
federal debt growth should slow from its pace earlier in the year to a
-12-
3-1/4 percent annual rate over the last four months of the year.
Non-
federal debt growth would continue at a 4-1/4 percent pace over the
same interval.
For businesses, borrowing will remain below the first
half of the year, held down by lower inventory investment and slower
growth in capital spending; the composition of borrowing, however,
should tilt back toward the bond market.
For households, some pickup
in mortgage borrowing should counter a further moderation in consumer
credit.
Concerning credit supply conditions, banks remain comfortably
positioned to lend, although the growing strains on households may
lead to a little more caution in this area.
As shown in the table be-
low, total debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors is projected to expand at a 4 percent rate over the final four months of this year,
placing this aggregate in the fourth quarter a little more than 5 percent above its year-earlier level.
Sept. to1
December
Implied
1994-Q4
to 1995-Q4
M2
5.7
4.9
M3
M1
6.0
-1.6
6.7
-1.0
2 -
6
4.0
4.3
5.2
5.4
3 -
7
Total debt
Nonfederal
1995
Ranges
1 - 5
Note:
Growth rates based on alternative B.
1. August to December for debt measures.
(17)
The broad monetary aggregates are expected to grow over
the remainder of this year somewhat more rapidly than forecasted in
the last bluebook.
The additional projected strength primarily owes
to the recent decline in market interest rates, both short-
and long-
term, which has further narrowed the opportunity costs of holding
-13-
retail money balances.4
Under alternative B, M2 is projected to
grow at a 5-3/4 percent rate over the final three months of the year.
M3 is foreseen as expanding at a 6 percent rate, somewhat faster than
the staff's projection of bank credit expansion, reflecting the anticipated ongoing shift from nondeposit to deposit sources of funding.
In the fourth quarter, the velocities of both monetary aggregates
would continue to decline, albeit at a reduced pace.
M2 in the fourth
quarter would be quite near the top of its 1 to 5 percent annual
growth cone, while M3 would be well above its 2 to 6 percent annual
growth range.
(A table showing the growth rates of the monetary
aggregates over the balance of the year under each of the alternatives
is attached.)
4. M1 is expected to continue to decline over the remainder of the
year, at about a 1-1/2 percent rate under alternative B, as still more
banks introduce sweep accounts that transfer funds automatically from
NOW accounts to MMDAs to reduce reserve requirements.
Assuming about
$10 billion of additional sweeps over the last three months of the
year, revised up from $3 billion in the last bluebook, this effect
will reduce the M1 growth rate over the last three months of the year
by 3-1/2 percentage points and over the four quarters of 1995 by 2-3/4
percentage points. Actual M1 over the four quarters of this year is
now projected to edge down by 1 percent under alternative B.
Alternative Levels and Growth Rates for Key Monetary Aggregates
M1
M2
Alt. A
Levels in Billions
Jul-95
Aug-95
Sep-95
Oct-95
Nov-95
Dec-95
Alt. B
Alt. B
Alt. C
Alt. A
Alt. B
Alt. C
4487.4
4517.5
4534.2
4556.1
4577.4
4598.4
1144.9
1143.6
1139.4
1137.7
1137.5
1137.5
1144.9
1143.6
1139.4
1137.2
1136.0
1134.8
1144.9
1143.6
1139.4
1136.7
1134.5
1132.2
6.0
8.3
3.8
5.8
5.8
5.5
8.3
8.0
4.4
6.0
6.0
5.9
8.3
8.0
4.4
5.8
5.6
5.5
1.2
-1.4
-4.4
-1.8
-0.2
-0.1
1.2
-1.4
-4.4
-2.3
-1.3
-1.3
1.2
-1.4
-4.4
-2.8
-2.4
-2.5
1.7
4.3
7.5
6.0
1.7
4.3
7.5
5.6
4.3
7.0
8.8
5.9
4.3
7.0
8.8
5.7
0.0
-0.9
-1.0
-1.8
0.0
-0.9
-1.0
-2.3
0.0
-0.9
-1.0
-2.8
To
Sep-95
Sep-95
Dec-95
5.0
6.1
6.4
5.0
6.1
5.7
7.2
7.0
6.0
7.2
7.0
5.7
-1.0
-1.5
-0.7
-1.0
-1.5
-1.6
-1.0
-1.5
-2.5
Sep-95
Dec-95
4.6
5.1
4.6
4.9
6.7
6.6
6.7
6.6
-0.9
-0.8
-0.9
-1.1
-0.9
-1.3
1.1
4.5
5.0
1.1
4.5
4.9
1.4
6.8
6.7
1.4
6.8
6.6
2.4
-0.6
-0.9
2.4
-0.6
-1.0
2.4
-0.6
-1.2
3714.3
3740.0
3751.8
3769.9
3788.1
3805.5
Monthly Growth Rates
Jul-95
Aug-95
Sep-95
Oct-95
Nov-95
Dec-95
6.0
8.3
3.8
6.2
6.6
6.3
Quarterly Averages
95 Ql
95 Q2
95 Q3
95 Q4
Growth Rate
From
Dec-94
Jun-95
Sep-95
93 Q4
94 Q4
94 Q4
Alt. A
4487.4
4517.5
4534.2
4556.9
4579.7
4602.2
3714.3
3740.0
3751.8
3771.2
3791.9
3811.8
94 Q4
94 Q 4
Alt. C
94 Q4
95 Q3
95 Q4
1995 Target Ranges:
1
to
3714.3
3740.0
3751.8
3768.7
3784.4
3799.2
5
4487.4
4517.5
4534.2
4557.6
4581.9
4606.0
2
to
6
-15-
Directive Language
(18) Presented below is draft wording for the operational
paragraph that includes the usual
options for Committee consideration.
OPERATIONAL PARAGRAPH
In the implementation of policy for the immediate
future, the
Committee seeks to DECREASE
SLIGHTLY)/maintain/INCREASE
(SOMEWHAT/SLIGHTLY) the
existing degree of pressure on reserve
positions.
the context of the Committee's long-run
price stability and sustainable economic
giving
careful consideration to
lesser
In
objectives for
growth, and
economic, financial,
and monetary developments, slightly
reserve restraint
(SOMEWHAT/
(SOMEWHAT) greater
(WOULD/MIGHT) or slightly
(SOMEWHAT)
reserve restraint would (MIGHT) be acceptable in
the intermeeting period.
ditions are expected to be
The contemplated reserve conconsistent withmoderate]
[DEL:
more
growth in M2 and M3 over [DEL:
months]
coming
THE YEAR NEAR THE PACE OF RECENT MONTHS.
THE BALANCE OF
Appendix:
Sweeps of Transaction Deposits into MMDAs
In January 1994, commercial banks began instituting sweep
programs for retail customers.
In such programs, household NOW
account balances
(included in the "other checkable deposits"
component of M1)
are swept into money market deposit accounts
(OCD)
(MMDAs).
Retail sweeps of this nature legally reduce a bank's required reserves.
Assuming a 10 percent marginal reserve requirement and in-
vestment of the reserve balances freed by the sweep at a 5-3/4 percent
federal funds rate, a bank earns 58 basis points of interest per dollar swept.
Improvements in automation over the years have reduced the
cost of installing and operating the software required for such a
system, making this financial innovation advantageous for many institutions.
While information about the detailed features of retail sweep
programs is not available from many of the banks that have implemented
them, the typical program appears to be structured as follows.
The
bank sets up two separate subaccounts for each depositor, a NOW
account and a special-purpose MMDA.
Each night, any funds in the NOW
account in excess of some upper limit, say $1,000, are transferred to
the MMDA.
If debits to the NOW account threaten to reduce its balance
below zero, enough funds are transferred back from the MMDA to replenish the NOW account to a $1,000 balance.
While there are no
limits on transfers out of NOW accounts, only six transfers per month
out of MMDAs are permitted under Regulation D.
Because of that limit,
1. Sweep accounts for business customers of banks became widespread
in the mid-1970s.
They involve sweeps of demand deposits into RPs or
other money market instruments whose minimum sizes are too large to
accommodate households.
if a sixth transfer is made from the MMDA to the NOW account within
the same statement month, then the entire remaining balance is
transferred and no further sweeps from the NOW account to the MMDA
occur until the following month.
Recently, two banks reported an alternative type of program
in which all balances in NOW accounts
are swept into MMDAs each Friday
night, and returned to the NOW accounts on Monday.
With a maximum of
five Mondays per month, there is no risk of triggering a sixth transfer.
This "weekend-sweep" reduces OCD balances to zero for three-
sevenths of each week--implying a smaller reduction in OCDs than the
80 percent typically achieved under the aforementioned schemes, but it
is very simple to implement.
Through edit checks and other reports from Reserve Banks,
Board staff have learned of the existence of retail sweep programs at
11 banking organizations;
each program typically includes several
banks within a holding company.2
No data are available on the
ongoing amount of funds that reside in MMDA accounts as a result of
sweep activity.
However, Board staff have tallied estimates of the
total volume of balances swept out of OCD accounts on the day each
program was implemented.
The cumulative estimated impact effects
through September 1995 are $34 billion. 3
The creation of retail sweep programs has no effect on M2,
since OCD balances are being swept into MMDAs, which are themselves a
component of M2.
However, adjustments need to be made to narrow
2. To date, 28 separately-chartered large banks and 69 small banks
have instituted sweeps. Large banks account for 85 percent of the
amounts swept.
3.
This estimate is likely to be close to the total dollar volume
of sweep activity, as it is based on edit checks of daily data supplied weekly to Federal Reserve Banks by all commercial banks having
total deposits above $55 million, which includes all banks with marginal reserve requirements of 10 percent.
-A3-
measures of money and to reserves to avoid misinterpretations arising
Such adjustments are reported below, based
from new sweep programs.
on cumulative impact effects.
Total
Monetary
Base
Reserves
OCD
M1
(percentage annual rates of growth)
-------- (1993:Q4 to 1994:Q4)--------Before Adjustment
2.4
After Adjustment
3.3
.3
.9
-2.4
-
Net Sweep Effect
-2.1
-
8.4
-1.3
8.7
.3
.3
-1.6
----- (1994:Q4 to September 1995)-----0.9
-9.4
4.3
-4.2
After Adjustment
1.6
-2.3
5.0
0.6
Net Sweep Effect
-2.5
-7.1
.7
Before Adjustment
-4.8
As shown, the establishment of sweep programs reduced the
growth rate of M1 by about a percentage point in 1994, and by about
2-1/2 percentage points from the fourth quarter of 1994 through
September of 1995.
The growth rate of total reserves was lowered by
an estimated 1-1/2 percentage points in 1994 and 4-3/4 percentage
points so far this year.
Because currency represents a large share of
the monetary base, OCD sweeps have had considerably less effect on
growth of the base--only 1/4 percentage point in 1994 and 3/4 percentage point so far in 1995.
While Board staff are aware of several other banking organizations that are considering the implementation of retail sweep pro-
grams, it is unclear how far this innovation will spread.
Small banks
who can meet reserve requirements entirely with vault cash would gain
nothing from it, and banks with a 3 percent marginal reserve require-
ment might not find it cost effective.4
If sweeps were implemented
only by banks that had ex ante a 10 percent marginal reserve require-
ment and were required to hold balances at the Federal Reserve, then
OCD would be reduced by perhaps another $160 billion, assuming that
about three-quarters of such balances are swept on average.
Required
reserve balances held at the Federal Reserve would be reduced from the
current level of about $20 billion to $7 billion in consequence.
This may be a high estimate of OCD sweep effects, as it includes some
large banks having no interest in reducing required reserves, since
they hold Federal Reserve balances on the margin for clearing purposes.
However, the new sweeping techniques may not be applied only
to NOW accounts.
One institution recently began sweeping a small
amount of personal demand deposits into MMDAs, and there is no real
impediment to the spread of this innovation to corporate demand
deposits as well.
(Given the uncertainty of corporate payment flows,
weekend sweeps may be the technique banks come to use to avoid the
reserve requirement tax on demand deposits.)
If sweeps of both OCD
and demand deposits become widespread, required reserve balances held
at Federal Reserve Banks could fall to a very low level.
Major declines in required reserve balances and associated
structural changes in reserve demand would have important effects on
4.
If, for each dollar swept, only 3 cents of reserve balances
were freed, the return per dollar swept would amount to 17-1/4 basis
points
with a
5-3/4
percent
funds
the maximum volume of deposits
rate.
In the
extreme,
if
a
bank had
($50 million) subject to the 3 percent
reserve requirement, they were all OCD, and 80 percent were swept, the
maximum potential earning would amount to $70,000 annually.
5. The reduction in required reserve balances is smaller than 10
percent of the reduction in OCD because some of the original reserve
requirements were met with vault cash rather than with Federal Reserve
balances.
-A5-
the implementation of monetary policy, and could potentially increase
substantially the volatility of the federal funds rate.
Depositories hold balances at the Federal Reserve to meet
reserve requirements, to make payments, and to access Federal Reserve
Overdrafts can occur because of large unpredictable trans-
services.
actions between a bank's customers and the customers of other banks.
Required reserve balances provide some cushion against the risk of
overdrafts.
If such balances fall persistently below the levels
needed for clearing purposes, a bank may choose to establish a required clearing balance, which earns credits against priced Federal
Reserve services.
When the marginal dollars in reserve accounts are
being held to meet required reserves or required clearing balances,
banks have considerable flexibility in managing balances at the
Federal Reserve from a day to day.
Because such requirements are met
on a two-week average basis, banks can arbitrage the federal funds
rate within days and across days, and, given carryover, across
maintenance periods to a limited extent.
This flexibility is an
important reason why the funds rate remains close to the FOMC's
desired levels.
However, a bank can benefit from required clearing balances
only to the extent that it uses Federal Reserve services. 6
If
required balances in total are low, a bank's reserve management will
be dominated by the daily risk of overdrafts, rather than by the need
to meet two-week average requirements.
It may, for example, seek
excess reserves in the form of precautionary balances early in the day
and late-day balances to cover unexpected payments.
Depending on the
6. Through August 1995, banks implementing retail sweeps have
established required clearing balances amounting to 18 percent on
average of the estimated reductions in required reserve balances
associated with the sweeps.
-A6-
distribution of reserves
lines
in the
among banks
and the degree to which credit
federal funds market have already been filled, the funds
rate could become quite volatile late
each business
day,
as some banks
try to work down unneeded precautionary balances while others scramble
to line up funding for clearing needs.
aggregate reserves
Furthermore, predicting the
needed on a daily basis at the time of the Desk's
11:30 A.M. open market operation becomes much more difficult when
reserve demands are based on daily, and even intraday, needs rather
than the more smoothly-evolving estimates
of maintenance-period
average demands for required balances.
Heightened volatility in the
in early
1991,
federal funds
rate was evident
after the Federal Reserve reduced to
zero the reserve
requirements on nontransaction deposits.
The
upper panel of chart A-1
shows the sharp increases in the intraday trading ranges of the
federal funds rate at that time.7
However, funds rate volatility
declined rather quickly as banks adjusted to the lower level of required reserves
(in part by establishing required clearing balances),
and as required reserves themselves grew rapidly along with M1
deposits in the declining interest rate environment.
As shown in the lower panel, the extreme volatility of the
funds rate in early 1991 was associated with an unusually low level of
required operating balances, the sum of required reserve and required
clearing balances.
While such balances are currently several billion
dollars above the lows reached in 1991, they could drop well below
such levels by the time the new sweep programs have become fully
implemented.
7. Reluctance to use the safety value of the discount window owing
to fears of adverse reputation effects in the market contributed to
the funds rate volatility.
Chart A-1
Intraday Federal Funds Rate Trading Range
(Maintenance Period Averages)
Percentage Points
1990
1991
1994
1992
1995
Required Operating Balances
(Maintenance Period Averages)
Billions of Dollars
-135
-130
1990
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1994
1994
1995
1995
-
25
-
20
-A7-
However, the current wave of transaction account sweeps is
unlike the experience of early 1991 in several respects.
The 1991
reserve requirement cut was an industry-wide change implemented by the
Federal Reserve without a long lead-time, while in contrast sweep
programs are being established voluntarily by commercial banks selfselected for an interest in reserve management on schedules they themselves choose.
Moreover, improvements in reserve management since
early 1991, including greater awareness of the advantages of establishing required clearing balances, may mitigate the impact of the new
sweeps on federal funds rate volatility.
Nevertheless, the uncertainties are considerable.
Staff at
the Board and the Desk are closely monitoring the diffusion of this
financial innovation for signs of potential adverse effects on the
implementation of monetary policy, and have begun studying possible
modifications to regulations and operating procedures that could
mitigate any such effects.
September 25, 1995
SELECTED INTEREST RATES
(percent)
Short-Term
federal
funds
1 _
Treasury bills
secondary market
3-month I6-month
1-year
2
3
4
CDs
secondary comm.
market
paper
3-month 1-month
5
6
money
market
mutual
fund
7
bank
prime
loan
8
U.S. government constant
maturity yields
3-year I10-year I30-year
9
10
11
Long-Term
corporate
conventional home mortgages
A-utility municipal secondary
primary
recently
Bond
market I
market
offered
Buyer
fixed-rate fixed-rate
ARM
12
13
14
15
16
94
-- High
-- Low
5.85
2.97
5.70
2.94
6.26
3.12
6.73
3.35
6.31
3.11
6.11
3.11
5.12
2.68
8.50
6.00
7.79
4.44
8.00
5.70
8.13
6.25
9.05
7.16
7.37
5.49
9.57
7.02
9.25
6.97
6.79
4.12
95
-- High
-- Low
6.21
5.40
5.81
5.25
6.31
5.25
6.75
5.15
6.39
5.69
6.10
5.73
5.61
5.16
9.00
8.50
7.80
5.65
7.85
6.06
7.89
6.48
8.81
7.48
6.94
5.94
9.57
7.74
9.22
7.41
6.87
5.77
94
94
94
94
4.73
4.76
5.29
5.45
4.62
4.95
5.29
5.60
5.04
5.39
5.72
6.21
5.43
5.75
6.13
6.67
5.03
5.51
5.79
6.29
4.90
5.02
5.40
6.08
4.15
4.30
4.62
5.00
7.75
7.75
8.15
8.50
6.69
7.04
7.44
7.71
7.46
7.74
7.96
7.81
7.71
7.94
8.08
7.87
8.62
8.80
8.95
8.78
6.55
6.83
7.27
7.07
8.93
9.25
9.43
9.51
8.64
8.93
9.17
9.20
5.54
5.79
6.10
6.66
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
5.53
5.92
5.98
6.05
6.01
6.00
5.85
5.74
5.71
5.77
5.73
5.65
5.67
5.47
5.42
5.40
6.21
6.03
5.89
5.77
5.67
5.42
5.37
5.41
6.59
6.28
6.03
5.88
5.65
5.33
5.28
5.43
6.24
6.16
6.15
6.11
6.02
5.90
5.77
5.77
5.86
6.05
6.07
6.06
6.05
6.05
5.87
5.85
5.17
5.36
5.51
5.54
5.51
5.46
5.39
5.27
8.50
9.00
9.00
9.00
9.00
9.00
8.80
8.75
7.66
7.25
6.89
6.68
6.27
5.80
5.89
6.10
7.78
7.47
7.20
7.06
6.63
6.17
6.28
6.49
7.85
7.61
7.45
7.36
6.95
6.57
6.72
6.86
8.75
8.55
8.40
8.31
7.89
7.60
7.72
7.84
6.84
6.45
6.32
6.22
6.16
6.07
6.21
6.37
9.41
9.13
8.90
8.71
8.32
7.96
8.03
8.24
9.15
8.83
8.46
8.32
7.96
7.57
7.61
7.86
6.82
6.68
6.45
6.35
6.14
5.87
5.83
5.93
Monthly
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Weekly
Jun
Jun
Jun
Jun
7
14
21
28
95
95
95
95
6.03
6.02
6.00
5.95
5.50
5.53
5.47
5.39
5.41
5.50
5.44
5.37
5.29
5.41
5.32
5.28
5.84
5.95
5.93
5.89
5.99
6.04
6.07
6.07
5.50
5.49
5.49
5.46
9.00
9.00
9.00
9.00
5.71
5.90
5.79
5.74
6.13
6.26
6.16
6.09
6.54
6.63
6.58
6.52
7.71
7.62
7.52
7.64
5.94
6.10
6.05
6.28
8.10
8.03
7.85
8.09
7.51
7.55
7.53
7.53
5.86
5.88
5.84
5.84
Jul
Jul
Jul
Jul
5
12
19
26
95
95
95
95
6.21
5.81
5.72
5.75
5.48
5.38
5.42
5.44
5.39
5.29
5.38
5.43
5.35
5.15
5.24
5.40
5.92
5.76
5.73
5.77
6.10
5.87
5.82
5.83
5.47
5.42
5.34
5.32
9.00
8.79
8.75
8.75
5.89
5.65
5.84
6.08
6.22
6.06
6.23
6.47
6.63
6.53
6.69
6.89
7.53
7.60
7.94
7.88
6.21
6.05
6.30
6.27
7.85
7.96
8.14
8.16
7.63
7.41
7.60
7.79
5.86
5.80
5.81
5.86
Aug
Aug
Aug
Aug
Aug
2
9
16
23
30
95
95
95
95
95
5.83
5.73
5.74
5.70
5.71
5.42
5.40
5.43
5.44
5.33
5.38
5.40
5.45
5.46
5.35
5.36
5.36
5.47
5.53
5.38
5.75
5.75
5.78
5.78
5.76
5.85
5.85
5.86
5.85
5.84
5.31
5.29
5.27
5.27
5.25
8.75
8.75
8.75
8.75
8.75
6.05
6.05
6.17
6.22
6.02
6.46
6.49
6.56
6.57
6.38
6.88
6.91
6.93
6.90
6.74
7.88
7.96
7.89
7.70
7.60
6.35
6.40
6.44
6.40
6.26
8.24
8.25
8.29
8.17
8.09
7.82
7.80
7.94
7.88
7.76
5.89
5.91
5.95
5.96
5.86
Sep
Sep
Sep
6 95
13 95
20 95
5.77
5.73
5.78
5.30
5.33
5.25
5.30
5.32
5.25
5.30
5.33
5.24
5.76
5.73
5.69
5.83
5.82
5.81
5.25
5.24
5.25
8.75
8.75
8.75
5.88
5.90
5.81
6.21
6.21
6.12
6.60
6.57
6.48
7.58
7.48
7.58
6.16
6.09
6.18
7.92
7.90
8.10
7.63
7.60
7.57
5.86
5.80
5.77
Daily
Sep
Sep
Sep
15 95
21 95
22 95
5.80
5.71
5.69p
5.30
5.24
5.19
5.28
5.29
5.29
5.24
5.30
5.31
5.69
5.68
5.73
8.75
8.75
8.75
5.80
5.91
5.93
6.11
6.21
6.25
6.47
6.56
6.59
NOTE: Weekly data for columns 1 through 11 are statement week averages. Data in column 7 are taken from Donoghue's Money Fund Report. Columns 12,13 and 14 are 1-day quotes for Friday, Thursday or Friday, respectively,
following the end of the statement week. Column 13 is the Bond Buyer revenue index. Column 14 is the FNMA purchase yield, plus loan servicing fee, on 30-day mandatory delivery commitments. Column 15 is the average
contract rate on new commitments for fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) with 80 percent loan-to-value ratios at major institutional lenders. Column 16 is the average initial contract rate on new commitments for 1-year, adjustablerate mortgages (ARMs) at major institutional lenders offering both FRMs and ARMs with the same number of discount points.
p - preliminary data
Strictly Confidential (FR)Class II FOMC
Money and Credit Aggregate Measures
Seasonallyadjusted
Period
Annual arowth rates(%):
Annually (Q4 to Q4)
1992
1993
1994
Quarterly(average)
1994-03
1994-04
M1
M2
1
2
Seasonlyaduted
SEPTEtMER25,1995
Money stock measures and liquid as: ets
Bank credit
nontransactions components
toal loans
In M2
In M3 only
3
4
Domestic nonfinancial debt'
M3
L
total loans
and
investments'
government 2
U. S.
other
total'
5
6
7
8
9
10
2
14.3
10.5
2.4
2.0
1.7
1.1
-2.3
-1.9
0.5
-6.3
-2.5
3.5
0.5
1.0
1.4
1.5
1.4
2.4
3.7
5.0
6.8
10.7
8.4
5.7
2.8
4.0
4.9
4.8
5.2
5.1
2.4
-1.2
1.0
-0.3
0.3
0.1
9.0
12.3
2.2
1.7
2,6
2.2
7.2
4.1
3.9
5.9
4.4
5.0
4.3
5.2
1995-Q1
0.1
1.7
2.4
18.5
4.3
1995-02
6.5
7.8
5.3
5.7
-0.9
4.3
5.5
6.7
20.7
7.0
8.3
13.1
5.3
7.2
6.7
-1.5
0.2
-0.6
-0.3
-0.2
-0.5
2.6
12.7
-0.1
1.7
2.2
-0.4
4.7
4.8
6.1
6.0
6.2
5.6
-2.9
-0.6
0.4
-1.4
0.5
1.6
-0.6
1.0
2.2
6.2
5.4
18.7
6.7
12.5
1.8
1.5
3.3
2.9
2.5
4.8
3.8
2.0
6.7
5.4
8.5
1.2
4.0
5.4
4.9
4.4
6.3
3.9
1.0
-1.8
0.6
1.9
-7.1
0.9
1.2
-1.4
3.9
-1.5
2.5
4.2
5.3
11.7
6.0
8.3
5.2
-1.3
3.3
5.4
11.0
16.6
8.2
12.6
19.2
24.1
26.1
15.8
21.2
17.1
18.9
7.0
6.3
2.7
6.4
6.2
8.0
12.7
8.3
8.0
5.9
9.3
9.9
6.8
7.6
9.5
12.1
11.9
4.9
9.0
23.6
9.0
4.8
3.2
5.3
2.5
10.6
7.4
0.7
5.9
8.4
4.1
6.1
6.2
5.0
8.8
9.1
3.8
2.6
5.1
7.4
5.6
6.6
8.3
5.0
3.0
1149.7
1142.9
1143.8
1144.9
1143.6
3643.7
3659.9
3695.7
3714.3
3740.0
2494.1
2517.0
2551.9
2569.4
2596.4
737.3
750.3
761.0
773.0
777.5
4381.1
4410.2
4456.7
4487.4
4517.5
5410.9
5445.3
5488.6
5544.0
3455.0
3480.9
3494.9
3504.2
3519.6
3559.5
3577.0
3602.0
3614.4
9668.6
9742.2
9772.9
9794.2
Monthly
1994-AUG.
SEP.
OCT.
NOV.
DEC.
1995-JAN.
FEB.
MAR.
APR.
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUG. p
Levels ($billions)
Monthly
1995-APR.
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUG. p
Weekly
1995-AUG.
SEP.
7
1144.6
3732.2
2587.6
782.2
4514.3
14
1143.0
3734.6
2591.6
774.6
4509.2
21
28
1145.3
1143.7
3744.7
3745.9
2599.4
2602.2
772.5
779.5
4517.2
4525.4
4 p
11 p
1142.2
1142.1
3749.6
3748.8
2607.4
2606.7
780.2
779.4
4529.8
4528.2
1.
2.
Adjusted for breaks caused by reclassifications.
Debt data are on a monthly average basis, derived by averaging end-of-month levels of adjacent months, and have been adjusted to remove discontinuities.
p
pe
preliminary
preliminary estimate
13228.1
13319.2
13374.8
13408.5
Strictly Confidential (FR)
Class II FOMC
Components of Money Stock and Related Measures
SEPTEMBER 25, 1995
Seasonally adjusted unless otherwise noted
Period
ur r
ency
S1
uevej8a
ao
b
Annual (04)
Demand
deposits
2
Other
checkable
deposits
3
Overnight
RPs and
Eurodollars
NSA'
4
avings
deposits
Small
denomination
time
deposits
-
6
Money market
mutual funds
general
e
Insttutons
and
only
brokert
dealer'
7
Large
denominaton
time
deposits
Term
Rs
NSA
-
l-r
Term
Euro-
Savings
NSA'
11
Short-term
rer
Commerci
seurities
13.
14
Bankers
an
acceptan-
i
ions)
1992
1993
1994
359.2
357.8
383.9
205.8
196.9
180.7
358.4
334.2
357.5
81.8
96.7
103.5
46.7
53.2
154.5
170.8
179.9
329.2
328.9
363.6
365.5
381.8
400.9
20.6
15.5
13.5
782.8
789.6
377.0
177.4
51.2
52.1
178.5
179.1
365.0
176.3
342.0
348.2
101.0
377.4
360.6
395.4
390.2
13.8
14.8
799.6
810.4
820.3
379.5
353.6
357.4
361.4
101.9
103.1
105.6
52.7
179.5
179.9
180.3
358.6
361.9
370.3
399.9
401.4
401.3
13.1
389.0
180.8
180.5
180.8
1129.8
1111.9
1094.9
835.7
392.1
391.5
390.9
186.3
180.4
189.0
361.9
371.2
378.6
109.4
113.4
113.4
53.1
56.3
180.5
180.4
180.5
372.3
392.0
405.3
402.8
414.7
421.7
13.4
13.3
14.0
1082.4
1081.4
1091.1
896.8
910.7
917.5
396.0
192.9
194.8
205.6
380.3
386.0
389.9
116.5
121.7
119.8
59.8
60.7
61.7
180.9
181.6
182.3
404.2
397,5
410.8
430.8
443.8
427.5
13.9
12.3
380.6
115.7
116.5
117.3
379.4
376.4
114.3
118.4
1091.5
1098.7
921.7
441.5
396.8
400.0
115.2
117.5
183.0
433.7
428.0
11.8
455.1
212.4
210.8
63.0
924.0
290.1
319.8
352.5
336.5
381.2
383.1
380.0
412.6
404.0
83.0
95.1
114.8
1177.5
1211.7
1157.7
882.2
345.1
347.2
386.6
386.5
410.8
408.9
111.0
112.0
1192.6
1183.7
350.0
353.0
354.5
384.5
382.5
382.2
405.4
403.8
114.0
113.4
117.1
1171.0
402.9
1144.2
357.7
358.8
383.6
384.1
362.5
383.3
399.3
395.9
393.3
123.9
118.3
118.2
365.7
368.1
367.4
381.2
380.6
386.8
393.6
385.0
367.1
368.3
389.5
390.1
790.4
810.1
46.5
Monthly
1994-AUG.
SEP.
OCT.
NOV.
DEC.
1995-JAN.
FEB.
MAR.
APR.
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUG.
p
1157.8
855.4
878.2
383.3
405.3
425.9
101.7
54.5
52.4
58.3
62.6
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Net of money market mutual fund holdings of these items.
Includes money market deposit accounts.
Includes retail repurchase agreements. All IRA and Keogh accounts at commercial banks and thrift institutions are subtracted from small time deposits.
Excludes IRA and Keogh accounts.
Net of large denomination time deposits held by money market mutual funds, depository institutions, U.S. government, and foreign banks and official institutions.
p
preliminary
13.5
14.0
11.3
September 22,1995
Treasury bills
Period
Net
2
purchases
1992
1993
1994
13,086
17,717
17,484
Redemptions
(-)
Net
t
change
1 year
1,600
11,486
17,717
17,484
.--.
1994 --01
--Q2
--03
--04
2,164
6,639
1,610
7,071
1995 --01
--02
4,470
4,470
1994 September
October
November
December
518
6,109
444
518
6,109
444
1995 January
February
March
April
May
June
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (FR)
CLASS II-FOMC
NET CHANGES IN SYSTEM HOLDINGS OF SECURITES 1
Millions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted
----
Treasurycoupons
Net purchases 3
puRedemptions
1-5
1,096
1,223
1,238
(-)
30,219
35,374
31,975
-13,215
5,974
-7,412
1,413
2,817
2,530
2,408
1,103
1,117
938
660
618
896
840
1,252
2,665
4,754
4,157
3,916
411
307
114
169
4,418
11,086
5,654
10,818
-11,663
4,179
-8,530
8,602
-621
4,156
229
312
-850
8,314
-4,083
10,395
4,459
-529
200
4,245
31
62
70
37
4,428
-72
6,239
4,652
-6,301
819
4,718
3,066
-621
91
55
83
20
30
262
333
122
-712
-55
-83
4,136
-30
4,208
-333
311
-8,171
-686
4,774
-2,758
2,474
10,678
-13,602
-2,984
186
68
4,284
-68
8
-8
15
300
18
-15
-300
-18
35
-35
87
-87
733
200
-77
-5,865
15,133
-12,253
1,281
-3,961
474
-4,659
4,411
-161
1,827
-2,512
1,445
1,556
5,466
2,526
51
50
2,549
2,530
---
200
2,208
2,549
433
433
4,470
4,470
4,156
Memo: LEVEL (bil. $) 6
September 20
---
733
733
---
-..
190.6
219.5
1. Change from end-of-period to end-of-period.
2. Outright transactions in market and with foreign accounts.
3. Outright transactions in market and with foreign accounts, and short-term notes acquired
in exchange for maturing bills. Excludes maturity shifts and rollovers of maturing issues.
5
632
774
1,002
July
August
Weekly
June 7
14
21
28
July 5
12
19
26
August 2
9
16
23
30
September 6
13
20
Net RPs
19,365
18,431
15,493
7,071
4,470
total 4
2,333
3,457
3,606
,639
4,470
Change
2,818
4,168
3,818
2,164
25
Net
over 10
Net change
outright
holdings
13,118
10,350
9,168
1,610
---
5-10
Federal
agencies
redemptions
85.9
30.0
384.1
35.6
-10.2
4, Reflects net change in redemptions (-) of Tre asury and agency securities.
5. Includes change in RPs (+), matched sale-puirchase transactions (-), and matched purchase sale transactions (+).
6. The levels of agency issues were as follows:
within
1 year
September 20
1.4
1-5
1.1
5-10
0.4
over 10
0.0
total
2.9
Cite this document
APA
Federal Reserve (1995, September 25). Bluebook. Bluebooks, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/bluebook_19950926
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_bluebook_19950926,
author = {Federal Reserve},
title = {Bluebook},
year = {1995},
month = {Sep},
howpublished = {Bluebooks, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/bluebook_19950926},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}